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  A B S T R A C T 
 
WHY THE BUSH DOCTRINE FAILED   
And How an Inadequate Understanding of Liberal Democracy and the Islamic Resurgence Continues to 
Cripple U.S. Foreign Policy 
 
Jonathan William Pidluzny 
Dr. Dennis Hale, chair 
 
This dissertation aims to evaluate the utility of democracy promotion in the Middle East 
to U.S. foreign policy; in particular, it asks why the Arab-Islamic world has proven 
uniquely resistant to liberal democracy.   The overall argument is that an inadequate 
theoretical understanding of our own regime and its prerequisites led American policy 
makers simultaneously to expect too much of democratization, and to think too little of 
liberal democracy.  We overestimated its promise, believing transforming key regimes 
could, in a cost effective manner, bring peace and prosperity to the Middle East, and in 
the long term help root out terrorist acts committed in the name of Islam.  One of the 
reasons for this:  policymakers underestimated what liberal democracy requires of its 
citizenry—deeply ingrained beliefs and social practices that are acquired only with 
difficulty.  In Iraq, the Bush administration failed to appreciate that long established 
opinions and mores establish boundaries that constrain political action.  
Part I begins by giving an account of the assumptions and deliberations that led the Bush 
administration to pursue regime change in Iraq.  It goes on to demonstrate by concrete 
examples drawn from the occupation period, the insurgency period, and the period since 
(characterized by utterly dysfunctional and increasingly authoritarian politics), that the 
	  rights and privileges associated with democracy—free and fair elections, new liberties, 
even the constitutional convention itself—are often used in illiberal ways, as weapons to 
serve narrow and self-interested factions, where the citizenry has not internalized a liberal 
political consciousness.  
Part II argues that a rare political personality—largely separable from any particular 
national character—accounts for the confluence of political liberalism and democratic 
institutions in the North Atlantic states.  Our gentle and tolerant politics are the result of a 
series of revolutions in social consciousness that have not occurred in the Islamic world.  
In fact, the Islamic Resurgence of the last century, a revolution as consequential as the 
French of American Revolutions, is the consequence of a conscious project dedicated to 
popularizing guiding opinions that are deliberately inhospitable to political liberalism.  
Analysis of leading Islamist thinkers in the Sunni and Shiite world demonstrates the 
extent to which they have been successful in erecting barriers to modern and moderate 
government in the Middle East, which they reject as unjust and corrupting.  The 
dissertation concludes by arguing that Turkey succeeded at establishing a mixed regime by 
emulating, so far as possible under its own circumstances, the conditions that made the 
emergence of liberal democracy possible in the West. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
 
 
“The Middle East is boiling” in the measured words of Robert H. Pelletreau, a 
former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain, Tunisia, and Egypt.1  Popular unrest first burst to 
the surface in a region with long experience of effectively suppressing dissent some three 
years ago in Iran.  The demonstrations, catalyzed by allegations of a stolen election, led to 
massive demonstrations and a brutal crackdown.  While the unrest captivated Western 
audiences, policymakers offered little better than half-hearted support for the 
revolutionaries marching in the name of democracy, what was at the time portrayed as 
America’s overdue return to foreign policy realism after the disastrous neoconservative 
experiment in democracy promotion.  In 2011, the tune began—haphazardly—to 
change.  Popular unrest unseated long-established rulers in Tunisia and Egypt.  In Egypt, 
the ensuing Constitutional referendum drew 14.1 million Egyptian voters to the polls on 
20 March, 2011, a turnout that “broke all records for recent elections.”2  Subsequent 
elections in both countries yielded their representative governments for the first time.  
American policymakers cheered both developments, if only after the fact.  In Libya, 
America has been more active.  Whatever the ultimate end-game of the intervention, the 
country’s dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, is unlikely to survive a NATO-led, U.N.-
authorized, military intervention sure to demolish his ability to project force in that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Robert Pelletreau, “Transformations in the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs Snapshot. 21 February, 
2011.  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67546/robert-h-pelletreau/transformation-in-the-
middle-east 
2 Neil MacFarquhar, “Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Changes,” New York Times, 20 
March, 2011.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/world/middleeast/21egypt.html?pagewanted=all  
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country.3  The unrest has spilled over into neighboring countries as well.  Large protests 
in Bahrain, Yemen, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Iraq4 have, to this point, been 
met with government action (coercive and conciliatory) successfully calibrated to preempt 
the intensification of domestic calls for regime change in almost every case.5  As of this 
writing, however, a slow-motion military coup continues to unfold in Yemen while the 
demonstrations and the violence continues to escalate in Syria. 
Elsewhere, compromise stalemates have broken down.  In January of 2011, the 
withdrawal of Hezbollah ministers and their allies toppled the national unity government 
in Lebanon; 6 the moment was clearly calculated to send a message, coming as it did at 
the very moment the prime minister was in Washington, D.C. to meet President Obama.  
That message:  ties to American policymakers are a liability.7  In Israel, renewed 
American investment in the peace process—the ostensible centerpiece of the Obama 
administration’s first Mideast foreign policy—came effectively to nothing.  Worse, 
violence between Israelis and Palestinians escalated in the Spring, especially in the South 
along the border with Gaza;8 on 23 March, 2011, a bomb went off at a Jerusalem bus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 At the time of writing, NATO allies could not agree on the endgame in Libya, nor who should 
lead the intervention.     
4 Raad Alkadiri, “Rage Comes to Bagdad,” Foreign Affairs Snapshot, 3 March 2011. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67557/raad-alkadiri/rage-comes-to-baghdad  
5 International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest In North Africa and the Middle East (I):  Egypt 
Victorious?,” 30.  Even in Syria, the government publicly announced that it will study the 
feasibility of lifting the emergency law and take steps to open Syrian politics to free party 
participation.  Al-Jazeera, 24 March, 2011.    
6 Nada Bakri, “Resignations Deepen Crisis for Lebanon,” New York Times, 12 January, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/world/middleeast/13lebanon.html/?pagewanted=all  
7 cf. Barry Rubin, “The Region:  Revolutions, walk-outs and fatwas,” The Jerusalem Post, 16 
January, 2011. 
8 STRATFOR, “Israeli-Palestinian Tensions Escalating:  A Special Report,” 23 March, 2011. 
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station killing one and injuring more than 20, the first major terrorist attack to occur in 
that city in seven years.   It what is likely an attempt to shift attention from domestic 
atrocities, Syria has more than once encouraged protests along its border with Israel.  
While the protests have turned violent, they have not yet provoked a wider confrontation.  
In the midst of the turmoil, America’s Mideast foreign policy has appeared to be 
schizophrenic at best.    
As popular protests intensified in Egypt in early 2011, “U.S. pronouncements appeared 
to zigzag daily.”9  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Vice President Joe Biden 
publicly signaled that America stood with President Mubarak, then pressured the regime 
to undertake state-led democratic reforms; that stance persisted until it became clear 
Mubarak had lost the support of the Egyptian military, at which point the administration 
began to celebrate the revolution.10  In a major defeat for the young political activists who 
led the revolution, however, a package of Constitutional amendments designed to ensure 
a speedy national election—enthusiastically supported by the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the remnants of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party—were ratified by an 
overwhelming majority of Egyptian voters in a referendum that drew record numbers to 
the polls on March 20, 2011.11  Elections will be held in September, a timeline that is 
almost sure to benefit the Muslim Brotherhood; liberal groups need more time to 
organize. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (1):   Egypt 
Victorious?” 26. 
10 International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (1):   Egypt 
Victorious?” 26. 
11 Al-Jazeera, “Egypt approves constitutional changes,” 20 March, 2011. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011320164119973176.html  
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In the wake of the referendum defeat, reformers complained that the administration, 
currently overseen by a military committee, had prevented them from “present[ing] their 
point of view” on “the influential state-run television.”12  It has since come to light that as 
many as 7,000 civilians have been sentenced to prison terms by Egypt’s clandestine 
military courts.13 Coupled with the fact that the amendment committee was “led by an 
intellectual with ties to the [Muslim] Brotherhood,” the regime’s apparent censorship of 
reformist voices lends credence to fears the new regime in Egypt will very much resemble 
the old, only with greater political space afforded the Brotherhood.14  The Herculean 
efforts of Egyptian protestors led, it seems, not so much to revolution as to revolution 
turned military coup.  Military leaders, while making “very polite general sounds” seem 
intent to ensure not all that much changes in Egypt.15  On 23 March, 2011, for instance, 
the military council endorsed a plan to outlaw public demonstrations and sit-ins.16  
Worse, Islamists, including radical Salafi groups in the process of organizing multiple new 
political parties, may well turn out to be the chief beneficiaries of the protests’ successful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Neil MacFarquhar, “Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Changes,” New York Times, 20 
March, 2011. 
13 Mohannad Sabry, “New Egypt?  7000 civilians jailed since Mubarak fell,” McClatchy.  13 June, 
2011. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/13/115722/egypt-military-7000-civilians.html  
14 Nathan J. Brown, “Egypt’s Constitutional Ghosts,” Foreign Affairs Snapshot, 15 February, 2011.  
C.f. International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (1):   Egypt 
Victorious?” 25. 
15 Nathan J. Brown, “Egypt’s Constitutional Ghosts,” Foreign Affairs Snapshot.  15 February, 2011. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67453/nathan-j-brown/egypts-constitutional-ghosts.  As 
George Friedman explains, while Hosni Mubarak is gone, his regime is not.  The regime consists 
of “complex institutions centered on the military but also including the civilian bureaucracy 
controlled by the military.”  It is not inconceivable that new compromises with and increased 
privileges for Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, will allow the regime to persist, albeit 
under new yet-to-be-determined leadership.  George Friedman, “Egypt:  The Distance Between 
Enthusiasm and Reality,” STRATFOR, 13 February, 2011.   




ousting of President Mubarak.17  The Muslim Brotherhood recently held a conference 
with Salafi groups that reportedly drew 50,000 people.18   
As International Crisis Group presciently warned as events were unfolding, 
Some Egyptian observers, anxious about the role the Brotherhood might play in 
the post-Mubarak period, claim to discern an emerging, implicit understanding 
between the military and the Brotherhood pursuant to which the former would 
allow the latter more space in return for it neither challenging the military’s 
privileges nor pushing radically democratic demands.19 
Elijah Zarwan, a senior Crisis Group analyst, later added this observation:  “There is 
evidence the Brotherhood struck some kind of a deal with the military early on.”20  The 
hope drawn from the reluctance of the Brotherhood to participate in large numbers while 
Egyptians took to the streets now appears to been the product of a strategic deal:  the 
Brotherhood declined to support the revolution; and in exchange, they gain increased 
influence in the military-dominated order that subsequently emerges.  A part of that deal 
seems to be that the rule of law will only apply when it suits the Brotherhood or other 
Islamist interests.  Violence has escalated in Egypt, especially targeting Egypt’s Coptic 
Christian minority, but little effort has been made to police or investigate Islam-inspired 
violence.21  Similarly, the military has all but ignored the limitations on executive power 
the reimplementation of the 1971 Constitution was supposed to reassert, a fact that only 
troubles the liberals who have also been the target of government harassment and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Michael Slackman, “Islamist Group is Rising Force in a New Egypt.”  
18 Yasmine El Rashid, “The Victorious Islamists,” The New York Times Review of Books.  14 July 
2011. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jul/14/egypt-victorious-
islamists/?pagination=false 
19 International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (1):   Egypt 
Victorious?” 25. 
20 NYT, Michael Slackman, “Islamist Group is Rising Force in a New Egypt,” 24 March, 2011.  
21 Yasmine El Rashid, “The Victorious Islamists,”  The New York Times Review of Books. 
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detention.22  The near-abandonment of efforts to police Egypt’s border with Gaza post-
Mubarak, similarly, can only be attributable to the influence of the Egyptian Brotherhood 
on behalf of Hamas.23 
There is also evidence that the wider crowd is not entirely with the young protestors who 
led the revolution.  A 2011 poll of Egyptians by the Pew Research Center found that 
while most (59%) of Egyptians believed democracy to be the best form of government, 
larger majorities believed Islam should play a significant political role.24  95% of 
Egyptians who believed Islam is playing a large role in politics approved of its role, while 
80% of those who believed Islam was playing a small role in Egyptian politics thought 
that was a bad thing.25  In all, 85% of Egyptians said Islam’s influence in politics is a 
positive thing,26 with 49% of Egyptian Muslims expressing a positive view of Hamas, and 
20%, a positive view of Al-Qaeda.27  Most tellingly, perhaps, when those Egyptians who 
perceive a struggle in Egypt between groups that want to modernize their country and 
Islamic fundamentalists were asked which faction they identify with, 59% said they 
identified with the fundamentalists while only 27% answered that they identified with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Yasmine El Rashid, “The Victorious Islamists,”  The New York Times Review of Books.  
23 International Crisis Group, “Radical Islam in Gaza,” 18. 
24 PEW Global Attitudes Project, “Egypt, Democracy, and Islam,” 31 January, 2011. 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1874/egypt-protests-democracy-islam-influence-politics-islamic-
extremism 
25 PEW Global Attitudes Project, “Muslims Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah,” 2 
December, 2010. http://pewglobal.org/2010/12/02/muslims-around-the-world-divided-on-
hamas-and-hezbollah/ 
26 PEW Global Attitudes Project, “Egypt, Democracy, and Islam,” 31 January, 2011. 
27 PEW Global Attitudes Project, “Muslims Publics Divided on Hamas and Hezbollah,” 2 
December, 2010.  
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modernizers.28  No wonder a recent poll found President Obama’s approval rating to be 
12% post-revolution.  Osama Bin Laden’s stood at 21%.29  Numbers such as these do not 
portend a favorable election result, neither from the perspective of American interests, 
nor to friends of liberty.   
With respect to Libya, American zig-zagging has been even more pronounced.  The 
Obama administration spent weeks downplaying the likelihood of military intervention30 
only to abruptly reverse itself; suddenly, America was leading a cruise-missile and air 
campaign against forces loyal to Colonel Gadaffi.  The strange justification provided by 
the administration:  “U.S. policy” vis a vis Libya, and the military intervention it is 
spearheading, are not in tune.  As the President explained the apparent inconsistency, 
while “U.S. policy [is] that Gaddafi needs to go,” the U.N.-mandated intervention in 
Libya has the more limited aim of protecting the country’s civilian population by way of a 
no-fly zone.31  NATO’s policy, on the other hand, seems to be regime change.  The 
lesson:  military invention is only justifiable where America stands to gain nothing from its 
deployment of force. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 PEW Global Attitudes Project, “Egypt, Democracy, and Islam,” 31 January, 2011. 




30 Washington Post, “Obama’s shift toward military action in Libya,” 19 March, 2011. 
31 Washington Post, “President Obama’s muddles Libya policy,” 22 March, 2011. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obamas-muddled-libya-
policy/2011/03/22/ABAmi5EB_story.html.  Disagreements regarding the end-game of the 
strikes authorized by the U.S. have emerged among the NATO countries involved in the 
intervention.  Whether the aim is to protect civilians, support the rebels, or enable a change of 
regime is unclear. 
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The narrative that has emerged chronicling the administration’s about-face confirms that 
the lack of a grand strategy is, in a strange way, the primary justification for America’s 
effective leadership of a new war, its third in the Muslim world. Hillary Clinton’s sudden 
support for the operation was decisive to overcoming the President’s initial reluctance to 
authorize the use of force.  Recognizing that Colonel Gaddafi’s counter-offensive was 
likely to succeed in pushing back (no doubt ultimately to slaughter) rebel forces absent 
Western air support, she finally joined Samantha Power (a National Security Council aide 
close to the President) and Susan Rice (U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations) in 
advocating U.S. military intervention on narrow humanitarian grounds, a position 
enthusiastically supported by France and Britain.32  As Ban Ki-Moon, U.N. Secretary 
General, explained, military action is justifiable, even necessitated, in Libya because the 
international community has a “responsibility to protect,”33 an obligation recently defined 
in these terms:  “the Responsibility to Protect is a new international security and human 
rights norm to address the international community’s failure to prevent and stop 
genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”34  Not a few 
commentators have noted that the “civilians” American armaments are protecting are 
heavily armed militants with an agenda of their own. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, “Obama Takes Hard Line With Libya After Shift by 
Clinton,”  New York Times, 18 March, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/world/africa/19policy.html?pagewanted=all 
33 Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, “Remarks to the Security Council Meeting on Peace and 
Security in Africa,” 25 February, 2011. 
34 As explained by the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect on its website.  
Accessed 23 June 2012 at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ 
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The U.S. position seems to be that strikes calculated to achieve regime change in Libya 
(what would contribute to “U.S. policy” according to the President), or coordinated to 
help rebel forces defeat Gaddafi, would exceed the U.N. mandate.  A resolution proposed 
by an international organization, then, and not U.S. interests, are the reason for America’s 
deployment of force.35  That the intervention lacked a national interest justification or 
clear exit strategy—and might well benefit rebel forces with ties to Al-Qaeda36—is said to 
be the reason Defense Secretary Robert Gates and National Security Advisor Thomas 
Donilon (among others including Vice President Biden) steadfastly opposed involvement 
in Libya.37  Colonel Gaddafi, no ally of the United States, had at least governed Islamist 
strongholds in the East “with an iron fist”38 since his renunciation of terrorism in 2003,39 
which is, no doubt, one reason Al-Qaeda too has called enthusiastically for his 
overthrow.40   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Some, notably Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the Arab League, already contend 
that the U.N. mandate has been exceeded, noting that U.N. resolution 1973 explicitly authorized 
the enforcement of a “no-fly zone,” but not airstrikes.   Others, including NATO contributors to 
the mission, seem to believe the aim of the engagement should be nothing less than the end of 
Colonel Gaddafi’s brutal reign, otherwise known as “regime change.”  Disagreements of this sort 
have proved an important stumbling block in the way of transferring command of operations to 
NATO, to say nothing of identifying the end-game in Libya. 
36 The rebel leader, Abdel-Hakim al-Hasidi, confirmed to an Italian newspaper that some of his 
fighters previously fought American soldiers in Iraq, adding that “members of Al-Qaeda are also 
good Muslims fighting against the invader.”  The Telegraph, “Libyan rebel commander admits his 
fighters have al-Qaeda links,” 25 March, 2011. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8407047/Libyan-
rebel-commander-admits-his-fighters-have-al-Qaeda-links.html 
37 Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, “Obama Takes Hard Line With Libya After Shift by 
Clinton,”  New York Times, 18 March, 2011. 
38 STRATFOR, “Jihadist Opportunities in Libya,” 24 February, 2011. 
39 STRATFOR, “Libya’s Terrorism Option,” 23 March 2011. 
40 “Al-Qaeda commander backs Libyan rebels in message,” The Jreusalem Post, 13 March, 2011.  
http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=212003 
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One inevitable consequence of NATO action against Gaddafi’s forces:  the already weak 
and fractured Libyan security apparatus will invariably be weaker (whomever ends up in 
control of it), an outcome that, combined with the month-long looting of weapons caches 
“reminiscent of… Iraq,” will provide the munitions and “operation space” which allow 
jihadists to thrive.41  By demolishing Libya’s security apparatus and precluding the 
deployment of ground troops, humanitarian intervention has increased the likelihood 
violent Islamists will end up with another failed state to call home, a civil war perhaps 
raging around them.  A recent report of a respect French think tank posits a darker 
possibility yet.  There is evidence that the rebels NATO finds itself supporting have a 
distinctly illiberal agenda.  Le Centre International de Rescherches et d’Etudes sur le 
Terrorism, has concluded, from assets on the ground, that the rebels are a disparate 
group with divergent interests, among whom “les véritables democrats n’y sont qu’une 
minorité [the real democrats are a minority].”  They are currently fighting with remnants 
of the Gaddafi regime, monarchists, and Islamists; in cases such as these, anticipating the 
outcome of the conflict once the threat holding the insurgent side together is vanquished 
is next to impossible.42  According to the French think thank, liberal democracy is the 
least likely of the possible outcomes.  Among the report’s conclusions:   
Western intervention is in the process of creating more problems than it 
has solved.  Above all, the action carries a significant risk of destabilizing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 STRATFOR, “Jihadist Opportunities in Libya,” 24 February, 2011. 
42 Centre International de Recherches et d’Etudes ser le Terrorisme, “Libyé:  Un Avenir 
Incertain,” May 2011, 7. http://www.burundirealite.org/PDFs/64.pdf 
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all of North Africa and the Near East, and of contributing to the 
emergence of another theater for radical Islam…43  
To make matters worse, “literally tons of weapons have recently entered into free 
circulation where there is little or no government control over them,” an inventory that 
includes rifles, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, military-grade explosives (used 
to build powerful Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs), as well as crew-served weapons 
systems (heavy machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, recoilless rifles, mortars, etc.) 
and most ominously, surface-to-air missiles.44  There is no need to discuss Colonel 
Gadaffi’s known WMD stockpiles, not all of them yet disposed of.45 
 
In other places, interest calculations have trumped humanitarian concerns amidst 
the chaos.  To say nothing of Iran or Darfur, protests have recently turned bloody in 
Yemen46 and Bahrain—where almost daily clashes with increasingly repressive security 
forces have killed dozens—and yet those regimes have escaped without so much as 
rhetorical disapproval.47  As one prominent commentator has noted, “Obama has not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 My translation. Centre International de Recherches et d’Etudes ser le Terrorisme, “Libyé:  Un 
Avenir Incertain,” May 2011, 7. 
44 STRATFOR, “Will Libya Again Become the Arsenal of Terrorism,” 10 March, 2011.  Reports 
from Africa indicate that Al-Qaeda has already moved weapons from Libya, including surface-to-
air missiles, to safe-havens for later use. “Libyan rebel commander admits his fighters have al-
Qaeda links,” The Telegraph, 25 March, 2011.   
45 STRATFOR, “Will Libya Again Become the Arsenal of Terrorism,” 10 March, 2011. 
46 International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (II):  Yemen 
between reform and revolution,” 10 March, 2011, 6.  C.f. STRATFOR, “Yemen in Crisis:  A 
Special Report,” 21 March 2011. 




even uttered a word in support of armed intervention” and has instead employed mainly 
diplomatic channels to pressure those regimes to undertake domestic reforms willingly.48   
The apparent double standard is not hard to understand.  Bahrain has hosted the 
headquarters of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, in effect the headquarters for all U.S. naval 
activity in the Gulf, since 1948.49  In addition to being of significant logistical importance 
in other respects, as well as an important staging ground for Operations Desert Storm 
and Enduring Freedom, the country’s sectarian dynamic—a Sunni minority ruling a 
majority Shiite country—closely resembles Iraq’s pre-2003 (which is to say, it is 
potentially explosive).  Recognizing the catastrophic consequences of revolution in 
Bahrain for the oil-rich Arabian peninsula, Saudi Arabia has deployed forces to the island 
nation to help quell Shiite unrest (which Iran is reportedly supporting actively).50  In 
addition to toppling an important U.S. ally, any change to the Bahraini regime could 
have serious consequences for Saudi Arabia’s domestic stability, another country with a 
repressed Shiite population. 
Yemen, on the other hand, is home to a growing and assertive Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula.  Cables published by Wikileaks confirmed that “President Saleh pledged 
unfettered access to Yemen’s national territory for U.S. counterterrorism operations,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Josh Rogin, “How Obama turned on a dime toward war,” Foreign Policy, March 18, 2011. 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/18/how_obama_turned_on_a_dime_toward
_war 
49 Robert Pelletreau, “Transformation in the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs Snapshot, 24 February, 
2011. 
50 STRATFOR, “Yemen in Crisis:  A Special Report,” 21 March, 2011. 
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making possible U.S. air strikes against Al-Qaeda targets operating in that country.51   
Moreover, Yemen’s protestors are seeking to unify two established anti-regime 
movements, the Huthi rebels in the north and southern separatists, a dynamic that could 
easily spiral out of control if the regime were to fail; Yemen is a tribal society, only loosely 
united by national affinities, with a long history of civil unrest.52   
The military and wider security apparatus are the closest thing the country has to a 
national institution.  But while parts of the security apparatus are professionalized, it is 
“on the whole… highly fragmented and personalized.”53  The defection of key military 
officials and diplomats on 21 March, 2011, demonstrated that powerful elements oppose 
the sitting president.  The apparent attempt at a military coup was reportedly led by Brig. 
Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a man widely considered to be “a veteran of the Islamist old 
guard” and credited with “the infusion of jihadists and jihadist sympathizers throughout 
the Yemeni security apparatus.”54  The defecting officers claimed to be “with the 
protestors” 55 (even going so far as to deploy their soldiers in a protective formation); 
popular or not in Yemen, such a regime would almost certainly be less popular in 
Washington and dramatically less supportive of America’s counter-terrorism undertakings 
in the region.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 James Traub, “The Sunshine Policy,” Foreign Policy, 10 December, 2010. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/10/the_sunshine_policy?page=full 
52 International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (II):  Yemen 
between reform and revolution,” 10 March, 2011, 3. 
53 International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (II):  Yemen 
between reform and revolution,” 10 March, 2011, 15. 
54 STRATFOR, “Yemen in Crisis:  A Special Report,” 21 March, 2011. 
55http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2011/03/2011322923357760.html 
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Al-Jazeera commentators have openly mused about the possibility of a return to civil war 
in the event that President Saleh is ousted, an outcome Saleh himself has ominously 
raised.56  The further erosion of the regime’s ability to more or less monopolize the means 
of violence throughout Yemeni territory could be catastrophic for Saudi Arabia, both by 
increasing the space for Islamists to organize attacks against its neighbors (as well as 
American interests), and by the potential of the ensuing intensification of unrest to spread 
to the kingdom.  STRATFOR has noted that Saudi Arabia “has the money, influence, 
and tribal links to directly shape Yemini politics according to its interests,” including a 
particularly close relationship with Mohsen, the defecting general, which has led to 
speculation that Saudi Arabia may be contemplating a contingency plan that would 
involve “a prominent political space” for Yemen’s Islamists.57 
Next to nothing has been said about Iraq and Syria, where protests are having 
diametrically opposite effects, nor about Israel-Palestine, where violence is escalating to 
levels not seen in years.  Let it suffice to say that in Syria, President Assad—facing the 
pressure of demonstrations and U.S. calls for increased political representation for 
Syrians58—took early unprecedented steps to appease protestors, promising to allow 
wider political participation and announcing the formation of a committee tasked with 
considering relaxing the country’s emergency laws.  Those concessions have not appeased 
Syrians, who continue to take to the street in numbers not long ago unthinkable.  The 	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57 STRATFOR, “Yemen in Crisis:  A Special Report,” 21 March, 2011. 




crackdowns have been brutal, with more than a thousand killed, but still, the 
demonstrations continue.59  The regime has blamed armed Islamist elements for stoking 
the violence.   
In Iraq, spectacular attacks remain a part of quotidian existence60 and signs are almost 
ubiquitous that Iraqis are souring on their new democracy and the utter political and 
administrative dysfunction that has accompanied it.61  In Israel, the peace process lies in 
shambles and a President who, not six months ago, expressed his hope that a two-state 
solution would be finalized before his next address to the U.N., is unlikely to have 
opportunity ever to resurrect it any time soon.62   
 
As the events of the last months well demonstrate, the wider Middle East (the 
Maghreb, the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan/Pakistan) is of significant national 
security consequence to the United States because (in no particular order), (a), the world 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Farnaz Fassihi and Jay Solomon, “Syrian Regime Rocketed by Protests,” Wall Street Journal, 26 
March, 2011. 
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60 Raad Alkadiri, “Rage Comes to Baghdad,” Foreign Affairs, 3 March, 2011. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67557/raad-alkadiri/rage-comes-to-baghdad 
61 Emma Sky, “Iraq, From Surge to Sovereignty,” Foreign Affairs, (March/April, 2011), 126-127.   
62 The President and George Mitchell, for a time his Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, have 
repeatedly suggested that a solution to the Israel-Palestine solution is the lynchpin prerequisite to 
a wider and durable peace in the greater Middle East. 
(http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/148321.htm, 
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/148525.htm).  In his celebrated Cairo speech, the President 
demanded Israel freeze settlement construction in the West bank as a precursor to meaningful 
peace talks.  In his 2009 speech address to the U.N., he promised direct Camp David-style talks 
between the Israeli and the Palestinian leadership within two months.  At the U.N. again almost a 
year later, September 23, 2010, the talks having finally begun, he emphasized their centrality to 
the problems of the region. 
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economy relies on a stable energy supply and the largest proven energy reserves reside in the 
Middle East; (b), America has an interest—whether strategic, moral, or both—in 
providing support for the state of Israel, the region’s only liberal democracy; (c), insofar as the 
violent anti-American extremism demonstrated by the events of 9/11 is headquartered in 
the Islamic world, the cooperation of rulers in the region is essential to the policing of 
jihadists who would threaten America or its direct interests before they reach our shores (the first 
requirement of which is that such rulers maintain a near-monopoly on the means of 
violence in their states); (d), to the extent large uncontrolled weapons stockpiles continue 
to circulate quite easily in the Middle East, counter-proliferation efforts (including, but not 
limited to, the WMD concerns raised by Iran) will continue to require some combination 
of active Arab cooperation in counter-proliferation efforts, direct American intervention 
in the region, and the intensification of out-of-this-world cyber warfare; (e) the 
geopolitical significance of the region requires that the U.S. military maintain access to 
airspace, military bases and waterways in territory controlled by Mideast regimes; and (f), 
America may have a moral obligation to prevent despotic rulers from terrorizing their 
populations insofar as the international community has a “responsibility to protect,” a 
responsibility that may extend to a U.S. commitment to promote liberal democracy.  The 
first five interests, of course, are best served where the emergence of a regional hegemonic 
power unfriendly to the West is prevented.  The challenge today is to craft a foreign 
policy likely to achieve—to the furthest extent possible given the means at the disposal of 
U.S. policymakers—U.S. interests in the Middle East, cognizant that actions calibrated to 
advance one goal may well undermine others. 
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Devising U.S. foreign policy in light of this variety of not-always-compatible American 
interests the Middle East is necessarily a thorny affair.  President Bush’s 2002 National 
Security Strategy constituted an utter rewriting of American foreign policy that in the first 
place rejected the notion that America could ally itself with dictators in the region, no 
matter how brutal.  9/11 had demonstrated that the domestic policies of Mideast tyrants 
do matter to U.S. security.  Condoleezza Rice explained what was a sea change in 
America’s Middle East foreign policy in a speech she gave in Cairo in 2005: “for 60 years, 
the United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in the Middle East — 
and we achieved neither.”63     
The Bush Doctrine, today most closely associated with the invasion of Iraq and the U.S.-
led endeavor to topple Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime in favor of democracy, in fact 
had four major components.  Taken together, they were expected to address the 
inadequacies of the general U.S. foreign policy approach to the Middle East that had 
prevailed pre-9/11 and failed to prevent, and done not a little to generate the rage that 
led to, the attacks on America’s symbols of economic and military might.   First, a 
willingness to strike preventatively to prevent the dissemination of WMD technology, 
especially to terrorist organizations or those who might support them; second, the goal of 
inducing foreign governments to police terrorism more aggressively within their own 
borders by making an example of an uncooperative dictator; third, the promotion of 
“modern and moderate government,” especially in the Muslim world as a way of 
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attacking terrorism at its so-called root over time; and fourth, the creation of new, more 
reliable, democratic allies in the Middle East willing to support America’s counter-
terrorism and counter-proliferation efforts.   
Notwithstanding the dramatic improvement in Iraq’s security situation since the darkest 
days of the insurgency, Iraq demonstrates the failure of the Bush Doctrine, or more 
precisely put, the incompatibility of the security strategy’s four objectives.  The well-
intentioned but ultimately ill-fated effort to achieve the most ambitious aim—
democratization—severely undermined progress toward achieving the important strategic 
objectives that were, in fact, attainable.   Regime change in Iraq could well have induced 
states with WMD ambition to abandon those programs—as Libya willingly did shortly 
after the invasion of Iraq began—and to police terrorist operating within their borders 
more aggressively—as Yemen, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and others have.  Of 
course, the Iraq precedent could only exert a profound behavior-altering effect if rulers in 
the region believed they might well be next to experience Saddam Hussein’s fate.   
As it is, however, assertive new interest-driven American intervention abroad is (correctly) 
perceived as extremely unlikely in the near future, no matter how serious the provocation.  
Why?  The democracy-promotion endgame opened space in Iraq for an insurgency, and 
ultimately what can only be termed a civil war, the effect of which was to increase 
dramatically the costs of intervention in Iraq.  In terms of lives lost, dollars expended, and 
(not unimportantly), the psychological toll exerted on a people ill-disposed to losing wars, 
the invasion and occupation of Iraq has exceeded every cost estimate by orders of 
magnitude.  The experience of a grinding, slow-motion, near-defeat in Iraq diminished 
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America’s willingness to deploy force in the Middle East, or anywhere else, going 
forward—except, apparently, from the air for very short periods of time.  This general 
reluctance to intervene again is further amplified as the immediacy of 9/11 fades, and 
further spectacular attacks are prevented.  Far from proving America’s resolve to 
behavior-altering effect, lengthy interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have undermined 
it—both in the American public, and in the eyes of the world.  Libya is the apparent 
contradiction that proves the point:  it is not only the most unpopular war America has 
ever waged at its onset;64 it is also a war being justified as unnecessary to U.S. interests, 
provoked only because the likelihood of humanitarian disaster had reached near-certainty 
in a country that, while it remained whole, did not much matter to American interests. 
  
The foreign policy President Obama promised Americans on the campaign trail, 
and which he went some ways toward implementing through the end of 2010, was hailed 
as a return to realism after a period of hubristic imperial overstretch.65  Insofar as the 
administration was articulating a much narrower conception of American interests in the 
Middle East—the promotion of democracy as a way to advance U.S. interests was all but 
abandoned in fact (though the rhetoric of development took on increased salience)—the 
claim is not outlandish on its face.  But in his announced reluctance to deploy American 
military might in the service of U.S. interests, or even credibly to threaten the use of force, 
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President Obama’s departure from the ordinary realist insistence on the high importance 
of power—of demonstrating strength and a willingness to deploy it to deter, contain, and 
negotiate from a position of strength—could hardly be more jarring.   
The departure, moreover, was deliberate.  It is not too much to say the Obama 
administration built its original foreign policy on the not entirely unreasonable suggestion 
that the Iraq war had “created more terrorists than it has killed,” that President Bush’s 
“highly assertive American policy around the world may increase the probability that it 
will be the target of terrorist attacks,” and that “American power… produces American 
vulnerability.”66  In other terms, if “the creation of a region that does not spawn, suffer 
from, or export violent Islamist extremism” is a major aim of U.S. foreign policy, “a 
robust U.S. ground troop presence in the region undercuts this interest, serving as a 
major impetus for radicalization.”67  President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy 
celebrates and advertises America’s newfound reluctance to use military force even more 
explicitly than President Bush warned that non-cooperation with the American-led War 
on Terror could lead to serious consequences.  Consider this remarkable passage. 
While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other 
options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and 
risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction.  When force is 
necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and 
strengthens out legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, 
working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council.   
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The Unites States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to 
defend our nation and out interests, yet we will also seek to adhere to 
standards that govern the use of force.68 
Where President Bush employed bellicose rhetoric and threatened preemptive war in an 
effort to persuade rogue leaders it was in their personal interest to police anti-American 
extremism within their borders aggressively (and in Libya’s case to abandon an active 
WMD program), President Obama all but preemptively renounced recourse to arms in 
an effort to create a diplomatic environment conducive to negotiation and cooperation.   
The reason for this:  he believes radical Islam will be vanquished in the long run not by 
helping to transform the region, but by building bridges and understanding between 
America and the Islamic world.  A “broader emphasis on Muslim engagement” replaces 
rhetoric designed to coerce rulers into policing extremism on their own soil.69  Thus, the 
Obama administration downplays or denies entirely its most decisive actions against Al-
Qaeda.  Spectacular covert attacks against high value Al-Qaeda targets in Yemen and 
Somalia, the use of a secret CIA army 3000-men strong to pursue targets across the 
Afghan border into Pakistan,70 collaboration with Algerian forces to hunt down 
extremists migrating to Iraq,71 remain unpublicized (or at least are not emphasized) 
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precisely to avoid giving credence to the charge America meddles with impunity in the 
Islamic world.72  
The President’s repeated apologies for America’s crimes in the region and his celebration 
of Islamic civilization’s great accomplishments can only be understood in this context.  
After the Iraq war which, the President frequently emphasizes, was a “war of choice”—
and which, there can be no doubt, fortified resentments and served the interests of 
propagandists intent to intensify hatreds—it would be up to America to demonstrate a 
willingness to honestly engage the world on friendlier terms.  And so, in his Cairo speech, 
the President promised a new beginning with the Islamic world while downplaying, to the 
chagrin of many, the importance of democratic reform.   
I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and 
Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual 
respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not 
exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share 
common principles -- principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the 
dignity of all human beings.73 
It is for this reason President Obama cited the Qur’an frequently, credited the Islamic 
world with making possible the European Enlightenment and discovering algebra, and 
praised it for inventing technologies including the compass and printing.  If President 
Bush intended to extract cooperation from Arab rulers through fear, President Obama 
believes more can be gained by making their peoples love, or at least like, a kinder, 
gentler, America.  Demonstrating respect and admiration for Islamic civilization after two 	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terrible centuries for the Muslim world was the first step, and key component, of that 
strategy.  The President did not choose this track simply because he prefers soft to hard 
power.  More important, the Obama administration believes America’s bellicose rhetoric 
and aggressive interventions in the Middle East are a—perhaps the—key reason for the 
existence of Islamic radicalism.  It is not a matter of defeating anti-American extremism; 
it is a matter of not provoking it in the first place.   
This explains the President’s frequent apologies for America’s misuse of its power, his 
arguably gratuitous public condemnations of his predecessor’s decision to invade Iraq, his 
abandonment of the term “War on Terror,” and his refusal to link terrorism to 
radicalized Islam in his speeches.  On the contrary, the President conceived of America’s 
interests narrowly at the beginning of his Presidency, believing they could best be attained 
by diplomacy and through international institutions so long as the United States 
demonstrates an appropriate degree of humility and restraint.  Where the term “Islam” is 
employed in the National Security Strategy, the administration goes out of its way to deny 
any connection exists between the world’s fastest growing religion and anti-American 
terrorism.  
We will always seek to delegitimize the use of terrorism and to isolate those 
who carry it out. Yet this is not a global war against a tactic—terrorism or 
a religion—Islam. We are at war with a specific network, al-Qa’ida, and its 
terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies, 
and partners.74  
It is not too much to say that underlying assumption of the entire strategy was that the 
Middle East would largely take care of itself if only the U.S. drew back, especially if 	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progress toward a two-state solution—achieved by pressuring Israel more aggressively 
than previous administrations had dared—was forthcoming.  It bears repeating that the 
President assumed American action in the region, and the plight of Palestinians, were the 
primary instigators of anti-American sentiment and its most pernicious fruit. The Obama 
administration clung to that policy while Iranian protestors took to the streets.  By 2011, 
however, it had determined that it could no longer play the disinterested observer.  While 
it is tempting to conclude the administration determined too much was at stake as 
important Western allies teetered on the brink of revolution, it was rather the fierce 
urgency of the humanitarian moment in Libya that led the President to suspend his 
calculated determination to refrain from the use force in the Muslim world wherever 
possible.  Which is why, presumably, a “senior administration official” recently signaled 
that a major change to U.S. foreign policy is on the horizon.  Libya is “the greatest 
opportunity to realign our interests and our values,” the President is said to have 
announced at an important (and “extremely contentious”) meeting on the eve of 
intervention.75  Those words bring immediately to mind President Bush and his 
administration’s promise in the 2002 National Security Strategy (the first comprehensive 
articulation of the Bush Doctrine) of a new “U.S. national security strategy… based on a 
distinctly American internationalism that reflects our values and our national interests.”76  
So too do the emerging new goals of President Obama’s Mideast policy recall his 
predecessor’s.    	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Briefing a group of experts called to the White House to discuss the situation in Libya, the 
same senior official explained that the president “was referring to the broader change 
going on in the Middle East and the need to rebalance U.S. foreign policy toward a 
greater focus on democracy and human rights.”77  The United States will use not only 
soft power, but hard power too it seems, to promote democracy and humanitarian ends 
in the Middle East.  In a major policy speech at the State Department on 19 May, 2011, 
President Obama confirmed his administration’s foreign policy pivot.   
Not every country will follow our particular form of representative 
democracy, and there will be times when our short term interests do not 
align perfectly with our long term vision of the region.  But we can – and 
will –speak out for a set of core principles, principles that have guided our 
response to the events over the past six months. 
The United States opposes the use of violence and repression against the 
people of the region.  We support a set of universal rights.  Those rights 
include free speech; the freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of religion; 
equality for all men and women under the rule of law; and the right to 
choose your own leaders – whether you live in Baghdad or Damascus, 
Sanaa or Tehran… 
Our support for these principles is not a secondary interest – today I am 
making it clear that it is a top priority that must be translated into concrete 
actions, and supported by all the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools 
at our disposal.78  
Libya, thus, represents gargantuan policy shift.  The tacit justification for the shift offered 
by the administration had to do, one the one hand, with the magnitude of the 
spontaneous revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, and on the other, with Colonel Gadaffi’s 
threat to slaughter thousands of his own people in Benghazi to decisively put down 	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Libya’s rebellion.  The administration was worried that if Gadaffi carried out his threat 
while the U.S. sat on its hands, a message would effectively be transmitted to dictators 
throughout the region: brutal force works, and it is tolerated by the international 
community.  Furthermore, a genuine concern that the outbreak of a civil war in Libya 
might lead to a refugee crisis that would affect its neighbors, and thereby perhaps also the 
revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, was also a factor.  One gets the sense that President 
Obama believed the democratizing movements might well succeed if Gadaffi could be 
kept from playing the spoiler, and for that reason, wanted to ensure American inaction 
did not stand in the way of what might be a world historical moment.  The concern was 
amplified in light of European impatience for intervention, an impatience born of interest 
calculations (related to oil interests and refugee fears) but couched in humanitarian 
concerns. 
And so, all of a sudden, America is involved in its third war in a Muslim country, drawn 
there in defense of democracy.  There is no evidence anyone raised what ought to have 
been the first objection:  has Iraq taught us anything about the specific reasons the region 
has proven so resistant to forms of popular constitutional government that at the same 
time protect the rights and liberties of their citizens on equal grounds?  This dissertation 
takes up the question. 
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M E T H O D   N O T E 
 
Larry Diamond, perhaps the most important scholar of comparative 
democratization, recently repeated his frequent observation that “the continuing absence 
of even a single democratic regime in the Arab world is a striking anomaly.”79  Since 
1974, the number of democracies in the world has exploded.  And yet, of the sixteen 
independent Arab states that make up the Middle East and coastal North Africa, not a 
single one can be considered a functioning constitutional democracy; only one, Lebanon, 
has ever been.80  The question that springs to mind is “why?”  Why is the Arab-Islamic 
world so apparently resistant to the erection of states organized along liberal democratic 
lines:  in which elections are regular, free and fair; and in which the government is stable, 
limited and tolerant?   
Scholars today tend to point to economic and geo-political factors to explain the 
persistent absence of representative government in the Middle East.  Seymour Martin 
Lipset demonstrated fifty years ago that wealthier countries do a better job of gaining and 
keeping democracy.81  Throughout the Arab world, per capita incomes remain fairly low 
in general, and in those countries with higher per capita incomes (Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, for example) income disparity is very high.  Theorists from Aristotle to 
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Tocqueville have noted the importance of a large and developed middle class to stable 
popular politics.  Their reasoning generally follows these lines:  members of the middle 
class are doing well enough realistically to aspire to improve their position; at the same 
time, their economic situation is precarious enough that they can imagine falling into 
poverty.  Thus, the middle class wields political power responsibly for being able to 
empathize with the rich and the poor alike—neither overburdening the wealthy with 
confiscatory tax policies, nor allowing the moneyed elite to crush the poor.  High levels of 
poverty, economic stagnation, the prevalence of corruption and graft, and enormous 
income inequality have led scholars to concur that prevailing economic conditions in the 
Middle East constitute an important impediment to durable political reform there.  
Similarly, the “oil curse” plays a role.  As Samuel Huntington demonstrated, large oil 
reserves are not an unmixed blessing.  Since the value of oil on the world market is 
disproportionate to the labor required to extract it, countries with resource wealth are 
able to develop extensive centralized bureaucracies without taxing their subjects.  Where 
the people are not taxed—in some Arab countries, citizens receive cash payments—it 
should not surprise that calls for representation are subdued.82  And yet, as Diamond 
notes, this is not the entire story.   Kuwait has almost the per capita income of Norway, 
and only eleven of the sixteen independent Arab states have considerable oil wealth; the 
economic impediments cannot be the only significant variables.83 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman:  
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 65. 
83 Larry Diamond, “Why are there no Arab Democracies?”  Journal of Democracy.  Volume 21: 1  
(January 2010), 97-98. 
	  29 
Diamond is partial to political and geopolitical explanations.  He notes that Arab rulers 
have perfected “authoritarian structures and practices” and employ them “with unusual 
skill.”84  Mohamed Talbi adds that Mideast dictators have every personal incentive to 
hang on to power, no matter what crimes it takes to do so; succession generally comes 
thanks to “violent death or, in the best cases, death by natural causes.”85  It is perhaps 
little surprise that regimes in the Middle East spend a higher proportion of their GNP on 
their security apparatuses—almost twice the global average, according to Eva Bellin’s 
recent study—than states in any other parts of the world.86  Moreover, scholars have 
demonstrated that authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have been able to mix 
coercion with temporary representative outlets, designed to vent popular frustrations, 
very effectively.87  Patterns of democratizing half-measures, followed by the assertion of 
authoritarian policies, what scholars have called “managed reform,” also helps to explain 
(or explained until 2011) the longevity of so many autocratic Mideast regimes.88  
An “unfavorable geopolitical situation” makes things worse:  for decades, the United 
States (and for a long time, the Soviet Union) has provided the economic aid and military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Larry Diamond, “Why are there no Arab Democracies?”  99. 
85 Mohamed Talbi, “A Record of Failure,” in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel 
Brumberg, eds. Islam and Liberal Democracy in the Middle East (Baltimore:  The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2003), 3. 
86 Eva Bellin, “Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders,” in Marsha Pripstein Posusney and 
Michele Penner Angrist, eds. Authoritarianism in the Middle East:  Regimes and Resistance (Boulder, CO:  
Lynne Rienner, 2005), 31. 
87 Daniel Brumberg, “Democratization in the Arab World?  The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,”  
Journal of Democracy 13 (October 2002), 56. 
88 Michele Dunne and Marina Ottaway, “Incumbent Regimes and the ‘King’s Dilemma’ in the 
Arab World:  Promise and Threat of Managed Reform,” in Marina Ottaway and Amr 
Hamzawy, eds. Getting to Pluralism:  Political Actors in the Arab World (Washington, D.C.:  Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 13-40.  
	  30 
resources that allow Arab autocracies to persevere.89  The Arab-Israeli conflict, 
meanwhile, “hangs like a toxic miasma over Middle Eastern political life” and constitutes, 
for autocrats, a “convenient means of diverting public frustration away from the 
corruption and human rights abuses of Arab regimes.”90  Larry Diamond has gone so far 
as to assert that the “future of democracy in the Middle East will remain bleak absent a 
permanent, peaceful, and mutually negotiated two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict.”91  Last, the ubiquity of autocratic regimes in the regimes seems to have a self-
reinforcing effect for at least three reasons:  the Arab Middle East lacks a successful 
democratic model to emulate (geographic proximity of a successful democracy that is 
culturally similar can help instigate and guide reform);92 regional political pressure to 
undertake democratic reform is non-existent; and, related to this, the region’s dominant 
regional organization, the Arab League, has become “an unapologetic autocrats’ club,” 
more interested in sustaining the status quo than in paving the way for reforms.93 
Diamond is certainly correct that political and geopolitical factors constitute impediments 
to democratization in the Arab-Islamic world.  But, like the vast majority of scholars who 
study democracy and democratization, he frames the question too narrowly.  In 
particular, he refuses to take seriously the possibility that “cultural” or civilization-level 	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factors may also play a role, perhaps the most important role.   He all but dismisses the 
possibility that the region’s dominant religion, Islam, may constitute an impediment to 
the establishment of liberal democracy in the Arab world.  His evidence:  eight non-Arab 
Muslim-majority countries are recognized democracies by Freedom House.94  
Furthermore, he notes that non-Arab Muslim-majority countries tend to be freer than the 
Arab states in the Middle East; in 2010, the 30 Muslim-majority countries outside of the 
Arab world averaged a score of 4.7 on the 7-point Freedom House scale (7 is least free), 
while the Arab states averaged a pitiful 5.53.95  With this, Diamond believes he has 
proven Islam has nothing to do with it; as he, somewhat flippantly, puts it, “So much for 
religion.”96  As for culture, he dismisses the possibility that prevailing sensibilities in the 
Arab world—for example, enduring habits taken on as a consequence of centuries of 
oppressive rule and the resultant dearth of “social capital”—might pose an impediment to 
democratization outright.  Here, he derives his evidence from opinion polls:  that 
“overwhelming shares of Arab publics—well over 80 percent in Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, and even Iraq—… agree that ‘despite drawbacks, 
democracy is the best system of government’” means no aspect of Arab culture constitutes 
an important impediment to durable democratizing reforms.97   
Diamond’s arguments do not withstand scrutiny in either case.  That Muslim-majority 
countries outside of the Arab world—the best examples are surely Indonesia and 	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Turkey—have established relatively successful liberal democracies does not prove Islam, 
or perhaps a twisted and ideological interpretation of its tenets, is not a very important 
variable in other places.  Islam, after all, is not a monolith (as Diamond himself is fond of 
explaining).  It could well be (to offer a premature glimpse of this project’s argument) that 
a radical political ideology claiming the authority of Islam, one that has been 
disseminated especially well in the Arab world (but much less widely in Indonesia) is, in 
fact, a very important variable.  It is not that ethnic Arabs are somehow incapable of 
limited constitutional government as a result of their ethnicity (Diamond mischievously 
implies racism drives those who disagree with him); it might rather be that an ideology 
designed to impede liberalizing reforms spread very effectively through the Arab world in 
large part because its original and most powerful exponents wrote in Arabic.  
(Incidentally, the fact that very similar ideologies have been expressed persuasively in 
Persian and Urdu could well explain why Iran and Pakistan—both non-Arab countries—
are nonetheless demonstrating a similar species of resistance to liberal democratic 
reforms.  Where local practices that pre-date Islam have blended with Islamic practice—
more common as one moves further from the Arabian peninsula—radical modern forms 
of political Islam have tended to take hold less assertively.  This helps to explain the 
success of the Indonesian democracy.)  Diamond’s public opinion argument is flimsier 
yet.  The fact that large majorities throughout the Arab world express a preference for 
democratic rule (in preference to what, totalitarian dictatorship?) in no way implies 
majority support for political liberalism.  This accidental but almost ubiquitous tendency to 
conflate political liberalism with democratic institutions or an expressed enthusiasm for 
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self-rule may well be the single most pernicious errant assumption present today in much 
of the democratization literature.  This project contends that it is also responsible for 
foreign policy blunders of magnificent proportion.   
 
After all, to claim one has a legitimate right to participate in crafting a polity’s 
laws does not ipso facto accompany the capacity to deploy legislative authority in a way 
that is tolerant, limited, law-governed, and informed by a love of the common good.  Not 
long after the French Revolution, reflecting on the attempt of a governing faction to 
solidify its authority by way of fictitious claims to democratic legitimacy, Tocqueville 
observed that it is impossible to prevent a mania for popular sovereignty from spreading 
once the idea is let out of the box:  “those who think that they can play with such a 
dogma [the dogma of the sovereignty of the people] and… prevent it for long from 
spreading… are truly stupid.”98  Tocqueville, who rarely expresses himself so indelicately, 
well understood that popular enthusiasm for democracy and a people’s capacity to rule 
well are different things entirely.  As he puts it, more artfully, in Democracy in America,  
The revolution in the United States was produced by a mature and reflective 
taste for freedom, and not by a vague and indefinite instinct of independence.  It 
was not supported by passions of disorder; but, on the contrary, it advanced with 
a love of order and of legality.99  
The point, of overwhelming importance, is this:  it is not surprising that large majorities 
everywhere should be attracted by the notion they should have a say in who rules and to 	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what end; it is a flattering and inherently appealing idea, especially so to those who 
believe their interests are underrepresented, or worse yet trampled upon, by the 
prevailing regime.  The desire to rule is not, however, identical with the capacity to rule 
well.  What, then, constitutes a “mature and reflective taste for freedom,” what 
Tocqueville observed in, and what impressed him above all about, Americans of the 
Jacksonian era?  For Tocqueville, Americans had internalized a species of mores, sacred 
opinions and habits of the heart, that equip and incline a people to rule itself 
responsibly—not simply to make good laws, but also to make restrained use of generous 
freedoms.  The argument of this dissertation is that a people’s employment of their 
legislative authority—the power of the majority wielded by way of voting, and then, the 
authority of the state as wielded by the victorious faction—is unlikely to be limited and 
law-governed if the people has not first internalized a liberal set of guiding commitments.  
Similarly, a people is less likely to employ the generous rights and freedoms associated 
with liberal democracy in restrained and neighborly ways if the people has not 
internalized a social character that disposes it to self-restraint and tolerance.   
Tocqueville replied to a letter he received from Louis de Kergorlay in 1847, almost a 
decade after the completion of Democracy in America, to express his opinion on a related 
point, the relationship between religious fanaticism and political freedom.  His opinion 
flies in the face of the prevailing assumptions today.  “As a general thesis,” Tocqueville 
wrote, “I believe that political liberty enlivens religious passions more than it extinguishes 
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them.”100  He goes on to offer this important admonition:  “We must be careful not to 
confuse political liberty with some of the effects it sometimes produces.”101  Political 
freedom will not always yield the result it did in America, and only belatedly, in France; 
in other places, it will empower illiberal tendencies and enflame violent factionalism.  For 
Tocqueville, America was exceptional:  the place where democracy sprung up, fully-
grown.  Democracies, after all, can be illiberal, an adjective that describes half of all 
newly democratizing countries, as Fareed Zakaria recently demonstrated.102  And as 
every student of politics knows, democratic majorities have (not infrequently, 
unfortunately) demonstrated a tendency to abuse their authority, sometimes tyrannizing 
over individuals and minorities.  Nor is it only a majority’s abuse of its legislative 
authority that threatens to shatter the public peace in free societies.  In the annals of 
history, groups of private citizens, acting as private citizens, have too frequently put their 
freedoms—of association, of movement, even their presumption of innocence—to 
horrifying use:  terrorizing, maiming, even killing objects of their hatred or impassioned 
temporary detestation.  This project is largely about the commitments, so far from 
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automatic, that lead a people to be self-restrained and tolerant as they assert their political 
rights and prerogatives, as well as the origins and preconditions of those commitments in 
the West.  It also asks the question scholars have been polite enough to ignore:  is Islam 
the problem?  M. Steven Fish has shown by way of regression analysis that, even 
controlling for economic development and the presence of oil, there remains a strong 
negative correlation between Islam and democracy.  As he notes somewhat 
apologetically,  
Due perhaps to cultural sensitivity or to an understandable reluctance to 
characterize nearly one-third of the world’s polities as intractably resistant 
to popular rule, scholars have tended to treat the relationship between 
Islam and democracy circumspectly and have steered clear of examining it 
rigorously.  The evidence presented here, however, reveals a link that is 
too stark and robust to ignore, neglect, or dismiss.103 
Acknowledging that political liberalism and democracy as a form of government are 
separate things allows one to make better sense of the data and phenomena scholars of 
democratization tend to focus upon, and it opens the door to responsible normative 
analysis of relationship of Islam to democracy.  Recall that, thanks to U.S. pressure, Iraq 
and Gaza have recently held elections.  Iran holds elections for significant political 
positions more frequently than any other country in the region save Turkey and Israel.104  
And yet, Iraq, Gaza, and Iran are among the most illiberal places in the Middle East—
indeed, on the face of the planet—according to their Freedom House scores.  It was not 
that long ago that Algeria’s free and fair elections plunged the country into chaos that 
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lasted more than a decade.  Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Kuwait, in contrast, rank as 
partially free, but their more favorable freedom scores are not attributable to free and fair 
elections, nor are they the result of a long history of popular participation.  Rather, in 
Morocco, Kuwait, and Tunisia (pre-Arab Spring), unelected elites with fairly liberal 
sensibilities ruled moderately, even absent elections for the most important political 
offices.  Turkey demonstrates the same dynamic particularly well:  as its non-democratic 
institutions have been weakened (as a precondition of consideration for admittance to the 
European Union) the country’s policies—domestic and foreign—have grown increasingly 
illiberal.  To lump electoral democracy and political liberalism together, as the dominant 
measures and most democratization scholars tend to, makes it difficult to investigate the 
reasons elections sometimes yield stable, limited governments friendly to Western 
interests, and other times, unstable and intrusive ones publicly committed to the 
annihilation of the West. 
To be fair, although he tends to downplay their importance in sweeping terms much of 
the time, Diamond is sensitive to the possibility religion and “culture” may, in the end, 
prove unusually consequential for democratizing efforts in the Arab world.  He worries 
that the consequences of increased political participation in the Middle East may not, in 
the end, meet the expectations of Westerners who associate democracy with stable, 
limited and tolerant government.  He is aware that Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and Gaza are not 
models to be emulated, and he is cognizant that empowering the people in other Arab 
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countries might yield similar results.105  It is not a study of the region’s dominant ideas, or 
the political history of the region, that seem to raise questions in Diamond’s mind.  
Numbers do.  Polls have shown that a proportion of those who support democracy in the 
Islamic world, perhaps an important proportion, in fact support Islamic democracy—a 
government that, while legitimate on popular sovereignty grounds, may nonetheless 
actively limit the rights and freedoms of minorities, perhaps going so far as to employ the 
coercive and regulatory authority of the state to enforce a puritanical moral code. “We do 
not yet know,” Diamond wrote in 2010,  
what proportion of those who opt both for ‘democracy’ and for Islamic influence 
in government favor an understanding of democracy that includes as an essential 
not only majority rule but also minority rights—including the right of the 
minority to try to become the majority in the next election.106 
Diamond is optimistic that democratizing reforms would yield tolerably liberal regimes 
throughout the Arab Middle East, but he admits he cannot be sure by his own 
methodology.  And yet, hardly any question in the discipline of political science is more 
urgent today, especially against the backdrop of the Arab Spring.   Answering it is 
indispensable to the articulation of a Mideast foreign policy tailored to achieve U.S. 
interest, no less than to crafting effective development strategies in the Middle East, to the 
pursuit of humanitarian objectives in the Middle East (which have more to do with liberal 
governance than political participation), and to the upcoming constitutional conventions 
that are the fruit of 2011’s revolutions.  It is, not, however a question that can be 
answered by the prevailing methodologies.  Analyses of Freedom House scores, economic 
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variables, and the geopolitical forces at work in the Arab Middle East offer limited 
insights.  Certainly, they cannot yield answers to the question:  “what did the drafters of 
Iraq’s constitution get wrong?” or “How is it that Ayatollah Khomeini’s popular 
revolution yielded a theocracy?”  Scholars must ask the harder, entirely theoretical, 
question:  what produced, in the United States, that which Tocqueville called “a mature 
and reflective taste for freedom?”; and what are the salient factors—that might impede, 
or indeed support, political liberalism—present today in the Islamic world?  Or to put it 
another, more general, way, what does it take to build in a population a temperament 
that will lead it to make limited use of its legislative authority, and show restraint in the 
employment of the rights and freedoms associated with democracy? 
The present study takes a theoretical approach to the study of liberal democracy, but 
attempts to apply theoretical insights derived from the great democratic theorists to 
concrete contemporary problems facing the Middle East and U.S. foreign policy today.  
Political theorists have, for most of history, acknowledged (if they did not simply presume) 
that a people’s guiding opinions matter very much to the manner in which a given 
political or institutional arrangement will function in practice.  Plato’s dialogues are 
replete with examples.  Hardly anything is more important than the education of the 
guardian class in the Republic; the just regime is impossible absent a domineering moral 
and political education that creates a very specific kind of citizen.  Similarly, in Plato’s 
Laws, an elite group, distinguished by their learning, are charged with the maintenance of 
their morally upright political community, what requires, above all, the close supervision 
of pedagogic influences, very broadly construed.  Speaking more generally, Aristotle 
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observes in the Politics that a regime is as much defined by its guiding principles—guiding 
ideals internalized by the population—as it is by the organizational or constitutional 
structure of the government itself; different regimes will require different kinds of citizens 
to function as they are supposed to.  Machiavelli traces the end of the Roman Republic to 
the expiration of Romans’ virtue; the influx of wealth and foreign ideas destroyed the 
republic by transforming the way her citizens understood themselves and their 
relationship to their fatherland; thus, they began to make new, and destructive, uses of 
long-established political offices that had long guarded Romans’ liberty.  Montesquieu 
called his great work The Spirit of the Laws precisely because it is the temperament of the 
people—affected by so many things, not least, prevailing manners of religious 
interpretation—that animates laws written on parchment.  Rousseau agreed, and to the 
same effect explains in his Social Contract that a population’s mores—its sacred opinions and 
habits of the heart—constitute the most important kind of laws, more important, even, 
than a place’s formal constitution.  This is why John Locke provides a foundational 
education for free and limited government in his treatises on government.  His refutation 
of the divine right of kings, and the teaching he replaces it with—that human beings have 
natural rights—was intended as much to constitute an education for liberal democrats as 
it is a theoretical meditation.   Locke meant to provide a firm theoretical basis for the 
sacred commitments that, once internalized, would lead a people to be vigilant defenders 
of their rights, prickly citizens constantly on the lookout for accumulations of political 
authority prejudicial to their freedoms.  Tocqueville, of course, is particularly conscious of 
the importance of mores to free government in the United States:  he attributes the success 
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of the American democracy, above all, to Americans’ sacred opinions, many of which he 
believed were derived from, and promulgated by, Reformed Christianity. 
A theoretical approach to questions such as these is not, therefore, anomalous in the 
context of the history of serious political thinking.  At a time France was debating the 
importance of Algeria to French interests, Tocqueville himself inquired into the 
compatibility of liberal democracy and Islam from that practical concern in much the 
same way this project does.   He contemplated the works of Rousseau and Montesquieu, 
read the Qur’an, visited Algeria, and proceeded to give public speeches about what he 
had determined.  The old approach to questions of this sort has lately been marginalized, 
however, probably as a result of the dominance of the positivist conception of the social 
sciences.  Methods and models that are able to quantify the variables under consideration 
have the clear advantage of yielding relatively unambiguous results.  Some questions, 
however, are much less amenable to investigation by quantitative methodologies.  The 
character and political impact of invisible commitments held in men’s minds cannot be 
measured and investigated adequately by the methods used to analyze economic 
indicators, nor even public opinion polls.  If ideas, airy nothings internalized by the 
population, determine how a particular political arrangement functions in fact, the 
appropriate research method will involve a careful investigation of those ideas:  their 
origins, bases, dissemination, the sources of resistance to them, their evolution over time, 
the ways they influence political and moral life.  It may even be that the dominant 
methods employed by scholars of comparative democratization have obscured the most 
important variables—at least in the Islamic world—by their inability to measure them. 
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One of the main hypotheses underlying this project—namely, that a series of 
intellectual revolutions built the free West—has been taken up from other angles by a 
number of studies published in the years since this study began.  In the aptly titled A 
Revolution of the Mind:  Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy 
(2010), Jonathan Israel argues that the dominant minds of the Enlightenment are 
responsible for the commitments that underlie modern democracy:   
Radical Enlightenment is a set of basic principles that can be summed up 
concisely as:  democracy, racial and sexual equality; individual liberty of lifestyle; 
full freedom of thought, expression, and the press; eradication of religious 
authority from the legislative process and education; and full separation of church 
and state.107   
He goes on to point out (“surprising as it may seem”) that “the history of this process—
the gradual advance of the ideas underpinning democratic Enlightenment in the modern 
era—remains very little studied or known.”108  Israel is right on this count.  And while his 
short book makes a tremendous contribution to the subject, it does not exhaust the field.  
In particular, the present project focuses less on Enlightenment ideas and their exponents 
(which is Israel’s express focus) in favor of investigating the reasons the radical new ideas 
put forth by the likes of Spinoza and Locke successfully took hold of the pre-modern 
minds in Europe to help build modern Western civilization.  This project also contends 
that the Enlightenment represents but one of three distinct ideational revolutions 
responsible for building the modern world.  Last, unlike Israel’s, the present study 
considers, first and foremost, the political consequences of these revolutions of social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Jonathan Israel, A Revolution of Mind:  Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern 
Democracy (New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 2010), viii. 
108 Jonathan Israel, A Revolution of Mind, ix. 
	  43 
consciousness in the West, especially from the perspective of the prospects of 
democratization in the Arab Middle East. 
Steven Nadler’s recent contribution, A Book Forged in Hell (2011), makes a similar 
contribution, but focuses on a particular Enlightenment thinker, Benedict Spinoza.  The 
subtitle of Nadler’s book, “Spinoza’s Scandalous Treatise and the Birth of the Secular 
Age,” nicely encapsulates its dominant argument.  Spinoza’s radical ideas—fairly obscure 
philosophic and theological arguments advanced in the seventeenth century—in large 
part laid the foundation for modern government, characterized so importantly today by a 
wall of separation between church and state.   Spinoza, arguing from purportedly 
religious premises, provided for theologians and priests a distinctly modern—and just 
barely respectable—new way of conceiving of the Bible, religion’s proper (more limited) 
role in the political affairs of the community, the nature of man, his rights and obligations, 
etc.109  With his Theologico-Political Treatise, Spinoza thus founded modern Biblical 
criticism:  he is the first to argue the Bible is a work of literature subject to critical 
interpretation, in particular, interpretations that severely limit the claims of religious 
authorities to political authority on earth.110  This revolutionary new idea had profound, 
and liberalizing, political consequences.  Nadler contends that Spinoza intended the book 
to “contribute to undermining both the practical ability of religious authorities to control 
our emotional, intellectual, and physical lives and the theoretical justifications they 
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employ for doing so.111  Thus, the Treatise is not simply “one of the most important and 
influential books in the history of philosophy”; for Nadler, by transforming Westerners’ 
conception of themselves and God, “the Treatise also has a proud and well-deserved place 
in the rise of democratic theory, civil liberties, and political liberalism.”112  On Nadler’s 
account, too, ideas built Western civilization; without their wide dissemination, political 
life as we know it would be impossible.  This project echoes aspects of Nadler’s work, but 
focuses on how the ideas spread, and the manner in which they exerted liberalizing 
political effect.  In particular, the current project underlines the significance of Spinoza’s 
contribution in the context of recent (and countervailing) trends in Islamist thought. 
In The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society (2012), Brad 
Gregory argues that “the Western world today is an extraordinarily complex, tangled 
product of rejections, retentions, and transformations of medieval Western Christianity, 
in which the Reformation era constitutes the critical watershed.”113  In particular, he 
underlines the historically unusual coexistence, in a single political community, of “an 
enormously wide range of incompatible truth claims pertaining to human values, 
aspirations, norms, morality, and meaning.”114  In a reversal of the common assumption, 
the West is the anomaly in this respect.  As Gregory goes on to note, “[a] hyperpluralism 
of religious and secular commitments, not any shared or even convergent view about 
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what ‘we’ think is true or right or good, marks the early twenty-first century.”115 
Gregory’s book investigates an intellectual transformation that occurred over the course 
of more than five centuries, one he believes made the momentous transition from modern 
to pre-modern life possible in the first place.  The “enormity of the transition,” Gregory 
goes on to argue, “has helped mask the continuing influence of the distant past in the 
present.”116  
Michael Allen Gillespie makes a similar argument in his brilliant, but very difficult, book, 
The Theological Origins of Modernity (2008).  Like Gregory, he traces the epistemological and 
metaphysical assumptions characteristic of the modern West to a crisis in Christian 
theology, not simply to the radical new, often secular, ideas proposed by Enlightenment 
philosophers.  Gillespie contends that the modern world cannot be understood absent an 
understanding of the theological revolution against the Nominalist conception of God 
that had emerged by the fourteenth century, which posited a willful, and frighteningly 
omnipotent Ruler who was “a continual threat to human well-being.”117  More than 
three centuries of disputation respecting the nature of man and God ensued among 
Christian theologians.  For Gillespie, efforts to restore a conception of man that 
acknowledged the dignity of the human intellect, and to reaffirm a loving conception of 
the Christian God, created an indispensable psychic receptivity among Christians to the 
cluster of sacred opinions—some of them secular in nature—that would later build the 
modern West. 	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Lynn Hunt has demonstrated that the West’s literature, too, played an important role in 
dispersing what would become the West’s new sacred opinions.  Her recent book, Inventing 
Human Rights:  A History (2007), takes a somewhat different, but complimentary, approach.  
She argues, in a lively and accessible style suited to reaching a broad audience, that 
“notions of liberty and rights” are underpinned by “a set of assumptions about individual 
autonomy.”118  While the “assumptions” that sustain the classical liberal temperament 
were first presented by philosophers in obscure treatises that advanced difficult theoretical 
arguments, their wider—popular—dissemination was made possible by novels written for 
mass consumption at a time literacy and the availability of printed materials was 
beginning to surge, as well as reforms to prevailing conceptions of education.  Most 
important for Hunt:  reforms in the intellectual sphere enabled men and women to 
empathize with their fellows more profoundly, and across a wider spectrum of society, 
than had ever before been possible.119  Thus, art roused feeling to teach new, modern, 
truths.  Among them:  a new disposition, characterized by a kind of willing self-restraint, 
that leads those who have internalized it to refrain from interfering with others’ pursuit of 
personal autonomy within fairly generous limitations.  Hunt argues that it was novels like 
Rousseau’s Julie and Richardson’s Clarissa that “taught their readers nothing less than a 
new psychology and in the process laid the foundations for a new social and political 
order.”120  Everybody loves, after all, no matter his or her social station.  The 
complimentary educational theories put forth by Locke and Rousseau, meanwhile, shifted 	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emphasis from “obedience enforced through punishment to the careful cultivation of 
reason as the chief instrument of independence.”121  Without putting it in quite these 
terms, Hunt shows how the emotionalism of the Romantics complimented the 
Enlightenment’s liberation of the human mind, even though the former movement 
sought expressly to refute many of the latter’s dominant assumptions. 
Hunt, very compellingly, offers a glimpse of the argument that would, perhaps, have been 
the heart of the book Isaiah Berlin was writing at the time of his death.  Berlin’s 
unfinished book-length study—to be titled something like “The Romantic Revolution”—
was the outgrowth of a series of lectures he delivered in March and April of 1965 at the 
National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C.122  It was not conceived as a work of literary 
criticism, art history, or any other subject that could fit comfortably within the realm of 
the humanities; rather, his book was to blend the social sciences and the arts, exposing the 
romantic movement’s underappreciated impact on “political and social life, and moral 
life as well.”123  In another place, Berlin goes so far as to remark that “intellectual history” 
in general, and “the relation of ideas to action”—that is, the “interplay of ideas with 
social, economic and technological developments”—in particular, have been under-
investigated in the English-speaking world.124  In a fragment discovered among his papers 
pertaining to those lectures, Berlin expressed the true magnitude of the revolution of the 
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European mind that made romanticism possible, along with its sweeping social and 
political consequences, this way: 
It appears to me that a radical shift of values occurred in the latter half of 
the eighteenth century—before what is properly called the romantic 
movement—which has affected thought, feeling and action in the Western 
world…  I hope to show that this revolution is the deepest and most lasting 
of all the changes in the life of the West, no less far-reaching than the three 
great revolutions whose impact is not questioned—the industrial revolution 
in England, the political in France, and the social and economic in 
Russia—with which, indeed, the movement with which I am concerned is 
connected at every level.125 
As Berlin put it in his first lecture, “The importance of romanticism is that it is the largest 
recent movement to transform the lives and the thought of the Western world.  It seems 
to me to be the greatest single shift in the consciousness of the West that has ever 
occurred.”126  That shift, in Berlin’s opinion, is defined by a collective uneasiness with—
and for some, an explicit rejection of—the notion that a single truth (knowable by reason 
or revelation) should guide human life:  romanticism “shifted consciousness… away from 
the notion that there are universal truths… that all human activities were meant to 
terminate in…”127  As a consequence, action (directed in a variety of different directions 
according to a variety of standards, emotions, inspirations, feelings, inclinations, etc.) 
came to be privileged above thought.128  To the extent that this transformation of moral 
outlook is internalized, Berlin implies it helps to make possible a new degree of toleration 
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of diversity in civic life, while at the same time legitimating—even demanding—a very 
limited government. 
This project employs the method Gregory, Israel, Nadler, Gillespie, Hunt and Berlin 
have utilized, and it concurs with the general thrust of their findings:  ideas that 
originated in Europe, and which could perhaps only have originated in Christian 
Europe—but which have since spread widely—made Western civilization in its modern 
incarnation.  This project goes further than any one of these recent studies in three 
respects.  First, it argues that a strange amalgamation of not two, but three, intellectual 
revolutions—the Enlightenment, the Reformation, and European Romanticism—built the 
modern Western personality.  Second, it pays special attention to the interplay between 
the sacred opinions of Westerners and liberal democracy as the West’s dominant—its 
only legitimate—political regime, demonstrating the dependence of the latter on the 
former.  Third, it situates the discussion in the context of the likelihood democratizing 
reform in the Arab-Islamic world, for the most part untouched by the those revolutions of 
human consciousness, will yield liberal government.  In particular, it examines the 
powerful arguments put forth by theologians and jurists who have popularized illiberal 
interpretations of Islam that were, to considerable extent, expressly and self-consciously 
designed to prevent modernity’s new opinions—and the political regime built upon 
them—from taking hold in the Islamic world.  And it tries to identify the foreign policy 
implications of these important theoretical insights.  To date, no English-language study 
of the arguments put forth by leading Islamists has been attempted according to the 
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present methodology, guided by the insight that ideas can have determinative political 
consequences. 
Commenting on the unusualness of his own study, Brad Gregory explains that the 
difficulty of questions such as these has deterred scholars from taking them up.  They are 
difficult to ask, and harder yet to answer, in part because of the specialized and 
compartmentalized nature of the academy today.  The coterization of the disciplines, and 
within them, so many sub-specialties, obscures the big picture:  “research restricted to the 
boundaries created by such parceling cannot itself answer the question of how the 
Western world today came to be as it is.”129  In addition to the organizational boundaries 
that separate the relevant kernels of understanding and scholarship from one another in 
the modern university, methodological disagreements among scholars and subfields tend 
to further reify the divisions that isolate academics who are studying questions and 
problems that are intimately related.  As a result, asking and answering big questions in a 
way that allows the outcome to have impact in any of the fields to which it is relevant 
requires a familiarity with the literatures and dominant approaches of multiple disciplines 
or specialties.  Too often, this impedes both the advancement of learning and the 
elaboration of policies that reflect the academy’s collected expertise.   
Gregory’s observation pertains to the current study, perhaps even doubly so.  This project 
proposes not only to demonstrate that Western ideals and commitments are intimately 
connected to the possibility of representative government that is also limited and tolerant; 	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it also investigates the origin and character of ideational impediments to liberalism 
present today in the Islamic world.  What is more, the current study means to identify a 
pressing practical application for the insights it collects.  It contends that the failure to 
understand and apply these “big ideas”—so far removed from the ordinary methods and 
interests of those who study and make foreign policy—is one of the main reasons for 
America’s misadventure in Iraq, a failure that has come at extraordinarily high cost to the 
United States in terms of lives lost, dollars expended, and international credibility 
squandered.  Renewed attention to questions such as these, by what is admittedly an old 
approach, is all the more important as the United States reaffirms its commitment to 
democracy promotion in the wake of the Arab Spring. 
 
 
	  	   52	  
F I R S T   P A R T 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, DEMOCRACY, AND IRAQ 
 
C H A P T E R   I 
THE EMERGENCE OF REGIME CHANGE AS  
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
 
Rarely in the annals of history has it been so difficult to determine casus belli as it is in 
the case of America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq.130  Steve Yetiv has written that “it will take 
years and perhaps decades for the declassification of documents that will allow a clearer 
picture of exactly why the United States invaded Iraq.”131  When asked why the U.S. 
went to war in Iraq, Richard Haass, at the time the head of the policy-planning staff at 
the State Department, told a reporter, “I will go to my grave not knowing that.”132  Nor 
can Robert Jervis, one of the most astute scholars of U.S. foreign policy writing today, 
conceive of a “fully satisfying account of why the Bush administration behaved as it 
did.”133   Perhaps because of this unusual degree of lingering ambiguity, commentators 
have been able to accuse President Bush of authorizing war to avenge his father, to steal 
Middle Eastern oil or for the sake of the energy industry’s profits, to expand the power of 
the U.S. Presidency, at the behest of a powerful Jewish lobby, or simply to reassert 
American military primacy.  If these are borderline ludicrous suggestions, the fact they 	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are nonetheless taken seriously in some quarters is revealing.  Even today, more than 
eight years after the invasion commenced, the relationship among the more serious 
rationales for the Iraq war—Saddam Hussein’s chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons programs, the possibility of a terrorist organization acquiring such weapons, the 
hope that a functioning liberal democracy could be established in and transform the 
Middle East—remains difficult to untangle.   
One reason for this:  the policymakers responsible for America’s intervention in Iraq did 
not themselves entirely agree about the war’s aims.  Too often in the lead-up to war, and 
more damaging yet, as it was being prosecuted, principal actors failed to marshal the 
resources of the U.S. government behind a single coherent war aim as a result of 
disagreements about what they were trying to achieve.  A second reason for the confusion 
over the casus belli that persists today:  a number of the very reasonable foreign policy 
objectives that did draw the U.S. to invade Iraq are related in complicated ways.  For 
instance, Saddam Hussein’s decade long refusal to abide to international agreements 
mandating the verifiable dismantling of his WMD programs necessitated a change of 
regime in Iraq.  Regime change, in turn, requires the substitution of one government for 
another.  Liberal democracy was the obvious candidate for the new regime in Iraq for 
both moral and strategic reasons; promoting it effectively, however, turned out to be the 
most difficult aspect of the engagement, so difficult in fact that the attempt to leave in Iraq 
a regime more decent that the one overturned has created a new set of security concerns 
for the United States today.   
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Why the emphasis on democracy?  In the first place, the establishment of a functioning 
liberal democratic regime in Iraq was expected to stanch a grave and gathering threat, 
replacing a unpredictable tyrant and state sponsor of terrorism long intent to become a 
nuclear power with a stable state, this at a time when America’s appetite for risks born of 
the stagnant politics of the Middle East had been greatly diminished by the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.  Second, it was hoped a prosperous and tolerant constitutional regime in the 
heart of the Middle East would lead to the diffusion of modern and moderate government 
throughout the region, perhaps addressing the problem of terrorism at its so-called root.  
Third, liberal democracy is believed to be the only morally defensible regime on 
humanitarian grounds; to aim at the establishment of anything less—a state dominated 
by a tyrant friendly to America’s interests, say—is not compatible with the character of 
the American democracy.   Last, the successful overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime was 
supposed to serve as a deterrent post-9/11; regimes elsewhere would be deterred from 
seeking WMD technology and/or harboring terrorists if they were confident the U.S. 
would not tolerate rogue behavior.  More important, they would be induced to use their 
domestic police capabilities to crack down in anti-American extremists operating within 
their borders. 
It does not, however, follow that the goals that guided policymakers to invade Iraq, and 
subsequently, to attempt to establish a liberal democracy there, were equally important to 
the decision-making process.  It makes sense, then, to begin one’s inquiry not by asking 
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what regime change in Iraq was supposed to accomplish, but why Saddam Hussein was 
targeted for replacement in the first place.134   
There is zero evidence the Bush administration came to office with grandiose foreign 
policy designs.   In fact, it is well known that prior to 9/11, the Bush administration 
envisioned a non-interventionist, neo-isolationist, foreign policy.  As Condoleezza Rice 
famously put it in the lead-up to the 2000 election, a Bush Presidency would have little 
interest in nation building; “U.S. troops should not be used to escort school children.”135  
That the Defense Department leadership had internalize a powerful aversion to nation-
building is, in fact, one of the reasons for a great many of operational blunders that 
crippled the reconstruction effort. 
If 9/11 is intimately related to the decision to invade Iraq, it did not serve as a pretext to 
invade for some other unrelated and illegitimate reason.  Rather, the terrorist attacks on 
New York City and Washington, D.C., utterly upended the prevailing foreign policy 
calculation.  9/11 revealed the threat posed by the possibility of an intersection of 
radicalism—jihadist Islam—and modern technology in terrifying and urgent fashion.  At a 	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moment, Americans were made aware that an enemy dedicated to destroying the 
country’s institutions and killing civilians en mass existed.  They had used the fruits of our 
civilization against us in a manner calculated to exert a horrendous toll, and there was no 
reason to imagine more spectacular attacks were not in the works.   
As a result, terrorist organizations and rogue states seeking or in possession of WMD, 
whose interests (which is to say, whose rulers’ conceptions of their own interests) were not 
easily deduced by policymakers in the West, had urgently to be reevaluated.  What threat 
did they pose?  The will to strike American and her allies was obviously stronger than had 
previously been acknowledged; and the means, it was feared, increasingly accessible.  
How precisely this dynamic led to the invasion of Iraq and the consequent effort to 
establish modern and moderate government in Iraq and beyond is not an uncomplicated 
story.  But to usefully evaluate that effort—its failures and the reasons for them—one 
must begin by considering the foreign policy approach and assumptions that had allowed 
the Al-Qaeda threat to gather largely unimpeded in the lead up to 9/11. 
 
U.S. Foreign Policy pre-9/11  
The Middle East has long represented a vital strategic interest for U.S. foreign policy.  It 
was President Jimmy Carter, in his 1980 State of the Union Address, who declared,  
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
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interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by 
any means necessary, including military force.136   
President Carter’s formulation is particularly illustrative for two reasons:  first, insofar as 
saber rattling was not emphatically not Carter’s style, his uncharacteristically bellicose 
rhetoric on this question should underline the region’s high importance to U.S. interests 
for readers from across the political spectrum; second, and more important, his statement 
more or less encapsulates America’s foreign policy in the decades leading up to 9/11—
there was no grand strategy.  America intervened here and there not to balance against 
the strongest power (as a realist foreign policy would demand), nor to achieve regional 
hegemony, but rather, to ensure continued influence in the region at relatively low cost, 
and when necessary, to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon with interests 
antithetical to America’s.  Far from relishing Mideast involvement, the U.S. “often tried 
to achieve these goals without involving itself seriously in the region.”137  As Steve Yetiv 
has recently shown, a new term, “reactive engagement,” best describes America’s 
approach to the region since 1972.  Call it reluctant realism.  There was no overarching 
grand strategy; U.S. actions were calibrated, for the most part, as hesitant responses to 
events it did not welcome and failed to predict.138  
Thus, Democratic and Republican administrations have supported regimes more and less 
compliant to America’s multiplicity of interests throughout the region for decades in a 
variety of ways.  From weapons’ transfers to Saudi Arabia, to massive foreign aid for 
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Egypt, to the funding and arming of the mujahidin movement in Afghanistan against the 
Soviets, to support for Saddam Hussein in his decade long war with Iran, the U.S. has 
backed authoritarian strongmen in the Middle East where it has served (or seemed to 
serve) U.S. interests.   
Dictators in the region have hardly proven reliable as allies, however, a fact clearly 
revealed by the calamity of 9/11.  One cost of the cooperation of Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, et al. had been tolerating their rulers’ tolerance of (and sometimes their 
aggravation of) widespread public anti-Americanism.  The importance of over flight 
privileges, or land for military bases, or intelligence sharing, or a proxy during the Cold 
War in Afghanistan, or the establishment of a climate hospitable to resource extraction 
(often by Western companies) was important enough that American policymakers more 
or less turned a blind eye to the rulers’ odious domestic policies.  On the one hand, the 
cooperation of men like Hosni Mubarak and Pervez Musharaff seemed manifestly more 
important to U.S. interests than their oppression of their own subjects.  On the other, 
their political rivals were not usually any more appealing, neither from a humanitarian 
perspective, nor the perspective of American interests in the region.  Rulers throughout 
the Middle East were “bastards”, it is often said, but their apparent containment of more 
serious threats and their cooperation with the U.S. (if often halfhearted) at least made 
them “our bastards.”  This justified tolerating their illiberality, even their blatant anti-
Americanism at home, sometimes even their tacit support of anti-American factions 
within their governments.   
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The approach was far from perfect, but insofar as the alternatives to strongman or 
military rule seemed sure to be much less amenable to U.S. influence and pragmatic 
compromise, it seemed the sensible approach on the grounds of the U.S. national interest.  
Iran’s 1979 Revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini’s Theocracy is the most obvious proof 
that the alternatives could, in fact, turn out to be worse (and not only for U.S. interests, 
but for the domestic population as well).  Fears that men like Ayman Zawahiri and 
Osama Bin Laden, jihadists willing to sacrifice everything to damage America and its 
interests, could well amass political influence (if not outright control) of a key Muslim state 
as a result of political instability (say, in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan) has always limited U.S. 
pressure to liberalize those states, even at the height of the Bush administration’s efforts to 
support the democratization of the Middle East.139  It is not hard to understand why. 
 
September 11th, 2001 Reveals Mistaken Assumptions 
The events of September 11th are a watershed moment for thinking about U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East because it revealed that America’s ostensible allies in the region 
had utterly failed to fulfill an implied end of the bargain.  True, they had cooperated in a 
number of highly important areas.  For their help, America had more or less ignored 
domestic politics in the Middle East.   Domestic politics in the Middle East had not, 
however, ignored America.  Far from containing radicals operating on their soil, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 In fact, in the lead up to the 2003 war in Iraq, the most persuasive argument against invasion 
(given what was known, or generally believed, about Saddam Hussein’s WMD program at the 
time) was, in my opinion, the possibility that increased U.S. military presence on the Arabian 
peninsula would destabilize Saudi Arabia in a way that was likely to benefit radical Islamists.  
	  60 
became apparent that rulers ostensibly supportive of U.S. interests were tolerating 
extremists who proved spectacularly that they could not easily be contained.  9/11 
revealed that a key assumption underlying the old foreign policy—namely, that America 
could afford to turn a blind eye to the domestic policies of Arab rulers—left America 
vulnerable to a new kind of threat. 
Nor were the ruling elites in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan simply turning a 
blind eye to radical Islamic and anti-American sentiment (in part to shore up their own 
legitimacy).  The way they governed was also, in large part, responsible for the complete 
breakdown of the Arab state.  The resultant political and economic stagnation, to say 
nothing of the monumental corruption and cronyism that is commonplace in the Arab 
world, gives increased traction to Islamist complaints about America, on both the political 
and jihadist ends of the spectrum.  Indeed, on virtually every measure, the Middle East 
lags desperately behind others region in terms of economic development and the spread 
of free and stable government, a fact that gives not a little traction to those championing 
renewed commitment to a purified form of Islam as the solution.  In many cases, 
authoritarian rulers actively encouraged Anti-Americanism insofar as it created an 
external enemy against whom the energies of domestic radicals could be channeled.  To 
the extent fundamentalists focused their attention on the distant empire whose support 
solidified despotic regimes on Islamic soil, the despots were thrilled. 
That this reactive realism as foreign policy approach to the Middle East tolerated and 
arguably strengthened the appeal of Islamic radicalism is not, itself, a sufficient argument to 
jettison it.  But in a world in which those depots cannot be counted in to contain to their 
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own borders the virulent anti-Americanism they often foment, one in which jihadists’ 
ambition to kill Westerners en mass on Western soil is more credible than ever, the 
foreign policy calculus is necessarily altered.  The terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington, the most destructive attacks ever carried out on American soil, highlighted a 
risk associated with the pre-9/11 foreign policy approach to the Middle East that had not 
previously been appreciated.  At the same time, the public’s appetite for the toleration of 
unpredictable Mideast tyrants plummeted as policymakers realized the old approach had 
created a vulnerability.  It is not hard to see that U.S. foreign policy had to change.  
 
A New Foreign Policy Emerges 
The Bush administration reinvented U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East for a very 
simple reason:  the former approach had failed; it had failed to prevent, and arguably 
helped make possible, the events of 9/11.  To prevent future terrorist attacks the 
administration developed a strategy it hoped would prevent the intersection of radicalism 
and technology by targeting both elements of the equation—jihadists’ access to the means 
of mass destruction, to modern technology, in the immediate term, while attempting to 
treat their radicalism over the long term.   
To this end, the Bush Doctrine had four concrete pillars.  First, it announced preventative 
strikes against regimes that support terrorism and those that might transfer WMD 
technologies to them (whether through official channels or backchannels) would be 
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authorized where diplomacy and containment seemed inadequate.  This was the primary 
justification for intervention in Iraq.  
In the interim, however, it was hoped intervention in Iraq would have a second beneficial 
effect:  it would deter other states in the region from sponsoring terrorism and signal to 
every regime that the consequences of failing to contain pockets of radical Islam festering 
within their borders would be serious.  Whether Saddam Hussein had connections to Al-
Qaeda in particular was and is immaterial on this point; demonstrating America’s 
willingness and capacity to overthrow regimes that did not comply with its demands was 
the key point.  The end of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq would provide a credible 
incentive for rulers from Saudi Arabia, to Egypt, to Pakistan, to Algeria to take the 
problem seriously or risk being unseated in the ignominious manner of Iraq’s former 
ruler.  WMD programs would be abandoned as well, it was hoped, if the U.S. and its 
allies could credibly establish that they would not be tolerated.   
Third, a successful political transformation in Iraq would, it was hoped, provide a new 
strategic pillar for the U.S. in the Middle East, thereby reducing American dependence 
on its not always reliable allies in the region.  A better relationship with Iraq post-Saddam 
would, by reducing the strategic importance of alliances with countries like Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt, have perhaps also permitted the application of greater modernizing pressure 
on those regimes, even at the cost of unseating their strongmen if they refused to 
progressively open their societies.  Condoleezza Rice, as she was leaving office, explained 
that building decent, friendly, regimes in the place of the brutal dictatorships the U.S. 
dismantled remains a vital interest of the United States:  “Our long-term partnerships 
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with Afghanistan and Iraq, to which we must remain deeply committed… provide a solid 
geostrategic foundation for the generational work ahead of helping to bring about a 
better, more democratic, and more prosperous Middle East.140 
Today, these aims are more or less forgotten, and the Bush Doctrine is identified with its 
fourth and long-term aim: the promotion of “modern and moderate government” in the 
Middle East.  This element of the administration’s security strategy led the U.S. to try to 
establish a constitutional regime in Iraq, in the hope that bringing freedom and 
democracy to the one part of the world in which it had not begun to take hold would 
invigorate a transformation, one that would ultimately make the perversion of Islam that 
has inspired jihadism less attractive.  
 
Threat and Opportunity 
Various critics have suggested (failing to note the contradiction) that democracy 
promotion was both the real (but secret because quasi-Imperialistic) rationale for war, and 
that democracy promotion was never a serious interest-driven component of the Bush 
Doctrine, but a disingenuous and flimsy attempt at a post hoc justification for a war that 
might otherwise have appeared unjustifiable given the ultimate failure to discover large 
WMD caches in the country.  It is true that the democracy-promotion rhetoric was 
ratcheted up as it became clear that the intelligence underlying the case for preemptive 
war was mistaken.  Of course, this does not mean the concerns about Saddam Hussein’s 	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WMD program were made up, or that some other motivation (democratization in this 
case) was, all along, the guiding concern of decision makers.   
The truth lies somewhere in between the two criticisms:  Saddam Hussein’s WMD 
program and democracy promotion were coordinate justifications for invading Iraq, the 
second emerging as an opportunity from the first.  Douglas Feith, whose firsthand 
account of the discussions at the Department of Defense and National Security Council 
that led to war is the most comprehensive we have, could not have be more adamant:   
[T]o my knowledge—and contrary to what his critics have charged—
[President Bush]never argued, in public or private, that the United States 
should go to war in order to spread democracy…  [T]he reason to go to war 
was self-defense.  If that necessity drove us to war, the fighting might open 
the way for a new democracy to arise (as it did with Germany, Italy, and 
Japan after World War II).  If that new democracy developed successfully, 
the United States, as well as the Iraqi people, would benefit.  But it’s one 
thing to try to ensure that your defeated enemy becomes a democracy after 
the war comes to an end, and quite another to initiate a war for that 
purpose.141    
Asked in an interview with The New Yorker in 2003, on the eve of invasion, “whether the 
United States, if it goes to war, would be doing so partly because it wants to change the 
Middle East as a whole,” Feith replied that while war in Iraq would create an opportunity 
to transform the region, something potentially very valuable, creating such an 
opportunity was not a sufficient reason to invade a country: 
Would anybody be thinking about using military power in Iraq in order to 
do a political experiment in Iraq in the hope that it would have positive 
political spillover effects throughout the region?  The answer is no.  That’s 
not the kind of thing that leads a country like the United States to commit 
the kind of military forces that we’re committing to this effort.142 	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If Feith’s account establishes on the one hand that the U.S. did not initiate war in Iraq 
specifically to spread democracy, his account of the articulation of the Bush 
administration’s National Security Strategy simultaneously explains why a traditional 
realist approach to Iraq would not have achieved the primary objective of securing the 
national interest as defined in the wake of 9/11.  He explains that while the catalyst for 
war with Saddam Hussein was not a desire to embark upon a democratic experiment in 
the heart of the Middle East, a way of life-transforming approach to the problem of terrorism 
was nonetheless necessary (and remains necessary today).143  The great contribution of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Here, he disagrees with Paul Pillar, the CIA’s National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East 
during the lead up to war in Iraq.  In 2006, shortly after his retirement from government, Pillar 
argued in a widely-cited piece published by Foreign Affairs that democracy-promotion must have 
been the primary justification for intervention in Iraq. His argument is based of his own 
interpretation of the CIA evidence against Saddam Hussein’s regime.  He does not go so far as 
some today and assert that the evidence against Saddam Hussein was manufactured.  In contrast, 
this knowledgeable opponent of the Bush Doctrine is quite willing to admit that “the Bush 
administration was quite right: its perception of Saddam's weapons capacities was shared by the 
Clinton administration, congressional Democrats, and most other Western governments and 
intelligence services” (Paul R. Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, 
Vol.85, No. 2 (March/April 2006), pp.15-16).  He goes on, however, to conclude that “in making 
[their] defense, the White House also inadvertently pointed out the real problem: intelligence on 
Iraqi weapons programs did not drive its decision to go to war. A view broadly held in the United 
States and even more so overseas was that deterrence of Iraq was working, that Saddam was 
being kept ‘in his box,’ and that the best way to deal with the weapons problem was through an 
aggressive inspections program to supplement the sanctions already in place. That the 
administration arrived at so different a policy solution indicates that its decision to topple Saddam 
was driven by other factors -- namely, the desire to shake up the sclerotic power structures of the 
Middle East and hasten the spread of more liberal politics and economics in the region.”  
Pillar, it must be noted, was not a member of a policy-making apparatus of the government.  
Moreover, Pillar and Defense Department officials including Feith have since traded serious 
accusations—the former (generally supported by the media) accusing the White House and 
Pentagon of politicizing intelligence, and the latter accusing the CIA of filtering intelligence in 
order to advance the CIA policy preference. That Pillar was not privy to the discussions from 
which the Bush administration’s security strategy emerged must lead us to view his suggestion 
with some skepticism.  And while it is probably impossible to adjudicate the dispute 
authoritatively on the basis of the available evidence, it seems to me that Feith’s account is the 
best and most comprehensive available.  This is not to say that a number of disagreements 
between Feith and other principals should not be considered.  A number of them do, indeed, shed 
interesting light on the decision-making process.   
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Feith’s account is his explanation of the connection between the goal—securing 
America’s way of life in the era of mass-destruction terrorism—and the means the Bush 
administration adopted.  The administration, early on, discerned that durable security 
from the threat revealed by 9/11 required more than a willingness to decisively confront 
grave and gathering threats, preemptively when necessary; from the beginning, key 
members of the Bush administration perceived it would require changing “the way they 
live.”  Preventing an intersection of radicalism and technology—by preventing the 
dissemination of WMD technology and killing jihadists where intelligence permits—was 
the short term strategy.  The long term strategy, which the Bush administration believed 
they had set in motion in Iraq, was the transformation of the region in such a way that it 
would no longer produce extremists. 
Condoleezza Rice confirms Feith’s account.  In a carefully crafted essay for Foreign Affairs 
published in the summer of 2008, she states plainly that “The United States did not 
overthrow Saddam to democratize the Middle East.  It did so to remove a long-standing 
threat to international security.”  She goes on, however, to explain that the removing the 
threat and reconstructing Iraq as a democracy were always intimately related:  what, 
other than a democracy, could the U.S. have built in the place of the Ba’athist regime 
that would have been less likely to degenerate immediately, or in time, into another 
autocracy ultimately susceptible to the Middle East’s malignancies?  As Secretary Rice 
explains, 
the administration was conscious of the goal of democratization in the 
aftermath of liberation.  We discussed the question of whether we should 
be satisfied with the end of Saddam’s rule and the rise of another 
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strongman to replace him.  The answer was no, and it was thus avowedly 
U.S. policy from the outset to try to support the Iraqis in building a 
democracy in Iraq.  It is important to remember that we did not overthrow 
Adolf Hitler to bring democracy to Germany either.  But the United States 
believed that only a democratic Germany could ultimately anchor a lasting 
peace in Europe.  The democratization of Iraq and the democratization of 
the Middle East were thus linked.  So, too, was the war on terror linked to 
Iraq, because the goal after September 11 was to address the deeper 
malignancies of the Middle East, not just the symptoms of them.  It is very 
hard to imagine how a more just and democratic Middle East could ever 
have emerged with Saddam still at the center of the region.144 
The impetus to replace Saddam Hussein’s regime emerged first and foremost from—and 
was the precondition of—the successful elimination of what was widely believed at the 
time to be a serious WMD threat.  Democratization was an opportunity presented by the 
perceived need to overthrow Saddam Hussein in Iraq (and the Taliban in Afghanistan).   
To put the question in the form of a counterfactual, it is indisputable that the U.S. would 
not have sought regime change by direct military engagement if Saddam Hussein had at 
any point decided to cooperate fully with UNSCOM weapons inspections (later 
UNMOVIC) or if he had acceded to the Coalition’s ultimatum—to leave Iraq voluntarily 
to avoid forcible removal—on the eve of the invasion.  Real compliance with inspectors 
could have satisfied the administration that Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs were not 
a threat to the U.S.  Compliance with the ultimatum would have represented a first, very 
real, step toward the species of regime change the U.S. hoped to achieve.    
Nonetheless, a great deal of emphasis must be placed on the term “opportunity” as the 
Bush administration, certainly key members of it, were actively looking for an opportunity 
to effect a thoroughgoing transformation in the region.  This chapter emphasizes that the 
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democracy-promotion component of the Bush National Security Strategy (NSS)—what is 
intended to be a long-term solution to the threat posed by the intersection of radicalism 
and technology—was not tacked on haphazardly midway through intervention in Iraq, 
but was rather an integral element of the security strategy from the very beginning.  In 
fact, a foreign policy “unprecedented in its goals” was first articulated privately in 
discussions among the principals, (in system-transforming terms, no less) in the days and 
weeks immediately following 9/11.145   The President’s speeches and policy statements 
between the Fall of 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in the Spring of 2003 often noted the 
importance of promoting liberal democracy.  Important speeches delivered on the eve of 
war, and as it commenced, moreover, made repeated references to the opportunity war in 
Iraq presented.  From the beginning, then, there was one proximate cause for war in 
Iraq—its WMD program and the gathering threat it represented—but Iraq, at the same 
time, presented an opportunity to advance the national interest in a multiplicity of ways.  
In other terms, there was one cause of, but multiple national interest justifications for, the 
invasion of Iraq.  
 
Saddam Hussein’s WMD program 
In policy statements and the 2002 NSS, the Bush Administration did not at any point 
argue that Iraq’s WMD programs constituted an imminent threat to the U.S.  The 
argument, rather, was that Saddam Hussein posed a “grave and gathering threat,” and it 
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can clearly be shown that he did.  The CIA intelligence assessments were shared by 
virtually every other consequential intelligence agency in the world; prominent 
Democrats who analyzed that evidence came to the same conclusions Republicans did.  It 
is utterly inconceivable that one of the most severe sanctions regimes ever enforced by the 
global community under U.N auspices would have lasted more than a decade absent a 
broad consensus that Saddam Hussein’s regime posed a real threat.  Nor could the 
United Nations of all organizations have mustered a series of Chapter VII resolutions—
authorizing “serious consequences”—in the absence of a widely shared conviction that 
Iraq’s Ba’athist regime remained a potential menace to the community of nations. 
Stunned though virtually every observer was to learn that Saddam Hussein had 
unilaterally destroyed (his claim to his CIA interrogator) or otherwise dispensed of a large 
majority of his WMD stockpiles (not even the inspectors’ final report in 2004 ruled out 
the possibility some had been smuggled into Syria),146 he nonetheless actively perpetuated 
the myth that he controlled a large arsenal.  To repeat:  Saddam Hussein deliberately 
misled the international community; he tried to trick his generals, Iranians, and the 
United States into believing his program was more formidable than it really was.  He did 
this for coherent strategic reasons:  to keep this generals in line (all of whom believed 
those most loyal to Saddam Hussein controlled more devastating arsenals than they), to 
deter the Iranians, and to deter American intervention.  It is well established, moreover, 
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that he remained committed to reconstituting his WMD arsenal at the first 
opportunity.147   
The Iraq Survey Group, the multinational commission charged with investigating Iraq’s 
WMD program and locating its stockpiles after the successful overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, is widely believed to have determined Saddam Hussein unilaterally 
abandoned his WMD ambitions altogether.  In fact, the commission came to conclusions 
at considerable odds with the dominant public perception of its work.148  In his 
introductory transmission, Charles Duelfer, the commission’s director, notes that 
“Virtually no senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever.  Evidence 
suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, 
there was a direct expansion of activity that would have the effect of supporting future 
WMD reconstitution.”149  In the much discussed Duelfer report, the Survey Group in fact 
concludes: 
Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially 
destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy 
stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which 
previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an 
incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting 
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economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical 
chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.150 
The report notes, furthermore, that in the interim, “Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 
2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime,” 
even that the U.N.’s readily corruptible Oil-For-Food (OFF) program was partially 
responsible for keeping those ambitions alive, and for abetting the survival of what turned 
out to be a rudimentary WMD program: 
The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire 
foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the 
means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related 
development.151 
What is more, Iraq’s capacity to produce chemical weapons remained to considerable 
extent in tact in the decade between the first and second gulf war, largely because 
essential resources were shifted to facilities that had civilian purposes as well as military.  
The most important element of any weapons program is personnel and technical ability.  
Whatever happened to the stockpiles Saddam Hussein was known by international 
inspectors to possess when they were kicked out of the country for the last time in 1998—
the Duelfer report is littered with statements like “ISG lacks evidence to document 
complete destruction”—the fact that the Ba’ath regime retained, at tremendous effort, the 
technical ability to produce further stockpiles has not been seriously disputed.  Regarding 
chemical weapons, the report comes to this conclusion:  
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The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed 
it to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, 
conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from 
the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war 
and UN-sponsored destruction  and sanctions. 
[…] 
ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) 
maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert 
laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily 
for intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have 
provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue CW 
agent R&D or small-scale production efforts...152 
Nor were Saddam Hussein’s biological weapons capacities as negligible as many assume 
on the basis of the prevailing narrative.  In this regard, the Survey Group’s findings are, 
in fact, even more startling.  According to the very report repeatedly cited by those 
claiming Saddam Hussein’s regime did not pose a gathering threat to the United States, 
Iraq’s dictator could have been producing biological weapons as quickly as within “a few 
weeks to a few months of a decision to do so”, even in spite of the sanctions regime. 
The Biological Warfare (BW) program was born of the Iraqi Intelligence 
Service (IIS) and this service retained its connections with the program 
either directly or indirectly throughout its existence.  
• The IIS provided the BW program with security and participated in 
biological research, probably for its own purposes, from the beginning of 
Iraq’s BW effort in the early 1970s until the final days of Saddam Hussein's 
Regime. 
[…] 
Iraq would have faced great difficulty in reestablishing an effective BW 
agent production capability.  Nevertheless, after 1996 Iraq still had a 
significant dual-use capability—some declared—readily useful for BW if 
the Regime chose to use it to pursue a BW program.  Moreover, Iraq still 
possessed its most important BW asset, the scientific know-how of its BW 
cadre. 
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Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW 
program within a few weeks to a few months of a decision to do so, but 
ISG discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a 
course.153  
If much of the intelligence gathered from sources operating inside of Iraq and those who 
fled turned out to be mistaken (largely because the regime actively perpetuated the myth 
that it had a large WMD arsenal at its disposal), there can be little doubt that Saddam 
Hussein posed a gathering threat.  His ambition was to reconstitute his WMD programs 
once the sanctions regime no longer impeded that goal.  Its deterioration was well 
underway by 2003.  He believed, moreover, that he was still at war with the U.S. (a fact 
evidenced by his constant attempts to shoot down the American patrols that enforced the 
no-fly zones over Northern and Southern Iraq).  In fact, Charles Duelfer himself, in the 
transmission that introduces his report, explains that Saddam Hussein’s ambitions had 
not been diminished by a decade of U.S.-led containment: 
Saddam's perspective on the world and his place in history was naturally a 
very long view.  He had long timelines—certainly as compared with 
Western democracies, which are driven by news and election cycles.  He 
also had a strong sense of the glory of a long struggle…  Saddam refused to 
admit Iraq lost the war in 1991…  Saddam saw it only as a temporary 
setback.154 
Duelfer goes on to acknowledge that Saddam Hussein placed a very high value of WMD 
development: 
the Iraqis believed that their possession and willingness to use WMD (CW 
and BW) contributed substantially to deterring the United States from 
going on to Baghdad in 1991.  WMD demonstrated its worth to Saddam.  
Moreover, senior Iraqis have observed that, if Saddam had waited until he 
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finished his nuclear weapon before invading Kuwait, the outcome would 
have been much different.155 
Somewhat perversely, it is precisely the high strategic value Saddam Hussein attributed to 
the possession of WMD that motivated him to pretend he possessed large stockpiles.  He 
led generals and high-ranking government officials to believe his arsenal was formidable, 
and perpetuated the same myth by his cat-and-mouse game with weapons inspectors, 
even as America’s military amassed a sizable force along his borders, because he 
remained under the mistaken impression that America would not invade so long as U.S. 
intelligence indicated that he did possess WMD.156  Indeed, it was nothing other than his 
WMD bravado—in his mind, the only sure way to deter the U.S. and avoid invasion—
that, in the final analysis, provoked the war that would unseat him.   In other words, by 
his refusal to submit to determinative weapons inspections Saddam Hussein inadvertently 
sustained the very myth that made it all but impossible for American policymakers to 
refrain from embarking upon a war to overthrow his regime in the post 9/11 world. 
To call Saddam Hussein’s miscalculation a strategic blunder is a mild way to describe the 
brinkmanship that resulted in his overthrow.  But it is not the worst strategic mistake he 
made as Iraq’s dictator.  In 1990, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait before testing a nuclear 
weapon and establishing modern warfare’s most powerful deterrent, even though his 
scientists were, at the time, as little as one year away from achieving the milestone.157  
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Whether Saddam Hussein was emboldened by the American Ambassador to Iraq (April 
Glaspie had communicated to Saddam Hussein himself that the U.S. had “no opinion on 
the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait”), or simply 
impatient to extend his influence, there can be no doubt but that the free West has 
benefitted disproportionately from strategic errors committed by overconfident fascist 
dictators over the course of the twentieth century.158  Recall that Saddam Hussein 
aspired, very openly, to unify the Arab world under his iron fist.  That Saudi Arabia and 
Iran were likely to be the next targets of his expansionist ambitions cannot be doubted.  
Nor is there any doubt that recent history would have unfolded very differently had not 
Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambitions been thwarted preemptively in 1982 and 1991. 
In other words, the 2003 war in Iraq can be justified both on conventional strategic 
grounds even though large stockpiles of weapons were never found.   Saddam Hussein 
remained committed to reestablishing his WMD arsenal and the containment regime 
preventing it was disintegrating.  If his WMD capabilities were significantly overestimated 
in 2003, Saddam Hussein did represent a gathering threat, one that would have become 
intolerable if the sanctions regime continued to disintegrate.  He was overthrown in 2003 
for the simply reason that 9/11 had reduced the American public’s tolerance for threats 
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emanating from the Middle East, what simultaneously increased the public’s willingness 
to support a foreign war.   
 
Safeguarding Our Way of Life 
If one consensus existed among the principle policy-makers almost immediately following 
9/11, it was that neither a law-enforcement approach to terrorism, nor a strictly 
retaliatory military campaign against those responsible for the attacks (and the state 
sponsors who aided them), would be sufficient to accomplish the primary goal of the 
emerging foreign policy strategy:  preventing future attacks of similar or greater 
magnitude.   
The task is easier said than done, however.  9/11 introduced the U.S. and the world to a 
form of terrorism that simply cannot be tolerated and with which it is impossible to 
compromise or negotiate.  Moreover, terrorists willing to sacrifice themselves are, in 
principal, impossible to deter; demanding nothing less than America’s complete 
abandonment of an area of vital strategic interests, they cannot be appeased; and given 
the devastation they seek to inflict, they cannot be tolerated.  Jihadist terrorism is, quite 
simply, a form of violence that must be eliminated so far as it is reasonably possible to do 
so.  Saddam Hussein’s regime was targeted in the first place, as we have seen, to limit the 
chances the means of mass destruction would ever fall into the hands of fanatics.  War 
planners hoped it would, simultaneously, provide an opportunity to address the 
extremism. 
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For the administration was not simply concerned to secure American lives and property 
against future attack, though this was certainly of utmost concern.  Securing America’s 
way of life against an enemy that seeks explicitly to disrupt it—by causing panic, insecurity, 
terror—was the overarching strategic aim.  But it was also recognized that defensive 
measures alone would not suffice to achieve that aim.  There was a real concern that a 
failure to confront terrorism abroad would require changing the way we live in an effort 
to prevent attacks at home.  As Feith recounts the concerns immediately expressed by 
Pentagon officials, both civilian and military (and it is a point he reiterates several times):  
Foremost in our minds was the prospect that 9/11 might be succeeded by 
further large-scale attacks on the United States.  That could permanently 
change the nature of American society, driving the government toward 
undesirable—even if necessary—protective measures.  At stake would be 
America’s essential traits:  our civil liberties and the open nature of our 
society…  It would be sensible for U.S. officials to understand their mission 
as defeating terrorism as a threat to American freedom and openness.  If we fought 
the terrorists so effectively that they no longer threatened the nature of our 
society—isolated future attacks notwithstanding—the United States would 
have achieved a substantial victory.159 
Nor did the administration labor under the illusion that it would be possible to prevent 
every single terrorist attack.  This was not the strategy’s aim because it was simply not 
believed to be within the realm of possibility:  “We cannot expect to eliminate every 
terrorist activity but we can realistically aim to prevent terrorism from undermining our 
way of life and to demonstrate its futility as a weapon of political blackmail against 
American and our interests.”160  The aim can be fairly summarized as follows:  prevent 
way of life altering attacks without changing America’s way of life. 
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It is worth considering the two alternative strategies that were immediately rejected, and 
especially the reasons they were rejected, as they both seem to be gaining popularity 
today.  The first, a law enforcement approach to terrorism, was rejected because 
terrorism is manifestly unlike other crimes.  Investigating terrorist attacks after they occur 
with the aim of bringing the perpetrators to justice does little to counteract the destruction 
and panic terrorists aim to bring about.  Where criminals conspire to murder thousands 
of Americans and destroy the country’s economic, military, and political landmarks, 
waiting for the crime to occur (or even for rock-solid evidence that it is impending) before 
thwarting the plotters is simply not an option.  Nor do the other guiding purposes of a law 
enforcement approach obtain in this case.  We convict and incarcerate to prevent the 
same people from committing future crimes, while deterring those who might otherwise 
be inclined to imitate them by the prospect of certain punishment.  Where the criminals 
in question are willing to sacrifice themselves to commit a single crime of terrifying 
magnitude, the ordinary law enforcement prevention and deterrence calculus does not 
apply.  Where those who pose a threat fear neither death nor imprisonment, the efficacy 
of a law enforcement approach is severely limited. 
True, the police often act to prevent crimes before they occur, or when they have a reason 
to believe a crime is imminent.  But they do so by curtailing and restricting the freedom of 
movement and action of law-abiding citizens in the hope of identifying (or deterring) 
would-be criminals—by, for example, establishing check-points or check-stops, or by 
searching bags in crowded and sensitive areas.  No doubt, these are perfectly reasonable 
infringements:  both justified by the harm they seek to prevent, and because they are 
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proportionate to their aim.  The law-enforcement methods that would be required to 
prevent another terrorist attack would likely be intolerably intrusive were U.S. efforts 
limited entirely to policing.  Security searches, increased surveillance, the expanded use of 
profiling, and increased limitations on access to sensitive sites are all prudent measures.  
But they cannot be relied upon exclusively without being expanded to the point that they 
undermine our way of life.  Somewhat perversely, the law-enforcement approach to 
preventing terror attacks threatens to erode the very aspects of our way of life we are 
seeking to secure against those bent on undermining it through fear.  Or as Feith puts it, 
“There were simply too many tall buildings—too many major targets—in New York and 
across the country for us to protect them by trying to secure each individually.  Any such 
attempt could change life in America radically, and for the worse, requiring methods 
characteristic of a police state.”161  
A strictly retaliatory strike, directed against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, would similarly 
have failed to accomplish the administration’s guiding objective.  Preventing the next 
terrorist attack requires more than simply neutralizing those who perpetrated the last one, 
especially when the enemy operates as a loosely coordinated network for strategic 
reasons.  Securing the country requires striking at would-be Al-Qaedas—annihilating 
training camps, seizing resources, monitoring communications—before they are capable 
of striking America in spectacular fashion.  The administration was cognizant that its 
military response could not be confined to those directly responsible for the attacks on 
New York and Washington, the architects and abettors of the previous attacks, for the 	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simply reason that it is a war against those who will undertake the next one if they are 
permitted the opportunity.   
 
Deterring Deterrables, and Inducing Enthusiasm  
Feith and others at the Department of Defense appreciated early on that because of the 
amorphous nature of terrorist cells—they tend to be loosely bound, their membership 
always fluctuating, many are not permanently tied to any single geographic location, and 
new ones are always springing up—the most effective way to combat terrorism in the 
short term would be to take away those things they cannot successfully organize far-flung 
attacks without:  most importantly, state sponsors (and secondarily, their means of 
communication and finance).  Thus, in contrast to Colin Powell and others at the State 
Department who countenanced a narrower focus on Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda, Feith, 
along with the Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, argued that the U.S. 
response ought to be calibrated to deter the actors susceptible to being deterred:  if not 
the terrorist organizations themselves, the states that had sponsored and harbored 
terrorists in the past, and might consider continuing to do so in the future. Nor was it 
simply a matter of ending state sponsorship.  States that had tolerated Anti-American 
extremism (most of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi citizens) could be induced to police the 
problem more aggressively given the proper incentive to do so.   
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This aspect of the Bush Doctrine is underappreciated in the extreme.  Few commentators 
have noted it, and many prominent analysts have missed it altogether.162  What the Bush 
administration understood is that a small number of well-selected and well-executed 
military campaigns could have a disproportionate global impact on terrorist networks by 
persuading state sponsors to change their behavior (or risk becoming the next target).  
The best way to neutralize and contain terrorist cells in Pakistan, the Philippines, and 
Saudi Arabia is to persuade foreign governments that it is in their interest to root out jihadists 
before they can attack beyond the state’s borders.  Neither the NYPD nor even military 
forces commanded by CENTCOM can police a meeting of jihadists in Amman.  The 
Jordanians, however, can.  This is why President Bush declared before a joint session of 
Congress on September 20, 2001, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”  
Foreign governments had to know they would be held responsible for future threats to 
American interests that gathered within their borders as a result of their failure to police 
them; de facto declarations of neutrality are not sufficient where all that is required for a 
threat to gather is for the state to turn a blind eye.  It is also one of the earliest arguments 	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for overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, one suggested by Rumsfeld even 
before Bin Laden’s connection to 9/11 was firmly established.   Feith recounts the 
calculus with brutal candor: 
The problem with focusing on Afghanistan, he [Rumsfeld] said, was that 
the country lacked valuable terrorist infrastructure targets.   Bin Laden’s 
assets were not buildings but people.  Destroying the scant infrastructure in 
Afghanistan would not cause the kind of pain that was likely to change 
behavior throughout the terrorists’ network, especially by state 
supporters…  Iraq, he observed, was a state that supported terrorism, and 
that might someday offer terrorist weapons of mass destruction to use 
against us.  Unlike Afghanistan, however, Iraq also had substantial 
infrastructure and military capability.  In Iraq, he noted, we could inflict 
the kind of costly damage that could cause terrorist-supporting regimes 
around the world to rethink their policies.163 
This remains, perhaps, the single best interest justification for regime change in Iraq.  It 
worked.  From Algeria to Jordan to Pakistan, rulers have policed Anti-American 
extremism much more aggressively since 2003.  Colonel Gadaffi voluntarily relinquished 
his WMD program—and permitted verification of his compliance—as a direct result of 
intervention in Iraq.  He was also induced to rethink his active sponsorship of terrorist, 
and as STRATFOR has noted, he governed Islamist strongholds in the country’s East 
“with an iron fist”164 after his renunciation of terrorism in 2003.165  The value of the Iraq 
example as inducement to other regimes was, without a doubt, the pillar of the Bush 
Doctrine that was emphasized least.  While Feith and Rumsfeld would never put it in 
these terms, the reason this justification could not be trumpeted from official rooftops—
neither then nor now—is obvious:  making an example of one country to change the 
behavior of other regimes is not precisely legal according to international law.  The 	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WMD justification, in contrast, was trumpeted to the extent it was because it very 
arguably justified war, even according to international law and existing U.N. 
resolutions.166  
The case for unseating Saddam Hussein was, then, multi-faceted.  It should go without 
saying that the strategic rationale for intervention can, in principle, remain valid even if a 
number of pre-war assumptions prove mistaken.  It was hoped that attacking Iraq would 
send a message to every regime, rogue or respectable:  do not support, do not even 
ignore, terrorists operating in your country; do not develop WMD; in a post-9/11 world, 
moreover, you will have no choice but to open your societies to the rest of the world.  Nor 
was Saddam Hussein to be made an example of arbitrarily.  He had every opportunity to 
cooperate with the UN weapons inspectors.  And he was responsible for a litany of crimes 
many of which are arguably sufficient to justify the overthrow of his regime on their own:  
he had invaded two countries (for conquest) and launched missiles against four; he had 
developed and used chemical weapons on foreigners as well as his own citizens; he had 
harbored, supported, and encouraged terrorism against targets in Israeli including 	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rationale for targeting Iraq beyond direct retaliation for 9/11, the existence of an imminent threat 
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and the enthusiasm to attribute nefarious motives to Bush administration principals, is traceable 
to precisely this failure of intelligence.  
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civilians; he had flouted the terms upon which an end to the 1990 war to liberate Kuwait 
was negotiated; he continually and flagrantly violated more than a dozen U.N. chapter 7 
resolutions (each of which authorized “serious consequences”); he was firing on U.S. and 
British no-fly zone patrols daily; his regime was behind the attempted assassination of an 
American president; and there was mounting evidence that the nearly fifteen-year-old 
containment regime was breaking down (the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food had been thoroughly 
corrupted further diluting the effect of U.N. sanctions).     
 
Changing the Way They Live 
In addition to these incontrovertibly interest-driven rationales for war in Iraq, 
justifications that satisfied many self-described realists at the time, the long-term element 
of the administration’s security strategy—democracy promotion—emerged early on 
among Pentagon officials, directly from a consideration of what it would take to prevent 
future attacks.  It would not be enough to rely on law enforcement approaches at home 
and strikes against terrorist organizations and their sponsors abroad.  As President Bush 
explained on September 20th, less than three weeks after the attacks on New York and 
Washington, “the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, 
eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows”; as Feith explains, “the President decided that, 
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in dealing with the terrorists, he had the choice of changing the way we live or changing 
the way they live.”167  
Feith goes on to explain that the president insisted from the beginning that they “break 
with the standard, backward-looking retaliatory posture the United States had taken in 
the past against its terrorist enemies.”168  The Bush administration wanted a truly 
constructive strategy—taking steps to identify and neutralize threats in short term was 
paramount, but the President was looking for an approach that could, over the long term, 
prevent terrorist strikes against the U.S. by affecting the circumstances under which 
terrorist organizations recruit and thrive.  A Defense Department Strategic Guidance 
approved on October 3rd, 2001, recognized that it would not be enough to “disrupt, 
damage, or destroy” terrorist networks, nor even to change the behavior of state sponsors.  
Although the Department of Defense did not expect to take the lead on this aspect of the 
strategy initially, it was recognized less than one month after 9/11 that the U.S. 
government would also have to “encourage populations dominated by terrorist 
organizations or their supporters to overthrow that domination.”169   Noting that this idea 
was not highly developed at the time, Feith goes on to note that “[t]he Guidance 
recognized the ideological component of the war on terrorism by making it an objective 
to ‘support the creation of an international political environment hostile to terrorism.’”  
Feith summarizes his chapter on the elaboration of the strategy that would eventually 
lead to intervention not only in Afghanistan, but in Iraq as well, in these terms:  “In a 	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little more than three weeks after 9/11, the Defense Department had helped the 
President set a course for a war that was ambitious in its scope and unprecedented in its 
goals.”170  
Indications that an aggressive action to bring about social and political reform in the 
Middle East as a foreign policy strategy to confront Islamic terrorism was being discussed 
early on, long before the failure to turn up the expected WMD stockpiles, can be found 
throughout Feith’s book.  He makes much of a conversation that took place in early 
October, 2001, with Qaboos bin Said, the Sultan of Oman, regarding the war’s 
“ideological essence.”    
He spoke of a great contest within the Muslim world—between fanatical 
Islamists, who inspired the terrorists with visions of a restored caliphate, 
and their opponents.  The extremists were driven by their particular vision 
of a new universal Islamic state that would be heir to the Prophet 
Mohammed’s empire, would follow Muslim law, and would be 
administered by a caliph, Allah’s deputy on earth.  Qaboos warned us 
against focusing our attention too narrowly on military objectives, for he 
thought that the outcome of the war might ultimately be decided in the 
world of ideas.  Rumsfeld and I exchanged a glance to confirm that we had 
registered the important of the Sultan’s words.171 
Feith complains on this, and many other occasions, that the U.S. government was not 
sufficiently attuned to the ideational aspect of the conflict.  He repeatedly laments the 
inadequacy of the State Department’s effort to confront the radical ideology that fired 
Islamic extremists.  Whereas he and Rumsfeld believed the battle of ideas would be a 
central front in the broader war on terrorism, he argues that “neither Powell nor 
Armitage [at State] saw the philosophical dimension of the war as particularly important.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Douglas Feith, War and Decision, 87. 
171 Douglas Feith, War and Decision, 94. 
	  87 
This was consistent with their general lack of interest in what they called ‘ideology.’”172  
Feith’s first attempt to remedy this deficiency was the creation of a new organization 
within the Department of Defense called the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI), its raison 
d’être: “to develop strategies against jihadist ideology.”173  It envisioned, among other 
things, providing technology to foreign governments that would have made the internet, 
language and educational software, as well as news broadcasts, available in areas where 
radical (often Saudi-funded) madrassas dominated the social and religious life of a 
community, thereby exerting a virtual monopolies over children’s education among other 
things.  The areas Feith hoped to impact with this strategy have long been points of 
interest in the war on terrorism, for instance, along the border between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.    
Important though this type of engagement surely is to the war against terrorism, the 
entire office had promptly to be dismantled when the New York Times provoked uproar 
among bien-pensants with a baseless and uncorroborated story alleging that OSI was 
created to spread disinformation.  By the time the reporting was thoroughly discredited, 
charges that the U.S. Defense Department was actively engaged in spreading propaganda 
had done so much damage to the reputation of the new office, as well as Douglas Feith 
personally, that the entire project was abandoned. 
The United States Information Agency is another example of such an effort.  It was 
folded into the State Department, its activities severely curtailed, in 1999 under Bill 	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Clinton, probably because its work rests uneasily against liberal commitment to freedom 
of conscience.174  (John McCain, incidentally, promised to reestablish the Agency in his 
2008 campaign for the Presidency.)  The USIA Alumni Association website preserves the 
Agency’s mission statement. 
The mission of USIA was to understand, inform, and influence foreign 
publics in promotion of the U.S. national interest, and to broaden the 
dialogue between Americans, their institutions, and their counterparts 
abroad. Specifically, USIA worked: 
    * To explain and advocate U.S. policies in terms that are credible and 
meaningful in foreign cultures; [and] 
    * To provide information about the official policies of the United States, 
and about the people, values, and institutions which shape those policies.175 
There is, at a minimum, anecdotal evidence that such efforts can yield real results.  The 
most prominent Pakistani diplomat in Washington DC today, and an energetic advocate 
of modernizing reform in his own country, Pakistan’s Ambassador Husain Haqqani, 
credits the program as it existed under President Reagan for turning him from radical 
Islam.  He was born to a conservative religious family in a poor part of Karachi.  
Growing up, he was drawn into the Muslim Brotherhood, and, in his words, “alternated 
between being attracted to and repulsed by political Islam.”176  He credits afternoons at 
the American library—spent reading The Federalist Papers, and William Buckley—with 
shaping a world view friendly to the United States and the West.  Both USIA and Feith’s 
OSI existed precisely to facilitate this sort of opportunity.  While Haqqani was still in 	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university, he was pressured by Islamists to lead an attack on the very Consulate that 
housed the library where he had studied.  He refused and later wrote “What I never said 
out loud is that burning down the consulate would have wrecked the wonderful library 
there, and deprived me of access to all the books I found so useful for my studies in 
international relations.”177  
The remarkable Ayaan Hirsi Ali tells a similar story.   Born in Somalia, she was, for a 
time, an ardent supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood.  She participated actively in what 
she calls “a new kind of Islam” based on Wahhabi/Salafi ideas actively supported and 
disseminated by the Saudis.178  She was never quite taken in by the hateful jihadist Islam of 
the most extreme adherents; and she was always sensitive to the problems implied by 
willing submission to a system that struck her as unjust in important respects, especially in 
its treatment of women.  But she was a devout Muslim.  On her way to Canada to be 
married to a man selected for her by her father, she sought asylum in Holland, and 
ultimately became a citizen, a Member of Parliament, as well as an outspoken critic of the 
treatment of women in the Islamic world and the West’s immigration policies.  (She 
worked with Theo van Gogh on the film, Submission, for which the film director was 
assassinated in the street by a Muslim extremist, and is today a Fellow at the American 
Enterprise Institute.)   
Much as Husain Haqqani was deeply affected by his exposure to West’s intellectual 
heritage, so does Hirsi Ali credit the opportunity to read works proscribed by her religion 	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with transforming her worldview.  Her exposure to Jane Austen and even “cheap 
Harlequins” during her teenage years conveyed a message fundamentally alien to what 
she learned in religious school, one that deeply affected her:  “women had a choice.”179   
One gets the sense that the kernel of doubt aroused in her by foreign tales of self-directed 
heroines confidently chasing love preventing her from ever completely submitting to the 
Islam she was supposed to internalize, in which the Muslim girls disappears “until there is 
almost no you inside you.”180  Her eventual escape from a marriage arranged against her 
will made it possible for her to attend university in Leiden.  There she was introduced to 
the European Enlightenment;  “And here,” in her words, “this commitment to freedom 
took hold of me, too.”181   
Her account of her own intellectual transformation highlights the power of ideas and 
therewith, the importance of ensuring individuals are exposed to alternatives in those 
parts of the world where intellectual life is utterly dominated by the radical Islam.  Hirsi 
Ali writes,  
Sometimes I could almost sense a little shutter clicking shut in my brain, so 
that I could keep reading my textbooks without struggling to align their 
content with my belief in Islam.  Sometimes it seemed as it almost every 
page I read challenged me as a Muslim.  Drinking wine and wearing 
trousers were nothing compared to reading the history of ideas. 
People had contested the whole basis of the idea of God’s power on earth, 
and they had done it with reasoning that was beautiful and compelling.  
Darwin said creation stories were a fairy tale.  Freud said we had power 
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over ourselves.  Spinoza said there were no miracles, no angels, no need to 
pray to anything outside ourselves.  God was us, and nature.182  
Programs like these are important.  In fact, we will return to the importance of ideas, both 
the particular ideas essential to liberal democracy and those that stand in its way, in 
Chapters 5 through 8.  On a practical level, that more resources have not been devoted to 
similar strategies, designed to offer an alternative to radical Islam where there is little else 
to oppose them, represents a serious failure of the Bush administration, and especially the 
State department.    
And yet, from the very beginning of the war, President Bush made clear he was planning 
to confront terrorism by affecting the conditions that sustain it in more dramatic ways 
than had been attempted previously.  The President’s 2002 State of the Union address 
already (if subtly) connects the spread of freedom to vanquishing terrorism.  And in 
speech after speech leading up to the mid-September release of the 2002 National Security 
Strategy (in which the administration officially lays out the rationale for encouraging 
democratic regime change), the President argued that we were standing at the edge of an 
opportunity to remake the world order for the better.  Iraq represented, on the one hand, 
an engagement that appeared to be necessary by the gathering threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein’s regime (and simultaneously, an engagement with the potential to deter other 
terrorism-sponsoring regimes), while it represented, on the other hand, a real opportunity to 
kick-start a democratic revolution in the part of the world that had thitherto proved the 
most resistant to modern and moderate government—an opportunity the Bush 
administration was looking for.   That grand political reform was embarked upon in the 	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absence of antecedent effort at moral and intellectual reform was, no doubt, one of the 
greatest errors the administration could have committed. 
 
Not just the “NeoCons” 
In the lead-up to invasion, support for the most ambitious pillar of the Bush Doctrine was 
widespread.  In fact, serious discussion of regime change in Iraq at the highest levels of 
government predates the Bush administration.  Mounting evidence that containment was 
not working led Bill Clinton to sign the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998.  It provided material 
aid to opponents of Saddam Hussein’s regime, and established as official U.S. policy the 
aim of regime change in Iraq.  It was a bipartisan effort, passing in the Senate by 
unanimous vote, and in the House, 360 to 38.  President Clinton made a statement that, 
though unobjectionable at the time, hardly squares with the contemporary Iraq narrative:  
“the United States favors an Iraq that offers its people freedom at home.  I categorically 
reject arguments that this is unattainable due to Iraq’s history or its ethnic or sectarian 
make-up.  Iraqis deserve and desire freedom like everyone else.  The United States looks 
forward to a democratically supported regime…”183   
It is unfortunate that, as a result of a concerted and disingenuous effort to revise history, 
there is a need today to review the broad consensus that existed regarding the threat 
Saddam Hussein’s threat posed to the U.S. in the lead-up to the war’s authorization.  
Dozens of prominent Democrats stood alongside the Republicans who argued for 	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“regime change” in Iraq, both before and after 9/11.  Some of them spoke of the threat 
he posed to the international order; others spoke in grand and optimistic terms of the 
importance of supporting freedom and democracy.  Many of them had access to the same 
intelligence that impelled President Bush and the Department of Defense to adopt Bill 
Clinton’s foreign policy approach to Iraq (adding only the gumption to carry it out).  It 
suffices to consider these statements, uttered by fair-weather supporters of intervention in 
Iraq, to establish that it was not the influence of some Jewish cabal or neoconservative 
conspiracy that led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime:  
Senator John Edwards: 
My position is very clear: The time has come for decisive action to 
eliminate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass 
destruction… We know that he has chemical and biological weapons 
today, that he's used them in the past, and that he's doing everything he 
can to build more.  Every day he gets closer to his long-term goal of 
nuclear capability. 
Democracy will not spring up by itself overnight in a multi-ethnic, 
complicated society that's suffered under one repressive regime after 
another for generations.  The Iraqi people deserve and need our help to 
rebuild their lives and to create a prosperous, thriving, open society.  All 
Iraqis, including Sunnis, Shia and Kurds, deserve to be represented.  This 
is not just a moral imperative.  It's a security imperative.  It is in America's 
national interest to help build an Iraq at peace with itself and its neighbors, 
because a democratic, tolerant and accountable Iraq will be a peaceful 
regional partner, and such an Iraq could serve as a model for the entire 
Arab world.184 
Senator Hillary Clinton: 
In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that 
Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological 
weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program… 
It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue 
to increase his capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will 	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keep trying to develop nuclear weapons.  Should he succeed in that 
endeavor, he could alter the political and security landscape of the Middle 
East, which as we know all too well, effects American security.185 
President Clinton: 
People can quarrel with whether we should have more troops in 
Afghanistan or internationalize Iraq or whatever, but it is incontestable 
that on the day I left office, there were unaccounted for stocks of biological 
and chemical weapon.186 
Sandy Berger, President Clinton's National Security Advisor: 
Imagine the consequences if Saddam fails to comply and we fail to act.  
Saddam will be emboldened, believing the international community has 
lost its will.  He will rebuild his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.  
And some day, some way, I am certain, he will use that arsenal again, as 
he has ten times since 1983.187 
Madeleine Albright, President Clinton's Secretary of State: 
No one has done what Saddam Hussein has done, or is thinking of doing.  
He is producing weapons of mass destruction, and he is qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from other dictators.188 
Senator Joseph Biden, ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 
Saddam is in material breach of the latest UN resolution.  Yesterday’s 
damning report by the UN inspectors makes clear again Saddam’s 
contempt for the world and it has vindicated the President’s decision last 
fall to go to the UN.  The legitimacy of the Security Council is at stake, as 
well as the integrity of the UN.  So if Saddam does not give up those 
weapons of mass destruction and the Security Council does not call for the 
use of force, I think we have little option but to act with a larger group of 
willing nations, if possible, and alone if we must.189 
Senator Jay Rockefeller, ranking Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
There has been some debate over how “imminent” a threat Iraq poses.  I 
do believe that Iraq poses an imminent threat, but I also believe that after 
September 11, that question is increasingly outdated.  It is in the nature of 
these weapons, and the way they are targeted against civilian populations, 
that documented capabilities and demonstrated intent may be the only 	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warning we get.  To insist on further evidence could put some of our fellow 
Americans at risk.  Can we afford to take that chance?  We cannot!190 
 
 
What Did Regime Change Actually Mean? 
If virtually every voice of consequence agreed that Saddam Hussein’s regime posed a 
threat that could not be tolerated post 9/11 (a threat to the U.S. for most, to the U.N.’s 
legitimacy in the minds of a few), we can ask what, in concrete terms, “regime change” 
meant to those advocating it before 9/11 and the subsequent 2003 invasion?  Feith notes 
that there was significant disagreement within the government on this point.  The State 
Department hoped it would not be necessary, favoring a new round of “smarter” 
sanctions, which would really have amounted to a renewed effort to shore up the flailing 
strategy to contain Saddam Hussein’s regime.  The CIA (though, as an intelligence 
gathering organization, it is not supposed to have a policy preference) favored regime 
change of a very narrow sort.  Presciently citing a paramount concern for Iraq’s stability 
and unease at the prospect that comprehensive regime change could yield another Shiite-
dominated state in the Middle East, potentially an ally of the Iranian theocracy, the CIA 
advocated supporting a military coup against Saddam Hussein, what would likely have 
amounted to the continuation of Ba’ath party rule under a different strong man.   
Feith and most of DOD under the Bush administration opposed this very limited 
approach for the simple reason that no such option seemed to exist at the time, and 
moreover, that any military or Ba’athist coup could also have had the effect of 	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aggravating an already bad situation.  There was little reason to expect a new dictator 
would rule justly, though he would certainly expect a “generous honeymoon” from a 
world community finally to be rid of a perennial problem.  Second, could the U.S. 
support a new Sunni dictator if the Kurds or Shiites seized the occasion to revolt in the 
name of majoritarian principles?  As Feith explains, “[t]he coup option would thus 
require either a huge leap of faith—or a complete abandonment of principles.  And the 
likelihood of a successful coup was in any case extremely slim.”191   
In the spring of 2001, lastly, Condoleezza Rice had presented the most ambitious option:  
she advocated arming Iraqi factions opposed to Saddam Hussein’s regime with the 
possibility of direct U.S. military engagement.  
In other words, pre-9/11, no decision had been taken even though it was becoming 
clearer by the day that the U.S. approach to Iraq would have to change.  Saddam 
Hussein was not cooperating with the UNMOVIC inspection structure, the sanction 
regime was breaking down, and it was only a matter of time before Iraqis firing daily at 
coalition planes enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq hit one—what would have 
necessitated an immediate response.  Contrary to the dominant caricature, Rumsfeld was 
at this point contemplating a variety of options ranging from the regime changing 
approaches noted above, to much less aggressive responses.  A retaliatory bombing 
campaign in response to the Iraqis’ repeated targeting of coalition aircraft enforcing the 
no-fly zones was on the table (targeting not only the source of those attacks, but high 
value elements of Iraq’s military infrastructure as a deterrent).  So was negotiated regime 	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change.  A proposal that would have provided the Hussein family and the regime’s 
prominent lieutenants a comfortable exile in return for the voluntary surrender of 
authority was already being drafted.  Even a form of appeasement was being 
contemplated:  the abandonment of the no-fly zones and direct negotiation with Saddam 
Hussein. 
Post-9/11, in the months leading up to war, the administration’s principals agreed 
Saddam Hussein’s regime had to go if he would not leave willingly, but they could not 
quite agree on what form the new Iraqi regime should take.  Nor was the character of the 
disagreement trivial:  the principals could not agree on what precisely an American 
invasion of Iraq—if it ultimately came to it—should be designed to achieve.   According 
to War and Decision, Feith and Rumsfeld had serious reservations regarding the course 
ultimately adopted by the President.  Somewhat strangely, however, Feith does not 
emphasize that DOD was, in effect, challenging the President on what has become 
perhaps the most controversial of his decisions.  Instead, he presents his disagreement as a 
policy dispute that pitted he and Rumsfeld against Condoleezza Rice and her staff. 
In August, 2002, Rice’s National Security Council contributed a paper to a Principals 
Committee meeting on Iraq advocating a very robust approach to democracy promotion 
in Iraq.  The paper, entitled “Liberation Strategy for Iraq” stated the aims of regime 
change in terms that are now familiar. 
When we move to bring about a change of regime in Iraq, we would want: 
The Iraqi population to believe that they will be enfranchised politically 
and better off economically as a consequence of U.S. actions. 
	  98 
To create a democratic, unified Iraq that can be a model of good 
governance for the region and a strategic partner of the United States, and 
to describe the U.S. effort as a struggle for the Iraqi people.  Such an Iraq 
would have [a] transforming effect on the region.  
Rice recognized, moreover, that accomplishing the aims she laid out in her paper would 
require “staying in significant numbers for many years to assist in a U.S.-led administration of the 
country.”192    
According to Feith, Rumsfeld “bristled” upon reading the war objectives as articulated by 
the National Security Advisor.  They thought Rice was overstating both the extent to 
which the U.S. should be committed to leaving behind a functioning liberal democracy, 
and the extent to which the U.S. could help build such a regime.   Though the Pentagon 
had made the strongest case for social and political reform in the Middle East in the 
nearly eleven months between 9/11 and the circulation of the first draft of Rice’s 
Liberation Strategy memo—recall that Feith goes so far as to criticize State and the CIA 
for their ambivalence on these aspects of Iraq—somewhat counter-intuitively, as the war 
plan for Iraq was being solidified it was Feith and Rumsfeld who argued that it would be 
inappropriate to commit the U.S. to so ambitious an undertaking.  The most striking 
passage in this regard occurs midway through Feith’s chapter on Iraq Planning: 
The statement that the United States aimed to create democracy in Iraq 
struck both Rumsfeld and me as off base.  The proper way to think about 
this, we believed, was that the Iraqis would have to create their own democracy; 
the United States should not undertake to do it for them.  Democracy in 
Iraq, if it were possible, would be highly desirable.  But we wanted 
President Bush to clarify that the measure of success of his regime change 
policy would be whether we ended the dangers posed by Iraq—WMD, 
support for terrorism, threats against neighbors, and tyranny… 
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I commented to Rumsfeld that Rice’s emphatic language about promoting 
democracy reflected the intensity of the President’s commitment to the 
idea.  But that was not a reason, we agreed, to say that America’s success 
depended on whether Iraq became a model democracy.  It would be 
dangerous to measure the success of our war effort against an 
accomplishment it was beyond our ability to guarantee.193 
Reflective though it was of the President’s own enthusiasm to promote democracy 
abroad, Rice’s paper was not well received.  Rumsfeld thought it lacked rigor and asked 
that it be rewritten with more emphasis on American interests potentially achievable by war 
in Iraq, and less on the democratization aspect of regime change.  Vice President Cheney 
agreed with the basic thrust of Rumsfeld’s argument:  the regime would be Iraqis’, and 
therefore, it should be up to them to determine its structure and laws, though the U.S. 
could certainly insist that it be basically democratic.  On Feith’s recollection, he went 
furthest of all, proposing that the term “democracy” be left out of the rewritten paper 
altogether.194  Most important to Rumsfeld, Feith, and Cheney:  the new regime must not 
pose the threat to the United States Saddam Hussein had.  The elimination of the threat 
he posed—something they believed was not likely to be achieved by any approach short 
of regime change—ought nonetheless be the guiding aim of intervention and the sole 
measure of its success.  In this, they were gravitating toward a more traditionally realist 
understanding of a country’s projection of military force, even if it remained unclear what 
precisely the new Iraqi regime would have to look like in order to achieve these narrower 
aims.  
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Early Talk of Modern and Moderate Government in the Middle East 
On August 30, 2002, Rice’s staff circulated a separate paper regarding the ultimatum 
strategy mentioned briefly above.  This approach was consistent with the overall goal—
regime change—but hoped to achieve it without having to resort to war.  Saddam 
Hussein and top Ba’ath party officials would be given the opportunity to live freely in 
exile so long as they left Iraq and surrendered political authority voluntarily.   In this 
paper, too, Rice defined “regime change” more ambitiously than any of the other 
principals.   As Feith recounts, “The paper went on to say that the only way to achieve all 
the war’s purposes was ‘through a pluralistic, democratic, representative government.’”195 
Two months later, on October 29, 2002, a rewritten and unclassified version of the 
original Liberation Strategy paper Rumsfeld and Feith had criticized for its audacity 
more than two months before was again circulated to the principals.   It begins by listing 
goals incontrovertibly related to the U.S. national interest:  an Iraq that does not threaten 
its neighbors, support terrorism, or develop WMD.  Nonetheless, the lead section of the 
paper devotes even more space to a description of the sort of a regime it was becoming 
U.S. policy to help establish:  a “unitary state” that  
• No longer oppresses or tyrannizes its people;  
• Respects the basic rights of all 'Iraqis—including women  
 and minorities;  
• Adheres to the rule of law and respects fundamental human rights, 
including freedom of speech and worship; and  
• Encourages the building of democratic institutions.196  
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On the realization that responsibility for governing Iraq would fall to the U.S. military 
once the Ba’ath regime was ousted, Feith insists that he and Rumsfeld worked to diminish 
expectations so as not to overpromise dangerously.  He quotes from the this same 
declassified memo to show that, contra Rice’s earlier enthusiasm for building a liberal 
democracy in Iraq, the Pentagon persuaded the National Security Council ultimately to 
adopt a more moderate approach, committing the U.S. to providing an opportunity for 
Iraqis to build a democracy of their own:  “The new version dropped the phrase ‘establish a 
broad-based democratic government’ and substituted a more realistic formula:  
‘establishes an interim administration in Iraq that prepares for the transition to an elected 
Iraqi government as quickly as practicable.’”197   
Unfortunately, Feith is less than fully forthcoming in this effort to portray the Department 
of Defense as the voice of caution when it came to articulating war aims for Iraq.  
Although his argument begins with the words “instead of defining the U.S. goal as ‘a society 
based on moderation, pluralism, and democracy’” (as the previous draft of Rice’s memo 
had), to prove it he quotes not from the new memo’s eight-point “U.S. Goals” section, 
but from the “Strategy” section that follows it.  In discussing this statement of “the 
administration’s ‘goals and objectives for Iraq,’” (Feith’s words) not only does he skip over 
the democratization goals explicitly stated in the revised memo (noted above); he also 
extricates this important strategy line:  
• Work with the Iraqis opposed to the regime that [sic] share our 
vision for Iraq.198  	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Near the end of his book, Feith argues that “the Administration tried to change the 
subject” when WMD stockpiles were not discovered in Iraq, in essence, that 
democratization was more of a post hoc justification for war, but not a driving factor.199  
He goes on to suggest the Bush administration was damaged by its failure to aggressively 
argue that war was justified on national interest grounds as it became less likely WMD 
stockpiles would be discovered.  While it is certainly true that the democracy promotion 
aspect of the strategy gained increased rhetorical salience in the latter part of 2003 and 
afterward,200 it seems disingenuous to suggest it was not an important, if a controversial, 
war aim from the beginning.  For the first half of his book, Feith himself emphasizes the 
importance of “changing the way they live” to confronting the problem of terrorism over 
the long term, going so far as to denigrate the CIA/State Department approach to 
terrorism and Iraq for not devoting enough attention to this question.  The very memo he 
underlines to support his contention that democracy-promotion was scaled back as a war 
aim at the behest of DOD, read in its entirely, places a much greater emphasis on 
building a liberal democracy in Iraq than he allows (or volunteers), even in its revised 
form.  Moreover, the approach Feith and Rumsfeld favored—creating the opening or 
opportunity for Iraqis to build a democracy of their own without making it U.S. foreign 
policy to help much—would likely have exacerbated the problems encountered during 
the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq.  If one thing is clear in retrospect, it is that 
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Iraqis needed more, not less, guidance than the U.S. ultimately provided if the goal was to 
establish a stable and functioning democracy on the ashes on the Ba’athist regime.  
Chapters 2 and 3 argue that a failure to understand liberal democracy—in particular, 
what our form of government requires of its citizens—and especially DOD's failure to 
internalize the scope and nature of the task the President had settled on, is one of the 
main reasons Iraq’s reconstruction was beset by such violence and has yielded unending 
political paralysis. 
Perhaps the most important evidence that the U.S. was in fact committed from an early 
date to establishing a recognizably democratic regime in Iraq are the President’s own 
policy statements and speeches, both pre- and post-invasion.  They reveal the outcome of 
the debate among the principals on the question of what emphasis to place on democracy 
promotion in much starker terms than Feith is willing to admit.  The soaring rhetoric of 
the 2005 Second Inaugural Address certainly, but long before this, the 2002 State of the 
Union Address, speeches at the Inter-American Development Bank (March, 2002), in 
Berlin (May, 2002), at West Point (June, 2002), and to the American Enterprise Institute 
(February, 2003) all place early emphasis on the important relationship between 
spreading freedom and democracy and the U.S. National Interest.   The National Security 
Strategy released a full month prior to the circulation of Rice’s revised Memo (September, 
2002) makes America’s commitment to “create a balance of power that favors human 
freedom” the centerpiece of the country’s international strategy; the statement prefacing 
it, signed by the President, devotes eight paragraphs to a discussion of democracy 
promotion and only three to the threat posed by “the crossroads of radicalism and 
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technology.”201  Add to this Paul Bremer’s oft-stated understanding of his own task in 
Iraq, and the Iraqi and Afghan constitutions yielded by the approach here articulated—
taken together, the record clearly demonstrates that Rice’s view ultimately prevailed, at 
least to the extent her office’s position aligns most closely with the Bush administration’s 
public statements of its war aims.   
Indeed, the debates relayed in War and Decision, many of them very impressive, seem to 
striking extent oblivious to the President’s public policy statements on the topic of U.S. 
foreign policy.   The Office of the President, articulating the national security strategy of the 
United States of America, did indeed define its goals for Iraq incredibly broadly, committing 
America in the public imagination and on the world stage to transforming not only Iraq’s 
regime, but the entire region.  
In a stirring speech delivered to the American Enterprise Institute and its supporters on 
26 February, 2003, a speech recognized at the time for its importance (but which Feith 
does not once cite from in his book), the President’s references to the benefits of a free and 
democratic Iraq outnumber his references to the threat posed by its WMD program by 
more than two to one.  Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced only a few weeks after this 
address, on 19 March, 2003.  It is worth recalling at some length the terms in which the 
case for regime change in Iraq was being in the period leading up to war. 
We hope that the Iraqi regime will meet the demands of the United 
Nations and disarm, fully and peacefully. If it does not, we are prepared to 
disarm Iraq by force. Either way, this danger will be removed. 
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The safety of the American people depends on ending this direct and 
growing threat. Acting against the danger will also contribute greatly to the 
long-term safety and stability of our world. The current Iraqi regime has 
shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle 
East. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by 
bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests in security, and 
America's belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq.  
The first to benefit from a free Iraq would be the Iraqi people, themselves. 
Today they live in scarcity and fear, under a dictator who has brought 
them nothing but war, and misery, and torture. Their lives and their 
freedom matter little to Saddam Hussein -- but Iraqi lives and freedom 
matter greatly to us. 
Bringing stability and unity to a free Iraq will not be easy. Yet that is no 
excuse to leave the Iraqi regime's torture chambers and poison labs in 
operation. Any future the Iraqi people choose for themselves will be better 
than the nightmare world that Saddam Hussein has chosen for them.  
[…] 
The United States has no intention of determining the precise form of 
Iraq's new government. That choice belongs to the Iraqi people. Yet, we 
will ensure that one brutal dictator is not replaced by another. All Iraqis 
must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their 
rights protected. 
Rebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment from many nations, 
including our own: we will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a 
day more. America has made and kept this kind of commitment before -- 
in the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we did not 
leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments. We 
established an atmosphere of safety, in which responsible, reform-minded 
local leaders could build lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that 
once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home. 
There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany 
were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong. 
Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken.  The nation of Iraq -
- with its proud heritage, abundant resources and skilled and educated 
people -- is fully capable of moving toward democracy and living in 
freedom. 
The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free 
nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a 
better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle 
East. Arab intellectuals have called on Arab governments to address the 
"freedom gap" so their peoples can fully share in the progress of our times. 
Leaders in the region speak of a new Arab charter that champions internal 
reform, greater politics participation, economic openness, and free trade. 
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And from Morocco to Bahrain and beyond, nations are taking genuine 
steps toward politics reform. A new regime in Iraq would serve as a 
dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region. 
It is presumptuous and insulting to suggest that a whole region of the world 
-- or the one-fifth of humanity that is Muslim -- is somehow untouched by 
the most basic aspirations of life. Human cultures can be vastly different. 
Yet the human heart desires the same good things, everywhere on Earth. 
In our desire to be safe from brutal and bullying oppression, human beings 
are the same. In our desire to care for our children and give them a better 
life, we are the same. For these fundamental reasons, freedom and 
democracy will always and everywhere have greater appeal than the 
slogans of hatred and the tactics of terror.  
[…] 
Much is asked of America in this year 2003. The work ahead is 
demanding. It will be difficult to help freedom take hold in a country that 
has known three decades of dictatorship, secret police, internal divisions, 
and war. It will be difficult to cultivate liberty and peace in the Middle East, after so 
many generations of strife. Yet, the security of our nation and the hope of millions depend 
on us, and Americans do not turn away from duties because they are hard. We have 
met great tests in other times, and we will meet the tests of our time.  
We go forward with confidence, because we trust in the power of human 
freedom to change lives and nations. By the resolve and purpose of 
America, and of our friends and allies, we will make this an age of progress 
and liberty. Free people will set the course of history, and free people will 
keep the peace of the world.202 
The AEI speech did not mark an abrupt shift in U.S. foreign policy either.  It elaborated 
an idea that had been gathering momentum for more than a year:  in the long term, 
combating terrorism would require a significant commitment to spreading freedom, 
democracy, and economic development.  On 14 March, 2002, the President stated: 
This growing divide between wealth and poverty, between opportunity 
and misery, is both a challenge to our compassion and a source of 
instability. We must confront it. We must include every African, every 
Asian, every Latin American, every Muslim, in an expanding circle of 
development. 
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The advance of development is a central commitment of American foreign 
policy. As a nation founded on the dignity and value of every life, 
America's heart breaks because of the suffering and senseless death we see 
in our world. We work for prosperity and opportunity because they're 
right. It's the right thing to do. We also work for prosperity and 
opportunity because they help defeat terror. 
[…] 
Development provides the resources to build hope and prosperity, and 
security. 
[…] 
Meeting this commitment is expensive, but securing peace and freedom is 
never too expensive.203 
In a speech to the German Parliament on 23 May, 2002, thanking Germans for their 
enthusiastic cooperation in the war against terrorism, the President espoused a loftiness of 
purpose rivaling even Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign address in Berlin: 
We must recognize that violence and resentment are defeated by the 
advance of health, and learning, and prosperity. Poverty doesn't create 
terror -- yet, terror takes root in failing nations that cannot police 
themselves or provide for their people. Our conscience and our interests 
speak as one: to achieve a safer world, we must create a better world. 
[…] 
Members of the Bundestag, we are joined in serious purpose -- very serious 
purposes -- on which the safety of our people and the fate of our freedom 
now rest. We build a world of justice, or we will live in a world of 
coercion.204  
Earlier yet, in February of 2002 (more than a year before the war began), he dismissed 
French reluctance to support escalation in Iraq by underlining the grandeur of his policy’s 
ambition: 
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History has given us a unique opportunity to defend freedom.  And we’re 
going to seize the moment, and do it.205 
The President reiterated his commitment to spread the blessings of liberty the 
following month: 
We understand history has called us into action, and we are not going to 
miss that opportunity to make the world more peaceful and more free.206 
As the President makes clear throughout the Berlin address and in the months leading up 
to it, he viewed the war on terror as an opportunity to remake the world order.  Much as 
World War II transformed a continent, ushering in an era of peaceful cooperation among 
the great powers, so the President expresses the hope that the present war would impact 
international relations in as fundamental and durable a manner as the political 
transformation of Germany and Japan —the democratization of those two countries—
had.  He makes multiple references to “great trans-Atlantic alliance of democracies” 
shaped by “the generation of our fathers,” ending his address by announcing for our 
generation a similar embarkation:  “we are building a house of freedom for our time and 
for all time.”  
In a moving speech at West Point the same Spring, the President again invoked WWII 
and its system-transforming legacy.  A shared devotion to the values of liberalism makes it 
possible for the great powers to compete in peace instead of war.   The military prowess 
of the Western powers extended a “deep commitment to human freedom,” uniting 
nations that had for centuries been antagonists.  Eisenhower, MacArthur, Patton and 	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Bradley were West Point officers and, in the President’s words, “the commanders who 
saved a civilization” and “lived to see a world transformed.”   He goes on to exhort 
graduates:  “History has also issued its call to your generation.”   That call:  “we have a 
great opportunity to extend a just peace by replacing poverty, repression, and resentment 
around the world with hope of a better day.”207 
As clearly as in any later address, the President makes clear in the West Point speech that 
the United States would no longer follow a traditionally realist foreign policy.  A 
distinguishing feature of a realist is that his actions are calculated to advance the national 
interest, even when they require amoral or even immoral action.  As Hans Morgenthau 
explains in Politics Among Nations, an individual has a ‘moral right’ to sacrifice himself or 
his interests to do what is right.  The state, however, “has no right to let its moral 
disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, 
itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival.”208  Put another way, “the 
political realist is not unaware of the existence of standards of thought other than political 
ones.  As political realist, he cannot but subordinate these other standards to those of 
politics.”  Actions that transgress the moral standards one expects to prevail within a 
decent society cannot always guide the men charged with defending that society and 
thereby, the way of life it permits or even exists to promote.  
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The President makes his half-disagreement with the realist school quite clear in the West 
Point address:  “Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the 
language of right and wrong.  I disagree.  Different circumstances require different 
methods, but not different moralities.”209  He does not hereby dispute that under some 
circumstances, the national interest will demand the abrogation of moral considerations.  
His idealism is not irresponsible; he never advocates compromising America’s interests for 
the sake of justice or right however conceived.  But he does argue that interest and 
morality can, under some circumstances, be united, even that a nation dedicated to America’s 
guiding principles looks for such opportunities.  Inspiringly, the President insisted that there need 
not be a disproportion between power and justice where the world’s most powerful nation 
is bound to America’s noble creed: 
I am certain of this:  Wherever we carry it, the American flag will stand not 
only for our power, but for freedom.  Our nation’s cause has always been 
larger than our nation’s defense.  We fight, as we always fight, for a just 
peace—a peace that favors human liberty…  And we will extend the peace 
by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.210  
The President believed the war on terror represented an opportunity to unite interest and 
morality because, in the long run, it would present an opportunity to disseminate freedom 
and prosperity—thereby transforming the way states interact with one another, as well as 
the character of their most dangerous citizens.  Nor was this a ludicrous idea.  WWII was 
tragic not only because millions died; it was also, as Churchill wanted to name it, the 
“unnecessary war,” insofar as it could well have been prevented by preemptive action in 
the decade leading up to overt Nazi aggression.  And yet, unprecedented destruction 	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yielded a half-century of unprecedented cooperation and prosperity in the Western world.  
That the President imagined a similar triumph might be wrested from the war on terror is 
indicated by what may well be the most ambitious phrase, the most audacious lines, he 
has uttered through his eight years in office.  They were spoken for the first time in his 
West Point speech, and repeated, not inconsequentially, in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy, the most official statement of the nation’s foreign policy and the rationale 
behind it:   “As we defend the peace, we also have an historic opportunity to preserve the 
peace.  We have our best chance since the rise of the nation state in the 17th century to 
build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.”211  
It would be a mistake to dismiss the President’s words as mere rhetorical overstatement.  
As we will see, members of the Bush Administration as well as its most prominent 
supporters in the academy laid out an audacious Grand Strategy that aimed at nothing 
less than the transformation of the international system.   This is not to say the primary 
reason for war in Iraq was to begin some democratic experiment.  But democratizing the 
Middle East was always a guiding, if coordinate, aim of that intervention.   
And yet, precisely because the Bush administration put such emphasis on something so 
ambitious—the establishment of a constitutional democracy in the heart of the part of the 
world historically most resistant to it—the perceived success of the enterprise is and will 
remain inextricably tied to the emergence of modern and moderate government in Iraq 
and the region.   Somewhat perversely, however, neither the State Department nor the 
Department of Defense worked very hard to elaborate a war plan effectively tailored to 	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accomplishing these goals.  Before we turn to an examination of the strategy as its 
architects understood it, let us turn back to the dispute going on within the 
Administration in the year leading up to war. 
 
DOD versus the White House? 
In light of the speeches the President was delivering—and which Feith hardly cites or 
acknowledges—the gulf between the discussions going on at the Department of Defense 
(the agency charged with directing military operations to achieve a given foreign policy 
objective), and the discussions going on at the White House (where the strategic aims 
themselves are ultimately finalized after interagency dialogue), is nothing short of 
astonishing.  Perhaps the most revealing admission in War and Decision is Feith’s account 
of his reaction to a prominent Iraq speech delivered at the United Nations on 12 
September, 2002: 
I always felt some tension in watching a speech by the President, because 
we in the Pentagon did not necessarily know in advance what he would 
say.  Although Presidential speeches on national security were important 
policy statements, they were produced not through Deputies, Principals, 
and National Security Council meetings, but by the President’s 
speechwriters, in coordination with the National Security Advisor and 
other White House officials.  Rice usually sent Rumsfeld a draft of a 
presidential speech for comment a few days (or occasionally a few hours) 
before it was scheduled for delivery.  Rumsfeld usually gave the draft to 
Wolfowitz and me, and we would give him our comments to pass back to 
Rice.  Sometimes I recognized the ideas in the draft speech from policy 
papers.  Sometimes, however, the ideas had not been discussed in 
interagency meetings; they may have been developed by the President, 
Rice, or another official—or the may have originated with the 
speechwriters themselves.  The speechwriters sometimes heeded our 
comments, especially factual corrections, but they often resisted suggestions 
about themes or presentation.   When it came to crafting the President’s 
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public statements—often his most important articulations of policy—even 
the most productive interagency policy discussions amounted to little more 
than suggestions to the speechwriters, that they could either take or 
leave.212 
Perhaps out of decorum, Feith makes less of this passage than the reader is apt to.   But 
this is a truly astounding revelation:  the war aims settled upon by the President of the 
United States—articulated by the Commander and Chief in public speeches and policy 
statements—sometimes came as a surprise to the highest-ranking officials at the 
Departments of Defense and State, the men who would be in charge of deploying military 
and diplomatic tools to achieve them!  Nor is Feith alone in his criticism of White House 
speechwriters (and thereby the office of the President) on this subject. It emerged to some 
fanfare, only days after the President’s 2002 State of the Union address, that high-ranking 
State Department were “stunned” by its saber-rattling tone, especially the phrase “axis of 
evil,” and that many had not seen a draft.213   Not even Secretary of State Colin Powell 
saw the final draft of the speech before the President delivered it.   It is well known that 
Powell set immediately to work downplaying suggestions that the speech was a harbinger 
to preemptive strikes against Iran, Iraq, and/or North Korea.214  That State and Defense 
were not always in the foreign policy “loop” is not a small charge.   
Feith’s official complaint is, unsurprisingly, more restrained.  He suggests the President 
did too little to combat disingenuous criticism of the war’s rationale as it became 
increasingly clear WMD stockpiles would not be discovered.  He insists, rightly, that the 	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WMD justification remained in tact as a legitimate casus belli; it was always claimed that 
Saddam Hussein posed a gathering threat, a claim that was not refuted but rather 
confirmed after the invasion.  Feith argues that the Bush administration ought to have 
more forcefully emphasized this point, that by giving up defending the WMD rationale, 
he incentivized the virulent and false criticisms that so damagingly affected his credibility.  
In short, Feith argues that a public relations failure accounts for a good deal of the 
public’s loss of patience with the war in Iraq.  He goes on to posit that the democracy 
promotion rationale was emphasized later in “a radical shift in Administration rhetoric,” 
the result of an explicit effort to “change the subject.”  As he put it in one memo, it looked 
as though the President appeared to be “rewriting history” and “chang[ing] the definition 
of success.”  Near the end of his book, he goes so far as to charge “the President’s shift in 
rhetoric could cost the United States the war.”215   
And yet, to make this charge Feith himself has to reinterpret history to no small degree.  
We know that the democratization rationale was discussed and debated from the very 
beginning at the Pentagon and the White House; Feith himself recounts discussions 
centered upon “changing the way they live” dating back to September 2001.  We know, 
moreover, than the President has been discussing publicly the importance to U.S. security 
of spreading freedom and development since at least February of 2002; promoting 
“moderate and modern government, especially in the Middle East” was, as we have seen, 
a central tenet of the National Security Strategy released by the White House in August of 
2002.  It is impossible to deny that the administration saw a clear and important link 	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between democratization in the Middle East and U.S. national security, between 
spreading freedom and development, and winning the war on terror.   
Though Feith makes little of it, important Pentagon officials shared this view.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz almost fades into the background of War and 
Decision, especially in the debates concerning democracy-promotion as foreign policy.  
Feith does hint, however, that he, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz did not always agree.  He 
recalls frequent discussions about “the importance of balancing U.S. interests in 
promoting democracy abroad with our other interests,” and goes on to add, 
We sometimes disagreed on how much weight to give the various interests, 
but none of us insisted that democracy promotion necessarily took 
precedence over all the other U.S. interests.216   
And yet, he gives no account of Wolfowitz’ precise contribution to those discussion, nor 
presents any principal at DOD as a strong proponent of dedicating the U.S. to building a 
democratic regime in Iraq post-invasion.  It is hard not to conclude that Wolfowitz was 
the one disagreeing with Feith and Rumsfeld on this question; the informed reader knows 
well that Wolfowitz more than any other principal was an enthusiastic promoter of 
helping to disseminate freedom and development in the Middle East.  Speaking to the 
question at issue specifically—what U.S. aims informed the decision to go to war in 
Iraq—Wolfowitz offered a revealing explanation in Vanity Fair only a few months after the 
invasion commenced, in May of 2003.  (Lest it be argued that Wolfowitz was not 
speaking for Rumsfeld and DOD, it bears noting that interview was published on the 
Defense Department website.) 	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The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. 
government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could 
agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason, but… 
there have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of 
mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the 
criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say 
there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the first 
two.217  
In other words, important voices in the Bush administration supported the invasion for a 
variety of reasons.  Stanching the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s WMD program in a 
post-9/11 world was simply the one they agreed constituted  the most pressing casus belli.  
Not unimportantly, it also justified invasion on the grounds of international law. 
Feith is well aware of all of this.  He references many of these speeches even if he declines 
to cite from them; he writes, “As I saw it, the purpose of a Defense Department strategy 
was to fulfill the national strategy” (Feith’s emphasis) and yet, not once, does he cite from 
the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States.218  War and Decision treats 
democratization as an important, coordinate, aim of the war, an opportunity presented 
by the dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s regime though not its primary cause.  This is 
surely true.   And yet Feith goes further than this at times, consistently trying to distance 
his department from the emphasis the President was placing on helping to build modern 
and moderate government in the Middle East.   
Feith’s more serious charge is therefore made somewhat obliquely.   The suggestion 
seems to be that the war’s objectives as stated by the Commander and Chief were framed 
and presented to the public without sufficient input from, or deference to, the department 	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that would be charged with attaining them.  This is no small accusation.  To charge that 
speechwriters had more influence over foreign policy in this respect than Pentagon 
officials—at one point he comments that he objected to the prominence of the democracy 
rhetoric in the draft of a May 2004 Presidential address “without great hope of 
persuading the speechwriting team”—indicates a serious disjuncture between the 
President’s rhetoric on Iraq and what military planners, civilian and soldier alike, believed 
could realistically be achieved.219  It may also explain, in part, the inadequacy of their 
preparations. 
We can say, then, without a doubt that enthusiasm for promoting democracy in Iraq and 
abroad was concentrated in the White House.  There may even be some truth to the 
charge that renegade speechwriters, supported by a small coterie around Condoleezza 
Rice, were exerting undue policy influence.  And yet, it would be too much to say they 
had hijacked the process for it must be acknowledged that they had the support of the 
President.  David Frum, a speechwriter close to the President for his first year in office, 
made this stunning admission on the subject of democracy promotion in a 2007 interview 
with Vanity Fair:  
I always believed as a speechwriter that if you could persuade the president 
to commit himself to certain words, he would feel himself committed to the 
ideas that underlay those words. And the big shock to me has been that, 
although the president said the words, he just did not absorb the ideas. 
And that is the root of, maybe, everything.220 
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Frum helped penned the phrase “axis of evil,” what may well remain the single most 
memorable, and controversial, phrase President Bush uttered in eight years.  White 
House speechwriters and the President’s senior advisors undoubtedly bear considerable 
responsibility for the ambitious, even grandiose, terms used to elaborate Iraq policy.  The 
notion that victory in Iraq would be measured by the establishment of a strong, unified, 
constitutional democracy became commonplace as a result.  Unfortunately, the resources 
of the U.S. government—military and intellectual, and which speechwriters and White 
House advisors do not directly control—were never fully marshaled to achieve the result 
the government committed itself to.  The neoconservatives who were the strategy’s most 
enthusiastic supporters have since blamed the Bush Administration (not only the 
President himself, but Tommy Franks and Donald Rumsfeld especially) for their failure to 
implement it intelligently.   
Feith turns this criticism on its head and instead goes so far as (subtly) to blame the 
President for misrepresenting his own administration’s real Iraq aim.  What is not 
altogether certain is whether the incongruity Feith decries is really the result of a public 
relations failure, a consequence of clever and overzealous speechwriters who were 
unwilling to articulate official policy and who succeeded in duping the President of the 
United States into articulating their vision for Iraq instead of his own administration’s.  It 
seems equally plausible that the Department of Defense simply lost the argument.  
Perhaps democratizing the Middle East was emphasized not because the speechwriters 
slipped the language in over the objections of DOD principals, but because the President 
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and Condoleezza Rice were never persuaded to adopt the reticent, cautious, approach 
Feith attributes to Pentagon planners.  
Feith sometimes speaks as though, when it comes to foreign policy, the President of the 
United States is the mouthpiece for policies developed by the Department of Defense, as 
though when the President emphasized democracy-promotion he was mischaracterizing 
American aims.  In doing so he risks overstating the policy role of the Pentagon.  The 
Secretary Defense is a member of the National Security Council, but so is the Secretary 
of State, the Vice President, the President.  President Bush no doubt took seriously the 
suggestions of every member of the NSC.  Ultimately, however, his voice is determinative 
on matters of U.S. foreign policy.  At that point, it is up to every agency to pursue its 
determined aim with complete commitment to its success.  Feith himself notes in the 
“lessons learned” conclusion to his book that “large projects—such as war—require 
cooperation among many government agencies.  If a President takes the nation to war, he 
needs to make a strategy and forge a team that will implement it.  If he cannot, the 
various agencies will work at cross purposes.”221  In this case, one or both elements were 
lacking.  Whether the President was misarticulating the policy settled on by the National 
Security Council, or the Pentagon mistaken as to the official strategy in Iraq, this fact is 
clear:  there was a disconnect between military ends and means, and it would prove 
responsible for many of the administration’s biggest mistakes in Iraq. 
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Democratic Peace Theory 
Thus, there can be no doubt but that the President vowed to attack the problem of 
terrorism at its so-called root.  By promoting the spread of political and economic 
freedom, by promoting “moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim 
world,” the Bush administration hoped to “ensure that the conditions and ideologies that 
promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation.”222 In the terms of the NSS, 
prosperous nations, in which the people value “political and economic freedom,” will 
develop “peaceful relations with other states”; nations in which men and women “respect 
human dignity,” do not typically support or produce terrorists.223  The heart of the 
argument, then, is this:  religious fanaticism—the real root of Islamist terrorist—does not 
flourish in societies devoted to freedom and economic opportunity.  Historically, it is 
exceedingly rare that the two exist in the same place at the same time.  
It is often said that “Democratic Peace Theory” is the theoretical foundation of the Bush 
Doctrine.   The historical fact that the Western democracies have never gone to war with 
one another suggests that something about their form of government discourages a rush 
to arms.224  First articulated by Michael Doyle in 1983,225 commentators have since 
referred to the apparent relationship between pacifism and democracy as “the closest 
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thing we have to a law in international politics.”226  Those who have studied the 
phenomenon have found that our inclination to settle disputes peaceably in the West is 
very real, but the theory accounting for it, unfortunately named.  It is not democracy in 
the strict sense of the term—citizens’ widespread popular participation in government 
through elections and representation, and the government’s responsibility to the 
electorate—that accounts for the neighborliness of the modern Western democracies.  (In 
fact, studies have shown persuasively that democratizing countries are more likely to go to 
war with their neighbors, more likely to oppress minorities or violate human rights, and 
more likely to perpetrate mass killings of civilians.)227  Rather, it is something about the 
people, the citizenry, being represented that accounts for their states’ neighborliness.  The 
Western democracies do not exist peacefully with one another because they are 
democracies, but rather, because they are liberal democracies. 
What is so determinative about liberalism, then?  John M. Owen, seeking to uncover “a 
causal mechanism preventing democracies from going to war against one another,” 
demonstrated in 1994 that “it is the liberal ideas undergirding liberal democracies” that 
explain their pacifist tendencies vis a vis other liberal democracies.228  In other terms, the 
purpose of a regime affects how it interacts with other, similar, regimes.  Because liberal 
democracies are self-consciously devoted to securing the lives, freedoms, and property of 
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individual citizens, the regimes tend to be (and would prefer to be) status quo powers.  
Where revisionist powers seek to expand their power, often by extending their borders, a 
status quo power prefers peace, and is willing to accept and even defend the international 
system as it stands in order to achieve it.  This disposition has very much to do with the 
character of democratic citizens.  Defending a citizenry’s right pursue happiness as 
defined by the individual scarcely ever requires interfering violently with regimes devoted 
to those same ends; in fact, the guiding national purpose of a liberal democracy is 
antithetical to conquest for the sake of gain or glory.  (Never has there been a state so 
troubled by the projection of power—even to advance its legitimate national interests!—
as America is today.)  Because war threatens lives, liberties, and property—the very things 
liberal democracies exist to protect—liberal democrats rarely engage in wars of choice.  
Only the most compelling necessity (or perception thereof) upends this disposition.  And 
when liberal democracies do go to war, it is almost always with states that are not liberal-
democracies, but rather totalitarian regimes with expansionist ambitions.   
Put another way, liberal democracies are good neighbors because their guiding purpose is 
best achieved under conditions of geopolitical stability.  Financial contracts and civil 
liberties—and the generous freedom of action they require—are most durable in times of 
peace.  Once established, moreover, security can be enjoyed in common by states 
disposed to value it; security is a sharable good so long as every power is satisfied with the 
status quo.  Because liberal democracies achieve the purpose of their existence under 
these conditions, the interests of liberal democracies coincide more often than they 
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collide.  We have more to gain by cooperating than by competing militarily.  Of course, 
perceptions matter a great deal.  As John M. Owen observes,  
Once liberals accept a foreign state as a liberal democracy, they adamantly 
oppose war against that state.  The rationale follows from liberal premises.  
Ceteris paribus, people are better off without war, because it is costly and 
dangerous.  War is called for only when it would serve liberal ends—i.e., 
when it would most likely enhance self-preservation and well-being.  This 
can only be the case when the adversary is not a liberal democracy.  
Liberal democracies are believed reasonable, predictable, and trustworthy, 
because they are governed by their citizens’ true interests, which 
harmonize with all individuals’ true interests around the world.229 
On this rationale, liberal democracies would prefer never to intervene abroad.  Indeed, in 
the history of the modern world, late intervention has arguably been a more costly foreign 
policy error than unnecessary intervention.  Of course, it would be too much to say 
liberal democracies always and infallibly act as status quo powers.  But where they 
attempt to affect or transform the international system, to alter its balance of power, they 
do so in the hope of stabilizing it, of containing aggressive actors, even of turning 
revisionist powers into status quo powers.  A clear example of status quo powers pushed 
to military confrontation with an expansionist state in order to defend the status quo is the 
First Gulf War.  They do not indulge expansionist or imperial ambitions; they oppose 
them.   
Stanching such threats effectively can only be accomplished by transforming the regime 
in question.  This, then, is the insight that lies at the heart of democratic peace theory.  
Something about liberal democratic mores—the guiding opinions and social habits of the 
regime—can actually transform a state into a status quo power once internalized by the 	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citizenry.  By transforming the way citizenry’s conceive of their interests where the people 
control the government, the incentives that have traditionally driven states to armed 
conflict—gain, glory, and self-defense—operate differently.  The desire for gain and glory 
cease to catalyze wars among liberal democracies.  What remains, a state’s concern to 
secure its way of life, can still today drive a democratic people to war, but the character of 
their participation is different. 
Gain.  Tocqueville observed almost two hundred years ago that the spread of democratic 
ideas and mores will lead to the intertwining of interests.  Commercial activity—not 
conquest—is the most important source of power and wealth for liberal democracies.  
Since war disrupts industry and trade, conflict is not only counterproductive from the 
perspective of the national interest, it is understood to be so.  Where potential belligerents 
– all sides – realize they stand to gain little and lose much from war, war is less likely.  As 
Tocqueville foresaw, 
As the spread of equality, taking place in several countries at once, 
simultaneously impels their various inhabitants to follow manufactures and 
commerce, not only do their tastes become similar, but their interests are 
so mixed and entangled with one another, no nation can inflict evils on 
other nations without those evils falling back upon itself; and all nations 
ultimately regard war as a calamity almost as severe to the conqueror as 
the conquered. 
Glory.  Kant, similarly, observed that where rulers are responsible to the people, their 
outward ambition is curtailed.  A fundamental insight of Perpetual Peace is this:  for a 
dictator, “declaring a war is the easiest thing in the world to do”230 – and many have 
done so build monuments in history to themselves, or to distract the people from their 	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domestic grievances; in a democracy, on the contrary, where citizens can and do hold 
decision-makers responsible for their actions, it is much more difficult to take the country 
to war.  Where rulers are responsible to the people, the pride and vanity of a single man 
cannot be translated into all-out war.  Nor can wars easily be embarked upon to rally a 
people around the flag in order to distract them from their regime’s failings.  Where the 
people who bear the hardships of war (in terms of blood and treasure) get to decide more 
or less directly whether to prosecute one, and where a body of elected officials must 
endorse or frustrate any such declaration, states are much less likely to take up arms.  
This follows the very basic insight—shared by Kant, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and others—
that the vast majority of men prefer stability and quiet to what cannot be had absent 
tremendous danger and risk:  honor, glory, victories of historical importance.  To 
diminish the influence of that small minority willing to sacrifice life’s comforts, even life 
itself, for glory and victory, it suffices to tether their political ascent to the risk-averse 
majority. 
Self-defense.  And so we come to the last motivation to take up arms, which is of course 
not limited to repelling imminent invasion or retaliating once the enemy has struck, but 
extends to deterring it, and to protecting a people’s way of life against threats immediate, 
gathering, and “existential.”  When liberal democracies go to war, it is to meet or 
preempt threats, not to gain resources, or territory, or to satisfy the honor of the ruler.  
What precisely security from external threat demands and justifies is, and always will be, 
the subject of debate and the matter for imperfect sciences.  The debates are, by their 
nature, full of hypothetical propositions and counterfactuals:  what if Chamberlain had 
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prevented Germany’s rearmament?; what if Bill Clinton had pursued Osama Bin Laden 
more aggressively?; what if George H. W. Bush had marched on to Baghdad?  It is a 
cruel irony, stemming from something so invincible as the forward arrow of time, that 
measures taken to deter or preempt future threats well in advance of their appearing 
obviously necessary, even (and especially) when successful, are more difficult to vindicate 
in the public mind—this, as a direct consequence of their success!  The event that would 
clearly justify prevention is prevented, and therefore cannot serve to justify the means 
precisely because they were successful.   
Preventive war and efforts to remake the world order are audacious foreign policy 
prescriptions, which can (often credibly) be justified in terms of self-defense—the 
requirement of stanching a threat while the costs and dangers associated with doing so 
are tolerable.   The question that arises here is this:  at what point is one further 
increment of security from potential future threat no longer worth expending the 
resources and power that would be required to achieve it?   
The United States has often been accused of twiddling its thumbs in the face of real 
danger.   In the context of America’s late entry into World War II, Winston Churchill 
famously opined that  “the American people can be counted on to do the right thing, 
after they have exhausted all the alternatives.”  And yet, once roused, America has 
demonstrated a real willingness to interpret its security with zealous (some would say 
impudent) concern for the future.  In the wake of both world wars as well as the attacks of 
September 11th, the U.S. sought to refashion the international system by transforming its 
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actors and/or its international institutions.  Not long after World War II, George Kennan 
wondered (provocatively),  
whether in this respect a democracy is not uncomfortably similar to one of 
those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the 
size of a pin: he lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little 
attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath—in fact you practically 
have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being 
disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind 
determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his 
native habitat. You wonder whether it would not have been wiser for him 
to have taken a little more interest in what was going on at an earlier date 
and to have seen whether he could not have prevented some of these 
situations from arising . . .231 
If it is in the nature of a liberal democracy to abstain from war for gain and glory, it is 
also characteristic that, once roused from a concern (real or imagine) for its own defense, 
its participation will often be tinged by grandiose aims.  The same features that lead 
modern Western states to refrain from wars of choice—in particular, their commitment 
to protecting a stable and free environment within which individuals are free to live as 
they please—lead them to seek to build, out of the ashes of conflicts they could not avoid, 
a world order that will not, in the future, require renewed intervention. 
 
The Bush Doctrine and Realism 
Let there be no mistake.  According to its exponents, the NSS articulates a realist foreign 
policy, but of a new variety.  On the understanding of those most closely associated with 
the Bush Doctrine, removing a brutal dictator to disseminate democracy is a morally 	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laudable use of American power; but it is justifiable as U.S. foreign policy only so far as it 
advances the national interest.  Charles Krauthammer, one of the most persuasive 
supporters of the Bush Doctrine leading up to Iraq’s invasion, refers to this as 
“democratic realism”.  Promoting democracy abroad requires expending resources and 
power.  And so, to the question “Where to bring democracy?  Where to nation-build?” a 
“single criterion” is proposed:  “where it counts.”232  A democratic realist approves of 
committing blood and treasure to regime change where, and only where, doing so 
promises a predictable payoff in terms of national security. 
It should, nonetheless, be noted here that traditional realists object vehemently to the 
aims of the NSS – they deny that the strategy is driven by a realist understanding – 
because they deny the logic of democratic peace theory.  In fact, realism begins with the 
premise that every state, irrespective of internal regime, struggles with other states in a 
perpetual pursuit of power.  For the realist, as a state’s power increases, so do its 
ambitions and the scope of its interests; and likewise, as a state’s power decreases, so 
simultaneously its ambitions and the requirements of its interests decrease.  Jonathan 
Monten adds pointedly to our understanding of the realist position:  “under conditions of 
anarchy, imbalanced power creates the possibility of aggressive behavior, regardless of the 
domestic character or benign intent of the leading state.”233  Contra the Neo-
Conservatives, then, other states will inevitably balance against the American hegemon 	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because hegemonic powers—be they democratic or despotic—are never believed by 
other state actors to be benevolent.   
As Fukuyama helpfully observes, “Realism can at times become relativistic or agnostic 
about regimes; realists by and large do not believe that liberal democracy is a potentially 
universal form of government or that the human values underlying it are necessarily 
superior to those underlying non-democratic societies.”234  For realists from Thucydides 
to Morgenthau, human beings are selfish and by nature power-seeking.235  Thus, states 
pursue power, which tends to engender conflict among them, however their politics are 
organized.  Neorealists, led by Kenneth Waltz, came to the same conclusion by more 
scientific means.  They emphasize the structural dynamic of the international system as 
determinative instead of the nature of man.  The international system can be 
characterized as a state of anarchy.  The lack of a set of rules enforced by an 
supranational authority with a monopoly on the means of violence means states will 
inevitably compete for power for the sake of security—tomorrow’s if not today’s—vis a vis 
other states in the same position. Conflict is not necessarily constant and ubiquitous, but 
the threat of it is.  Man’s nature, and/or the system, makes competition inevitable and 
perpetual.  For realists and neorealists, the form of government is more or less an 
irrelevant variable when it comes to predicting their behavior in the international system.    
States, then, are like black boxes or billiard balls (on Waltz’s famous analogy):  to predict 
their actions and reactions one needs only to understand their relative positions, their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Francis Fukuyama, American at the Crossroads, 37. 
235 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3-4. 
	  130 
weight, their velocity, etc.; what’s inside is immaterial to their behavior within the system.  
In fact, the system is much more likely to determine states’ behavior than the states are to 
influence the system’s dynamic.  States, therefore, cannot “appropriately adjust[] their 
strategies” in order to “be able to achieve their original ends” because the structure which 
determines the effects of states’ actions is itself determined by the unintended effects of 
their actions; in effect, the structure changes by the efforts of the states within it to adjust 
to it, thus making attempts to adjust to the structure, or to adjust the structure itself, all 
but futile.236 
Advocates of the Bush foreign policy can claim the mantle of realism only by rejecting 
two of realism’s fundamental assumptions.  And it was possible to reject them, they 
thought, not because they are theoretically flawed, but because a unique set of historical 
circumstances permitted a temporary suspension of realist logic. 
First, they rejected the inevitability of anarchy.  The end of the Cold War yielded what 
Charles Krauthammer called America’s “unipolar moment” or “era.”  (It turned out, 
indeed, to be short.)  Nonetheless, upon the sudden and unexpected expiration of the 
Soviet Union, this following Europe’s self-destruction in the first half of the century, 
America was left with a preponderance of power on a scale unknown in human history.  
And yet America had no interest in building an Empire on the model of Rome, or Persia, 
nor even Spain or Britain.  
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This simple empirical fact represents a challenge for the traditional realist understanding.  
First, while most realists from Thucydides onward believed that “the plain truth is that 
both past events and those at some future time, in accordance with human nature, will 
recur in similar or comparable ways,” advocates of the Bush foreign policy believe 
America’s assent to hegemonic status had changed this uniquely. 237   The American 
Empire—and it can only be called an empire upon partial redefinition of the term—
marked an exception to the realist rule because America (and her motivations) are 
exceptional in fundamental respects.  If realism’s pessimism is rooted in its unhappy 
assessment of human nature or the international system, the realist logic is suspended 
today because America has managed to transform, or at least contain, the operation of 
the selfish human passions when it comes to her foreign policy.  As John Owen explained 
in explaining the “mechanism” that accounts for democratic peace theory, it is necessary 
to open the ‘black box’ of the state “to show how democratic structures translate liberal 
preference into policy even when statesmen are themselves illiberal” in order to 
understand why liberal democracies do behave according to traditional realist rules.238  
The character of the American regime—most important, the ingrained respect for 
natural, universal, rights built into the nation’s DNA, and from this, the conviction that 
the legitimate government can only be derived from consent—differentiates the United 
States from every previous hegemonic power because it renders her uninterested in using 
her power to accumulate more power and rule over foreign peoples without their consent.  
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Blatantly imperialistic behavior is morally unconscionable and utterly illegitimate on the 
basis of the nation’s guiding principles.  To the extent those principles are graven into the 
hearts of the electorate, Americans’ political morality determines limits beyond which the 
state’s power-seeking behavior cannot—except in extraordinary times, in which its 
security or way of life is obviously at stake—extend beyond.  Thus, the international 
system American bestrode like a Colossus took on an unusual character.  Indeed, 
America has famously been called a “benevolent hegemon,” more likely to act as a 
custodian of a world order, in which the autonomy of status quo powers is sacrosanct, 
than to employ its power to extend its influence.239 
One of the Neoconservatives’ great services was to rehabilitate serious discussion of 
regime and its impact in policymaking circles.   They half-agreed with constructivists, led 
by Alexander Wendt.  Wendt argued that ideational factors can affect the systemic 
dynamic by transforming the behavior of states.  Put another way, the character of a 
people and its governors has a profound impact on the manner in which a state conceives 
of its interests, and therefore, the manner in which it seeks to amass and project power.240  
That Americans’ most fundamental political convictions are utterly incompatible with the 
traditional motivations of an imperial power mean that an international system 
dominated by such a power will necessarily operate differently.  And indeed, in the 
context of history it is simply astonishing that America today buys the oil necessary to 
power its military, to maintain what stability exists in Iraq, from Iraq (among others) at 	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prevailing market rates.  What other hegemonic empire would have returned the oil fields 
of Kuwait—liberated at high cost—to Kuwait?  Where the realist model posits that states 
will seek to increase their power and influence—prompting others to balance against it—
the United States aspires to be able to build a stable status quo.  When America projects 
power, it is aimed generally at defending or solidifying a legitimate world order, one 
which operates according to standards of legitimacy compatible with the constitutional 
principles Americans hold to be sacred.  In the most ambitious case:  it has aimed to build 
a better order.  
Following from this, the Bush foreign policy denied a second realist proposition, namely 
that the internal makeup of states is irrelevant to their behavior vis a vis other states. 
Much as America puts its hegemonic power to benign use because of its own internal 
composition, so do the organizing principles of other regimes render them more or less 
hostile in their relations with other states.  Pushing the logic of a constructivist further 
than its authors had, neoconservatives argued that by affecting the internal composition 
of a state, one could affect the manner in which state actors conceive of their interests so 
as to benefit the U.S. (and every status quo power in the system).  They assumed the 
relevant ideas, values and norms that restrain America’s power seeking behavior would 
likewise, and more or less automatically, restrain other states’ behavior if they were only 
given new political regimes.  The end result was the ambitious project articulated by the 
Bush Doctrine:  successful regime change in a few key states could affect the entire 
international system.  Democratization (if it also liberalized the people) would contribute 
to this end in two ways:  by transforming the way the people conceive of their interests, 
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and by ensuring that the peoples new and gentle mores are reflected in a state’s behavior 
(by new participatory institutions).241  To be sure, constructivists thought their logic was 
much better suited to explaining and supporting a liberal internationalist foreign policy 
than the neoconservative version of realism that united the assertive use of power 
(unilateral and preemptive as necessary) to the constructivist notion that “ideationally 
constructed identities” exert an important affect on the character of the international 
system.242  
Furthermore, neoconservatives seem to have assumed the character of a state’s political 
regimes affects the sort of citizens it produces: commercial democracies produce men and 
women disposed to respect the rights and dignity of others, who will be tolerant and 
aspire to peaceful relations with those around them; totalitarian regimes tolerant of, or 
even friendly to, fanatical religious ideologies tend more often to produce fanatics, intent 
to promulgate their beliefs, by force when necessary.  It makes a difference, in other 
words, whether the political education of a state teaches that justice requires the 
toleration of other ways of life; or alternatively, that America is the Great Satan, full of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 John M. Owen suggests goes so far as to suggest that a “synthesis” of liberal and realist 
thinking is possible on the issue of democratic peace if one is willing to accept a key constructivist 
assumption.  International anarchy does not, necessarily, lead to narrow power-seeking behavior 
among liberal democracies because their mutual commitment to liberal principles transforms 
their conceptions of their own interests.  Thus construed, liberal democracies achieve their 
overriding interests without resorting to arms.  One must add to Owen’s analysis that the mutual 
recognition among liberal democracies that all liberal democracies are deeply committed to the 
same principles makes possible a higher than ordinary degree of trust among those regimes 
insofar as liberal democracies can, with confidence, predict and rely upon the (usually restrained) 
behavior of other liberal democracies.  John, M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic 
Peace,” 123. 
242 cf.  Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis:  Classic and Contemporary Theory, (New York:  Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2007), 10. 
	  135 
infidels, and that God wants such states and peoples destroyed.   As a result, supporters of 
the Bush foreign policy would deny that one can anticipate how a given state, as well as 
its citizens or subjects, will behave in the international sphere without considering the 
internal makeup of that state.  To illustrate this point by way of the billiard ball model, it 
matters what the billiard balls are made of.  Iron balls, magnetic balls, plaster balls, 
explosive balls—they interact differently with one another.  Predicting their behavior is 
impossible without considering what’s inside. 
These two insights led to the articulation of a strange new kind of realist foreign policy—
the national interest remained primary, but by transforming the way states conceive of 
their interests, it was believed the power-seeking behavior of states can be moderated, and 
the system itself rendered less (militarily) competitive.243  So, too, policymakers believed 
that the transformation of key regimes might render them less likely to create terrorists. 
America’s unipolar moment represented an opportunity to affect this change precisely 
because ordinary realist logic did not hold.  Properly deployed, it was believed America’s 
preponderance of power could render more durable this suspension of the classical realist 
logic.  The United States had a unique opportunity to build a new international world 
order.  The Bush Doctrine, thus, ranks among the most audacious foreign policies 
consciously articulated by a superpower in modern history. 
Unlike the system-transforming aims of other modern imperial powers—the Soviet and 
Nazi visions, for example—the American vision as articulated by President Bush was also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 As Robert Jervis observes, “although Bush and his colleagues are realists in the large role for 
force they see in international politics, they are classical liberals in their beliefs about what drives 
foreign policy.”  Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era, 82. 
	  136 
morally laudable.  What had often been impossible during the Cold War due to the 
existence of a peer power locked in a zero-sum struggle for influence was no longer 
impossible:  America’s values and interests could me made to come together.  Thus, an 
ambitious plan to refashion the international system in a way that would benefit every 
participant seemed to be plausible.  Policymakers hoped that liberating Iraq, helping to 
build a liberal democracy in the heart of the Middle East, would constitute a step toward 
the transformation of a part of the world in which oppression and poverty are the norm, 
and from which the most urgent threat to America’s security had emerged. 
If they did not quite articulate their goal in the terms of I.R. theory, this is, indeed, how 
leading supporters of the war understood its promise.  Charles Krauthammer called the 
strategy “enormous, ambitious, and arrogant.”  He was even willing to admit that the 
Bush Doctrine might fail.  But since it was impossible to draw up the bridge, and retreat 
to an isolationist foreign policy in the wake of 9/11, Krauthammer became one of the 
most powerful apostles for an audacious system-transforming approach, even though he 
acknowledged it might not work.  The Bush Doctrine, what he called democratic realism, 
“may be a bridge too far,” he admitted.  “Realists have been warning against the hubris 
of thinking we can transform an alien culture because of some postulated natural and 
universal human will to freedom. And they may yet be right.”244  Robert Jervis is, 
therefore, correct, at least in a sense, when he notes that “under the Bush Doctrine the 
United States is not a status quo power.”245  And yet, insofar as the Bush administration 
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sought to transform the international system in order to build a more stable peace—a 
more stable status quo—U.S. foreign policy under the Bush Doctrine is most assuredly 
not governed by the ordinary aims of a revisionist power on the classical realist 
understanding.  As Jervis later intimates, the Bush doctrine rejected that status quo when 
it was revealed that a new threat, which it deemed intolerable could spring from it; thus, 
the U.S. dedicated its considerable power to “fashioning a new and better world.”246 
Krauthammer endorsed democracy promotion in spite of the attendant uncertainties 
because he could not imagine another plausible solution to the terrorism problem that 
addressed jihadists’ motivations.  A reactive realist posture toward the Middle East that 
ignored the internal goings on of strategically important states had helped to create the 
monster responsible for 9/11.  In the age of Islamic terrorism and American unipolarity, 
an interests-first foreign policy seemed to demand seizing the opportunity presented by 
America’s unipolar moment and the opportunity Iraq seemed to represent.  As he put it 
then, 
Establishing civilized, decent, nonbelligerent, pro-Western polities in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and ultimately their key neighbors would, like the 
flipping of Germany and Japan in the 1940s, change the strategic balance 
in the fight against Arab-Islamic radicalism.247 
John Agresto explains, similarly, that it was ultimately a “grander self-interest” that drove 
the undertaking in Iraq. 
 
Yes, if there were weapons of mass destruction, they would need to be 
removed; yes, if there were Al-Qaeda links, they would need to be broken.  
A grander self-interest was at work in all this, but a self-interest 	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nonetheless:  The coming of freedom and democracy and prosperity and 
stability to Iraq would be a world-changing event, an event of inestimable 
value to us and the free world… 




Is the Bush Doctrine Really So New? 
If the Bush Doctrine can be distinguished from previous U.S. foreign policies for the 
grandiosity of its aims, and the loftiness of the rhetoric deployed to advance it publicly, 
the ideas at its core are not new.   In fact, to charge that neoconservatives are solely 
responsible for the notion that spreading democracy is both noble and beneficial from the 
perspective of the U.S. national interest is simply false, either the product of gross 
historical ignorance or blatant disingenuousness.  The United States has a long history of 
promoting regime change and democracy abroad, in a variety of ways from a variety of 
motivations.  Debates surrounding the desirability of such undertakings are nothing new.  
As Robert Kagan details in an important 2008 World Affairs piece, even though the war in 
Iraq will probably always be linked to the term ‘neoconservative,’ it is as much a product 
of a thread that runs from the American Founders to the Clintons and beyond, through 
heroes such as Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt.    
He reminds us that Alexander Hamilton, “even in the 1770s, looked forward to the day 
when America would be powerful enough to assist peoples in the ‘gloomy regions of 
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despotism’ to rise up against the ‘tyrants’ that oppressed them.”249  It was the great 
American Republican, Thomas Jefferson—a Republican who really stood for limited 
national authority!—who famously devoted the last letter he would pen to the universality 
of the ideals underlying America’s Declaration of Independence.  Jefferson may not have 
approved of foreign adventures dedicated to spreading it—not, in any case, in the 
aftermath of the French Revolution—but he poetically reminds us of the special 
significance of America’s Founding creed with words we wrote on the fiftieth anniversary 
of the signing of the Declaration:  
May it be to the world, what I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, to 
others later, but finally to all,) the signal of arousing men to burst the 
chains under which monish ignorance and superstition had persuaded 
them to bund themselves, and so assume the blessings and security of self-
government.250 
Abraham Lincoln’s commitment to the ideals of the Declaration of Independence led to a 
rebirth of freedom, a second American founding possible only in the aftermath of a 
bloody civil war.  He understood that the republic could not stand divided against itself, 
and argued that if slavery was not on a sure road to eventual extinction, it would have to 
be extinguished by the sword, even at terrible cost.  Lincoln believed free government, in 
America and beyond her borders, depended on it.  The Civil War completed America’s 
founding.  It is the valiant and ultimately successful defense of the ideals to which the U.S. 
Constitution is devoted that redeems the blood and sacrifice of so many valiant men.  
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On the eve of World War One, Theodore Roosevelt conceived of America as “the just 
man armed,” a nation charged with the noble task of defending freedom against 
autocracy.  Once again, America was fighting in the service of its guiding principles:  “As 
our fathers fought with slavery and crushed it, in order than it not seize and crush them… 
so we are called on to fight new forces…” the President announced.251  When Woodrow 
Wilson appeared before a joint session of Congress to seek a Declaration of War against 
Germany on 2 April, 1917, he explained America’s motivations in inspired terms: 
The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted 
upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to 
serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for 
ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. 
We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be 
satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the 
freedom of nations can make them.252 
World War II and the Cold War, similarly, were framed by American leaders as wars 
fought not simply for the sake of tangible U.S. interests, but from a broader commitment 
to freedom and democracy as well.   The totalitarian empires of the twentieth century 
represented a clear threat to the free world, and the free world met that threat by 
confidently asserting the value of its way of life.  To be sure, means were, at times, utilized 
that were not consistent with the American character and the ideals it was fighting 
ultimately to preserve.  At the same time, however, the grand system-transforming 
ambitions of Nazi Germany and the Communist Soviet Regime revealed very clearly the 
important relationship between U.S. security and the endurance and proliferation of 
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constitutional democracies abroad.  The Marshall Plan is considered such a foreign policy 
success today because the rapid rebuilding of Europe’s economies, decimated by the war, 
helped to ensure that the prevailing instability was not translated into Communist gains.  
U.S. security required containing Soviet Communism; containing Soviet Communism, in 
turn, required shoring up regimes that shared America’s liberal democratic values (and so 
conceived of their interests in similar terms) on the borders of that expanding Empire. 
If the Cold War was dominated by a realist approach to international relations in which 
the exigencies of an existential conflict sometimes demanded compromising liberal-
democratic principles, it must be remembered that they were compromised for the sake of 
the regime’s ultimate survival.  Jimmy Carter’s inaugural address seemed to portend an 
important shift in American foreign policy—away from the interest-based posture that 
demanded supporting friendly strongmen, toward the promotion of freedom and 
American ideals abroad.  Jimmy Carter spoke eloquently about freedom and the nation’s 
ideals.  
The passion for freedom is on the rise. Tapping this new spirit, there can 
be no nobler nor more ambitious task for America to undertake on this day 
of a new beginning than to help shape a just and peaceful world that is 
truly humane. 
We are a strong nation, and we will maintain strength so sufficient that it 
need not be proven in combat—a quiet strength based not merely on the 
size of an arsenal, but on the nobility of ideas. 
 We will be ever vigilant and never vulnerable, and we will fight our wars 
against poverty, ignorance, and injustice—for those are the enemies 
against which our forces can be honorably marshaled. 
 We are a purely idealistic Nation, but let no one confuse our idealism with 
weakness. 
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 Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom 
elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for these 
societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human 
rights. We do not seek to intimidate, but it is clear that a world which 
others can dominate with impunity would be inhospitable to decency and 
a threat to the well-being of all people.253 
President Carter was, of course, mugged by the reality of the Communist threat when 
Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan in 1979.  It is indeed a revealing irony that the Carter 
Doctrine—an eminently realist appraisal of the strategic importance of the Middle East to 
U.S. interests—is associated with (arguably) the most liberal President of the twentieth 
century, a man who today takes the lead making appeasing overtures to Hamas.  It was 
the same Jimmy Carter who, in cooperation with Pakistan’s Islamist-dominated Inter-
Services Intelligence agency (the ISI), began arming the Afghan mujahedeen as a proxy—a 
very effective proxy as it turned out—in order to help the Afghans resist the Soviet 
incursion, a move was no doubt but a preface to the possible invasion of Iran and the oil-
rich Gulf states.  In a testament to the truism that war begets bizarre and unholy 
alliances, the movement was funded and armed by America (support expanded 
dramatically under Ronald Reagan), even as it drew jihadist Muslims from across the 
Middle East and North Africa to Afghanistan and into the struggle against an infidel 
imperial power.   
A decade later, the Soviet Union was defeated but out of the ashes of the brutal infighting 
that beset the mujahedeen there emerged a new movement—the Taliban.  (The undeniable 
contribution of Islamists who, in their minds were fighting a Holy War, to the defeat and 
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expiration of the Soviet superpower, meanwhile, has served as a potent propaganda 
instrument for Islamists bent on recruiting young Muslims to join the jihad against the 
world’s remaining non-Islamic superpower, the United States.)  The conclusion to draw 
from this unfortunate and unanticipated consequence of American intervention is not 
that America is responsible for creating the monstrous regime that harbored Al-Qaeda 
pre-9/11. Rather, it demonstrates clearly that the relationship between the requirements 
of defending our way of life and the regime dedicated to it on the one hand, and the 
ideals our regime exists to protect on the other, are related in complicated ways, 
especially when the country’s interests are threatened.  
If Ronald Reagan met the Soviet threat by emphasizing and increasing America’s 
military might, he was, at the same time, a powerful apostle for democracy and liberty.  
For Reagan, a more assertive posture vis a vis the Soviet Union was justified by the fact it 
was an evil and oppressive tyranny.  A moral commitment to freedom, and the 
recognition that democracy would be best preserved in an expanding free world, 
underlay his foreign policy.  His rhetoric reflected as much.  If calling the Soviet Union 
an “evil Empire” and challenging Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” did not resonate 
particularly well among ivory tower intellectuals in America, it was positively inspirational 
in Eastern Europe.254  An ambitious arms build up was the cost of ensuring the weapons 
would never be used.  And the pressures of competing in an arms race with a free 
economy ultimately led Gorbachev to open the Soviet economy.  The result:  the end of 
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the Cold War and the emergence of a block of constitutional regimes that have been 
called ‘new Europe.’  
Nor did the disintegration of the Soviet Union end America’s interventions for the sake of 
democratic regime change in foreign countries.  George H. W. Bush intervened in 
Panama and Kuwait in the name of an improved “New World Order.”  Bill Clinton 
authorized the deployment of U.S. military force in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo (the latter 
without U.N. authorization) on humanitarian grounds.  In fact, not counting the great 
wars of the twentieth century, by one count, the U.S. overthrew fourteen governments 
with the intention of installing new governments between 1893 and 2003.255 
Kagan concludes that this “belief in the possibility of global transformation, this 
‘messianic’ impulse, far from being aberrant, is a dominant strain in the American 
character.”256  Moreover, he argues that “in every generation… the expansive, moralistic, 
hubristic American approach has rolled over its critics, sometimes into victory and 
success, sometimes into disappointment and calamity.”257  Kagan does not mean this as a 
damning criticism of the history of U.S. foreign policy.  Rather, he traces the enduring 
power of this “messianic” impulse to an important feature of American exceptionalism.  
An important “source” of this long-standing commitment to spreading democracy, he 
argues, “is the American commitment to universal principles embedded in the nation’s 
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founding documents, and the belief that these principles are not debatable but are… 
written in the stars by the hand of God…”258   
One can even go further than Kagan.  The ideas integral to a functioning liberal 
democracy—that all men are created equal, that individuals and minorities have rights no 
government can legitimately encroach upon, that legitimate government can only be 
derived from consent, and that impartial laws ought to apply equally and durably to every 
member of the society—are the very same ideas that, once genuinely internalized, 
implore those committed to them to live in peace with other nations so disposed, and to 
spread them where the ideas do not prevail.  An awareness that our form of government 
and the freedoms it makes possible is the most just (certainly the least imperfect) political 
arrangement that has ever existed is inseparable from the recognition that it is a noble 
thing to spread it, at least where doing so is possible.   
This is not to say, however, that the nobility and worthiness of our regime justifies every 
foreign intervention in the name of its vaunted principles.  Far from it.  Prudential 
calculation—aimed at determining whether the end is attainable at a cost that is 
justifiable—must be undertaken seriously.  Similarly, policymakers must not allow 
themselves to become so carried away by their noble eagerness to deploy U.S. power in a 
morally responsible way as to lose sight of balance of power considerations.  
In a seminal article entitled “The Mainsprings of U.S. Foreign Policy” (1950), Hans 
Morgenthau foresaw and warned against precisely this danger.  He argued that the rough 
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identity of America’s security interests and the requirements of a democratic morality 
from the time of the Founding through World War II was a fortuitous accident of history.  
Support for constitutional democracies abroad has, very often, helped to maintain a 
balance of power in Europe, what was arguably the first requirement of U.S. security 
until the end of WWII.  In his estimation, however, only the strategic importance of 
maintaining that balance—not the moral argument in favor of promoting decent 
government—can demand and legitimate the expenditure of U.S. blood and treasure 
abroad.  Furthermore, he discerned a worrying trend in the foreign policy rhetoric of 
American policymakers mid century:  the subordination of American interests to moral 
considerations.  Morgenthau argues that devoting great attention to morality in 
international relations is positively dangerous.  Very likely, he would point to America’s 
post-Cold War foreign interventions (with the likely exception of Kuwait in 1990) as 
examples of the danger.  He may well be correct that to the extent that maintaining 
power balances in regions of vital strategic interest is no longer the fixed guiding star 
according to which U.S. foreign policy is organized, it is as a direct result of its 
subordination to moral considerations.  To wit, there is little evidence that policymakers 
gave sufficient consideration to the likely effect of intervention in Iraq on the region’s 
balance of power.  Iran—arguably a greater threat to American interests than Iraq, even 
in 2003—has been the chief beneficiary of the removal of its historical rival in the region.  
There is little evidence policymakers asked themselves how Iranian actors would conceive 
of and pursue Iran’s interests while a world superpower sought to transform the political 
regime of two of its neighbors. 
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One purpose of this dissertation is to, with the benefit of hindsight, highlight important 
elements of the foreign policy calculation that were not sufficiently appreciated when the 
Bush administration decided to intervene in Iraq with the aim of establishing a 
constitutional democracy there.  Grave errors were made because the requirements of 
liberal democracy were insufficiently appreciated, and the impediments present today in 
parts of the Islamic world, underestimated.   It is, nonetheless, appropriate to begin by 
acknowledging that it is in precisely those individuals who most appreciate our 
tremendous good fortune, in whom the awareness that we are uniquely privileged to live 
under conditions of unprecedented freedom, prosperity, and stability is most pronounced, 
that the good and noble impulse to help disseminate the blessings of liberty exerts the 
strongest influence. 
Kagan ends his essay with a remarkable statement it would be difficult to dispute:   
[T]he expansive, idealistic, and at times militaristic American approach to 
foreign policy has produced some accomplishments of world historical 
importance—the defeat of Nazism, Japanese imperialism, and Soviet 
Communism—as well as some notable failures and disappointments. But it 
was not as if the successes were the product of a good America and the 
failures the product of a bad America. They were all the product of the 
same America. The achievements, as well as the failures, derived not from 
innocence or purity of motive, and not because Americans abided by an 
imagined ideal of conduct in the world, but from the very qualities that 
often make Americans queasy: their willingness to accumulate and use 
power, their ambition and sense of honor, their spiritedness in defense of 
both interests and principles, their dissatisfaction with the status quo and 
belief in the possibility of change. Are we really interested in abandoning 
this course?259 
If the Bush Doctrine has failed, it is not necessarily because of an error of grand strategy 
or guiding impulse, but rather, because the prudential calculation was off.  For 	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misunderstanding the nature of the task, America tried to achieve too much while 
misapplying the resources it had at its disposal.  It is worth repeating that President Bush 
is not the first U.S. president to have emphasized democracy-promotion as an integral 
element of this nation’s foreign policy.  Most have.  The Middle East had, until 2001, been 
exempt from such efforts, subjected to a more brutal interest-based calculus.  Far from 
being the first president to make democratization an integral element of his foreign policy, 
President Bush was merely the first U.S. President to apply a democratization strategy 
aggressively in the Middle East.260  As Condoleezza Rice noted in an important speech 
delivered in Cairo on 20 June, 2005, “for 60 years, the United States pursued stability at 
the expense of democracy in the Middle East — and we achieved neither.”261  As she 
explains, shifting U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East toward a greater emphasis on 
liberty and democracy was, in effect, to bring to America’s approach to Islamic world into 
line with America’s broader foreign policy tradition.  Secretary Rice expressed this point 
in Foreign Affairs near the end of the administration’s tenure: 
our approach is, in reality, an extension of traditional tenets – 
incorporating human rights and the promotion of democratic development 
into a policy meant to further our national interest.  What is exceptional is 
that the Middle East was treated as an exception for so many decades.  
U.S. policy there focused almost exclusively on stability…  After 
September 11, it became increasingly clear that this old bargain had 
produced false stability.262 
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It is impossible to deny that democratization in the Middle East (along liberal-
constitutional lines) is desirable:  success would be good for those living under the 
transformed regimes, and good for the United States.   In Iraq, however, the endeavor 
proved more ambitious in scope and more difficult to implement than virtually anybody 
anticipated.  The questions that remains—the question to which this project is devoted—
is why?  Why did the Bush administration fail to achieve its grand strategy in Iraq, and 
what can be learned about democratization as foreign policy, especially in the Middle 
East, going forward? 
	  	   150	  
C H A P T E R   I I 
CLUMSY, SLAPDASH, AND DUMB 
 
Does the apparent failure of the U.S. military to build a functioning democracy in Iraq 
discredit the Bush foreign policy?  Answering this question requires that we address an 
important prior question:  were the difficulties encountered in Iraq inevitable, therefore 
constituting a repudiation of the strategy?  Or were those difficulties the product of a 
failure to implement a strategy that may yet be sound?  Answering this question requires 
that we dwell in some detail on the mistakes they were made, as well as the reasons they 
were made.  To put the question another way:  was the brutal insurgency no one 
predicted in Iraq, and which in many minds discredits the Bush Doctrine, inevitable?  Or 
was it the avoidable consequence of terrible failures of implementation?  Either way, what 
does the insurgency tell us about the possibility of establishing a constitutional democracy 
in Iraq and the Middle East?  These questions are taken up in the next two chapters. 
That war preparations were inadequate to the ambitious aims laid out by President Bush 
is unanimously accepted.  In aftermath of the initial, and wildly successful, shock and awe 
campaign that toppled the Ba’athist regime in three weeks in the Spring of 2003, every 
month seemed to bring worse news until it seemed the country might only be saved by 
partitioning its warring factions into separate states.  The Defense Department is usually 
singled out for special criticism; it was the department in charge of planning the war, 
including Iraq’s reconstruction.  A number of very good studies detailing the early 
operational failures that made way for the insurgency come to precisely this conclusion.  
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The general charge is that the U.S.-led Coalition did not deploy its resources in a 
responsible or intelligent manner given its own war aims and in light of the circumstances 
under which it was operating.  The means deployed did not match the aims of the war.  
Virtually every commentator agrees that the insurgency could have been avoided, that 
Iraq came to the brink of civil war—to some descended into civil war—because of 
planning and implementation failures on a scale rarely seen.   
According to Larry Diamond in Squandered Victory, a series of mistakes and miscalculations 
in post-war Iraq, mistakes and miscalculations constituting “negligence on a monumental 
scale,” effectively led to the “squandering of a decisive, potentially historic military 
victory.”263  For Gordon and Trainor in Cobra II, “the bitter insurgency American and 
British forces confront today was not preordained,” but rather, the product of “five 
grievous errors” committed by “President Bush and his team.”264  They argue pointedly 
that “there is a direct link between the way the Iraq War was planned and the bitter 
insurgency the American-led coalition subsequently confronted.”265  Peter Galbraith has 
been a consistent critic of the way the Iraq war has been prosecuted; he argues that “The 
Bush Administration’s grand ambitions for Iraq were undone by arrogance, ignorance, 
and political cowardice,” that a series of bad assumptions led to operational and tactical 
errors that have made it much more difficult to accomplish American objectives in the 
country.266   In perhaps the most impressive account of the war in print, The Occupation of 	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Iraq, Ali A. Allawi is palpably at a loss when it comes to encapsulating for the book’s 
prologue the “astonishing” range and number of errors committed:  “The invasion and 
occupation of Iraq comprised an index of errors of commission and omission.  I would be 
difficult to catalogue them all.  There were just too many...”267  Disparate and numerous 
though the mistakes he elucidates are, he attributes them all to one cause:  “in official 
Washington, the ignorance of what was going on inside Iraq before the war was 
monumental.”  George Packer, in The Assassin’s Gate is, perhaps, the one of the harshest 
critics of all:  
I came to believe those in positions of highest responsibility for Iraq 
showed a carelessness about human life that amounted to criminal 
negligence.  Swaddled in abstract ideas, convinced of their own 
righteousness, incapable of self-criticism, indifferent to accountability, they 
turned a difficult undertaking into a needlessly deadly one…  The Iraq 
War was always winnable; it still is.  For this very reason, the recklessness 
of its authors is all the harder to forgive.268 
Most serious treatments of the Iraq war contend that the aim was noble, and the war 
necessary (or at the very least well-intentioned).  They tend to agree that the war’s 
objective could have been achieved at reasonable cost, but that inexcusable operational 
and tactical mistakes have rendered the establishment of a moderate constitutional 
regime more difficult than it ought to have been.   Underlying most of these criticisms is a 
confidence that better planning, and a better understanding of the task at hand could 
have made a world of difference, that a moderate constitutional democracy could have 
been built, and a brutal internecine war avoided.  No doubt, Iraq could have been 
prevented from coming to the brink of civil war.  It is not clear, however, that operational 	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mistakes alone, and the space these provided for the brutal insurgency, account entirely 
for the fact Iraq has proven resistant to democracy and moderate government.   
John Agresto’s criticism in Mugged by Reality is in a sense the most trenchant because the 
author goes beyond the long and tragic catalogue of errors of implementation most 
authors identify as being determinative.  It is not simply that the Coalition’s many 
operational and planning mistakes provided opportunity and fuel for a destabilizing 
insurgency; Agresto argues that American policymakers lacked an adequate 
understanding of what the task the Bush administration had committed itself to in a much 
more fundamental sense.  The U.S. had no idea what building a liberal democracy in the 
part of the world most resistant to it would require because the principals’ understanding 
of liberal democracy was deeply inadequate.  Agresto, a scholar with an unusually 
impressive understanding of the founding tenets of the American regime to begin with, 
admits that his time in Iraq (he was a CPA minister) further reinforced his appreciation 
for the importance of the ideological underpinnings of the West’s liberal democracy.  He 
argues, furthermore, that building a functioning constitutional regime along Western lines 
would have required more than a better organized sweeping away of what remained of 
the old regime in favor of building new institutions and writing a new constitution in Iraq.  
It would have required much more attention to public mores and social practices, to 
education and the political impact of religion, in short to the effective springs that give 
motion and character to participatory institutions in any country.  He suggests that the 
policymakers in charge of the Iraq effort had no stomach for the means and methods 
successful democratic reform would have required precisely because they could not 
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envision that some reform of the subject matter, the people and their ideas, would have 
been prerequisite to successful political reform.  Similarly, he argues that building 
democratic institutions cannot be a democratic process where the people have not been 
deeply touched by liberal ideals.  As he summarizes, “We are in danger of losing all we 
hoped to accomplish in Iraq because we haven’t a clue as to how to be an effective 
occupying power…”269   
Implied by that statement is the recognition that building a functioning constitutional 
regime in Iraq would have required patience beyond anything policymakers fathomed, 
and means they refused to consider.  As we will see, high-ranking officials approached 
Iraq beholden to the pleasant and easy assumption that, in Agresto’s words, “all that 
would be needed to have liberty and democracy succeed in that sad nation was to take 
the lid off.”270  One of the things Iraq has reminded Westerners is that democratic politics 
is more than institutions and elections.  Culture, that is civilization-level non-material 
factors, is important.  Agresto is surely right when he argues that it is too much to say 
“culture is destiny,” as a few of critics are professing after ten long years in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  But the bigger mistake is the one planners made:  to deny that civilization-level 
influences are important.  Precisely because Agresto well appreciates the relationship 
between democratic institutions and liberal beliefs in the West, his position on Iraq is 
nuanced; he argues that the fundamental mistake in America’s approach to Iraq stemmed 
from  “our inability to understand and promote those parts and aspects of the culture that 
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were modern, democratic, and liberal and deflate those parts that were fanatical, 
repressive, and antagonistic.”271   	  
Critics who focus exclusively on the operational errors and planning failures are 
absolutely correct that a parade of terrible and inexcusable mistakes made the situation in 
Iraq much worse than it would otherwise have been.  But Agresto’s more radical 
criticism—that we underestimated Iraq’s preparedness for modern and moderate 
government for failing to appreciate liberal democracy’s requisites and its impediments—
is the more perceptive criticism.  Near the end of his book he underlines what surprised 
him most about his time in Iraq as an American member of the initial transition 
government: 
I guess what I found most amazing about the liberation, the occupation, 
and the repeated desire to help Iraq become ‘democratic’ as stated by 
Americans at all levels—from us in the CPA [Coalition Provisional 
Authority] all the way to the White House—was how little Americans 
actually knew about democracy… 
What most hit me behind the head was America’s ignorance of what 
America had accomplished and what made America great.272 
The second half of this dissertation is devoted, on the one hand, to a systemic explanation 
of the underappreciated and exemplary social character required to make democracy 
“work” as it does on the Western world.  What, precisely, does Agresto mean by a 
Christianity “tamed by the Enlightenment” or the “‘conversion’ of Christianity from its 
theocratic and absolutist tendencies”; and how did this lay the ground for tolerant 
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liberalism?273  On the other hand, Part 2 investigates efforts by Islam’s most widely read 
twentieth century thinkers to accomplish precisely the opposite in the Islamic world, that 
is, to radicalize or purify Islamic practice.  How have these ideas helped erect barriers to 
liberal democracy in the Arab-Islamic world?  This is the “eight-hundred-pound gorilla in 
the room” Agresto refers to in his account, one “we in the Judeo-Christian West have 
scant notion how to confront.”274  While very insightful comments in this vein can be 
found in Agresto’s work among a few others, to date, no examination of what scholars 
have termed the “Islamic Resurgence” and its dominant system of beliefs exists, certainly 
not one that investigates its effects from the perspective of liberal democracy.  The 
political nature of the Islamic Resurgence, and the extent to which it limits political 
possibilities in the Arab world is also taken up in Part 2. 
Before we consider those questions, however, it is important to consider two prior 
questions:  first, the character of the operational failure that allowed the insurgency to 
spiral into what can arguably be considered a civil war.  In short, the Bush administration 
did not muster a war effort calculated to attain the end game it announced; this chapter 
tells that story.  Second, it is worth considering the manner in which the rights and 
institutions of democracy were put to illiberal use in Iraq by Iraqis fuelled by passions and 
hatreds hardly recognizable to Western observers.  The same sectarian zeal and 
fanaticism that manifested violently after Saddam Hussein’s regime was decapitated 
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continues to cause political paralysis and governmental dysfunction today.  Chapters 3 
and 4 are devoted to these questions. 
  
Interagency Disputes and Planning Failures 
From the beginning, there was little coordination among the government’s departments 
and agencies that would be involved in the war.  The CIA and State Department were 
opposed to comprehensive regime change in Iraq from the beginning as we have seen, 
and would end up frustrating the Defense Department’s efforts to prepare a government 
of externals to take over after the invasion itself.  Worse than this, neither the civilian nor 
(especially) the military leadership at the Pentagon ever really internalized the 
democratization strategy settled upon by the President.  They did not internalize the goal, 
in the first place, because they did not share it.  As a result, the scope of the planning for 
post-conflict operations and reconstruction never quite matched the scope of the 
objective.   
Precisely to avoid jurisdictional conflicts between State Department and Defense 
Department officials, it was decided a few months before the March 2003 invasion that 
the Pentagon would be in charge of the entire affair.  The key recommendation at an 
October 15th National Security Council meeting was to put a single cabinet official, the 
Secretary of Defense, in charge of the entire military mission, from major combat 
operations to reconstruction:  pointedly, even Feith admits that Donald Rumsfeld and his 
department would bear responsibility “for the full range of reconstruction tasks—political, 
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economic, and security.”275  National Security Presidential Directive 24 formalized DOD 
command primacy, and established a clear command structure.  It represented a 
concerted attempt to minimize the practical consequences of inter-agency disagreements, 
to ease the transition from combat operations to reconstruction (where the State 
Department could conceivably have taken the lead), and to leave one agency responsible 
for Iraq’s success (or failure).   
This was prescribed largely to remedy problems encountered in Bosnia and early in the 
Afghan campaign.   In both countries, dividing reconstruction responsibilities by task 
among agencies (and in the latter case, among countries as well) had confused the process.  
Coordination proved next to impossible and related tasks—undertaken by diverse 
actors—were constantly accomplished according incommensurate standards and 
specifications.   Having settled on unity of command in principle, the Defense 
Department was the natural choice of agency in which to lodge that authority.  It is 
where civilian and military chains of command come together (in the Secretary of 
Defense).  Moreover, as Paul Bremer would later observe, the successful reconstruction 
and democratization of Germany and Japan had been directed by a single department 
after WWII when DOD was still known as the “War Department.”276  
According to Feith, the Secretary of State agreed that all reconstruction authority and 
responsibility be located in one department, and even that the Department of Defense 
was the obvious place to locate that authority.  Colin Powell confirms this in a 2008 	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interview with the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction:  
“State does not have the personnel, the capacity, or the size to deal with an immediate 
post-war situation in a foreign country that’s eight thousand miles away from here.”277  
While it is certainly true that State commands no divisions, the vast majority of the non-
military personnel that could have made the biggest contribution—Arabists, officials with 
reconstruction experience, and those post-conflict expertise—were part of the State 
Department, resources that were simply not employed in the aftermath of the invasion.  
Powell supported giving the Department of Defense the lead in Iraq reconstruction 
planning, but added that the effort “would have been better served if [the DOD] had 
asked for more help from outside people.”278  Moreover, if Rumsfeld and Powell 
ultimately agreed on the “who” and the “why” when it came to the unity of command 
decision, Lt. Gen. George Casey emphasizes that the decision was not taken easily.   In 
his interview with the Contemporary Operations Study Team, he explained that 
achieving this consensus came at a heavy cost:  “we lost, in my view, two months while we 
fought over who was going to be in charge.”279   
Unity of command makes a good deal of sense if those in command have the resources 
and capacity to accomplish the mission.   But there was a flipside.  Suddenly the 
Department of Defense was in charge of tasks it had little recent experience undertaking.  
The State Department and its Agency for International Development had accumulated 	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significant expertise through their humanitarian relief and nation building efforts in Haiti, 
Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo in the decades leading up to Saddam Hussein’s overthrow.  
It was decided that a brand new office at Defense would be chartered to undertake these 
tasks less than three months before it would be deployed halfway around the world 
rebuilding and reconstituting a regime.  It is hardly surprising that the small office 
underestimated the on-the-ground requirements of accomplishing their task in a fragile 
and war-torn country.  David Phillips usefully points out that “one of the cardinal rules in 
post-conflict peace building is to apply lessons learned from comparable operations.”  As 
he goes on to explain, in this case “the Pentagon decided to erase the U.S. government’s 
institutional memory and go it alone.”280  The unity of command decision was an 
audacious one.  The consequences of the lack of expertise and nation-building experience 
at DOD would, unfortunately, prove more consequential than the benefits of a unified 
command. 
In the meantime, the establishment and staffing of an agency under DOD auspices 
specifically tasked with planning post-combat operations was delayed for months, until 
war was clearly imminent, for diplomatic and public relations reasons.  There was a fear 
that the New York Times or some other paper would have cried “scandal!” had they 
discovered the Pentagon was actively planning the reconstruction of a country before war 
to unseat its ruler had become inevitable.  Or rather, they would have broadcast the 
decision to plan diligently and in advance for post-conflict Iraq as a damning indicator 
that war was, at this point, a settled fact.  The President had not yet come to any such 	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determination, a fact evidenced by his concern to avoid appearing as though he had.  In 
this case, explicit concern for appearances trumped prudential calculation and careful 
logistical planning.  Rumsfeld ordered the establishment of what would eventually 
become ORHA in October 2002, five months before the war began, only to retract the 
order a few days later on the President’s direct order.281  Perversely, a concern for the 
optics, for the appearance of propriety, once again hampered the Pentagon’s ability to 
meet Iraq’s exigencies—the terrible requirements of war and war planning—responsibly 
and effectively.  ORHA, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, was 
finally re-chartered on 20 January, 2003, only 61 days before the task of rebuilding a 
devastated country would commence in practice.   
The organization initially numbered fewer than two hundred staff.  It was created to 
advise Tommy Franks on the aspects of reconstruction that went beyond security.  Headed 
by Jay Garner, a retired Lieutenant General with humanitarian experience in Iraq dating 
to the 1991 Gulf War, ORHA recruited individuals from the military and DOD, the 
private sector, the academy, out of retirement, and a few people from State, for their 
expertise on issues germane to the establishment of a new regime: security, resource 
management, infrastructure, education, health, sports, urban planning, etc. 
Garner’s team spent the end of January and the month February reviewing studies of 
post-Saddam Iraq prepared by various government agencies.  As army historians 
summarize in an under examined 720-page study of the first 18 months of the 
occupation, On Point II:  Transition to the New Campaign (released in June, 2008), ORHA 	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concluded that “the four most likely crises to occur in Iraq after the toppling of the 
Baathist regime [were] oil field fires, large numbers of refugees, food shortages, and the 
outbreak of epidemics.”282  As a result, the office was organized around the three 
dominant concerns war planners thought likely to afflict Iraq post-war:  providing 
humanitarian relief, establishing a new civil administration, and initiating reconstruction.  
Needless to say, these assumptions were wildly off the mark.  Garner’s ORHA expected 
“to hand off its mission to a new diplomatic entity or embassy in as little as a few 
months.”283   In sum, ORHA was a tiny organization assembled hastily mainly of 
academics and analysts; it commanded no divisions, had virtually zero concrete 
capabilities of its own, and had no existing relationship with civilian contractors or the 
military upon whom it would be reliant for virtually everything; the problems and 
contingencies it expected to encounter on the ground, lastly, and for which it devoted the 
little time and inadequate resources it had at its disposal, were worlds away from those 
that would convulse Iraq for years.284   
Moreover, Garner had expected the new office would be “operationalizing” plans that 
had been developed through a long interagency planning process.  He was shocked to 
find that no detailed point-by-point campaign plan for reconstruction existed as the U.S. 
transitioned to Phase IV (Reconstruction) of the war.  Nor could Garner get immediately 
to work when he arrived:  a portion of the short time they had to plan Iraq’s 
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reconstruction was instead spent trying to staff the organization, even setting up the 
organization’s offices.285 
Another immediate problem:  Garner was not able or permitted to hire the most 
competent people in government who were willing to contribute to Iraq’s reconstruction. 
Secretary Rumsfeld quashed 32 of Garner’s requests because they came from the State 
Department.  As Timothy Carney, a former Ambassador to Sudan who joined ORHA 
for a short time on the recommendation of Paul Wolfowitz, has noted, the State 
Department’s Arabists (though a lack of Arab-speaking personnel was an enduring 
problem) “were not welcome because they did not think Iraq could be democratic.”286  
Not even Feith is able to provide Rumsfeld much cover on this charge.  On his account, 
Garner presented a list of prospective Senior Ministry Advisors for ORHA (the men who 
would fill its most senior positions) in late February 2003.  Though he denies Rumsfeld 
rejected the nominations out of interagency malice, he admits Rumsfeld had a problem 
with the list primarily for the number of State Department and USAID personnel it 
included.  Recall that the fundamental dispute between State and Defense was their 
differing assessment of how long it would take to establish a functioning government in 
post-Saddam Iraq, and how best to accomplish it.  Rumsfeld rejected the list and 
demanded more options, something Feith took to indicate he wanted more of a “voice in 
selecting the key Senior Ministry Advisors.”287  Colin Powell and high-ranking officials at 
State were incensed; Feith admits that “officials there took it as the grossest of insults that 	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Rumsfeld would toss that group of senior diplomats overboard.  Steve Hadley called to 
tell me that Powell was enraged beyond anything that anyone had seen before.”288   
The lack of interagency, even inter-office, cooperation is more than dumbfounding.  It 
seems no one made an effort to ensure what policy work had been done on Iraq’s 
reconstruction was shared with the office now in charge of that task.  Feith’s Office of 
Special Plans reportedly declined to share its postwar planning research; in fact, Garner 
only discovered the office existed by accident!  In other words, DOD was in charge of 
Iraq, but the office it established to help guide Iraq’s political transition post-conflict did 
not even know there was a DC-based Pentagon policy office dedicated in part to the same 
task.  On Garner’s account of his first days, “they hadn’t lined up anybody to brief us… 
we really had to find out what they were doing by word of mouth.”289  Equally shocking, 
Garner learned of the State Department’s Future of Iraq Project (a study conducted with 
significant input of Iraqis about regime change in their country) when its director, 
Thomas Warrick, asked him an insightful question at an inter-agency retreat.  In light of 
this, it is not altogether surprising that the time ORHA had to devote to Iraq was spent 
planning for the wrong problems.  Garner would be replaced, and ORHA revamped, 
within weeks to arriving in the country’s capitol. 
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Who Was Actually Responsible for Reconstruction? 
Although the principals disagree on many of the details—a fact which itself testifies to the 
severity of the conflicts between and within the various agencies involved in Iraq 
reconstruction—it can be concluded with a reasonable degree of certitude that General 
Franks was ultimately responsible for Ira’s reconstruction.  Jay Garner reported to Franks, 
and ORHA was a part of the CENTCOM architecture (although precisely how it fit into 
it, and its exact relationship to CENTCOM’s parallel planning office, JTF-4, remains a 
matter of some dispute even today).290  In one respect Franks’ predominance is 
unquestionable:  for all practical purposes, as regional commander in charge of 
CENTCOM and the American military apparatus in Iraq, he and only he had the 
authority to command the resources that would be necessary to secure the country and 
create the institutions of the new regime.  On Feith’s account,  
Once he overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, Franks would become 
responsible for governing Iraq.  Rumsfeld had been clear that he did not 
want that responsibility fragmented and distributed among separate chains 
of command.  The Secretary anticipated that, at some point, President 
Bush might appoint a civilian administrator for Iraq, to assist (or perhaps 
relieve) Franks regarding some of the governing tasks.  As Franks well 
understood, Rumsfeld nevertheless intended to retain personal 
responsibility for the whole range of Iraqi reconstruction tasks.291 
And yet, Franks has been widely portrayed as uninterested in Phase IV of the war, Iraq’s 
post-“shock and awe” reconstruction.  Jay Garner complained that that it was difficult to 
obtain military support for very important, and oftentimes basic, tasks including security 
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and transportation.292  Bob Woodward claims that Franks did not believe himself to be in 
charge of reconstruction planning; he reports that Franks came away from the October 
15th unity of command meeting relieved that reconstruction was not his responsibility.  
His operations’ director, Air Force Major General Victor E. Renuart, is said to have 
remarked “’it sounds to me like OSD Policy”—that is, Feith’s office—“has responsibility 
for planning post-conflict and our responsibility is security.  And we don’t own the 
reconstruction stuff.”  To this, Woodward claims Franks replied “That’s the way I look at 
it too.”293    
Most commentators agree with Woodward, locating culpability for the lack of pre-war 
planning with the Defense Department.  Whether its civilian leaders or military 
commanders were responsible for planning is a debate that will perhaps never be solved.  
Many single out Douglas Feith’s office for particular censure; others, CENTCOM under 
Franks.  Franks’ own memoir, not surprisingly, generally agrees with Woodward’s 
account.  The General routinely discusses his part in Phase IV of the Iraq war (post-
hostility operations) in terms of “stability operations”—as though his responsibility was 
limited to securing and stabilizing the country.294  Reconstruction, of course, requires 
security; but it requires much else besides.  Franks seems to have believed DOD’s civilian 
leadership would be responsible for virtually everything else.  Near the end of American 
Soldier, he writes,  
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the military coalition would liberate Iraq, set conditions for civilian 
authority to stand-up a provisional government supported by Coalition 
stability forces, and provide security until Iraq could field her own security 
forces—a common sense approach to a complex problem…  Washington 
would be responsible for providing the policy—and, I hoped, sufficient resources—
to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people:  jobs, power grids, water 
infrastructure, schools, hospitals, and the promise of prosperity.295 
Paul Bremer, Garner’s eventual replacement and head of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, also believed that “responsibility for ‘post-hostility operations’ had been 
removed from General Franks.”296  Feith, for his part, vehemently denies that either 
ORHA or his small office at the Pentagon could ever have been responsible for planning 
Iraq’s reconstruction:  “The notion that Rumsfeld would take responsibility for postwar 
planning or operations away from the CENTCOM commander before the war—and 
give it to his Pentagon-based policy advisor—is ludicrous.”297  Feith’s office did not have 
the resources, let alone the respect, such an assignment would have required.  
That it was Franks who spectacularly underestimated the requirements of Phase IV in 
Iraq—notwithstanding his post-war claim that he realized as early as December 2001 that 
reconstruction could well “prove more challenging that major combat operations”—
would seem to be established by the fact it was General Franks who recommended that 
President Bush “make an address that sounded to both the U.S. audience and the 
international community like a victory speech” (this, according to army historians).298  
That speech, delivered by the President in front of a “Mission Accomplished” banner on 
the USS Abraham Lincoln May 1st, 2003, is today the enduring symbol of America’s ill-	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planned occupation of Iraq.  According to the On Point II study, Franks may have initially 
declared an end to Phase III of the war as early as 16 April, 2003, only three weeks after 
the campaign began.299  (General Sanchez, subsequently the ranking commander in 
theater, would maintain, in contrast, that Phase III of the war—major combat 
operations—persisted through most of 2003.)  
One thing seems clear amidst the finger-pointing:  according to the memoirs available to 
this point, when it came to Iraq’s reconstruction, no principal believed himself responsible 
“for providing the policy”—that is, operationalizing the overarching strategic plan settled 
on at the White House by providing the planning papers, the memos, the logistical 
guidance, and the resources that those hard at work on the ground desperately needed.  
The Contemporary Operations Study Team delicately suggests DOD’s approach to 
nation-building was shaped by Candidate Bush’s “overall wary attitude to what was 
sometimes called nation-building.”300  There was no real internalization of the grand war 
aims of the Bush Doctrine, no serious effort to modify DOD’s approach to war in a way 
that would support the aim of building a new form of government in a region historically 
resistant to liberal democracy.  The President was articulating an ambitious strategy, but 
those responsible for implementing it either did not understand the scope of the task, or 
they believed its most difficult components would be handled by some other organization.  
To make matters worse, Franks was not an easy man to work with.  While the General in 
command asserts that he believed DC-based policy advisors were in charge of 	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reconstruction planning, he certainly did not act as though Feith’s opinions on Iraq’s 
reconstruction were of any real consequence.  Feith makes clear more than once (though 
always very politely) that his working relationship with Franks was not good.  For 
instance, “knowing Franks was easily annoyed with advice from Washington,” Feith 
explains that he took the trouble to deliver to CENTCOM the operational directives his 
policy office did draft by way of intermediaries within CENTCOM.301    
Franks, for his part, is not so polite in describing his relationship with Feith.  In American 
Soldier, Franks writes “I generally ignored his [Feith’s] contributions…  Rumsfeld never 
allowed Feith to interfere with my business.  I was thankful for that.”  In fact, the General 
had so little respect for Feith that the notion that OSD could effectively have taken the 
lead on Iraq’s reconstruction—considering that Franks and CENTCOM commanders 
would have to implement those plans in theater—quite beggars belief.  According to 
Franks, by January of 2002 Feith was already “getting a reputation around here 
[CENTCOM] as the dumbest fucking guy on the planet.”302  In other words, if Feith was 
in charge of reconstruction policy, he was not taken seriously enough to affect its 
implementation.   
The disagreement surrounding Phase IV planning responsibility will never be settled to 
the satisfaction of the principals involved.  On the basis of interviews conducted in 2008 
with Secretary Rumsfeld and other principals, as well as the various memoirs published to 
this point, the Special Investigator for Iraq’s Reconstruction concludes that Secretary 	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Rumsfeld “directed the planners [at CENTCOM, at this point commanded by Tommy 
Franks] not to prepare for a military administration in Iraq after Saddam’s regime fell” in 
the fall of 2001 when he first ordered revisions to General Zinni’s invasion plan for Iraq.  
Initially, it seems everybody shared the impression that, “others in the government, 
probably the Department of State, would handle the governance aspects of ‘Phase 
IV.’”303   
When DOD argued for—and received—command primacy in Iraq at the end of 2002, 
however, they neither devoted sufficient resources to Reconstruction planning, nor 
leveraged the assets in other parts of the U.S. government that had the experience and 
resources to contribute to the task.304  Neither Secretary Rumsfeld nor General Franks 
and CENTCOM planners, for reasons that remain unclear, seem not to have appreciated 
the significance of the decision.  Army historians confirm this, at least to the extent forces 
on the ground believed guidance would still be coming from DC:  “CENTCOM and 
CFLCC prewar plans assumed that military forces would receive strategic guidance from 
ORHA once major fighting ended and post conflict operations began.”305  It is possible 
that the civilian leadership failed to properly communicate the scope of CENTCOM’s 
responsibilities to DOD’s military command, including Franks; it is also possible that no 
one at DOD appreciated what reconstruction would entail and more or less expected the 
hardest part of the job had been or would be delegated to somebody else. 
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As late as May, 2008, the finger-pointing persisted at the highest levels.  In written 
comments to Special Investigator assigned to assess Iraq’s reconstruction, Donald 
Rumsfeld asserts,  
I do not recall, nor do others present in the numerous discussions with 
General Franks, giving any guidance that could be interpreted as 
requesting CENTCOM not plan for Phase IV post-war operations, as 
General Franks will attest.  Nor would I have minimized its importance.306   
Michael Fitzgerald, CENTCOM’s Chief of War Plans, countered Rumsfeld’s assertion in 
equally unequivocal terms:  “We, CENTCOM, were not in charge of designating and 
developing the government, determining who would be responsible in immediate post-
conflict.”307 
The series of misunderstandings and misperceptions responsible for this planning failure 
would be the stuff of comedy if the consequences were not so real, so inexcusably tragic.  
In light of the various memoirs published to this point, the Inspector General’s report on 
this phase of the war and the early reports assembled by the Army’s Contemporary 
Operations Study Team, it appears Rumsfeld and DC-based policy officials believed 
Franks was organizing reconstruction.  Franks’ had real on-the-ground authority in Iraq, 
but believed CENTCOM was more or less absolved of reconstruction responsibilities 
extending beyond security.  Franks and CENTCOM planners seem to have believed the 
task had fallen to State, and later, the Pentagon’s policy office under Feith.  ORHA—to 
which the task ultimately did fell in fact—was assembled late and somewhat haphazardly; 
it had a limited mandate, trouble coordinating with CENTCOM, and was organized on 	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the expectation it would be operationalizing policy, not constructing it from the ground 
up.   
To further complicate matters, a month after the war began, ORHA was floundering and 
was rolled into a separate, larger, organization with an expanded mandate.  The 
Coalition Provisional Authority was headed by Paul Bremer.  Bremer, as we will see, 
conceived of his mandate, his mission, and his authority, in wholly different terms.  At the 
same point in the war, Franks, who was being replaced by General Abizaid as 
CENTCOM commander, directed General McKiernan, at this point commander of the 
Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) to leave Iraq, even though 
CFLCC had been responsible for planning and conducting the Iraq campaign to that 
point on the military side.  Responsibility for Iraq’s reconstruction was transferred to V 
Corps.  The Army’s Contemporary Operations Study Team explains that  
V Corps, a European-based headquarters with a purely tactical mission 
during the invasion of Iraq and already on the verge of gaining a new 
commander, would now have to develop the staff, knowledge, and 
experience to take over for CFLCC, an organization whose focus since 
1990 had been Iraq.308  
Army historians relate that a number of senior military officers on the ground were 
absolutely flabbergasted by this decision.  General Keane called it a “recipe for disaster”; 
his interview with the Contemporary Operations Study Team is colored by profanity on 
this point.309  General Sanchez took over responsibility for the Iraq mission having only 
just arrived in the theater a few weeks before.  Keane underlines the consequences of this 
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decision:  “It took us months, 6 or 7 or 8 months, to get some semblance of a 
headquarters together so Sanchez could at least begin to be effective.”310  Jay Garner’s 
evaluation is similarly scathing.  He notes that V Corps was not staffed for the task in 
terms of experience and seniority; “We took the junior three-star in DOD and put him in 
charge of the greatest problem in the nation.”311  As experienced senior CFLCC officers 
were leaving Iraq, General Sanchez was scrambling to assemble a new team, even as the 
security situation in the country was rapidly deteriorating.  The headquarters under his 
command would be upgraded in August 2003, but staffing was slow, and the Combined 
Joint Task Force under his command was not “fully mature” until the Spring of 2004 
according to Sanchez’s own Chief of Operations, Major General Thomas Miller.312  The 
general problem at this point was the lack of an overarching campaign plan adequate to 
the exigencies of Iraq, one that would apply U.S. military force to secure Iraq and begin 
serious reconstruction efforts.  And yet, with the decision to remove CFLCC from the 
Iraq theater meant that the Army headquarters in theater would be one accustomed to 
operating at an operational/tactical level.   In the first 18 months of America’s Iraq 
occupation, three different military commands would develop and apply four separate 
campaign plans.313  Commanders in the field would be left to work from drafts, memos, 
and briefings, some of their key features constantly under revision.314 
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If there was one thing everybody believed as the war was beginning, it is that the State 
Department was not in charge.  Perversely, even though its officials undoubtedly 
possessed the most relevant nation-building expertise and virtually all of the country’s 
Arabists, their role was seriously, and deliberately, limited.   
If there is one thing that can be said with confidence, it is that post-conflict operations got 
off to such a bad start not least because those with the authority to elaborate a plan lacked 
an understanding of what building a constitutional regime in Iraq would entail; those with 
an understanding of the task, conversely, were deliberately denied the authority to affect 
it.  In sum, everybody had acceded to the unity of leadership idea for Iraq’s 
reconstruction in principle, but no principal believed he was the leader of the effort in 
fact. 
The only way to avoid the conclusion that incompetence on a monumental scale accounts 
for the failure to plan for Iraq’s reconstruction is to accept what the principals had 
apparently concluded and attribute their failures to ignorance instead:  building a new 
regime in Iraq was not going to be all that complicated.  A number of “what to expect”, 
even “worst-case scenario,” assessments were commissioned.  The most high-profile of 
these was conducted by the NSC’s Humanitarian Working group, and included officials 
from the CIA, USAID, the Joint Staff, DOD, State, Treasury, Justice, and Commerce.  
Created to address “humanitarian contingencies”, its nightmare scenario was that the 
deployment of WMD would cause a humanitarian catastrophe, killing scores and creating 
as many as 1.1 millions refugees.  Its participants concluded what decision-makers at all 
levels of government had concluded:  Iraq’s infrastructure and government ministries 
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would play essential roles in post-war operations.”315  Among the “core judgments” 
arrived at, in the name of one participant:  “It was taken as an assumption… that the war 
would be brief, war damage would be minimal, and oil revenues would finance almost all 
of reconstruction.”316   
 
What About the other Iraq studies? 
Critics have called alleged that Defense Department officials neglected to read and 
actively sought to marginalize prescient strategy papers written explicitly to guide the 
American occupation of Iraq.   The most famous of these was prepared by some two 
hundred Iraqi exiles and expatriates under the auspices of the State Department.  While 
it is no doubt the case that the papers were not widely disseminated as a result of 
interagency rivalries, in fairness to CENTCOM and DOD, the thirteen volume, 1,200 
page, “Future of Iraq Project,” though prescient in many respects, was not an action plan 
but a collection of concept papers.  Paul Bremer notes in his memoir that even the State 
Department officials involved in writing the plan did not view it as an administrative 
guide at all. 
Sometime after arriving in Baghdad, I read press reports about a State 
Department study on the future of Iraq, claiming that it provided a full 
plan for post conflict activities in the country.  Crocker had been deeply 
involved in the study, so I asked him if it provided a practical “plan” for 
postwar Iraq.  “Not at all,” he told me.  Its purpose was to engage Iraqi-
Americans thinking about their country’s future after Saddam was ousted.  	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“It was never intended as a postwar plan,” Crocker noted.  When I 
eventually had a chance to read the fifteen volume study, I agreed.317 
According to Feith, it was the State Department that declined to develop the concepts 
articulated in the strategy papers—they didn’t become memos, briefings, or plans suited 
to guiding operations on the ground—because on the two most controversial issues the 
Future of Iraq Project rejected State’s approach to reconstruction in favor of the 
Pentagon’s.  In the first place, where State had sought to minimize the role of “externals”, 
the report itself was written by 17 working groups made up of Iraqis who had fled the 
Ba’athist tyranny:  lawyers, engineers, business people, and other experts living mainly in 
the West.  Second, many of the recommendations assumed the existence of an Iraqi 
Provisional Authority and were so formulated; State, as we will see, objected to the 
constitution of an Interim Authority made up of Iraqi externals in the near term in favor 
of a prolonged period of U.S. rule.318   
A number of practical difficulties also stood in the way of the report’s capacity to exert a 
profound impact.   In the first place, the majority of the working groups had not even 
finished their deliberations, much less their reports, by the time the invasion began.319   
This is certainly not to say the study could not have been put to better use.  Summaries of 
its major findings seem prescient in retrospect.  It predicts that former Ba’ath party 
officials and soldiers purged from the military were likely to “present a destabilizing 
element, especially if they are left without work or ability to get work.”320  It does not, 
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however, consider it likely that Coalition forces would have to contend with an organized 
insurgency, or that inter-sectarian violence could bring the country to the brink of civil 
war.321   
The report suggested gradually halving the Iraqi army, and in the mean time using it to 
support for the transition to democracy. It correctly predicted that U.N. sanctions had 
exerted a heavier toll on ordinary Iraqis than was widely believed, and that corruption 
was even more prevalent that most expected—two facts of considerable consequence to 
the establishment of something resembling a commercial republic.  For all the gems 
buried in it, however, the report is of uneven quality and full of platitudinous 
generalizations—“unwieldy” and “of varied utility” according to the SIGIR report leaked 
in December, 2008.322  The Project’s director, Thomas Warrick, had opportunity to brief 
the principals at an NSC Executive Steering Group on Iraq and failed to convince 
anyone of its relevance.  According to a 2008 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, the 
Chairman of that group, “to planners preparing for war, the Future of Iraq Project did 
not look like a coherent plan for the postwar period.”323  Much as Feith suggests, it was 
full of general propositions, but far from a blueprint for reconstruction. 
To wit, one passage often cited to give the impression that decision-makers ignored 
advice that might have saved Iraq deals with the relationship between Islam and the new 
Iraqi state:  “This is an important question which ultimately only the people of Iraq can 
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decided upon in the course of their deliberations during the transitional period.”324  Of 
course, this is precisely what has occurred, and far from facilitating the march of 
democracy, open deliberation on this most sensitive matter yielded, as we will see, 
increased influence for those intent to establish something resembling a theocratic state in 
Iraq in the Shiite South, as well as the most illiberal features of the country’s constitution.  
Far from leading to the establishment of a functional constitutional democracy, declining 
to answer this question in advance—and rather leaving it to Iraqis to sort it out—had the 
effect of exacerbating religious-sectarian feuds, as well as the radical decentralization that 
is today an impediment to national reconciliation.   
True, had more attention been devoted to The Future of Iraq Project, had serious 
operational planning been undertaken on the basis of the opinions and concerns of this 
group of educated Iraqis, a number of Coalition setbacks may well have been avoided.  
Nonetheless, the problem is surely not that the Pentagon ignored a coherent plan for Iraq 
because it was developed under State Department auspices—as has often been charged—
but rather, that adequate resources were not devoted to the development of a coherent 
reconstruction plan from the insights contained in this report as well as others.  One of 
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DOD versus State:  The Substance of their Dispute on the Ground 
Interagency disagreement—and the failure to decisively settle on a single reconstruction 
approach—is a major cause of the initial political failures in Iraq.  If nobody took charge 
of reconstruction planning after Baghdad’s fall, it is not because favored overarching 
approaches to post-conflict administration in Iraq did not exist.  The State Department 
and CIA had one vision for Iraq post-Saddam, the Department of Defense quite another.  
Neither had the opportunity to operationalize their own vision.   
State had always envisioned a considerable period of occupation during which the 
coalition would effectively rule the country as an occupying power.  During this period, a 
group of Iraqis who had lived under Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, “internals”, would 
be groomed to take over.   Officials at State were concern that given Iraq’s fractured 
make-up, Afghanistan’s Karsai model—wherein a provisional government is parachuted 
in as CENTCOM draws down its administrative authority—would not be likely to 
succeed in Iraq.   State feared that a government made up of expatriate Iraqis would be 
viewed as illegitimate one, if not a plurality, of Iraq’s main factions.  They therefore 
wanted to proceed slowly and carefully:  to build a government that was representative of 
Iraq’s various religious and ethnic groups over time.  In the interim, the country would be 
governed by a provisional authority, perhaps under a U.N. mandate, but made up 
primarily of U.S. forces.  
State and the CIA expected that it would be a long, frustrating, and expensive 
proposition.  USAID, a State department organization that administrates close to $10 
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billion annually in foreign aid, cautioned in 2002, that “complete reconstruction to the 
economic and institutional capacity of 1980 (conditions prior to the Iran-Iraq war) will 
require years of public investment.”325  Based on their involvement in Somalia, Haiti, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo, USAID was cognizant that building a stable constitutional regime in 
Iraq would involve a species of development aid that “went beyond merely rebuilding 
what was destroyed.”326  There were cognizant, moreover, that Iraqis would require 
focused and specific help, not just the opportunity to build a regime on their own.  As the 
Inspector General Report on Iraq’s Reconstruction summarizes, USAID believed that  
physical rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure would only be one step in 
a democratic transition.  Neighborhoods would need to elect their own 
governing councils to restore civil order.  Teachers and civil servants would 
have to stay on the job.  Job programs, micro-lending, and other economic 
stimuli would be offered alongside programs that fostered 
reconciliation…327 
While USAID and the optimists within the U.S. government were united in their goals 
for Iraq, they could not find common ground in their approach.  As the invasion of Iraq 
neared, the White House was unwilling to commit the resources that would have been 
necessary to take the approach favored by USAID (an approach USAID informally, and 
very quietly, estimated would cost $90 billion, and take up to five years, assuming a 
favorable security situation and minimal damage to Iraq’s infrastructure).328  
USAID officials feared that the administration’s focus on “’bricks-and-mortar’ 
rebuilding” in place of “the ‘softer’ programs that characterized USAID’s favored 	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conflict-transformation approach” would make it difficult to achieve the Administration’s 
lofty objectives for the new political regime.329  USAID officials believed the optimists at 
the White House underappreciated the importance of background capacity-building 
efforts and less glamorous development project to successful political reform; they failed 
to appreciate that democratization requires expensive and time-consuming 
transformations at the local level—both economic development, and the creation of social 
capital.  James Kunder, USAID deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near 
East until 2004, would later explain that the reconstruction effort in Iraq ran into trouble 
because the approach was wrong:  “We needed to be thinking at a much different order 
of magnitude of what is required to reconstruct a failed state, in the context of a U.S. 
military invasion.”330 
By this point, the decision to lodge unity of command at the Pentagon had been taken at 
the highest levels but news of it had not trickled down nor was its likely impact apparent.  
USAID discovered DOD was intending to marginalize its role in Iraq on January 20th, 
only 61 days before the invasion began.  Kunder and his team “were just stunned,” as he 
put it in a 2008 interview.  The Office of the Inspector General concludes that “[w]ith the 
stroke of his pen, the President superseded the existing system for interagency postwar 
planning inside the National Security Council.”331   Responsibility was transferred from 
USAID, an organization that could bring thousands of trained staffers and decades of 
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experience rebuilding countries to bear on Iraq’s reconstruction, to ORHA, an 
organization that did not yet exist in fact. 
While USAID continued to plan for humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations, 
DOD was moving to embrace a very different, and much narrower, guiding approach.  
Recall that State had, all along, been reluctant to endorse any prescription for regime 
change in Iraq because they believed governing the country would be a massive task, 
likely to be beset with unforeseeable but potentially game-altering complications.  Colin 
Powell recalled offering the President an analogy even more vivid that his pottery barn 
anecdote:  “when you hit [Iraq], it’s like a crystal glass.  It’s going to shatter.  There will 
be no government.  There will be civil disorder.  You’ll have 25 million Iraqis standing 
around looking at each other.”332  This fear underlay not only State’s reticence to commit 
to a strategy advocating regime change, but also its take-it-slow, from-the-bottom-up 
approach to reconstruction.  
DOD, in contrast, expected U.S. troops would be leaving Iraq within months.  SIGIR 
historians explain that under the scenario Rumsfeld envisioned,  “the United States 
would not need to administer the functions of government after major combat operations 
ceased.”333  Administrative and security infrastructure was expected to remain in tact 
through to Phase IV of the campaign.  Revealingly, when Jay Garner tried to appropriate 
money for basic rebuilding tasks, indicating to Rumsfeld he expected the reconstruction 
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bill would run into the billions, the Defense Secretary replied “My friend… if you think 
we’re going to spend a billion dollars of our money over there, you are sadly mistaken.”334   
DOD had wrested authority for reconstruction without realizing what it would entail:  
The Pentagon and the White House planned to rebuild what the invasion had destroyed, 
and planned not to destroy very much.  It would be up to Iraqis to build a democratic 
regime of their own, with revenues derived from their massive oil reserves.  If the 
planning for economic development, public works infrastructure, local governance 
capabilities, even the governmental and administrative apparatus of the national 
government were lacking, it is because DOD planned to leave everything to Iraqis.  This 
was the rationale underlying the initially very optimist projections.  As John Agresto 
shows quite decisively, however, Iraqis were not willing to fight, bleed, or compromise for 
their country at all.   Loyalties were narrow, sectarian, and cross-cutting; and social 
capital extending across the lines of mosque and tribe, next to non-existent.335  
On the political end of the spectrum, Pentagon leadership had expected that Iraqi 
“externals,” men who had fled Saddam Hussein’s tyranny and were living abroad at the 
time of the invasion, would play a decisive role in the country’s government from day 
one.  Feith even suggests that the disagreement between State and Defense on the role of 
Ahmed Chalabi was the most important bone of contention between the two 
departments.  Chalabi was an energetic and by all accounts highly competent Iraqi exile 
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with an equally checkered past.  He had headed the National Congress (an umbrella 
organization that brought together Iraq’s non-extremist opposition leaders in exile).   
DOD saw a number of benefits to relying on externals, Chalabi in particular.  In fact, 
Garner recalls that Feith suggested he declare Chalabi Iraq’s new President in the first 
days of the occupation; Feith and Wolfowitz made the same suggestion to the President, 
twice.336  The major advantage of relying on exiles:  they could have been organized 
before Saddam Hussein’s overthrow (and even, they hoped, contribute on the battlefield 
as soldiers and interpreters).  Defense was also concerned to transfer authority to Iraqis as 
quickly as possible in an effort to avoid the appearance that America was an occupying 
power, interested in Iraq for (say) its oil.  Moreover, externals tended to be more secular 
than internals; having experienced life under free governments in the West, they would 
bring a first-hand familiarity with the ethos of constitutional democracy to building a new 
regime while simultaneously having easier access to the perspective of an Iraqi.   
Lastly, and rarely noted, the early transfer of significant authority to an Iraqi government 
would have permitted what some might call draconian measures (to end the looting, to 
pacify insurgents, to indict sacred persons or assault mosques being used by enemies of 
the state, to interrogate and imprison foreign fighters, to suppress enemy propaganda and 
foreign influence), methods of the sort U.S. forces were afraid even to contemplate.  The 
American occupation was, in many respects, an occupation on eggshells (perhaps the first 
in history)—not only because the audience at home would not have easily tolerated, say, 
the summary execution of a few looters for the sake of public order; but from the 	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important calculation that the appearance of undue brutality or insensitivity, especially if 
religious in nature, could well undermine the U.S. effort to capture Iraqis’ hearts and 
minds.  For all these reasons, extreme measures ordered by a government made up of 
Iraqis would likely have been better received—and would certainly have had less value to 
a possible insurgency’s propaganda campaign—than the same measures ordered by 
American forces occupying foreign territory.     
State, however, vehemently opposed relying on externals because they feared a 
government of exiles and expatriates would be viewed as illegitimate, and provoke even 
more resentment than a provisional U.S. administration.  Officials in the CIA and the 
State Department distrusted Chalabi in particular.  They had reason to, as it turned out.  
He used his authority over the de-Ba’athification proceedings to dramatically restrict 
Sunni involvement in Iraq’s new government.  For these reasons, they believed crafting a 
government of internals representative of Iraq’s various sects was more important than a 
quick transfer of authority.  
The disagreements between the State and DOD approaches were never resolved in a 
coherent manner.  While the State Department very effectively opposed pre-war efforts to 
organize and train externals for a large and immediate role in post-Saddam Iraq before 
the command primacy decision was taken, the Department of Defense was ultimately 
charged with overseeing the reconstruction effort State had done the most to plan for.  
The Pentagon’s military and civilian leadership agreed that they should aim at 
transferring authority to Iraqis as quickly as possible, but by the time their authority over 
Iraq was uncontested, there was not time to prepare a provisional government on the 
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Afghanistan model.  ORHA and CENTCOM ran the country for the first month, and 
though they had not made as much progress with the externals as had been hoped, Jay 
Garner was prepared to name an interim Iraqi authority—a council that would share 
authority with CENTCOM—when he was replaced by Paul Bremer and ORHA’s 
mandate expanded a month after Baghdad’s fall.  Bremer—even though he reported to 
Donald Rumsfeld at DOD officially—would abruptly adopt something resembling the 
State Department approach to Iraq, even though the military had not prepared to 
administrate Iraq over the long, or even medium term.   
In sum, State managed to scuttle key elements of the reconstruction approach advocated 
by Defense in the lead up to war, and Defense, ultimately vested with authority over Iraq, 
refused to embrace State’s approach when the occupation began even though the ground 
had not been prepared for its own.  The externals to whom Defense would have preferred 
to turn over massive responsibility were not organized or prepared for the task of 
governing the country by the time Baghdad fell, rendering it impossible to transfer 
authority to an organized group of Iraqis quickly as the U.S. had done in Afghanistan.  
Nonetheless, it remained a paramount objective to avoid the protracted period of U.S. 
rule State thought necessary to build a government of internals.  Inexplicably, the 
President selected Bremer (a man to head the provisional government who was set on the 
State Department’s take-it-slow approach), but failed to persuade the military 
command—still intent on a quick draw down—to support it.  Instead of supporting 
Bremer wholeheartedly, Rumsfeld and the President went on to send Bremer mixed 
messages—limiting his resources, rushing Iraq’s constitution convention, rushing the 
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handover of power to an interim Iraqi authority, rushing elections—thereby stymieing 
the long-term vision Bremer was working from in Iraq.  It was at this point that the U.S. 
military, under Sanchez’ direction, had finally developed a campaign plan suited to 
Bremer’s vision for Iraq; the decision to role up the CPA early in favor of transferring 
authority to the IIP was yet another “tectonic plate shift,” in Sanchez’s words, forcing his 
CJTF to make yet further revisions to his campaign plan.337  This failure to elaborate a 
single coherent approach to reconstruction led to a litany of slapdash decisions that, 
however well intentioned, ultimately served undermine the establishment of a stable, 
modern, and moderate Iraqi regime.   
 
They Ran too Fast 
Critics also claim that an Iraq war and reconstruction developed under General Zinni at 
CENTCOM in the Clinton years was simply ignored “for being too pessimistic,” as 
though the administration in general, and Secretary Rumsfeld in particular, were in the 
habit of ignoring prescient planning if it failed to reflect their hopes.  This, again, is an 
overstatement.  A plan for an invasion of Iraq, the product of years of work, did exist; it 
was known as Concept Plan 1003.  According to The US Army Combat Studies Team, 
Donald Rumsfeld directed Tommy Franks and his staff to develop an up-to-date plan to 
remove Saddam Hussein and his regime on 27 November, 2001.  On Point II asserts that 
Franks “directed a major recasting of these plans” because the 1998 approach “did not 
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reflect either the US military’s new capabilities or the reduced capabilities of Iraq’s 
Army.”338  Note that the existing plan demanded large troop numbers not because it 
foresaw the possibility of civil unrest and an insurgency, but because major combat 
operations would have required more fire power if the invasion had occurred years 
earlier.  Nonetheless, Zinni's Concept Plan 1003 called for the deployment of 380,000 
troops as well as the careful (and practiced) integration of civilian agencies including the 
Treasury Department and the Agency for International Development.339  No doubt the 
extra troops would have been useful after the regime fell. 
In contrast, Franks’ new plan advocated a “running start.”  Commencing the invasion 
with only 170,000 Coalition troops in theatre (the 4th Infantry Division was still in the 
Mediterranean, and remained there deliberately after it became clear that Turkey would 
not allow it to deploy through its territory) had its intended effect of catching Saddam 
Hussein by surprise (and his forces ill-deployed).  In fact, Franks’ revised plan—by 
utilizing overwhelming airpower, agile forces, and rapid deployment—achieved a 
stunning victory if evaluated on the aims of Phase III of the war, major combat 
operations.  Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled in 21 days at minimal cost in terms of 
U.S. casualties.  The problem is surely not that insufficient effort was directed to updating 
the war plan; nor can it be said that General Zinni’s Concept Plan was simply ignored.  
Rather, the problem was that a key feature of the new plan (and a major reason for its 
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resounding success)—the “running start”—had the effect of undermining the possibility 
of a successful Phase IV.   
Why?  Again, the only conceivable explanation is that everybody underestimated the 
scope of the task to which they were committed. 
Franks had deliberately developed a very flexible war plan.  He imagined that troops 
would be added, as needed, to the war effort.  By buttressing Coalition forces after 
combat began to whatever extent necessary, the advantages of tactical surprise would be 
retained, and the expense of deploying too many troops, avoided.  Victory was achieved 
so quickly, however, that a large contingent of reinforcements were not in place by the 
beginning of stability operations for the simple reasons that victory was swifter than 
anyone imagined, and there hardly seemed to be any need for them.  Nobody envisioned 
stability operations would be more difficult than major combat operations. 
While it is certainly the case that Donald Rumsfeld was a proponent of a faster, lighter, 
U.S. military, the critics who claim he ignored the Joint Chiefs and CENTCOM planners 
on the question of force strength in Iraq are mistaken.  Prominent voices did dissent.  We 
now know that Colin Powell thought “too few troops were envisioned in the plan,” and 
expressed his concern to Franks at a Camp David meeting as early as September, 
2002.340  More famously, General Eric K. Shinseki (the Army’s Chief of Staff at the time) 
suggested that “something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers—are 
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probably, you know, a figure that would be required.”341  Shinseki went on to 
acknowledge, in the same hearing, that the regional commander in charge, General 
Franks, would “determine the precise figure.”   The Joint Chiefs did, in the end, endorse 
their regional commander’s evaluation. General Shinseki’s own Vice Chief of Staff, 
General John Keane, who attended almost every session in the Pentagon’s planning 
room, explains that while there was some disagreement, the Joint Chiefs ultimately signed 
off on Franks’ Iraq approach: 
The Joint Chiefs asked questions, but when Phase III, Major Combat 
Operations [sic] went to the President it had the thumbprints of the Joint 
Chiefs on it, as well as Phase IV. That is another thing that is not fully 
understood. People attacked it as Rumsfeld’s troop list and he kept the size 
of the force down. It was Tommy’s [Franks] plan and the Army supported 
it. That is the truth of it.342 
In the end, the priority given to Phase III of the war undermined the possibility of a 
successful Phase IV.  As Franks explains in a 2006 interview with the Contemporary 
Operations Study Team, he believed the force structure could be adjusted quickly enough 
even to meet exigencies on the ground after Saddam Hussein’s regime fell:   
We don’t know what the force needs to look like for Phase IV, so we can’t 
and we won’t design a force of 250,000 or 350,000 people. What we will 
do is we will begin to move forces into the region and when we reach the 
point where that force is sufficient to remove Saddam Hussein, we will just 
start running. So it took on the name ‘running start.’343   
In a real sense, then, the invasion was too well-executed, U.S. troops too fast out of the 
gate.   Operation Iraqi Freedom began when sufficient troops were amassed to achieve a 
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military success.  Planners had anticipated that Decisive Offensive Operations would take 125 days; in 
fact, Baghdad fell in less than three weeks.344  Phase III was supposed to have established 
an environment tailored to the requirements of an integrated reconstruction plan, first 
and foremost among these, a stable country; in fact, Baghdad fell before troops sufficient 
to provide stability, the first prerequisite for a successful Phase IV, had been assembled.   
As remarkable, Baghdad fell before concrete plans for post-conflict operations had even 
been finalized or transmitted to the commanders who would be charged with their 
implementation.  Lieutenant General William Webster, deputy commanding general of 
CENTCOM’s Combined Forces Land Component Command (CLFCC), to which 
Franks had delegated the bulk of Cobra II planning, told military historians that planning 
Iraq’s reconstruction was subordinated to planning the invasion:   
Phase IV was always something we were going to get to when we got Phase 
III well under way and we knew what forces we were going to have 
available for this fight…  there was seriously not anything but a skeleton of 
Phase IV until very late.345 
One of the most poignant passages in Bremer’s memoir is his description of what he 
witnessed in the hours after his plane touched down in Baghdad—widespread looting, 
much going on in front of American soldiers and tanks; a city out of control—as well as his 
dismay at the U.S. decision not to try to suppress it.  The man who would be charged 
with directing the effort to reconstruct Iraq rode into a country that was burning.  And he 
perceived that it was burning because of American mistakes:  too few troops and rules of 
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engagement that prohibited firing on looters, or even enforcing ordinary civil laws.346   As 
Bremer explains, “according to the CENTCOM briefing in Qatar, we didn’t yet have 
enough troops in Baghdad to ‘secure key tactical objectives’—traffic circles, bridges, 
power plants, banks and munitions dumps—and also patrol the streets.”347  
And so, American troops did next to nothing as Iraqis raided ministries, destroyed 
documents, pillaged their museums, and created the impression that the U.S. was 
unconcerned with law and order in Iraq.  The local police melted away, in part because 
they were facing marauding bands of Iraqi bandits who were better armed than they 
were; it became instantly clear that the police could not count on the support of the U.S. 
military, the alien institution that suddenly held a near-monopoly on force in their 
country, for support.  As a result, the administrative and security capacity of Iraq was 
degraded, and much of the good will America could have hoped for on the part of 
liberated Iraqis, squandered on short order.   As bad, once it became clear that 
Americans would not act to stop the destruction, the looting became increasingly 
purposeful.  Records essential to governing the country were deliberately destroyed:  both 
in an effort to protect individuals and entities that had been beneficiaries of the previous 
regime’s crimes, and by members of the old regime trying to “make the task of governing 
Iraq that much more difficult.”348 
The failure to suppress the looting in Baghdad, a consequence (at least partially) of an 
inadequate number of troops, ranks as one of the biggest operational blunders the U.S. 	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could have committed.  And yet it was not an oversight, but a decision taken at the 
highest levels.  Major General Webster told Army historians that he had heard General 
McKiernan explain to Iraqi leaders that “The President and the Secretary of Defense 
have said that we will not declare martial law.  We are not going to put our military in a 
position of enforcing Iraqi laws.”349  The Contemporary Operations Study Group 
explains that once Baghdad had fallen, “unit commanders were unsure about their role in 
maintaining law and order.”   They point in particular to General Petraeus’ interview, in 
which he expressed the opinion that CENTCOM guidance’s on Phase IV operations 
post-Saddam “lacked specific details on tasks and purposes.”350  Planners had focused 
“primarily on the fight to Baghdad.”  The plan for Reconstruction, in contrast, was 
“relatively general” containing “themes, which seemed to be sound in concept, but the 
meanings and the operationalizing of those themes… were not very evident to us.”351  
The On Point II study cites from numerous interviews in which commanders on the 
ground asked “what next” and got answers that failed to provide any concrete guidance.   
Army historians explain that over the course of April 2003, as it became increasingly clear 
that Iraq’s law enforcement entities were not stepping in to fill the vacuum.  As such, 
“U.S. Army units simply transitioned to full spectrum operations without much in the 
way of detailed guidance or special resources.”352  Few units had any counter-insurgency 
training; since they lacked an overarching campaign plan for the unexpected situation 
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that confronted them, commanders responded differently across the country.353  One of 
the reasons the efforts of General Petraeus in Ninawa and Mosul stood out is that he took 
the initiative to “get started with a broad program of what he called ‘nation-building’”  
from an early date.  He recognized that by waiting for headquarters to provide a 
“detailed blueprint for the next phase of the operation,” the Coalition risked allowing a 
threat to emerge.  The General explained his departure from DOD’s general approach 
this way: 
The bottom line is we were going to have to do a lot and a big part of it, 
believe it or not, in the beginning, was just accepting or embracing the fact 
that we had to get on with [nation-building] because we are, in reality, 
going to do it—no one else is coming to do it.  There may be very little 
help, if any, and so let’s just get on with it because it is a race against the 
clock.354 
Most commanders did not emulate Petraeus in this regard.  By late April of 2003, looting 
and criminality had escalated dramatically.  With this, the best “window of opportunity 
that could have been exploited to produce the conditions for the quick creation of a new 
Iraq” had all but closed.355 
Virtually every commentator dwells on the psychological impact of the looting.  John 
Agresto notes that America’s apparent unwillingness to stop the looting engendered 
contempt on the part of Iraqis who could not understand how a superpower that had 
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achieved easy and decisive victory over an entrenched tyrant could not keep order in the 
streets.356  Army historians’ criticism is more scathing yet.  They note that  
for many Iraqis, the looting and disorder became signs of the Coalition’s 
inability or unwillingness to maintain order.  From the start, some Iraqis 
assumed Americans did not care about the looting, or that they even 
welcomed the destruction.  One cleric told a journalist, ‘I simply cannot 
understand how your soldiers could have stood by and watched.  Maybe, 
[the Americans] are weak, too.  Or maybe they are wicked.357   
In sum, then, the problem was not that Anthony Zinni’s Concept Plan for Iraq was 
ignored—to the contrary, great effort was put into revising it, or at least the first half of 
it—but that the revisions failed to develop a coherent bridge between major combat 
operations and post-hostility operations.  Pre-war planning for Phase IV was so 
inadequate, in turn, for a number of reasons.  On the military side, those involved in the 
planning have admitted that their failure stemmed, in part, from a lack of time and 
resources.  While prosecuting one war in Afghanistan, CENTCOM was charged with 
making dramatic revisions to the existing Iraq plan; it began, understandably, at the 
beginning—by planning the invasion.   Baghdad fell before they had opportunity to make 
plans for the war’s subsequent phase.   
Another reason greater urgency and resources were not devoted to preparing for Phase 
IV:  Franks wanted little to do with it, as we have already established.  The On Point study 
summarizes his message to the Joints Chiefs and Defense Department this way:  “You pay 
attention to the day after, and I’ll pay attention to the day of.”358  One CENTCOM 
planner, Major Ray Eiriz, told an interviewer that “CENTCOM never wanted military 	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administration and the Joint Staff and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] had not 
decided what it would look like.”359  This, of course, recalls the initial disagreement 
between State and Defense, the former insisting on a protracted period of military rule 
that DOD officials, civilian and armed forces alike, objected to in principle.  In other 
words, no coherent early decision was ever consciously taken and deliberately enacted on 
one of the most basic questions of all:  whether Iraq would be administered by the U.S. 
military, or a civilian body (made up of some combination of Americans, Iraqis, and 
other members of an international coalition).  One must presume this accounts for the 
utter schizophrenia evident in the first month of U.S. occupation:  first, ORHA (a brand 
new civilian organization) uneasily shared reconstruction responsibilities with 
CENTCOM; then Jay Garner and ORHA were replaced by Paul Bremer’s more 
powerful CPA. One of Bremer’s first acts, in turn, was to dissolve the transitional 
authority made up of Iraqis and which Garner had labored to assemble, one that had 
hoped, moreover, to assume significant responsibility; Bremer, favored of a prolonged 
U.S. occupation, as we will see.  On the military end, as we have seen, DOD transferred 
the Iraq command from CFLCC to the less well-prepared V Corps.  
Lieutenant Colonel John Agoglia, one of the main planners at CENTCOM, makes an 
even more damning admission.  As Gordon and Trainor recount a 2003 interview, 
“CENTCOM planners had been told early on that others in the government would 
assume the principle responsibilities for Phase IV…  But for months the planners could 
never locate the officials who were supposedly preparing for Iraq’s future”; in the 	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Colonel’s words, “there wasn’t a whole lot of intellectual energy being focused on Phase 
IV.”360   Another General, CFLCC’s deputy commander, William Webster, explained 
that “all along, General Franks said that the Secretary of Defense wanted us to quickly 
leave and turn over post-hostilities to international organizations (IOs) and 
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) led by ORHA.  That was the notion.”361  In other 
words, DOD, its civilian and military command, wanted very badly to avoid taking over 
the administration of Iraq and clung to the notion this would be possible until escalating 
violence made it abundantly clear that no other organization could handle the task. 
The conclusion, then, is a familiar one:  reconstruction failures in Iraq were the result of 
mistaken assumptions. Too few troops were dispatched, too little energy devoted to 
planning the country’s rebirth, because there was a consensus that success would rather 
easily be achieved.  First, virtually everyone was convinced Iraq’s administrative and 
security infrastructure would be utilizable for reconstruction, that Iraqis would do most of 
the administrating and securing under a new leadership—initially the U.N., soon 
afterward, a provisional Iraqi authority, ultimately, an elected Iraqi government.  Second, 
nobody predicted widespread looting, violence, ultimately an insurgency.  Many, in 
contrast, expected Americans would be greeted as liberators.  While cooperation among 
the Shiite and especially the Kurds was indeed impressive at the war’s outset, their 
leaders’ enthusiastic cooperation quickly morphed into plays for power on the basis of 
narrow sectarian agendas—not so much from an eagerness to build an inclusive modern 
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state as from a desire to increase their influence in post-Saddam Iraq from parochial 
concerns.   Against the backdrop of the deteriorating security situation, a new civilian 
organization was created that would take a dramatically different approach to Iraq’s 
reconstruction. 
 
Bremer’s Mistakes  
Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad Monday, May 12th, almost two months after the 
invasion of Iraq began.  The Contemporary Operations Study Team notes that “the 
decisions made and actions taken in May 2003 proved pivotal to the 18 months that 
followed.”362   They set Iraq on a trajectory from which the country has not yet fully 
recovered.  
Bremer considered himself the President’s personal envoy, and believed he reported 
directly to the Commander in Chief.  In his book, he explains that he had the President’s 
wholehearted support, which came with “full authority to bring all the resources of the 
American government to bear on Iraq’s reconstruction.”363  He presents President Bush 
as being “emphatically” committed to his (Bremer’s) vision and timetable, and goes so far 
as to quote the President to this effect:  “We’ll stay until the job is done.  You can count 
on my support irrespective of the political calendar or what the media might say.”364  In a 
2008 interview with the Inspector General, Bremer puts an even finer point on it:  “[t]he 	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President’s instructions to me… when I had lunch with him alone on May 6th, were that 
we’re going to take our time to get [Iraq] right…  The President had effectively, though 
perhaps not formally, changed his position on the question of short or long 
occupation.”365    
Bremer believed the “easy transfer” of power approach—that is, the approach which 
had, to that point, guided DOD—amounted to a “reckless fantasy.”366  He explains that 
the constitutional democracy he was tasked to help build would require a time-consuming 
investment to create what he calls “social ‘shock-absorbers’”:  those features of a stable, 
modern, and moderate society—he enumerates, “a free press, trade unions, political 
parties, professional organizations”—that allow its democratic institutions to function as 
they do in the West.367   Finding “no Iraqi political leaders inside the country 
commanding a significant following to whom we could hand over power,” and believing 
most of those working with ORHA to be incompetent, he immediately backtracked on 
Garner’s plan to establish an Interim Iraqi Authority.  This decision left a number of 
prominent Iraqis, those expecting to be named to the interim government and who had 
devoted considerable time and effort to Garner’s initiatives “completely flabbergasted.”368  
That they were less enthusiastic to cooperate with Bremer’s organization going forward 
should not have been altogether surprising.  
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In place of an interim authority made up of Iraqis, Bremer’s first act (by signing CPA 
Regulation Number 1) was to establish in the place of ORHA a provisional government 
with dramatically expanded authority under international law.  The Coalition Provisional 
Authority vested in itself all “executive, legislative, and judicial authority,” what 
effectively put Bremer in charge of the country for what was to be a 14-month U.S. 
occupation.369  Senior Pentagon officials, including the Secretary of Defense to whom 
Bremer officially reported, “found Bremer’s new course unexpected”; Rumsfeld believed 
Bremer was on board with DOD’s basic approach to Iraq which still called for the 
“transfer power to an Interim Iraqi Authority as soon as possible.”370  The unexpected 
reversal led Iraqis, especially its aspiring politicians, to question with a new urgency 
America’s motivations.  On Ali Allawi’s account, “Uncertainty reigned, while there was 
dark talk about the imposition of a colonial regime.  Many Iraqi leaders felt that the USA 
had been duplicitous in its negotiations and that there had always been a parallel track 
that aimed at the installation of a ‘pro-consul’ figure.”371  
Along with the decision to formally announce a protracted American occupation—
necessary in his mind to build the requisite supports for a non-despotic regime after 
decades of authoritarian rule—Bremer’s first two orders are among the most criticized 
decisions of the war.  On May 16th, CPA Order No. 1 mandated the “De-Baathification 
of Iraqi society,” and removed from public life all Iraqis who had held the top four ranks 	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under Saddam Hussein’s regime; on May 23rd, CPA Order No. 2 disbanded Saddam 
Hussein’s military and intelligence institutions.  At a stroke, hundreds of thousands of 
proud men were humiliated and relegated to the unemployment lines.  The 
Contemporary Operations Study Team has noted the magnitude of these decisions:  
These orders, designed to signal the end of Saddam’s tyranny and the 
beginning of a new era, removed thousands of Sunni Arab Iraqis from 
political power, creating the perception that Sunni Arabs would have 
limited power in a new Iraq, fostering a huge unemployment problem, and 
leaving Iraqi institutions without bureaucratic or technical leadership.  
Many Coalition military figures believed at the time that these important 
CPA decisions created a pool of disaffected and unemployed Sunni Arabs 
from which a growing insurgency could later recruit.372 
Bremer insists in his memoir that the orders were necessary in order to prove to Iraqis 
that the new regime would be dramatically unlike the old; they guaranteed Iraqis Saddam 
Hussein’s instruments of repression would not be a factor as Iraq built its future.373  
Shiites appreciated the gesture, and fought hard for thoroughgoing de-Ba’athification; on 
the Sunni side, it had the opposite effect, contributing not a little to the insurgency in a 
number of important ways.  Unbelievably, neither order was discussed with the military 
leadership.  Generals were “surprised, shocked” when they were informed of the 
decisions.374  CENTCOM commanders had devoted time and energy to cultivating 
important relationships with Iraqi Generals (all of them former Ba’athists) and had 
expected to leverage the forces they still commanded during the reconstruction period.  
Instead, they were told to build a new military leadership from the junior officers 
unaffected by the deBa’athification order, and to essentially recruit a new volunteer 	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army—a task that would take years to complete.  Its dollar cost was also high.  According 
to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, by 2008, the U.S. Congress had 
appropriated almost $23 billion dollars to rebuild Iraq’s security services, what amounted 
to “by far the single largest Iraq reconstruction expense.”375  DOD had assumed the Iraqi 
military would remain in tact, and that a part of its leadership would be, rather easily, 
induced to support Coalition efforts.  In fact, the new Iraqi army proved utterly hapless in 
the initial years of the insurgency; a year on, as fighting was intensifying, of the “200,000 
Iraqi security force personnel rushed into service… no more than 5,000” were “fully 
trained an equipped.”376  When pitted against insurgents, some refused to fight; others 
actually switched sides.377  Worse yet, as General Petraeus would later explain, the order 
to disband ignited nationalist impulses against the Coalition and created “tens of 
thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of additional enemies for the Coalition”378  
Today, Iraq’s army is larger than it was under Saddam Hussein (recall that the Future of 
Iraq Project had called to cuts it size in half gradually) and it is utterly dominated by 
Shiite Iraqis.  It is difficult to imagine the military will not demand an increasingly large 
political role as American forces withdraw.  
So, also, DOD assumed that Iraq’s administrative apparatus would continue to function, 
that it could relatively easily be directed toward the competent achievement of different 
ends in a new regime.  Lieutenant General Wallace, a V Corps commander when 	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command was transferred to it from CFLCC, explains the significance of the Bremer’s 
decision to purge Ba’athists from government this way:  “The de-Baathification meant 
that the bureaucracy that made Iraq work was no longer allowed to help make Iraq 
work.”379  Lieutenant General Sanchez puts a finer point on it:  “The impact of this de-
Ba’athification order was devastating…  it eliminated the entire government and civic 
capacity of the nation.”  Indeed, 30,000 administrators—some of them teachers, and 
many of them Ba’athists in name only (membership was often a condition of employment 
and a prerequisite to advancement)—were summarily dismissed.  Bremer’s decisions thus 
further undermined DOD’s too easy assumptions about Iraq’s reconstruction.  His first 
two orders are seen, by virtually every commentator, as having launched (or at least 
fuelled) the debilitating insurgency that soon emerged.380   
That Bremer and Rumsfeld both believed they had the President’s unconditional support 
complicated matters significantly.  Bremer was trying to build a constitutional regime 
from the ground up, and thought he had time to take an approach resembling the one 
State had been arguing for.  To his surprise, he encountered constant pressure from 
DOD and, it would turn out, the White House, not just to move toward a transfer of 
authority as quickly as possible, but to expedite nation-wide elections and the ratification 
of a new constitution, all of this under a rapidly deteriorating security situation.  This led, 
as we will see in Chapter 4, to clumsy political errors that permitted the use of important 
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democratic institutions and procedures to achieve narrow partisan objectives at high cost 
to the possibility of a unified Iraq.  
Either the State Department’s or DOD’s approach, pursued coherently and resolutely, 
may well have had some chance of creating a stable regime much more responsive to the 
citizenry than Saddam Hussein, if not quite a modern liberal democracy.  But the 
haphazard series of disjointed decisions that were taken, as slapdash lowest common 
denominator solutions tend to, produced the advantages of neither approach and the 
drawbacks of both.  The result:  ill-conceived initiatives and operational disasters that 
created a vacuum for, and then fuelled, the brutal insurgency that brought the nation to 
the brink of civil war and the U.S. to the brink of ignominious withdrawal.   
 
Neoconservative Assumptions 
It is an unfortunate irony that for all their emphasis on the importance of regime, 
neoconservative policymakers—by all accounts, those within the administration who were 
the most ardent supporters of regime change—dramatically underestimated the 
challenges the U.S. would face establishing a democratic regime in Iraq.  Were it not for 
this misunderstanding, the most enthusiastic supporters of regime change might have 
done a better job communicating the scope of the objective to DOD; they might have 
even selected individuals who were sensitive to many of the challenges that did emerge to 
lead the effort.  Instead, civilian policymakers as well as military officials failed to 
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recognize the stunning disproportion between the ends of the Iraq war and the means 
being mobilized to achieve them. 
Some thought it would be relatively easy, and went so far as to describe the task in 
infuriatingly lackadaisical terms.  Kenneth Adelman, who served Donald Rumsfeld on 
three occasions over the course of his career, will be remembered in part for his glib 
overconfidence during his final stint.  He posited, in op-eds for The Washington Post 
published in the lead-up to invasion and in its immediate aftermath, that “demolishing 
Hussein’s military power and liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk.”381   Why was 
Adelman so sure it would be easy?   He offered four “simple” and “responsible” reasons:  
“(1) It was a cakewalk last time; (2) they’ve become much weaker; (3) we’ve become much 
stronger; and (4) now we’re playing for keeps.”  Amazingly, he did not consider that the 
scope of U.S. aims would separate the two campaigns—in 1991, U.S. forces aimed to 
push Saddam’s army from Kuwait, thereafter to contain his military capabilities to a 
limited sphere; in 2003, the U.S. sought to topple Iraq’s ruler and build an entirely new 
regime.  Leaving it to Saddam Hussein to keep Iraq together (albeit under extensive 
restrictions) permitted the U.S., in 1991 but not in 2003, to ignore that host of 
complications—Iraq’s sectarian dynamic, the country’s dearth of political capital and 
individualist mores, the political claims of Islam, Iran’s meddling, etc.—that would prove 
so determinative in the absence of a strongman. 
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Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, exuded a similar overconfidence as the 
U.S. girded for war.  In a speech delivered 11 March, 2003, he said this: 
Over and over, we hear reports of Iraqis here in the United States who 
manage to communicate with their friends and families in Iraq, and what 
they are hearing is amazing. Their friends and relatives want to know what 
is taking the Americans so long. When are you coming? 
In a meeting last week at the White House, one of these Iraqi-Americans 
said, 'A war with Saddam Hussein would be a war for Iraq, not against 
Iraq.' 
The Iraqi people understand what this crisis is about. Like the people of 
France in the 1940s, they view us as their hoped-for liberator. They know 
that America will not come as a conqueror.382  
There was a real sense that removing Saddam Hussein would be sufficient to provoke a 
major transformation for the better, perhaps even beyond Iraq.  Wolfowitz, perhaps 
better than any other proponent of the Iraq war, voices the idea that free government 
would thrive were only its dictator to be removed.  A bitter insurgency targeting 
American troops as well as Iraqis who supported them, civil war in Iraq, and a 
strengthened Iran—these weren’t even unlikely contingencies; they were unimaginable.   
To judge from resource allocation, the Pentagon shared this estimation; the civilian 
leadership believed Phase III, major combat operations, would be much more difficult 
that Phase IV, reconstruction.   Wolfowitz explained in February of 2003 to the House 
Budget Committee that the “higher-end [troop strength] predications” that had been 
floated by Shinseki and others were “wildly off the mark.”  He went on to explain that 
“it’s hard to conceive that it would take more force to provide stability in post-Saddam 
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Iraq thank it would take to conduct the war itself…  Hard to imagine.”  The military 
command at DOD, as we have seen, shared this evaluation.  In the last week of April, the 
deployment of the I2th Cavalry Division, planned under the running start doctrine, was 
cancelled, a decision Franks has taken responsibility for.383  He told the President the 
mission had effectively been accomplished sometime before 1 May, 2003. 
Others, less prone to wishful thinking, did not believe constructive regime change in Iraq 
would be easy.  They did, however, generally share Richard Perle’s 2003 assessment of 
Iraq, namely, that the country was “a very good candidate for democratic reform…”384  
They believed this because they saw in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq a more or less secular 
social state, a developed middle class, an educated population, and an apparent 
enthusiasm to join the globalizing world.  Underneath this veneer, maintained with great 
difficulty by a regime dedicated to breaking spirits, censoring dissent, and exerting control 
through pervasive fear, there existed a very different and unappreciated reality.  The 
middle class had been utterly decimated by U.N. sanctions, and Saddam Hussein was 
managing, only with great difficulty and through increased concessions, to hold the 
country together in the face of surging Islamic sentiment and intensifying crosscutting 
loyalties (as we will see in the next chapter).   
If these influential policy makers did not think transforming Iraq would be a cakewalk, 
neither did they recognize that its sectarian makeup and dominant religion would present 
special, complicating, impediments to the goal of establishing a liberal democracy in the 	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heart of the Middle East.  In retrospect, Perle’s expectation, voiced in these terms in 
February 2003, today seems hopelessly naïve:  
It won’t be Westminster overnight, but great democracies of the world 
didn’t achieve the full, rich structure of democratic governance overnight.  
The Iraqis have a decent chance of succeeding.385 
As Douglas Feith insinuates in an interview with the New Yorker the same year, at the heart 
of this confidence lies an assumption:  the assumption that the West’s model of 
government—its devotion to the rights and liberties of the individual—would resonate in 
every breast.  If members of the administration expected Iraqis to greet Americans as 
liberators—as the Neoconservatives did, and as some Iraqis did in fact (at first)—it is 
because they believed that every human being, at some level and in spite of whatever 
countervailing impulses, recognizes that America stands for individual freedom and 
equality of opportunity above all else.  And that, whatever America’s failings, it aspires to 
the noblest of principles, ideals that anchor a way of life worth fighting for.  As Feith put it 
succinctly before the invasion began, “this administration does not believe there is an 
inherent incompatibility” between free government and “either Muslim culture, or Arab 
culture.”  This notion (again, in Feith’s words) that “some of the basic institutions of 
democracy—not any particular democratic system, but some of the basic institutions of 
democracy—had universal appeal,” was ultimately the theoretical insight, or the 
assumption, that made regime change a plausible goal.386  It is the idea that inspires the 
noblest passages in the President’s Second Inaugural Address, and much earlier than that, 
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speeches delivered at AEI and elsewhere.  If true, it is the innate human inclination or 
predilection that makes the democratization of the Middle East not only a worthy goal, 
but under the best circumstances, a credible one too.  The “if”, however, be may of 
greater consequence than anybody initially appreciated.  A desire for freedom may well 
be universal.  This does not mean the capacity for tolerant majoritarian rule—rule that is 
limited, and administered on equal terms—is also universal.  It is not impossible or self-
contradictory to find a group of individuals in which each simultaneously desires freedom 
for him or herself, while at the same time proving utterly incapable of organizing the 
majoritarian institutions of a state in such a way that protects the rights and liberties of all.  
It is entirely possible, that is, to desire at once freedom for oneself and dominion over 
others.  The recognition (and internalization of the notion) that others have an 
unalienable right to their own lives and liberties—to pursue happiness how they 
themselves define it within a generous sphere protected by laws that apply equally to all—
does not come from nowhere, especially not in a country with a history of brutal sectarian 
discord fuelled by ingrained religious dissimilarity.  
David Frum, who with Perle wrote a book called An End to Evil in 2003 urging U.S. 
intervention in Iran and Syria as well, today acknowledges that his support for 
intervention in the Middle East aimed at democratization was motivated by an 
overconfidence of exactly this sort:  “the hope that fairly easily this world governed by law, 
the world of the North Atlantic, can be extended to include the Arab and Muslim Middle 
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East.”387   Once again, this project aims to take up the question these policymakers 
neglected:  namely, what does constitutional government in the West require of the 
citizenry in terms of mores and sacred opinions; and are the dominant sacred opinions in 
the Islamic world as hospitable to the form of government taken for granted in the West? 
Fukuyama had exactly this overconfidence in mind when he points to what seems, on his 
argument, to be the error at the heart of the Neoconservative foreign policy (and the 
reason he distanced himself from his erstwhile cadre).  He contends regime change was 
conceived in terms far too optimistic, and at the same time, much too simplistic—“not as 
a matter of the slow and painstaking construction of liberal and democratic institutions 
but simply as the negative task of getting rid of the old regime.”388  Robert Jervis is 
absolutely right to note that the entire democratization project operated on the “implicit 
belief… that democracy can take hold when the artificial obstacles to it are removed.”389  
So impressed were Neoconservatives by the sudden disintegration of European 
communism, and the impressive, rapid, strides made in the former Soviet Bloc toward 
stable, relatively limited, and constitutional government at the end of the twentieth 
century, that an unspoken assumption emerged:  would not the oppressed, anywhere and 
everywhere, take freedom from any hand—excitedly, greedily—as a hungry man would 
snatch a piece of bread?  
It is a beautiful notion, but Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is not quite Conrad’s Russia.  And 
Eastern Europe is a long way from the Islamic world in terms of its history, its religion, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 My emphasis; David Rose, “Neo Culpa.” 
388 Francis Fukuyama, America at a Crossroads, 63. 
389 Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era, 82. 
	  211 
and its intellectual points of integration with the West.  It is possible—no, it is certain— 
that political Islam today is more powerful as a worldview, even internally coherent to a 
greater degree, than Soviet Communism ever was.  Amazingly, for all the problems U.S. 
forces have encountered, this assumption has yet to dissipate entirely in neoconservative 
circles.  A number of the war’s most prominent supports, including some of the men who 
helped plan it—Richard Perle, Kenneth Adelman, David Frum, and Douglas Feith—
have publicly blamed the difficulties encountered in Iraq on errors of implementation, 
many of them singling out Tommy Franks, Donald Rumsfeld, even President Bush, for 
brutal censure.390  Adelman’s criticism was particularly harsh, and in a way proportionate 
to his initial enthusiasm:   
I just presumed that what I considered to be the most competent national 
security team since Truman was indeed going to be competent…  They 
turned out to be among the most incompetent teams in the postwar era. 
Not only did each of them, individually, have enormous flaws, but together 
they were deadly, dysfunctional.391 
Fewer policymakers have admitted that their own assumptions about democracy and Iraq 
proved gravely flawed, and that their misconceptions played a role in formation of an 
approach to Iraq that proved entirely inadequate to the noble task they trumpeted.  
Fukuyama, whose almost two-decade-old “end of history” thesis captured the 
neoconservatives’ democratic optimism better than virtually anything else written on the 
subject, at least struggled to distance himself from the notion that democracy was a more 
or less universal and inevitable form of government in the aftermath of Iraq.  The later 
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Fukuyama understands the neoconservatives’ error better than most for having shared it 
so long; as he puts it, “there was a tendency among promoters of the war to believe that 
democracy was a default condition to which societies would revert once liberated from 
dictators.”392  In most cases, this is probably an overstatement.  But, as overstatements 
often do, his nonetheless contains a useful kernel of truth.  DOD failed to plan 
appropriately for reconstruction because so many planners focused almost entirely on the 
easier task (overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime) at the expense of thinking seriously 
about “the slow and painstaking” endeavor the U.S. had committed itself to.  Once the 
dictator was removed, however, popular government organized in such a way as to 
protect the rights and liberties of the citizenry did not spring into existence.   
Instead, old hatreds and long-suppressed sectarian ambitions burst to the surface and 
those motivated by them marshaled the variety of new means suddenly available—
political, religious, violent—to secure the version of Iraq’s future they preferred.  Those 
preferences, in turn, far from being inculcated by a long-established civic education 
championing the value of tolerance, equality, and liberty, were animated by much darker 
impulses indeed.  Put another way, policymakers failed to understand how dramatically 
citizens in the West have been formed by Western civilization and the political regimes 
they inhabit.  The political character in display in the gentle, neighborly, and more or less 
tolerant liberal democrats who ubiquitously confine their disputes to a relatively narrow 
political sphere in Western democracies was imagined to be the default nature of man 
everywhere.  The insurgency revealed a much darker side of human nature, one that had 	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not been tamed and remolded in Iraq as it has in the West by civilization-level influences 
that took centuries to exert their accumulated effect.  Fukuyama today recognizes as 
much.  He writes that liberalism and pluralism came to reign in the West  
only by smashing the existing connections between traditional religion and 
political power, and by exercising actual power in a pluralistic political 
space, that Protestantism laid the groundwork for modern secular politics 
and the separation of church and state.  In Europe, this process took 
several centuries; we can only hope for a more accelerated timetable for 
Muslims today.393   
Observations such as these, generally made in passing, can be found throughout the 
writings of the most perceptive criticisms of the Bush Doctrine and the American 
intervention in Iraq.  To date, the suggestion that liberal democracy has essential 
ideational requirements has not been systematically investigated.  Part 2 of this 
dissertation provides that analysis.  Before we turn to the series of revolutions in social 
consciousness that helped build the modern world, however, consideration of the 
insurgency sheds light on the nature of the passions—untamed by an Enlightenment or a 
Reformation—Iraq’s “liberation” unleashed. 
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C H A P T E R   I I I 
ANATOMY OF THE INSURGENCY AND THE SURGE 
 
A failure to appreciate the scope of the task to which the President committed the United 
States in Iraq, and the consequent failure to marshal the country’s resources in service to 
accomplishing it, created the environment under which Iraq’s insurgency was able to 
gather steam.  But to ask whether the insurgency (or so devastating an insurgency) could 
have been avoided is not necessarily equivalent to determining whether, in the absence of 
the strategic blunders that no doubt exacerbated it, a functioning liberal democracy could 
have been established in Iraq.  The passions that were permitted so violent a 
manifestation have, indeed, created other serious problems for Iraq's nascent democracy 
as well.  Nonetheless, the first question is the reasonable place to start insofar as the 
instability wrought by insurgents made the establishment of anything remotely resembling 
a moderate and modern regime utterly impossible.  That was, indeed, the explicit goal of 
those behind it.   
The insurgency began as a Sunni campaign against the Coalition designed to pressure it 
into abandoning Iraq.  They quickly turned from targeting Coalition troops to targeting 
Iraqi civilians, however—especially those working with the Provisional Authority, and 
eventually any group vulnerable to indiscriminate slaughter, especially Shiite civilians.  
The insurgents’ sought to prevent the establishment of a Shiite dominated state in Iraq, 
something majoritarian institutions seemed likely to guarantee given that Iraq’s Shiite 
population amounts to more than 60% of the population with the remaining 35 or 40% 
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split between two distinct minority groups.  To this end, they undertook a strategy 
designed to provoke U.S. withdrawal by turning Iraq into a quagmire.  This led, 
ultimately, to an effort to provoke a civil war between the Sunni and Shiite populations. 
 
Saddamists and their Allies 
The Sunni insurgency had two discernable wings—each formed by a variety of 
amorphous organizations with their own leadership.  The first was made up of a small 
number of foreign fighters motivated by radical Islamic ideas united with a much larger 
group of long-suppressed domestic fundamentalists; the second, larger, wing was made of 
generally more secular Sunni Iraqis (whose most important allegiances tended to be to 
tribe or to the Ba’ath party).394 
According to the On Point II study, the core of the more secular group, for the first year 
the most important wing of the insurgency, was made up of members of the Ba’athist 
military and intelligence services who had gone underground of their own volition after 
the war or as a result of the deBa’athification order.395  They doubted there would be a 
place for them in the new Iraq and feared retribution at the hands of a government 
democratically elected by Iraq’s Shiite majority.  As a result, they believed they had little 
to lose by fighting the establishment of a new regime.    
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The extent to which the early insurgency was directed by top-ranking Ba’athists, 
including Saddam Hussein himself, remains unclear.  Nor is it clear whether a 
sophisticated insurgency plan was in place before the regime fell, although some 
(including Saddam Hussein) have claimed as much.396  It is clear, however, that actions 
taken by the Ba’ath leadership before the regime fell abetted the insurgency’s initial 
success:  hidden money and weapons stocks, as well as tribal contacts, were exploited to 
great effect in the months following the fall of Baghdad.  Money and ammunition were so 
easily accessible, in fact, that former regime elements funneled both to insurgent groups 
they did not themselves direct.  Equally problematic, Iraq (especially Baghdad) was 
littered munitions dumps and weapons caches which Coalition troops took disastrously 
inadequate measures to secure (in part from a shortage of soldiers).  The Ba’ath party, 
meanwhile, had squirreled away billions (US$600 million in cash was discovered in a 
shed on Uday Hussein’s property).397  The quiet that prevailed immediately after the fall 
of Baghdad reflected not the absence of opposition to the Coalition, but the period during 
which remnants of that regime were organizing their opposition.   
Somewhat perversely, the Coalition’s quick and decisive victory contributed to the 
strength of the early insurgency.  U.S. military might was so overwhelming that entire 
Iraqi divisions simply capitulated, laying down their arms and going home.  This is 
precisely what the shock and awe decapitation strategy intended.  There was no war of 
attrition, no need to demolish the Iraqi army in order to overthrow the regime.  The 	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consequence: Coalition forces did not have to kill or capture and imprison a large 
proportion of the soldiers they met on the battlefield.  That fact, taken together with CPA 
orders that disbanded the military and alienated Sunnis who were disproportionately 
reliant on Iraq’s security apparatus for the livelihood, left many of them to fight another 
day, another way, while at the same time creating an incentive for them to do so.  Indeed, 
Bremer’s aggressive de-Ba’athification policy and the haphazard disbanding of the Iraqi 
military cost 500,000 Iraqis their livelihoods, humiliating them at them at the same time.  
Counting their families, nearly 2.5 million Iraqis were affected.  Though salaries and 
stipends were announced more than a month later for many of these men (late payments 
remained an issue long afterward) the affected Sunnis—men who were once first in line 
for well-paying and honorable positions in the army and intelligence services—had at a 
stroke been deprived of all hope for any such employment or position in the new Iraq.   
Although the de-Ba’athification of Iraq was never meant to be, or appear to be, de-
Sunnification, that is precisely how it was perceived by many Sunnis. Under Saddam 
Hussein, 20% of the population had monopolized wealth and opportunity.  Ba’athists 
were respected and envied by Sunnis, feared by the Kurds and Shiite.  In Iraq, there was 
no better path to fortune and success than to become a member of the Ba’ath party.  
They had hope for their futures the majority of Iraqis could not share.  And so it is among 
this segment of the population that one finds the strongest expressions of patriotism.  
Throughout the Sunni triangle, virtually everybody knew somebody connected to the 
Ba’ath party elite.  Most wanted to be a part of it and were proud of any connections to 
Saddamists they had.  Empowered Sunnis loved their country; many were exceedingly 
	  218 
proud to serve it.  It must, of course, be noted that for them Iraq was a Sunni-Arab state, 
their love for country an extension of their position in the regime they dominated.  Their 
opposition to the Coalition was therefore imbued by the passion and energy love of 
country can inspire when the way of life it represents comes under attack.  
(Unsurprisingly, the communities they had ruled by the Ba’ath did not share the Sunnis’ 
passion for Iraq).  
Nor was it simply the Sunnis who had worked for Saddam at the highest levels of 
government (and those who depended on them) who were affected by regime change.  
The psychological effect on a self-consciously close-knit community ran much deeper.  As 
army historians note, “one unifier among traditional Sunni Muslims and Baathist or non-
Baathist secular Sunni Arabs was the privileged status they enjoyed…”398  For this 
segment of the population, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein replaced pride and hope 
with fear and uncertainty.  Disbanding the military and security apparatus, along with 
aggressive de-Ba’athification that proscribed Sunnis who had succeeded in the former 
regime from rising in the next, made it seem they had no stake in the new regime.   That 
the de-Ba’athification of Iraq was led by Ahmed Chalabi, a prominent Shiite expatriate 
with long-standing connections to American policymakers, only served to confirm the 
fears of many Sunnis. 
Worse even than the loss of livelihood, honor, and hope of future advancement for these 
men was the specter of ceding their position to the faction they had so long so brutally 
suppressed.  The Sunnis were cognizant from the moment the regime fell that the new 	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regime was sure to empower a sect many of them believed to be beneath them, and had 
therefore treated terribly for decades.  Amatzia Baram, a trusted Iraq expert who has 
testified before Congress and advised senior policy makers, emphasizes the importance of 
understanding the profound transformation in worldview regime change was poised to 
effect.  For it would reverberate well beyond those who were directly affected by de-
Ba’athification policies; insofar as the position within society of a cohesive group was 
being upended at a stroke—privileged status ceding to uncertainty and fear—virtually all 
Sunnis shared in the humiliation and fears of the formerly privileged Ba’athists.  
Understanding the impact of the war on the group that would provide so many 
insurgents, and among whom they found support for their brand of guerilla warfare, is 
important if one is to understand the insurgency. 
His example of a typical Sunni affected by the decisions, Isma’il Muhammad Juwara, was 
not a high ranking Ba’athist.  At the time Saddam Hussein’s regime was overthrown, he 
was a midlevel official in Iraq’s security service.  As Baram explains, his life was utterly 
transformed. 
After the fall of the Baath regime, he was sacked and his organization was 
taken apart.  He was offered no other means of existence except for simple 
rations and tried to make ends meet by selling gasoline on the black 
market. Further, those who had once feared him now treated him with 
disdain. A clerk at one bank where he held an account called him a “dog” 
when he went to withdraw funds and told him he should go to Saddam to 
ask for his money. However, his newfound misfortune was confounded by 
his inability to understand how being a Ba’thi, something of which he had 
been extremely proud since he was a young man, had become “some sort 
of disease.” He began to ask himself: “Was serving the country some sort of 
crime? . . . We were on top of the system. We had dreams. . . . Now we are 
the losers. We lost our positions, our status, the [economic] security of our 
families, stability. Curse on the Americans. Curse on them.” Worse still, in 
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his mind, were the Shiite: “These people with turbans are going to run the 
country. What do they know? Iraq needs people like us.”399 
It was not properly appreciated pre-invasion that Sunnis as a group would view regime 
change as a more or less zero-sum upending of the prevailing order:  their loss would be 
proportionate to an enemy’s gain.  Nor was the impact of regime change merely 
psychological.  The Sunni Arab part of Iraq contains hundreds of tribes and sub-tribes, 
many of them organized into larger tribal federations (between 20 and 30 of these are 
thought to have more than 100,000 descendants).  While the precise number of Sunnis 
who self-consciously identify with a tribal unit is unknown, those claiming tribal 
affiliations make up an important part of the population; no doubt, the count runs into 
the millions.  And while Iraq is a predominantly urban country, many city-dwelling 
Sunnis nonetheless continue to espouse “cultural tribal values”:  in addition to the 
expression of this pre-modern political allegiance, the demonstration of courage in battle 
is still regarded as an important point of honor, it is not unusual for tribesman to avenge 
blood relatives, and the practice of marrying first and second cousins remains common.400   
In fact, nearly half of all marriages in Baghdad are between cousins according to the New 
York Times.401  
Under Saddam Hussein’s regime, the army and security apparatus recruited 
enthusiastically from these tribes largely because Sunnis with tribal connections proved 	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generally to be fiercely loyal and adept as soldiers.  The advantages enjoyed by Sunni 
tribes went well beyond this however.  The entire region owed much of its economic well-
being to its privileged relationship with the Ba’athists in other respects as well.  Saddam 
Hussein tolerated, in some cases encouraged, large-scale trans-border smuggling 
operations; some tribes received payments for their loyalty, which was also an incentive 
for continued obedience; many tribes even supplied border guards to the regime.402  
Virtually all of these privileges ended when the regime was overthrown.  In fact, the CPA 
and later Iraq’s provisional government and its elected government took steps to curb 
trans-border smuggling.  This, too, had a disproportionate affect on Sunni Iraqis and 
added to the fear that the new Iraq would be dominated by Shiites to their detriment.  
Not unreasonably, Sunnis as a group—not just those who had committed crimes or 
benefitted from Saddam Hussein’s reign—believed their very way of life to be at risk.  
Tightly knit tribes and communities feared losing the privileges and independence they 
enjoyed; their leaders feared losing their positions. 
Furthermore, that Coalition troops were put in the position of fighting a nascent 
insurgency in an environment in which traditional points of honor and offense still 
dominate made their task next to impossible.  Ordinary (indeed necessary) security 
measures—the use of dogs in Iraqis homes, searches of persons (including women), 
commonplace manners of restraining suspects—all transgressed long-established cultural 
mores.  If Coalition methods did not quite create insurgents, they certainly offended a 
population already distressed by the transformation regime change was exerting.  In some 	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cases, Coalition strikes against known insurgents made them new enemies as families and 
tribes transferred their allegiance to avenge the honor of those who had been killed.  This 
is one of the main reasons that a relatively small number of active insurgents (most put the 
figure in the thousands) was able to do so much damage so enduringly.  A year after the 
worst of the insurgency had been contained, support for insurgents remained high.403 
In other words, Sunnis were willing to fight the Coalition (and support those carrying out 
the violence) for a number of reasons:  some just needed a paycheck, some fought to 
retain Sunni dominion in Iraq, some feared the ascent of Shiite majority, some fought to 
retain local authority or autonomy, some fought to restore their personal, tribal, or 
sectarian honor; many fought from a combination of motives.  The first year of the 
Insurgency (Phase I) was dominated by the competition between small and localized 
groups, fighting for a constellation of related and sometimes opposing reasons, to gain 
exposure and the means to expand their operations and influence.404  Insurgents 
successfully leveraged their connections—party, family, tribal, geographic, religious—
which in a society organized largely along traditional conceptions of honor provided a 
very supportive environment for the bourgeoning insurgency.   
While this first group of insurgents was not motivated to oppose the Coalition by radical 
Islamic ideals, but rather by self-interested calculation, they increasingly took on an 
Islamic identity, or at very least, the leaders who would prove successful utilized religious 
arguments to give the insurgency cohesion and enthusiasm.  Ali Allawi points out that 	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while what remained of the Ba’ath party was “too unpopular and its ideology too full of 
holes” to mount a sustained and popular challenge to the new regime, it did provide the 
starting point—the people, the networks and organization, the material resources, to get 
the insurgency off to a start.405   While American planners expressed optimism that 
stemming the insurgency would be a simple matter of tracking down a few dozen top 
officials—the deck of cards unfortunately likened it to a game—the insurgents themselves 
were going out of their way to make it clear they stood for something much grander.  
Near the end of 2003, one group appeared on Al-Jazeera television to make this point: 
We, your brothers in the resistance, announce to the world at large that we 
will resist.  We will resist the occupier to defend our religion, creed, 
homeland, and people. 
We would like to draw your attention to an important fact.  This spreading 
resistance, which is growing bigger and bigger in an uninterrupted 
manner, has absolutely no links with the so-called remnants of the former 
regime.  The former regime and its Ba’athist agents lack the courage to 
sacrifice their blood, funds, spouses, and sons.  Had they been so, they 
would not have surrendered Baghdad so easily… 
This land is ours and the occupier is an enemy to God and Muslims…  
Our religion orders us to pursue jihad.406 
Islamic jihadists had, by this point, largely wrested control of the insurgency.  Thus, mid-
2004 to Mid-2005, or Phase II of the Insurgency, saw the consolidation and 
centralization of insurgent groups under an Islamist banner.  The leadership and texture 
of the insurgency had evolved:  radical Islamists rose to prominence, and by framing their 
struggle as a religiously mandated war against foreign infidel conquerors, the insurgency 
gained a new unity and ferocity.  The insurgents’ arguments were not constrained to the 	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battlefield however.  Iraqi society had been radicalizing quietly for some time.  Army 
historians cite a cleric in Mosul as representative of a sentiment startlingly common 
among insurgents and their supporters:  “In invading a Muslim territory, the objective of 
the infidels has always been to destroy the cultural values of Islam…  We have been 
delivered of the injustices of one man [i.e., Saddam Hussein] but this does not mean we 
must accept the American-British domination.”407 
 
The Islamist Insurgents 
The second group, extremist Islamists, though inspired by different and in a way much 
loftier ultimate purposes (the establishment of a Taliban-style Islamic government 
devoted to the instantiation of sharia law), their aim in practice was much the same:  to 
prevent the establishment of a stable and democratic, Shiite-dominated, Iraqi state.  
While the most radical among them call for the reestablishment of an Islamic Caliphate, 
this is not an end goal that was emphasized by the major insurgent groups in their 
propaganda campaigns, probably for tactical reasons.408  They were, however, united by 
the belief that it is a religious duty to confront infidels wherever they can, by whatever 
means.  For homegrown Iraqi Islamists, the overthrow of the Ba’athist regime marked an 
opportunity (for some, the duty) to come out from underground in order to participate in 
that struggle.  Many observers were indeed shocked by the number of insurgents (and the 
extent of their devotion) who now appear to have been part of a simmering group of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Contemporary Operations Study Team, On Point II, 100. 
408 International Crisis Group, “In their own Words,” 18. 
	  225 
extremist Iraqis hitherto driven underground by Ba’athist censorship and repression.   Ali. 
A. Allawi conveys his surprise at what the world quickly perceived in Iraq, finally freed 
from modes of repression:  “It was in post-Saddam Iraq… that I could see how far into 
Islamic political and social life the crisis [of Islamic Civilization] had seeped.  The 
murderous violence unleashed by radical Wahhabi-inspired Islamists was accompanied 
by laborious jurisprudential ‘justifications.’”409    
For this faction, as well as for the foreign fighters who flowed into the country, mostly 
through Syria but from a wide variety of countries throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa, Iraq was one battleground among many (if ultimately the most important one).  
They were not fighting as Iraqis, nor even as Sunni Iraqis, but as Muslims against infidel 
Americans and apostate Shiite.  They cast their struggle in the broadest possible terms, 
situating their actions in the context of a centuries-long conflict between civilizations:  
they invoke the Crusades, the battle of Hittin, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, etc.410  They 
were fighting as Holy Warriors, claiming a divine mandate to protect a way of life under 
siege by infidels. 
One of the most glaring pre-war misperceptions about Iraq—one that persisted through 
the first year of the insurgency411—was that Iraq was a mainly secular country, that for 
this reason it was particularly well-suited to democratization.  No doubt, the Ba’ath party 
had secular, Arab nationalist, roots.  But the Islamic Resurgence that began to affect the 	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politics of the Middle East in the 1970s had also exerted a profound effect of the social 
character of Iraq—its Sunni and Shiite populations alike.  According to Hay’at al-‘Ulama 
al-Muslimi (the Muslim Ulema Council in Iraq, an association of Iraq’s Sunni scholars of 
Islam established five days after Saddam Hussein’s fall which has since become a 
powerful counterpoise to Iraq’s Shiite religious hierarchy based in Najaf),412 the Sunnis of 
Iraq have been radicalizing for some time.  ‘Ayyash al-Kubaysi, spokesperson for the 
council, explained that during the decade of U.N. sanctions against Iraq, a generation of 
young men “were reared in the mosque… the mosque embraced them.”413   
Whether there were actually organized clandestine Islamist organizations of any real 
political significance pre-invasion remains a matter of some dispute.414  Ali Allawi notes 
that from 1993 onward, the Iraqi Islamic Party, infused by the ideas of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, was newly tolerated “as it tried to reconstitute its base in a semi-clandestine 
way.”415  It went on to become perhaps the most important political force on the Sunni 
side in post-Saddam Iraq, its power base located in Anbar Province, and manifest in local 
and national elections.  Others assert that Islamist organizations were pushed 
underground in Iraq, but continued to exist and organize actively in spite of state 
repression.416  However active politicized Islamists remained on the Sunni side, two 
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things are undeniable.  Key mosques and their communities were radicalizing, and 
Saddam Hussein’s attempt to co-opt the Islamization of Iraq had the unintended effect of 
further exacerbating that radicalization.  
As Baram observes, “The mosques were the only institution, apart from the tribes, 
relatively immune to regime and party control.  They became the natural place for 
people in search of an alternative to the Ba’ath to pass their free time.”417  The result:  
much as opposition to Nasser’s modernizing reforms in Egypt a half-century ago had 
taken refuge in the mosque, and as Somalia’s present radicalization grew out of its 
mosques, so were Iraq’s most radical elements congregating in the one place beyond the 
reach of the country’s tyrant.  Saddam Hussein had always been harder on the Shiite 
religious hierarchy—prohibiting certain forms of observance, censoring literature from 
Iran, assassinating popular leaders who amassed sufficient following to threaten his 
regime.  Sunni clerics were allowed much more freedom (even if the Ba’athist regime 
tamed those who crossed the line by interrogating or imprisoning them for short 
periods).418  Censorship accompanied by brutal force can prevent opinions pernicious to 
the state from manifesting in deed.  But as Rousseau points out, censorship cannot erase 
the opinions from men’s minds.  More often, to forbid something increases its appeal; by 
highlighting the subversive power of a set of ideas, one draws a dangerous type of man to 
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embrace them:  young, energetic, honor-loving men, precisely the type willing to sacrifice 
everything for a cause bigger than he is.419 
Saddam Hussein’s defeat after his invasion of Kuwait had a number of transformative 
effects on Iraqi society that contributed to this underground radicalization.  First, much as 
Egypt’s humiliating defeat in 1967 had been a death knell for the country’s pro-Western 
liberal nationalists, prompting Egypt’s reconciliation with the Middle East’s more 
conservative states, so did the West’s easy and utter demolishing of Saddam Hussein’s 
military apparatus further strengthened its anti-secular currents.  Second, the militaristic 
Ba’ath—a party that had long ceased to hold itself up to its ideological foundations—was 
even more obviously discredited by military defeat.  The possibility of uniting the Arab 
world under Iraq’s flag seemed dashed by a new world order apparently intent to 
preserve sovereign boundaries with overwhelming military force, Ba’ath party ideas no 
longer inspired its youngest members, nor promised to serve as a useful recruitment tool.  
The party itself was at risk of disintegrating if it could not reinvent itself.  Realizing both 
these things, Saddam Hussein turned to the most powerful ideational pillar still in tact in 
the country, hoping that an outward (if halfhearted) embrace of Islam could co-opt its 
potentially destabilizing moral authority to legitimate his rule.   
Thus, as Baram argues, it was his sense that a “new zeitgeist was filling the horizon—
Islam” that led Saddam Hussein to initiate Iraq’s Faith Campaign.   While most date its 
beginning to 1993 or 1994, Arabic script, Allaahu Akbar or “God is Great”, had been 
added to Iraq’s flag in 1991 in an attempt to rally sympathy in the Arab world to his 	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cause and motivate the religious among his soldiers to fight for country.  In the years that 
followed, new emphasis was placed on the Islamic identity of the country in the (state 
controlled) media.  Sermons and Qur’anic recitations were broadcast over the radio and 
television.  The Saddam University of Religious Studies was opened, and new resources 
devoted to the training of preachers and religious studies teachers. The regime provided 
funding for mandatory Quran classes in Iraq’s schools and government offices.  Sunni 
preachers were permitted more generous freedom of expression.  New mosques were 
built with public funds, the largest in the world planned for Baghdad.  Women were 
encouraged to wear the hijab.  The consumption of alcohol in public was banned.  Sharia-
inspired punishments began to be employed throughout the country.420  And Saddam 
Hussein embarked on the megalomaniac undertaking of having a copy of the Qur’an 
produced by hand using his blood as ink. 
The most perceptive commentator on modern Iraq, Ali Allawi, concurs with Baram’s 
assessment that Iraq’s zeitgeist was undergoing a transformation in the decade leading up 
to invasion.  But as he explains, Iraqis’ religiosity could not so easily be co-opted for 
political purposes: 
The effects of the ‘faith campaign’ were profound and far-reaching.  The 
regime now actively sought to infuse religious sentiments into its 
population and these became an anchor stone of the new, religiously 
conscious Ba’ath…  But the Sunni world itself had changed.  Moderate 
Sunnism had been ceding ground to radical Islam everywhere, and this 
situation had been unwittingly imported into Iraq by a hitherto aggressive 
secular regime.  This had an unintended radicalizing effect on society, and 
encouraged the growth of salafi (ultra orthodox) currents in the Sunni 
community.  The regime attempted, somewhat haphazardly and with 	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indifferent results, to control the radical Sunni preachers, but to little avail.  
They became firmly established in key mosques throughout the country…  
The seeds of Sunni Islamic radicalism, laid during the ‘faith campaign’, 
were hard to remove.421  
It was during this time that radical clerics captured important mosques throughout the 
country—these constituted pulpits from which to disseminate radical ideas during the 
decade leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the bases from which insurgents 
would later organize their campaign against it.  Commentators agree that the ultra-
radical Wahhabi-Salafi strain of Islam gained especially in Iraq during this period.  While 
there are differences between the camps, what they have in common is more important 
for our purposes.  The Salafis (who emulate the practices of the Prophet Muhammad 
himself, as well as the generations of the four subsequent rightly guided Caliphs), and the 
Wahhabis (literalists too, distinguished by their close adherence to the teachings of 
Muhammad Ibn Abd’ Al-Wahhab) both deny the legitimacy of virtually every state in the 
Middle East—they have transgressed too far against Islam at the behest of Western 
powers and ideas, they are dominated by force instead of Islamic law, or by apostate 
Shiite—and must therefore be destroyed and replaced by regimes organized according to 
sharia properly understood.  The term jihad as it is typically used today refers to this 
struggle:  war for the sake of expelling unbelievers and usurpers from Muslim lands with 
the aim of instantiating government according to Islamic law.  These ideas drive the most 
radical Sunni Islamists and the ones willing to become warriors—and martyrs—in service 
to that cause.  
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Precisely because the regime in Iraq—though illegitimate to be sure—was so durably 
cosseted by Saddam’s security apparatus, the behavior of the ultra-radicals took a 
different, much less perceptible, form.  For Iraqi radicals had also been heavily influenced 
by the teachings of a prominent Iraqi member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Muhammad 
Ahmad al-Rashid, during the decade leading up to the regime overthrow.  Officially 
censored, he still managed a profound influence, his works smuggled into the country 
from Egypt and Jordan.  He did not dispute the Salafi/Wahhabi claim that governments 
throughout the Islamic world were illegitimate, that they should be overthrown and that 
those guilty of apostasy, killed.  Nor did he argue against jihad for the sake of instantiating 
a more literal species of Islam.  He does, however, advocate caution and patience.   
Much as Muslim Brothers have, in recent decades, become supporters of popular 
elections as a means to gain political power—whereby to enact a decidedly illiberal 
agenda—so does al-Rashid inveigh upon believers where the state is strong to prepare 
their societies for Islamic law by proselytizing peacefully until the moment to resist 
appears more auspicious.  As Baram helpfully summarizes al-Rashid’s thought, “jihad 
warriors should be rational and calculating”; where open jihad against oppressive states 
cannot succeed, believers can help to prepare the way for future success by working to 
“expand the ranks of true Muslims and deepen their Islamic education and 
conviction.”422  In essence, al-Rashid helped to persuade ultra-radicals that they could be 
committed Islamic warriors while remaining politically inactive.  Iraq’s Salafis and 
Wahhabis were no less radical in their opinions and ideals; they were, however, 	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persuaded to spend their energy spreading them quietly as opposed to organizing a 
violent jihad against the Ba’athist regime.  Driven underground in Hussein’s Iraq (as 
indeed all opposition was) their significance was underestimated by orders of magnitude. 
Allawi concurs that the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood “became particularly 
important” in the decade preceding the invasion of Iraq, and further emphasizes their 
significance post-invasion: 
Iraq under Saddam had been just such a state [in which radicalism was 
driven underground].  It was inadvisable and dangerous for the Islamists to 
confront the state directly there, but Iraq was fertile ground for the special 
brand of proselytizing that [al-Rashid] advocated, a watered-down version 
of Salafism, in line with the Brotherhood’s own brand of politics…  this 
allowed Sunni Arab Islamists simultaneously to take advantage of the 
opening offered by Saddam’s ‘Faith Campaign’ while laying the 
foundations for a more direct challenge to the state.  To Islamist Sunni 
political activism remained imperceptible during the 1990s but would 
break out into the open after the fall of the regime. 
The Coalition was unprepared for the emergence of Islamism as an 
important force in Iraq’s Sunni Arab community.  The indifference to 
politics that marked the posture of Islamists during the 1990s changed 
perceptibly after the fall of the Ba’ath regime.  Jihad, in the sense of armed 
struggle against a ‘pagan’ order, was now obligatory, and the fact that this 
order was linked to foreign occupiers made it doubly so. When Islamist 
political and social activity broke out in earnest in Mosul, just after the fall 
of the regime, Coalition officials put it down to the sudden freedoms that 
the population now enjoyed.  It was claimed to be a passing fancy that 
would disappear when jobs, democracy and security were provided.  One 
Coalition official stated that ‘there is a certain amount of novelty to this… 
This will disappear over time. 423 
It did disappear.  Instead, Salafi preachers became a vitally important support for the 
insurgency—spreading Jihadist literature and anti-Coalition propaganda, serving as an 
organizational focal point for insurgents, and even offering their mosques as secure hiding 
places for insurgents’ weapons and bombs.  	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Foreign Islamists no doubt played an important role in the insurgency, especially as it 
reached its destructive zenith.  A Jordanian, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, founded the group 
responsible for many of the most spectacular attacks in Iraq, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad 
(Monotheism and Jihad), which later became Tandhim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-
Qaeda’s Organization in Mesopotamia or Iraq).  Indeed, the majority of the most daring 
and gruesome acts of terrorism—suicide bombings and beheadings—were committed by 
foreign nationals.424  And yet, it is believed that at the height of the insurgency, even al-
Qaeda in Iraq claimed at least ten Iraqi members for every foreign fighter.425  Military and 
expert analysis reach consensus on this point:  the Islamist wing of the insurgency was 
predominantly made up of Iraqis, not foreign nationals.  In late September of 2004, 
General Abizaid estimated that the number of foreign fighters in Iraq was below 1,000.426  
Around the same time, USA Today noted that only 90 of 5,700 detainees being held in 
Iraq were not Iraqi Nationals.427  On 14 July, 2006, as the insurgency entered its most 
destructive phase, Colonel Sean MacFarland noted in a Defense Department briefing 
that while foreign fighters were responsible for virtually all of the suicide bombings in 
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Iraq428 they were nonetheless “very few in number.”429  According to expert analysts at 
the Brookings Institute, the number of foreign fighters is not believed to have exceeded 
1,000 until August of 2005, reaching a peak of not more than 2,000 at the end of 2007.430  
In other words, the Islamic Resurgence in Iraq provided a good deal of the impetus, and 
most of the fuel, for the insurgency.  The botched occupation of Iraq provided the 
opportunity, and implementation missteps, addition fuel for a situation that was already 
incendiary.  A brief look at the names of the major insurgent groups reveals that most 
claim an explicit religious orientation.  Tandhim al-Qa’ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaeda’s 
Organization in Mesopotamia) was formerly known as al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism 
and Jihad).  The most active insurgent group in Kurdistan is known as Jaysh Ansar al-
Sunna (Partisans of the Sunna Army); al-Sunna refers to the Prophet’s deeds and sayings.  
Other important groups include Al-Jaysh al-Islami fil-’Iraq (the Islamic Army in Iraq), Al-
Jabha al-Islamiya lil-Muqawama al-’Iraqiya (the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance), Jaysh 
al-Rashidin (the First Four Caliphs Army), Jaysh al-Mujahidin (the Mujahidin’s Army), 
Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya fil-’Iraq (the Islamic Resistance’s Movement in Iraq), Jaysh 
Muhammad (Muhammad’s Army), and Saraya Al-Ghadhab Al-Islami (the Islamic Anger 
Brigades).  That many of the organizations state their connection to Iraq specifically 
further attests to the insurgency’s domestic bent. 
 
Equally troubling, perhaps, insurgents were eager to legitimize their jihad, and turned to 	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prominent religious scholars to shore up support for their resistance.  Respected elements 
of Saudi Arabia’s non-establishment Al-Sahwa ulema, and later, Iraq’s progressively more 
radical Association of Muslim Scholars, have both supported the jihad on theological 
grounds.  The leaders of the former group, perhaps the most respected faction of scholars 
in Saudi Arabia and increasingly radical since the established ulema acquiesced to a U.S. 
presence in the kingdom during and after Desert Storm, signed an open letter to the Iraqi 
people urging them to join a defensive jihad against the Coalition occupiers on 5 
November of 2004—“jihad against the occupation was mandatory for all those who were 
able”—going so far as to issue a fatwa prohibiting Iraqis from harming jihadists or assisting 
Coalition troops carrying out anti-insurgent raids.431  Commentators note that while the 
House of Saud has successfully compelled the non-establishment ulema to refrain from 
criticizing the regime itself (by way of censoring and imprisoning leading clerics), it has 
not shown the same enthusiasm to moderate their pronouncement regarding foreign 
affairs.432  The Iraqi group, meanwhile, did demonstrate an initial reluctance to endorse, 
or even use the term, “jihad”; it ultimately adopted “a discourse that resembles that of the 
jihadi salafis,” however, in the end asserting that “the call to Islam is the call to jihad, 
because jihad is Islam,” and that jihad is a “duty of the times.”433  In other words, 
resistance to the Coalition was both Iraqi and increasingly Islamist, contrary to the 	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expectations of war planners and their strategic assessments through the first year of 
conflict. 
 
In fact, convinced that the insurgency was being organized by former regime elements, 
Coalition planners were hopeful in December of 2003 that the capture of Saddam 
Hussein would help stem the violence—not necessarily because he was believed to be 
directing the insurgency, but because his capture (along with other prominent Ba’athists) 
would send a powerful signal to Iraqis that Iraq’s tyrant was not coming back.  As Ahmed 
S. Hashim explains in his book on the insurgency, “it is clear that for many former regime 
elements he constituted a symbol of resistance to foreign occupation.  It was important 
that he was free, even if he was not in direct control of the insurgency.”434   The clear and 
indubitable end of the Ba’ath tyranny in Iraq was supposed to undermine an insurgency 
many still believed was motivated by a desire to reestablish it. 
 
That, however, is not at all how the story unfolded.  The gulf between the expected effect 
of Saddam Hussein’s capture, and its effect in fact, was revealed in the first half of 2004.  
After a short lull, the insurgency intensified dramatically, attacks almost tripling in 
number by the summer, and the number insurgents quadrupling according to some 
estimates.435  The capture of Saddam Hussein had the unexpected effect of strengthening 
the insurgency by, so to speak, purifying its objectives in the minds of Iraqis disposed to 
support a resistance justified on Islamist lines.  The taint of the Ba’ath party and its 	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objectives disintegrating, recruitment soared and a new unity of purpose coalesced 
around the insurgency’s most radical elements. 
 
Army historians agree with the International Conflict Group’s 2006 assessment of the 
ultimate impact of Saddam Hussein’s capture.436  By clearly dissociating the insurgency 
from the any possibility of the restoration of a despised regime, Saddam Hussein’s capture 
gave new momentum to the insurgents’ emerging cause by “shoring up its… 
religious/jihadist credentials.”   The indisputable end of the Ba’ath—accomplished at 
great effort by Coalition troops as they combed the country for high-ranking officials of 
the former regime—had the simultaneous effect of facilitating “a rapprochement between 
the insurgency and transnational jihadi networks,” groups that were, in principle, as 
opposed to Ba’athist ideology as to the presence of U.S. troops on Muslim soil.437 
   
From mid-2004 through approximately the autumn of 2006, the insurgency was 
effectively led by Zarqawi’s group.  He had linked his nascent insurgent group to Bin-
Laden’s worldwide network by October of 2004.  In January of 2006, he expanded Al-
Qaeda in Iraq into an umbrella-like operation called Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin (Shura 
Council of Mujahidin), which sought to unify all the major insurgent groups under his 
control, or at least coordinate their operations.438  As a result, the insurgency established 
and maintained a remarkable degree of cohesion as it approached its destructive zenith.   	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On the face of it, this is a remarkable feat.  We have said that the insurgency’s strength to 
this point derived in large from the underestimated intensity of Islamist sentiment in Iraq.  
And yet, the majority of the Sunnis who supported the insurgency—and many of the 
insurgents, as we have seen—were hardly jihadists of the Salafi-Wahhabi school.  
Nonetheless, religious arguments had significant resonance given the increasing religiosity 
of the population; moreover, many opposed a foreign presence whose motivations they 
had come to distrust.  Sunnis were disproportionately apprehensive about their futures, 
and living under circumstances that quite understandably drove many to reaffirm their 
faith.  But they were not necessarily eager to endorse the radical Salafi end-game 
(certainly not as articulated by Al-Qaeda in Iraq):  the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate 
governed according to a literal interpretation of sharia law.  In fact, a widely cited 2006 
International Crisis Group report argues that, for strategic reasons, the most important armed 
groups deliberately refrained from articulating a “political program” through the 
beginning of 2006:   
 
[T]here has been neither elaborate vision of a future Islamic Republic nor 
extensive reference to restoring Sunni Arab rule, nor calls to revert to a 
pre-war status quo. 
Instead, the insurgency principally has concentrated on the more 
operational, immediate aspects of the conflict.  This was most evident 
during earlier phases, when insurgents believed U.S. forces would be 
present for an extensive period and thus conceived of their struggle as a 
long jihad.439  
What held the two wings of the insurgency—the Islamists and the Sunnis who had 
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prospered under the Ba’athists—together then?   The authors of the report contend that 
“the shared objective simply was to prevent the U.S. from stabilizing the situation,” even 
that  “an untainted jihad transcending particular interests or ambitions”—one the various 
groups would be content to allow Zarqawi’s group to lead—was only possible so long as 
the Salafis refrained from articulating a “detailed political program.”  Indeed, evidence 
suggests that an important preface to the Surge’s success was Al-Qaeda’s overreach in the 
latter part of 2006.  They widened the rift between the first group of insurgents and the 
radical Salafi Islamists (thereby making it easier to exploit) by turning their focus from 
fighting Coalition troops to the establishment of a brutally Islamist state.  As they began 
targeting Iraqis they deemed insufficiently Islamic, the barbaric tactics they were 
employing frightened moderate Sunnis, and the revelation of their end-game with the 
declaration of an Islamic state in Anbar province (what was to be the seat of the restored 
Caliphate), created the opportunity U.S. forces were able to parlay into significant 
security gains.   
 
Beyond the initial reluctance to specify a political program, two further factors 
contributed to the insurgents’ unity through the middle of 2006:  political developments 
(including Shiite domination of government and the constitutional convention that 
yielded a document prejudicial to Sunni interests) were viewed as a harbinger of a Shiite-
dominated Iraq and served to rouse Sunnis to action; and Shiite Iraqis, under the 
auspices of Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and the Badr organization, began to retaliate in the 
face of Sunni provocation, making it easier to for insurgent leaders to encourage Sunnis 
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to escalate counter-retaliations in turn.  In other words, the two strains of the insurgency 
were never united when it came to the radical Islamist end-game.  But the first step 
toward their respective end-games—expelling American troops and preventing Shiite 
ascendency—was something both strains could agree upon.  
 
Insurgent Tactics 
In the beginning, insurgents focused their attacks on the occupying power they railed 
against, targeting Coalition forces and the U.N.  Quickly, they realized that to accomplish 
their aim of destabilizing Iraq it would be more effective (and much easier) to target Iraqi 
civilians:  those working with the coalition as translators and drivers, those waiting outside 
recruiting offices, civilians shopping in markets, worshippers assembled to pray, wedding 
and funeral processions, Shiite Iraqis in particular.  The insurgency would never be able 
to defeat American forces militarily; this, they knew.  But by revealing to non-insurgents 
that working with the Coalition was a death sentence, they realized most Iraqis could at 
least be made to cower, ultimately to surrender the fight.  By taking away all hope that a 
stable and modern Iraq could be built—by targeting innocents working to that end, by 
committing spectacular attacks as enraging as they were murderous, all the while waging 
a sophisticate propaganda campaign—insurgents sought to turn Iraqis against one 
another and the Coalition, to catalyze a civil war along sectarian lines.440   
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Insurgent leaders believed, moreover, that they had only to fight American troops to a 
stalemate to precipitate U.S. withdrawal, the first step toward their stated end game.  
They stood little chance of accomplishing this if they limited themselves to attacking U.S. 
troops; and indeed, wherever the forces were allowed to meet more or less openly, the 
insurgents (the Shiite Madhi Army too) were routed.  And so insurgents targeted 
vulnerable groups that did not represent a threat to them.  By inciting Iraqis who were 
not necessarily loyal to the aims of the insurgency to nonetheless react to insurgent 
provocations violently, the level of chaos in Iraq could be made to exceed what the 
insurgent groups were capable of fomenting by more limited methods.  Thus, insurgents 
believed they could raise the expense of the war beyond the threshold the American 
public would accept.  In his authoritative study of the insurgency, Admed Hashim 
suggests that “all the insurgent groups—whatever their ideological provenance—share 
with one another (and with the politically active Sunni political party/groups) the desire 
and determination to make the stay of the United States as painful as untenable as 
possible so that it leaves Iraq.”441    
Between the beginning of the war and destruction of the Askariya shrine at Samarra on 
22 February 2006, dozens of attacks had killed fifty Shiite civilians or more at a stroke.  
Many of them were calculated to exert maximal symbolic effect, targeting prominent 
leaders, holy places, or disrupting religious celebrations.  On 29 August, 2003, Ayatollah 
Bakr Al-Hakim, the leader of the largest Shiite political party, the Supreme Council for 
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), was killed along with 94 others outside Imam Ali 	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mosque in Najaf.  On 2 March, 2004, suicide bombers killed 180 Shiite pilgrims 
celebrating Ashura for the first time in decades in coordinated attacks in Karbala and 
Baghdad.  On 19 December, 2004, car bombs struck Najaf and Karbala, Shiite Islam’s 
holy cities, killing at least 67.  On August 31, 2005, 965 Shiite pilgrims died when Sunni 
insurgents fired rockets near Kadhim’s Shrine in Baghdad, which combined with rumors 
that a suicide bomber was among them, sparked a deadly panic on a crowded bridge.   
While Zarqawi denied repeatedly that his group was targeting Shiite civilians specifically, 
he did claim responsibility for attacks directed against Shiite political parties and 
recruitment centers.  International Crisis Group notes, moreover, that in one important 
audio address, he exhorts Sunnis to “a comprehensive war against the Rawafidh all over 
Iraq, wherever and whenever they are found.”442  While the term in question is 
apparently of ambiguous literal significance, it is “increasingly used as a pejorative 
designation for all Shiites”; its use permitted Zarqawi to fan the flames of sectarian 
conflict while claiming to less radical insurgents of the more secular wing that he was not 
trying to ignite a civil war.  In private letters, his denunciations of Shiites is utterly 
unrestrained.443 
Shiite leaders demonstrated considerable fortitude (in the service of their interest in a 
stable Iraq to be sure), urging restraint in the face of brutal provocation.  Until February 
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of 2005, Sunni attacks were not inspiring counter-attacks in significant numbers.444  
Change came from opportunity.  The January 2005 election had elevated to power an 
alliance between the Kurdish list and the Shiite umbrella party called the United Iraqi 
Alliance, giving control of the interior ministry to SCIRI.  Commando units under the 
control of the Badr organization, an offshoot of SCIRI, infiltrated the department and 
began to carry out midnight raids targeting Sunni neighborhoods.445  It quickly became 
clear that the raids were not always directed against suspected insurgents, but often, 
innocent civilians who happened to be Sunnis.  The Mahdi Army, too—a group loyal to 
Muqtada al-Sadr, a young cleric who opposed working with the Coalition and amassed a 
powerful following among the Shiite urban poor—began targeting Sunni civilians in 
retaliation during this period. 
Peter Galbraith is probably correct in his assessment that “Iraq’s deadliest terrorist attack 
killed no one.”446  The demolition of the Askariya shrine in Samarra on 22 February, 
2006, marked yet another escalation of sectarian hatreds.  Restraint proved impossible, 
and the following week, 184 Sunni mosques were vandalized or destroyed.  Thousands of 
Sunnis were kidnapped and executed in the months that followed, many of them by 
Shiite Iraqis in uniform and on the national payroll, often while areas were under curfew.  
Sunni insurgents had finally succeeded in tipping the Shiite balance:  violent extremists 
on both sides of the equation had become the dominant forces in Iraqi politics.  The 
activity of Shiite death squads, as they came to be known and which continued to 	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infiltrate and emerge from Iraq’s new “national” police force and army, contributed 
dramatically to the intensification of the violence as tit-for-tat inter-sectarian attacks 
continued to provoke still more vicious retaliation.   
By this point, some were calling the spiraling Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq a civil war.  It 
is not hard to understand why.  An important threshold had indeed been passed:  
innocent civilians were being targeted, kidnapped and killed, tortured and maimed, for 
no other reason than the manner in which they worshipped, the neighborhood they lived 
in, the clothes they wore, in some cases their names.447  At the time of the Samarra 
mosque bombing, an average week saw between 700 and 800 attacks against the 
Coalition and its Iraqi partners.  From February of 2006 to the beginning of the Surge, 
that number increases spectacularly, to nearly 1600 attacks per week at its peak in June of 
2007, a figure that does not capture the activity of Shiite death squads.448  Hundreds of 
thousands living in mixed Sunni-Shiite areas (as many as 90,000 per month during this 
period) were forced from their homes as neighborhoods homogenized, those in the 
minority leaving for fear of their lives.  The U.S. death toll, meanwhile, was soaring.  
During this period, most months saw between 60 and 110 U.S. soldiers lose their lives. 
Virtually every commentator now agrees that the depth of Islamist commitments, and 
what is a separate thing, the widespread sympathy in certain areas of the country for 
those advocating radical interpretations of Islam against the backdrop of the American 
occupation, were dramatically underestimated by war planners.  Many expressed the 	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belief that Iraq was a particularly good candidate for liberal democracy precisely because 
it seemed to be a relatively secular state under Saddam Hussein’s oppressive rule.  We 
have said that planners failed to perceive how deeply the Resurgence of Islam had 
affected Iraq, especially over the decade following the first Gulf War.  It would have been 
hard for any Westerner to imagine the terrible violence and intensity of hatred renewed 
religious commitment would provoke and feed.  John Agresto acknowledges the mistake 
this way:  
What we failed to realize was how even the more moderate and less 
fanatical versions of Islam still see their versions of sectarian truth as more 
important than general religious toleration, how natural the desire to 
impose orthodoxy by law on the heterodox is to most men, how resistant to 
philosophical modernity certain parts of the Islamic faith would be, and, at 
the extreme, how virulent, how savage, the response of the religious zealots 




On the Shiite side 
As the violence intensified, it became clear that Iraq’s Shiite community was more 
cohesive, segments animated by a politicized species of Islam and virulent if long-
suppressed anti-Sunni sentiments, than war planners anticipated.  One reason for this:  
pervasive and long-standing Iranian influence.  No friend of the Sunni-dominated secular 
Ba’ath regime, Iran’s theocratic regime had been funding Shiite revolutionaries in Iraq 
since the Shah’s overthrown in 1979.  In fact, of Iraq’s two dominant Shiite parties—
which cooperatively constitute the single most powerful political force in post-Saddam 	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Iraq—one, SCIRI, owes its existence to Iranian support, while the other, the Da’awa, 
though founded domestically in 1964, has at times relied on Tehran for safe-haven and 
funding.   
Neither party has proven, at any point, committed to building a stable, united, and 
tolerant liberal democracy in Iraq.  Before the invasion, SCIRI was unwilling to work 
with the American-supported Iraq Congress, an umbrella under which Iraq’s moderate 
opposition groups organized (without tremendous success) to support Iraq’s future 
government.  Until the January 2009 election, SCIRI sought, from a position of strength, 
to leverage U.S. support in service of its own vision for Iraq.  Shiite leaders have deftly 
manipulated the political process thanks, largely, to the cooperative relationship between 
the Najaf religious establishment led by Ayatollah Al-Sistani, and Iraq’s Shiite political 
elite (too often a distinction without a difference).  Together with Da’awa, SCIRI leads 
the Shiite umbrella party that has controlled the Iraqi government since 2005, the United 
Iraqi Alliance.  Led by a prominent member of the party with more radical roots, 
Da’awa’s Nouri Al-Maliki, the UIA has proven unabashedly eager to hasten America’s 
departure from Iraq and therewith its influence over the Iraqi state, and has arguably 
done more to inflame Iraq’s sectarian hatreds than to temper them.  The militia attached 
to SCIRI, for instance, the Badr corps, captured the Ministry of the Interior in 2005 and 
proceeded to carry out attacks against the Sunni population after curfew and in 
government uniforms.  
In terms of guiding ideology, both parties are deeply influenced by Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
thought.  Committed to the notion that absolute sovereignty belongs to God as opposed 
	  247 
to the people, they differ, most importantly, on the relative political authority they believe 
should be designated to the umma (the community of believers) and the ulema (the 
religious scholars based in Najaf).  Both assert that legitimate laws can only be derived 
from the tenets of Islamic law; both insist on a prominent place for Shiite religious 
scholars; and, as we will see, members of both parties fought the inclusion of provisions in 
Iraq’s constitution designed to protect the rights of individuals and minorities.  
One of the greatest U.S. failures stems from precisely this:  no one appreciated what 
Iraq’s prominent Shiite leaders hoped to achieve, nor their broad base of popular 
support.  That the leaders of Iraq’s majority faction had a vision for Iraq utterly 
incompatible with the vision espoused by American policy makers is no doubt the root of 
a great many of Iraq’s problems today.  It is as though the key policymakers failed to ask 
themselves what should is among the most basic foreign policy calculus questions:  how 
do the primary actors conceive of their interests; how will they act to achieve them?  To 
make matters worse, the cohesion of the Islamist-leaning Shiite community in 2003, and 
the extent to it would increase once their leaders were free to speak and organize openly 
post-Saddam, was also dramatically underestimated. 
No doubt the insurgency has played a role in binding and radicalizing Iraqi Shiites. And 
while it is true Sunni-Shiite relations deteriorated manifestly in the years since the 
invasion began, the roots of this animosity run deeper.  The post-Kuwait Shiite revolt in 
March of 1991, brutally put down by Saddam Hussein, as well as continual regime-
sponsored assassinations of prominent Shiite clerics, helped to reinforce a sectarian 
consciousness in the decade leading up to the war.  Prominent Shiite leaders have also 
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explained that many of their polarizing initiatives are the calculated result of a 
commitment to learn from mistakes further in the past.  Many blamed the reluctance of 
Shiite leaders to make aggressive plays for power in the 1920s (in the face of British 
colonial rule) and the 1960s (in the face of the Ba’athist coup) for their community’s 
almost century-long marginalization at the hands of the more assertive Sunni minority.  
The same leaders were determined to gain a larger share of the spoils this time around, a 
commitment to faction over country that was bound to complicate the construction of a 
new regime in Iraq. 
Poorer Shiite, meanwhile, tended to gravitate toward Moqtada Al-Sadr, an intractable 
opponent of the U.S. occupation, and leader of the Mahdi Army, a civilian militia that 
would be responsible for some of the most brutal sectarian violence in Iraq.  His vitriolic 
rhetoric, and atrocities committed by SCIRI’s militia, the Badr Corps, were important 
contributors to Iraq’s descent toward civil war.  Brutal Sunni provocations were 
increasingly met with still more ferocious Shiite reactions; the cycle fed itself and violence 
escalated uncontrollably. 
As Shiites coalesced around political leaders determined to exploit the community’s 
religious convictions to sectarian political advantage, and to leverage that popular support 
toward the decentralization of Iraq and Islamization of its Shiite South, Sunnis continued 
to support (if uneasily) the increasingly radical, and increasingly brutal, Salafi-inspired 
insurgency.  By mid-2006, U.S. forces had all but lost Anbar province.  Mixed districts—
Baghdad, its environs, Fallujah, and the areas in and south of the Sunni triangle—were 
descending into complete chaos, many neighborhoods controlled entirely by insurgents or 
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Shiite death squads.  Iraq’s political fate seemed likely to be determined by its most 
violent elements, a recipe for outright civil war and genocide. 
In 2006 through the middle of 2007, it was hard not to conclude Iraq was lost.  The 
assassination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June of 2006 hardly affected the number of 
insurgent attacks; the execution of Saddam Hussein in December only fanned fan 
sectarian flames.  A steep upward trajectory marks virtually every measure of violence in 
Iraq available for this period.  Commentators and politicians began to advocate partition.  
On 19 April, 2007, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid went so far as to declare “this 
war is lost” while prominent Democrats in Congress continued to advocate a rapid 
withdrawal, whatever the consequences for Iraqis and the U.S. national interest.  In a 
word, when President Bush courageously announced that he was prepared to ignore 
mounting pressure to begin withdrawing troops, and in fact increase U.S. combat 
capacity in Iraq, Zarqawi had almost achieved his short-term objective of forcing 
American troops out of the country, even if he was not alive to appreciate it. 
 
The Surge 
Under the command of General Petraeus, the surge succeeded beyond the expectations 
of even its most committed proponents.  In little more than a year, the security situation 
in Iraq was transformed spectacularly.  Civilian and military casualties dropped to their 
lowest levels since the war began.  With the calm, some semblance of normalcy has 
returned to the streets of Baghdad.  Virtually every economic and quality of life indicator 
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indicates significant improvement.  By the end of 2008, markets and even liquor stores 
had reopened; oil production soared as attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure 
declined precipitously; electricity production finally came to exceed prewar levels; the 
number of telephone subscribers today approaches 15 million, up from 833,000 prewar 
(the number of internet subscriptions has jumped from 4,500 to 827,500); there are in 
Iraq today 45 commercial television stations, 114 commercial radio stations, and 268 
independent newspapers and magazines (not a single independent media outset operated 
under the Ba’ath regime); inflation, running at 5% in 2007, is running near levels deemed 
acceptable in the developed world.450   
30,000 additional American troops are the root of this near-miraculous transformation; 
they made possible a new counter-insurgency strategy designed to separate the two wings 
of the insurgency, employing the first against the second.  We have noted already that one 
of the biggest mistakes war planners made was to send an insufficient number troops.  
The mistake was in large the result of the failure to predict the mobilization, as well as 
quickly note the emergence in its early stages, of an organized insurgency.  Almost 
nobody believed Iraq risked becoming an ungovernable, failed, state.  The decision to 
send so few troops, combined with the unplanned disbanding and dissolution of Iraq’s 
military and security forces, meant that the Coalition lacked the manpower it would have 
required to successfully combat an insurgency that benefitted from tremendous local 
support according to the classic counter-insurgency strategy:  by clearing and then holding 
territory, what would permit them to help rebuild infrastructure and build the local 	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economy.  The approach was, therefore, termed “Clear-Hold-Build.” 
Commanders, who were not prepared for an insurgency and had not trained their units 
to fight one, noted early on that the insurgents’ strength as a resistance movement is 
derived from the support they receive—active (the contribution of resources) as well as 
passive (a reluctance to help counter-insurgency forces find insurgents and their weapons 
caches)—from the population.  Given the number of troops available, and noting (as 
General Sanchez did early on) that an “iron-fisted approach to the conduct of operations 
was beginning to alienate Iraqis,” a light footprint strategy was adopted throughout the 
country.451  In other words, the Coalition was not primarily committed to establishing 
security in Iraq pre-surge.  Instead, they were operating under immense pressure to 
prepare a quick transfer of authority to Iraqis, on the assumption that U.S. withdrawal 
would dramatically improve the security situation.452  Army historians note that many 
commanders devoted the bulk of their resources to reconstruction, governance and other 
types of noncombat missions, perceiving that gaining the trust and support of the local 
population was the key to victory, and that focusing on “aggressive combat operations 
that directly attacked insurgent networks… might alienate the population.”453  
The problem:  insufficient troop numbers made it impossible for the Coalition to gain 
widespread Sunni trust and support because they could not protect them over time.  
(There were actually areas within shooting distance of Baghdad’s Green Zone that had 
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gone without sustained Coalition presence from 2003 until the surge!)  Well-trained 
Coalition troops were able to eliminate known enemies and begin reconstruction where 
they were deployed, but they could not hold their gains.  No matter how valiant their 
efforts, in some areas everything fell apart when they left; and there was always a hot spot 
necessitating attention and so troops were continually being transferred to areas where 
conditions had deteriorated.  Insurgents filled the vacuums, building explosive devices 
and organizing attacks against civilian and military targets nearby from the areas they 
were able to control.  Al-Qaeda in Iraq systemically and deliberately moved in as the 
Coalition moved out of areas they had secured.  By controlling swatches of terrain, 
especially on the outskirts of Baghdad, the insurgents could project their influence—and 
chaos—even into areas they did not control.   
A diagram discovered in a Baghdad safe house in 2006, drawn it is believed by Zarqawi 
himself, revealed a rather sophisticated operational strategy:  AQI sought to secure a series 
of belts around the city which permitted easy communication and the free movement of 
resources, and from which they launched attacks into Baghdad as well as outward, into 
neighboring provinces.454  Moreover, the Improvised Explosive Devices and Vehicle-
Borne Improvised Explosive Devices built in these areas were deployed along strategic 
roads, securing important transportation routes Westward to Fallujah, Ar Ramadi and 
into Syria, Southward toward Karbala, and Northward to Baqubah, Samarra, Tikrit, and 
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Most important of all, the fact that U.S. troops could not hold terrain reduced the 
incentive for Iraqis to cooperate with the Coalition; they were, understandably, afraid of 
the inevitable insurgent reprisals that would come when Coalition troops left, fears 
insurgents did everything in their power to stoke.  The light footprint strategy developed 
to avoid offending Iraqis made it impossible to provide security in the face of an 
organized destabilizing force.  The insurgents, meanwhile, sought to gain a monopoly on 
the means of violence—as well as vital resources like food, water, and fuel—wherever 
they could, thereby co-opting, or coercing, the support of the local population.  Coupled 
with the existing incentives to support the insurgency heretofore discussed, U.S. troops 
were facing a near-impossible task. 
The Surge effectively reversed the light footprint strategy in the areas insurgents were 
strongest.  Increased troop presence permitted significant military operations to route 
jihadist strongholds; as important, it also permitted the establishment of more permanent 
outposts within those communities and then to help improve them.  Troops stayed, made 
contacts, gathered intelligence, trained Iraqis to fight with them, and helped rebuild the 
infrastructure and economy that had been battered by and neglected under the jihadist 
reign.  Significantly, the U.S. military made the “safety of the local population rather than 
force protection a priority.”456  In other words, the bravery and sacrifice of American 
soldiers accounts both for the success of the Surge and the escalating fatality rate in its 	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early stages.  In all, this new strategy helped American troops finally to gain the trust of 
the local population. 
One U.S. military commander interviewed in March of 2008 by International Crisis 
Group explained how a modest surge in numbers, combined with increased Iraqi security 
forces, was utterly transforming the security situation: 
My unit got [to a semi-rural neighborhood of ‘Arab Jbur, not far from 
Baghdad] in June 2007 as part of the Baghdad defensive belt. At the time 
there was no Iraqi police, no Iraqi Army, just a lot of al-Qaeda. Before the 
surge, we only had enough troops to focus on big population centers. ‘Arab 
Jbur had always been an insurgent stronghold, but al-Qaeda came in and 
drove out the Islamic Army, as well as many civilians. Throughout 2006 
al-Qaeda was manufacturing VBIEDs [cars rigged to explode] there and 
sending them into Baghdad. We had a very tough fight working our way 
into the town. The local population worried we would be like other 
coalition troops – stay a couple of weeks and leave. Still a local sheikh 
produced three of his guys to help coalition forces find al-Qaeda fighters. 
They would also walk in the streets in front of the soldiers and point out 
IEDs [improvised explosive devices]. They explained this was out of 
rejection of al-Qaeda’s random and deliberate extreme violence. Al-Qaeda 
had controlled resources such as food and water, which led to passive 
support by the remaining population. When people understood we were 
here to stay, intelligence improved. The surge gave us the number of 
troops we needed to start living here.457 
The cooperation of locals—essential to the identification of insurgents and their 
instruments of terror—only became possible thanks to increased troop numbers.  (An 
important lesson must be derived from this.  Insofar as the same dynamic is yielding the 
actionable intelligence American drones rely on to strike targets in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, the consequences of early withdrawal are likely to be noticeable.  Put another 
way, effective though hellfire missile strikes and covert missions against Al-Qaeda targets 
have been in the Afghan/Pakistan theater, they cannot be maintained at the current level 	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without the troop presence sufficient to provide levels of security under which the local 
population will continue to provide actionable intelligence.) 
The strategy underlying the Surge also highlighted (once again) the disjuncture between 
the White House and the civilian command at DOD on how aggressively nation building 
in Iraq was to be pursued.  Secretary Rumsfeld initially opposed the Surge strategy 
(which Condoleezza Rice vociferously supported) and dismissed the “Clear-Hold-Build” 
strategy in these terms when it was first proposed in 2005: 
Anyone who takes those three words and things it means the United States 
should clear and the United States should hold and the United States 
should built, doesn’t understand the situation.  It is the Iraqis’ country.  
They’ve got 28 million people there.  They are clearing, they are holding, 
they are building.  They’re going to be the ones doing the reconstruction of 
that country.”458 
Rice again won the argument, but the debate about adopting a new strategy went on in 
the administration, and as the Inspector General notes, the disagreement between Rice 
and Rumsfeld “soon appeared to be impeding the execution of the new strategy.”459  
Even though the strategy remained “under-resourced for over a year,” its promise 
nonetheless “became increasingly apparent” as U.S. troops progressively eliminated 
insurgents where they had previously been strong.460  It was not until January of 2007 
that President Bush announced the actual troop Surge that allowed the strategy to have 
its spectacular effect. 
The importance of increasing the number of troops in Iraq and the bravery of those who 	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confronted the insurgency cannot be overstated.  It permitted the hold and built aspects 
of the approach instrumental to improving the security situation in Iraq.  What cannot be 
ignored, however, and what is perhaps more important for our purposes, are the reasons 
Sunnis who had been induced and compelled to support the insurgency up to that point 
were newly disposed to cooperate with Coalition troops from the end of 2006 onward.  
Broadly speaking, two developments are of particular consequence:  as Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
consolidated its hold in Anbar province and the Sunni triangle, its radicalism became 
more obvious to inhabitants of the area, provoking a counter-reaction; Coalition troops, 
meanwhile, were finally able to establish a working alliance with the tribal leadership, in 
part because the tribes began to recognize a threat to their own importance as the 
Islamists consolidated their authority. 
 
Zarqawi’s Grand Ambitions  
After making a concerted effort to unify the insurgency through the middle of 2006, in 
part by abstaining from discussion of its long-term aims, Al-Qaeda in Iraq began to proceed 
too aggressively, in part because the insurgency was succeeding.  We know from a letter 
sent from Ayman al-Zawahiri (second in command of Al-Qaeda’s worldwide network) to 
Abu Musab Zarqawi in the summer of 2005, as well as from later public statements, that 
Al-Qaeda placed high importance on its Iraq operations.  The 6,500 word communiqué, 
released on 6 October, 2005, lays out in intricate detail the aims of the Al-Qaeda-led 
insurgency in Iraq.  Shmuel Bar and Yair Minzili, at the Center on Islam, Democracy 
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and the Future of the Muslim World, have argued that “the jihad in Iraq… is arguably 
the most profound development that the global jihadi movement has undergone since the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.”461  The Al-Qaeda leadership recognized that their 
most important prerequisite is a jurisdiction they control, or which supports them, within 
which operatives can train and organize freely.  They sought, therefore, to build in Iraq 
what had been dismantled in Afghanistan.462 
Recognizing the importance of the Iraq theater to Al-Qaeda’s grandiose long-term aims 
(the reestablishment of an Islamic Caliphate, its coercive force dedicated to the 
instantiation of sharia), Zawahiri identifies two short-goals for Iraq’s jihadists in his letter to 
Zarqawi:  first, expel U.S. forces (Zawahiri and Zarqawi believed the insurgency would 
precipitate a Vietnam-like withdrawal, as indeed it almost did); second, establish an 
Islamic emirate “over whatever Sunni territory in Iraq can be brought under its 
control.”463  Al-Qaeda in Iraq seemed well on its way to achieving both aims by the summer 
of 2006.  Iraq was in chaos, the rising death-toll and fading hope had American 
politicians discussing withdrawal, insurgents controlled Anbar province, and in a 	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proclamation on 15 October, 2006, The Mujahedeen Shura Council (the umbrella group 
created by Zarqawi and, officially, the successor to Al-Qaeda in Iraq), declared the province 
to be an independent Islamic state.  Indeed, the leaders of the insurgency no longer saw 
themselves as non-state actors fighting to liberate Iraq.  They laid claim to de facto 
statehood—in the sense that they believed the insurgency had succeeded and driven out 
the occupier (radical jihadists believe the system of nation-states to be an illegitimate 
imperialist construct)—and strove to govern Al Anbar Province according to their brutal 
interpretation of sharia law.  The independent political entity they believed they had 
created was called the Islamic State of Iraq, and was supposed to be a base from which to 
advance Al-Qaeda’s longer term aims.464   
Nibras Kazimi, also at the Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim 
World, emphasizes in a 2008 report what a triumph the Al Anbar state, eventually to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Nibras Kazimi observes that the announcement of “the Islamic State of Iraq was downplayed 
by American officials, analysts, and journalists as an ‘al-Qaeda affiliate’ rather than its successor.”  
It had, nonetheless, become at this point America’s most important foreign enemy—whether one 
prefers to call it a state, or simply the new seat of the radical Islamic terrorist network—making 
Iraq the central battleground in the war on terror.  Kazimi suggests Americans were more or less 
oblivious to this development because due to partisan acrimony at home: 
 
The American public was uncurious as to the identity, nature, and goals of 
its enemy in Iraq. And, unfortunately, U.S. leaders and commanders were 
mostly complicit in such willful unawareness. The lack of interest on the 
part of the public was partly due to bitter partisan recriminations over the 
Bush administration’s policy in waging the Iraq war, and over who in 
Washington was to blame for the insurgency that ensued. Consequently, 
the doctrines of the Bush administration regarding preemptive strikes and 
democracy in the Middle East came under incessant scrutiny from the 
administration’s domestic political foes. Meanwhile, the doctrines of the 
jihadists were overlooked or, in the few cases where they were considered, 
dismissed as esoteric. Fantastical as they may be, these doctrines do indeed 
motivate and inform the enemy’s actions and strategy, and their 
significance was not recognized (“The Caliphate Attempted,” 32). 
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ruled by a restored Caliphate, signified for the jihadist movement: 
 
The creators of the Islamic State of Iraq understood it as the most 
ambitious jihadist venture to date. They could, they believed, lay claim to 
the leadership of the global jihadist movement, since they had surpassed in 
scope, purpose, and martial triumph the generation of jihadists that came 
before them, including bin Laden. Among other things, they believed that 
their state would elevate the Islamic struggle against the West to a new 
level of confrontation: rather than have disparate groups of jihadists 
retaliating against Western targets by terrorist means, the Islamic State of 
Iraq would confront its foes as would an emerging empire—and in the 
same fashion as the early Islamic conquests. Moreover, defeating the 
United States, the world’s mightiest military and economic power, on the 
battlefield of Iraq was to be the harbinger of even greater victories for 
Islam.465 
Thus the impending achievement of Zawahiri’s short-term goals thanks to Zarqawi’s 
leadership in Iraq seemed to make possible yet more ambitious undertakings.  According 
to the letter, a jihad directed against the rest of Iraq and its neighboring states (in order to 
extend the Caliphate through the Sunni Arab world) was next on the agenda; and 
following that, armed struggle against Israel as well.  The ultimate goal, of course, is the 
same as Osama Bin-Laden’s:  the eclipse of Western civilization by Islamic civilization, 
where the latter is defined along radical Salafi lines. 
The putative leader of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-
Baghdadi, puts the new entity’s raison d’être in precisely these terms: 
 
Today, we are embarking on a new era, and a point of transformation for 
the region and the entire world, we are witnessing the end of that lie called 
Western civilization, and the rise of the Islamic giant, and this is exactly 
what Bush warned of in his latest speech in front of the veterans [August 
22, 2007] saying: ‘the region is developing in a way that threatens the 
downfall of civilization’ and by that he means the civilization of unbelief, 
the civilization of usury and prostitution, the civilization of oppression and 	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humiliation. And he had this to say about the soldiers of the Islamic State 
of [Iraq]: ‘they seek to restore the caliphate from Spain to Indonesia’ after 
[the Americans] made clear that [the soldiers of the Islamic State] are only 
Sunni danger threatening America and its civilization, and this is the truth 
as testified to by the enemies.466 
Portentous though these remarks are in themselves, their context is also important.  
Baghdadi’s Sixth Speech was released on 9 July, 2007, and in it he is exhorting Sunni 
insurgents who were already beginning to turn away from his movement to continue 
supporting the radical Islamist cause.  For by the middle of 2007, the insurgency was well 




By the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007, the jihadists were beginning to alienate the 
constituency that had to this point been their most important supporters—former 
Ba’athists, disenfranchised tribesman, “patriotic” Sunnis afraid for their future in a Shiite 
dominated Iraq.  Recall that the insurgency’s cohesion had been a product of their shared 
short-term aim:  to expel U.S. troops and foment sufficient turmoil to prevent a national 
Shiite ascendency.  This much effectively achieved in Anbar province—Coalition troops 
had essentially “lost” the governorate—the jihadist leadership proceeded beyond what the 
two wings of the insurgency could agree upon, and began to enforce sharia law in areas 
under their control. 
The brutality of their tactics had long been a source of unease and dispute between the 	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two wings.  Zawahiri had foreseen as much, and wrote to Zarqawi as early as the middle 
of 2005 urging him to end the practice of decapitating hostages, as well as to take other 
steps to moderate the insurgency’s public image.467  Al-Qaeda in Iraq ultimately followed 
that advice.  The beheadings stopped, and steps were taken to “Iraqify” the insurgency.   
AQI even issued numerous public statements denying that they were targeting Shiites or 
civilians specifically.468  In spite of these steps, finally in control of a province they called 
the Islamic State of Iraq, the jihadists—most of them Iraqi, but not necessarily natives of 
Al Anbar—began to enforce their more radical interpretation of sharia much more 
aggressively.  Their most spectacular acts of brutality were no longer publicized, but 
everyday brutality in the name of Islam became more and more common in areas 
controlled by the insurgents. 
Increasingly, they were making the sort of mistake that American troops had made with 
devastating consequence in the first years of the occupation, but to a degree and with an 
impunity, it is hard to imagine.  In the name of a purer Islam (American troops were 
aiming to secure the country after the fall of its government), Al-Qaeda’s fighters were 
more and more brazenly transgressing tribal cultural mores:  expelling, intimidating, and 
killing local sheiks; forcibly taking wives in an effort to establish roots; assassinating 
policemen, the educated, the wealthy, and landholders—all in order to eliminate the 
existing structure of authority in favor of consolidating their own power.   The radical 
jihadists even harassed and terrorized ordinary Sunni civilians—thitherto their own 
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supporters!—who were, for whatever absurd reason, not Islamic enough according to 
what commentators have called “the most ruthless and primitive version of Salafi 
Islam.”469   Shaving was banned; smokers lost their fingers.470 
Needless to say, jihadist dogmas and the instability they wrought made economic recovery 
all but impossible.  Thus, jihadists progressively lost Sunni support as they grew more 
assertive.  AQI, in effect, undermined the very aspects of civil society most Sunnis believed 
they were fighting the insurgency to protect from an American-backed Shiite-dominated 
regime.  As AQI began to show its true face, governing in ways more frightening even 
than what propagandists could accused the Shiite dominated national government of 
plotting, it became increasingly clear that they were a more serious threat to the 
population.  One man sympathetic to the insurgent cause, and no enemy of jihad in 
principle, but who ultimately supported the surge as a sahwa leader, explains his problem 
with the jihadists this way: 
 
We have nothing against mujahidin fighting in the name of God. But these 
people tarnished the notion of jihad. They targeted educated people and 
tribal leaders, they blurred lines and interfered in everything. They banned 
cigarettes and even ruled that tomatoes and cucumbers couldn’t be mixed 
together. They blew up mobile phone relays. Islam never taught us 
decapitation. Those committing these crimes often were foreign to Fallujah 
– not necessarily foreigners, but ignorant peasants who killed people as if 
slaughtering mere animals.471  
Thus, the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq in Anbar province, and barbaric 
practices the jihadists adopted there and everywhere they could claim nominal control, 	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finally revealed for all to see that the two wings of the insurgency—to that point working 
together (if often uneasily)—had radically different end-games.  The first group wanted 
the Americans out; but they did not want to live under a brutal Islamist-fascist despotism.  
As we have noted, they had been willing to fight for a host of things:  to preserve some 
degree of tribal autonomy, for an independent Iraq, to restore personal, familial, or tribal 
honor, to prevent Shiite ascent with American backing.   Once American troops—
reinforced by the Surge as well as newly trained Iraqi soldiers—proved they could fill the 
vacuums that had, to that point, permitted the insurgency’s continuing intensification, an 
entire wing of the insurgency was suddenly amenable to, in essence, switching sides.   
This wing of the insurgency realized the jihadists represented a greater threat to the very 
interests that had originally impelled them to forcibly resist the coalition, than American 
troops or Shiite politicians could ever pose.  What is more, while the first wing was 
fighting a resistance battle that had, in principle at least, a clear end date—the withdrawal 
of American troops—the jihadists battle was only just beginning.  For them, forcing the 
U.S. to leave Iraq was the first step, mere preparation for decades of violent struggle, for a 
global jihad that was to be headquartered in the part of Iraq they called home.  Tribal 
leaders had been fighting for primarily pragmatic reasons (if often their ardor was stoked 
by religious arguments they were sensitive to).  They were not, however, committed 
ideologues; that is, they were not devoted to an maximalist interpretation of Islamic 
doctrine to the prejudice of every other aspect of their lives.  Quite understandably, they 
were uninterested in living at the center of a perpetual war that aimed to make an enemy 
of virtually every reigning Arab ruler and the whole of Western Civilization.  Radical 
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Islamists were promising an armed struggle in the name of Islam that would go on for 
generations; American troops were promising to leave as soon as practicable.  
Recognizing these things, at the end of 2006 Sunni tribal leaders in Al Anbar formed an 
Awakening Council to push back against Al-Qaeda in Iraq.   
American forces noted this split between the insurgency’s two wings, and with it, an 
opportunity.  To the promise of security (increasingly credible thanks to the Clear-Hold-
Built approach to counter-insurgency operations and the Surge that was in its early 
stages), they added the prospect of patronage, hiring Sunnis to help fight the Islamist 
insurgents.  The strategy, which began in Al Anbar where AQI was strongest, was 
replicated virtually everywhere the insurgents were operating freely.  Once AQI was 
revealed to represent a real threat to non-extremist Iraqis of every creed, a new (if 
reluctant) willingness to work with the Coalition emerged.   
The shift of allegiance made possible by the Surge is referred to as the Anbar Awakening 
or sahwa in Anbar province and the “Sons of Iraq” initiative elsewhere, though both 
terms are sometimes used to describe the phenomenon as a whole.  Much as Saddam 
Hussein once paid tribal leaders for their loyalty and employed their sons—indeed, the 
end of that arrangement is one of the reasons they participated in the insurgency when 
Saddam Hussein’s regime fell—so the Coalition began basically to purchase the loyalty of 
moderate Sunnis in Al Anbar, Baghdad’s environs, and the rest of the Sunni triangle.  As 
of October 2008, 99,859 sons of Iraq were registered with the U.S. military, their average 
	  265 
monthly pay ranging from $171 to $368.  Another 25,000 support U.S. troops in Anbar 
province on a voluntary basis as part of the Awakening.472   
Many of those now fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq were at one time passive, some of them active, 
supporters of the insurgency.  (Not unimportantly, de facto amnesty for those with U.S. 
blood on their hands was extended to former insurgents willing to fight Al-Qaeda).  The 
tribal leadership, newly empowered (or re-empowered), is for now exerting its influence to 
help route the remaining jihadists.  Son of Iraq and Awakening members have as their 
basic mission policing.  They patrol neighborhoods, man checkpoints, and, of course, 
gather intelligence.  They have been trained, but not heavily armed, by the Coalition.  
Major engagements with jihadists are still left to American forces and the best-trained 
divisions of the Iraqi Army. 
Jihadists themselves blame the Awakening and the Surge for the reversal in their fortunes.  
As one former insurgent explained to International Crisis Group, 
I’m stuck; there is nothing I can do. The sahwa walks hand in hand with 
the Americans and that’s extremely bad for us. There is no doubt 
we have been weakened. It’s become extremely difficult to move in 
Fallujah and throughout the region. Some have left for Ba‘quba and 
Mosul, where room for maneuver is greater, but here we are in an open 
prison. The surge was never the problem. The Americans are not that 
dangerous.  They have the technology, but they don’t know the 
topography. We know the terrain, we’re on our land. More U.S. troops 
alone simply could have meant more and perhaps easier targets.  But we’ve 
been betrayed by our own brethren.  They use the pretext of fighting al-
Qaeda to crack down on anyone who does not comply with their rule. If 
they find a weapon, they say it’s al-Qaeda.473 
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The Institute for the Study of War quotes a “senior AQI leader” then operating in Anbar 
province who agrees that losing the support of Iraqis long tolerant or supportive of their 
activities marked a turning point:  “the turnaround of the Sunnis against us had made us 
lose a lot and suffer very painfully.”474 
An underappreciated contributing factor to the dramatic reduction in violence is the 
impact of a simultaneous progress in stanching Shiite radicalism.   The most radical non-
governmental Shiite militia, Moqtada Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, willingly ceased hostilities 
in response to the increase in American troop levels (and a very large payment).  Nouri 
Al-Maliki, who narrowly won his nomination to the Prime Minister’s office thanks to 
Sadrist support in 2006, later broke with the Al-Sadr’s faction in early 2008.  In March, 
he used the Iraqi army to oust the Mahdi army from Basra (a move that surprised U.S. 
officials), later continuing the assault in their stronghold, Sadr City, Baghdad’s sprawling 
Shiite slum. 
As Peter Galbraith pointed out at the end of 2008, “in 2006 and 2007, both the Sunnis 
and Shiites fought civil wars within their communities,” what in each resulted the 
emergence of “relative ‘moderates.’”475  These moderates seem, indeed, to reject civil 
strife as a means to accomplishing their ends.  This question, however, remains:  have 
their ends changed? 
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Put another way, it is apparent that the Sunnis who supported the insurgency (as well as 
the insurgency’s moderate wing) can be co-opted to the extent their interests can be made 
to align with the Coalition’s.  Whether this is evidence that the insurgency could have 
been prevented—or at least prevented from reaching civil war-like proportions—remains 
unclear.  We can, of course, speculate.  Had tribal leaders been engaged (and paid off) 
from the onset, had the Iraqi army not been so casually disbanded, had de-Ba’athification 
not been permitted to become something resembling the de-Sunnification of Iraq, it 
stands to reason the insurgency could have been deprived of the fuel that fed its tragic 
intensification.  On the other hand, it is not clear that this more pragmatic wing of the 
insurgency would have recognized that their interests are better served by America’s 
vision for Iraq than the radical jihadists’ had not AQI revealed their terrifying end-game 
for all to see, this with a clarity only their brutality and fear-inspiring tactics could afford.  
Perversely, it is the jihadists’ initial success, followed by their overreach, that provided the 
U.S. with an important “hearts and minds” victory in the war against radical Islam that 
reaches well beyond Iraq.  President Bush described the significance of the success of the 
surge in 2008 this way: 
For the terrorists, Iraq was supposed to be a place where al-Qaeda rallied 
Arab masses to drive America out.  Instead, Iraq has become the place 
where Arabs joined the Americans to drive al-Qaeda out.476   
Indeed, the popularity of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and of their aims and methods, has 
cratered everywhere they have had opportunity to show their true colors.477   
What remains an open question, then, is whether the accommodation of former 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 Marc A Thiessen, “Obama’s Inheritance:  Al-Qaeda in Retreat,” 3. 
477 Marc A Thiessen, “Obama’s Inheritance:  Al-Qaeda in Retreat,” 3. 
	  268 
insurgents is anything more than opportunistic:  driven by a new imperative (ridding the 
countryside of Al-Qaeda in Iraq), as well as a desire to amass whatever political spoils 
they can with the aid of U.S. pressure.  Are Sunnis, who for so long opposed the 
occupation, today cooperating with Coalition forces and the Iraqi government because 
they are interested in building a stable and modern regime?  Or are they cooperating 
because the American alternative is the better of two, from their perspective, 
irredeemably imperfect alternatives.  That is, does the moderate wing of the insurgency 
believe their interests align with America’s (a stable, unified, moderate government in 
Iraq); or did they calculate that their interests were served by a temporary tactical alliance 
with the U.S. military, one they forged for the sake of routing a common enemy and 
improving their positioning the national government?   
 
Similarly, one must ask why Prime Minister Maliki used the Iraqi government to route 
Moqtada al-Sadr’s the Mahdi Army?  Was it to end sectarian violence as a prelude to 
Sunni-Shiite reconciliation?  Or was it to consolidate his party’s authority—his own 
authority, even—within Iraq’s Shiite community in order to maintain a near-monopoly 
on government authority in Iraq?  The security gains created by the Surge, the sahwa, and 
Maliki’s campaign against Shiite radicalism, are no doubt very real; but the motivations 
of these moderate Iraqis must be evaluated before we can jump to the conclusion that a 
new era of politics is about to dawn in the country. 
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Political Progress in a Stabilized Iraq? 
Against the spectacular success of the surge, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that one of its 
dominant ends was to provide space and opportunity for a national political 
reconciliation.  General Keane, an architect of the Surge, provided this assessment of its 
success, and suggested in the Spring of 2008 that there was reason to hope it would be 
translated into political progress. 
Fundamental to that success was the use of proven counter-insurgency 
practices, to protect the people, with sufficient amounts of Iraq and U.S. 
troops. This was a catalyst for the widespread Sunni awakening movement 
….  What really happened is the Sheiks and tribal leaders decided they 
could not achieve their political goals with the AQI [al-Qaeda in Iraq], in 
fighting the U.S. and the GOI [government of Iraq]. As such the 
overwhelming majority of Sunni leaders made four strategic decisions to 1) 
stop the violence; 2) leverage the U.S. leaders to influence the GOI; 3) 
reconcile with the GOI; and 4) provide their “sons” to work with us and 
the Iraqis to help defeat the AQI and protect their own people.…  Clearly 
the Sunnis are politically reconciling with the GOI, and the GOI is 
assisting.478 
While the security gains are both impressive and incontestable, it is not clear the gains will 
be permanent.  Many are concerned that the peace will only last as long as the 
intersection of interests.  In the mean time, this large group of Sunnis—long disaffected 
and prone to becoming so again absent real political progress in Iraq—has been 
organized, trained, and (lightly) armed.  An International Crisis Group report cautions that in 
the solution to the problem represented by AQI, another problem may be germinating: 
the sahwat… are not on their way to becoming a self-sufficient, 
autonomous force.  Instead, they remain thoroughly dependent on an 
outside sponsor…  Were the U.S. abruptly to end its support, it follows, the 
situation would essentially revert to the status quo ante:  sheikhs would 
either be targeted in Iraq by vengeful insurgents or return to (more 	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comfortable) exile abroad; their militias would either evaporate or blend in 
with the insurgency.  Without U.S. backing, the sahwat would fade away or 
offer themselves up to the nest highest bidder.479  
The report goes on to conclude that “the sahwat provide a temporary fix which does not 
begin to resolve—and may perhaps even further exacerbate—the deeper, more 
fundamental problem of rebuilding a legitimate and functional state.”480   An Institute for 
the Study of War report makes a similar point.  Noting that the “permanence of [the sahwat] 
change of heart is hotly contested,” and that the Shiite dominated Iraqi government is 
concerned that it will be unable to control these Sunni-dominated movements, Farook 
Ahmed cautions that absent genuine political accommodation between Sunnis and 
Shiites, “the security situation could destabilize as U.S. forces draw down from the 
Surge.”481   
Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, has made clear he does not trust the Sons of 
Iraq movement.  His reticence to embrace what is essentially a Sunni militia is, moreover, 
understandable.  Many of its leaders are ideologically linked to the Ba’ath and served in 
Saddam Hussein’s military; many of those paid by the U.S. to seek out AQI first spent 
years fighting the establishment of a new regime in Iraq.  Peter Galbraith, a man with 
experience in Iraq who has been one of the most consistently thoughtful commentators 
on the war, cautions against the view that sahwat is made up of patriotic Iraqis fighting 
Iraq from love of country.  Better, he suggests, to view them as mercenaries who in the 
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end “reject Iraq’s new Shiite-led order.”482  To wit, commentators pointed to a significant 
uptick in unclaimed sahwat checks at the end of 2010 as possible evidence a recent 
recruitment campaign by remnants of the insurgency was yielding fruit.483 
If understandable on the one hand, the Maliki government’s demonstrated reluctance to 
incorporate Sons of Iraq into the (already bloated) national security apparatus is, 
nonetheless, cause for concern on the other.  Evidence that even the most thoroughly 
vetted Sunnis are being turned down, and those few who are admitted subjected to 
inordinate application delays as compared to Shiites with comparable qualifications, does 
not bode well for the possibility of meaningful reconciliation.484  Nor does the fact that 
high-ranking positions in the Iraqi administrative apparatus, especially the security 
apparatus, remain virtually impenetrable to Sunnis.  Worse, Maliki’s use of the national 
government to weaken the movement by arresting its leaders in mixed Shiite-Sunni 
provinces further demonstrates his proclivity to utilize the authority of the state against its 
people as and how he sees fit.485   The persistent institutionalized discrimination against 
Sunnis by the national government recalls the darkest days of the insurgency.  Shiite 
domination of the Interior Ministry led to the slaughter of Sunnis by men wearing 
government-issued uniforms.  Today, Sunnis are not being slaughtered, but it remains 
clear that Iraq’s government is controlled by a faction intent upon using the state’s 	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authority advance its own parochial interests.  Nothing could be further from the rule of 
law where all are equal before it.  
If it remains unclear whether the Sons of Iraq movement represents a permanent shift in 
Sunni allegiance, it is even less clear that an improved security situation can be translated 
into political progress.  Iraq’s national government has remained paralyzed along 
sectarian lines, and the prospects of resolving disputes regarding resource-revenue from 
new developments, the genuine reversal of Iraq’s Shiite-led overzealous de-Ba’athification 
laws, Iraqi federalism, and the status of Kirkuk remain bleak.   Everyday governance 
meanwhile—from the naming of important ministers and the staffing of important 
government bureaucracies, to the dispersal of budgeted funds—is systematically stymied 
as factions jockeying for advantage on these larger, apparently intractable, problems hold 
cooperation on every issue hostage to their most important demands.486  
The success of the Surge and the Sons of Iraq initiative thus brings us to our next 
question:  why do Iraqi politicians remain deadlocked in spite of such impressive security 
gains?  This question raises an even more fundament question:  was sectarian violence the 
main impediment to political progress toward a unified and moderate liberal democracy 
in Iraq, in the first place?  The utter inability of Iraq’s parliament to seize the opportunity 
provided by the Surge in order to resolve the country’s paralyzing political disputes 
suggests that the answer to this question may be “no.” 
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C H A P T E R   I V 
POLITICAL PARALYSIS AND ITS (DEEP-ROOTED) CAUSES 
 
No doubt, the insurgency exacerbated Iraq’s political tensions, and its political tensions, 
the insurgency.  Since the Surge, however, government favoritism and corruption on a 
grand scale, political dysfunction, and the use of government to advantage the country’s 
dominant sect have persisted.  Put another way, the same dynamic that fuelled the 
insurgency has prevented significant progress toward optimists’ end-game for Iraq.  The 
passions and hatreds that manifested violently have shaped Iraq’s politics from day one, 
and continue to do so post-Surge. This is revealed most clearly by three trends:  first, the 
difficulty secular nationalist politicians have had gaining political traction; second, 
politicians incapacity to put nation above sect; and third, the use and abuse of the 
constitutional process and new liberties in Iraq to advantage sect to the detriment of the 
possibility of a stable and united country. 
 
Little Popular Support for National Unity on Secular Grounds 
The only prominent Iraqi politician to articulate a vision of Iraq’s future similar to the 
one that drove the optimists in the administration to support a policy of regime change, 
Ayad Allawi, mustered little popular support in Iraq through the first three national 
elections.  While he did well enough in the latest round of elections (January 2010) to 
contest the Prime Ministry, after a 9-month stalemate, the Shiite bloc that has controlled 
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Iraq’s government since January of 2005 maintained its hold on the legislative and 
executive branches, and therefore, the main levers of political power. 
A wealthy Shiite from a prominent Iraqi family, Ayad Allawi spent most of his adult life 
in London, driven into exile after participating in a failed coup in 1978.  By some 
accounts, he was the Iraqi favored by the British to lead a provisional government in Iraq.  
He did lead Iraq’s interim government—in place between the disintegration of Bremer’s 
CPA in June of 2004 and Iraq’s first national election in January of 2005.  His selection 
by Iraq’s highly partisan Governing Council (the body of Iraqis that shared authority with 
the CPA) was in a way accidental.  Most, including Iraq aspiring politicians, did not take 
his initial candidacy seriously.487  He was only elected because he was “last man standing” 
once Iraq’s competing factions had mutually frustrated each other’s attempts to nominate 
favorite partisans.  The Shiite bloc in government reportedly consulted Ayatollah al-
Sistani, a leading Shiite cleric, about Allawi’s candidacy.  The religious leader only 
acquiesced to the nomination of a liberal, secular, technocrat “because all the Islamists 
had been vetoed,” and because he “was banking on a quick transition to the 
constitutional elections,” a process those loyal to him were almost sure to dominate.488 
Ayad Allawi is, without a doubt, the most nationalistic, most liberal, and most pragmatic 
Iraqi yet to hold considerable power in the country.  A Shiite, he nonetheless opposed 
sweeping de-Ba’athification from the beginning, arguing that most of those who joined 
did so as a “vehicle to live.”  As head of the Governing Council, he took steps to 	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reintegrate former Ba’athists;489 he also demonstrated a rare willingness to engage 
Moqtada’s al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army aggressively while it was becoming a surpassingly 
powerful organization.490  He offered amnesty to insurgents, Shiite and Sunni alike, while 
meeting with insurgent leaders personally in the hope of bringing them into the political 
process.  He even knew when to eschew liberal democratic ideals, limiting newly 
established press freedoms in an effort to quell violence by silencing some if its instigators, 
and encouraging the U.S. to delay elections when it began to look as though free and fair 
elections would elevate an Islamist government and partisan Prime Minister.  Most 
important, he began assembling an alliance between political elites, professional officers, 
and “apolitical technocrats” that crossed sectarian and ideological lines.491  Only by 
reaching out to those for whom religion was not a dominant concern was he able to build 
a party representative of Iraq’s diversity and committed to liberal and democratic ideals, 
what he hoped would form a durable ruling coalition (he permitted Islamists only a 
minority role).492   Known as the Iraqi List, the party contested the 2005 election on a 
platform that emphasized security and competent management.   
As the elections approached, fears mounted that illiberal Islamists were likely to win 
power in Iraq by democratic means, especially as violence increased throughout the 
country.  Though the U.S. refused a postponement, there was, belatedly, some 
recognition that very much was at stake.  CPA Order 96 stipulated that delegates would 
be selected proportionately, from closed party lists (that is, put forward by the party 	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leadership, not determined by a caucus system), because planners mistakenly believed 
secularists and minorities stood to gain the most if their support across localities could 
somehow be amalgamated.  As Allawi sums up, “senior CPA democracy and election 
advisers” worried “that a constituency-based election would produce a lopsided majority 
for the Islamists from both sects, and would seriously harm the prospects of liberal-
minded groups and minorities.”493   
Their rationale was not absurd.  The insurgency had not yet entered its more destructive 
phase and planers had yet to recognize the depth of Islamist sentiment in the country.  
Furthermore, they believed secular liberals had little chance of winning pluralities in 
localized single-member districts; for their support was diffused across the country while 
Islamists of both sects (as well as the Kurds) had highly concentrated support in localities 
they dominated.  On the assumption that there were nonetheless significant numbers 
(though far from a plurality) of moderates in every district, planners (Allawi singles out 
Larry Diamond, in particular) proposed an electoral system that would represent the 
totality of their support.  A proportional list system, the Coalition hoped, would yield a 
relatively liberal government.494   
Diamond, for his part, explains that planners were trying to make the best of a bad 
situation.  The CPA had come up with a genius plan for indirect elections by way of 
provincial selection caucuses, one that bore notable resemblance to the design (and 
shared the goals) of the Electoral College system as put forward at America’s Founding.  	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In each of Iraq’s 18 provinces, the CPA would supervise the establishment of a 15-
member “organization committee.”   The organization committee would, in turn, choose 
the members of a selection caucus for each province.  (The selection caucuses would 
proceed to elect representatives to the national assembly in proportion to their share of 
Iraq’s total population.)  The idea was to ensure moderate Iraqis would elect moderate 
and public spirit representatives; indirect selection of the legislative branch by Iraqis 
acceptable to all factions seemed a promising way to ensure this, and thus, refine and 
enlarge the public view.  The CPA was finally applying the lessons of the Federalist 
Papers and America’s Constitutional Convention.  By employing a complicated method 
selection designed to identify moderate electors, the influence of sectarian affinities could 
be reduced, and the representatives themselves insulated from the vagaries of public 
opinion. 
To ensure Iraqis of a variety of sects and persuasion made it onto the selection caucuses, 
CPA planners proposed taking two further steps.   The make-up of the 15-member 
organization committees would be determined in a way that would allow equal input 
from the local, state, and national bodies the CPA had already established.  Iraq’s interim 
Governing Council would select five members in every province, the local provincial 
councils, five more; and the five largest local (in most cases, city) councils in each 
province, the remaining five.  Furthermore, to ensure the provincial selection caucuses 
were not dominated by members of a single faction or group in relatively homogenous 
provinces, the organizing committees charged with establishing them would be required 
to solicit nominations from political parties, provincial and local councils, professional 
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and civic associations, university faculties, and tribal and religious groups (including 
minorities).  Moreover, nominations to the selection caucuses charged with electing the 
national assembly would require a 9-vote supermajority on the organization committee.  
This would help empower minorities to (slightly more easily) block nominations that 
appeared to be narrowly partisan choices.495  
Unfortunately, Ayatollah al-Sistani’s opposition to the caucus method was 
“intractable.”496  He had previously issued a fatwa categorically rejecting Bremer’s 
insistence that unelected experts draft Iraq’s Constitution before national elections could be 
held.497  He objected, moreover, professedly on the basis of majoritarian (as opposed to 
Islamic) principles, declaring “elections must be held so that every eligible Iraqi can 
choose someone to represent him at the constitutional convention that will write the 
constitution.”498  It was a naked power grab couched in democratic terms for popular 
resonance.  Noah Feldman, who had served the Coalition as senior advisor on 
constitutional issues, warned presciently at the time “the end constitutional product is 
very likely to make many people in the U.S. government unhappy.  It’s not going to look 
the way people imagine it looking.”499  As he went on to explain, “Any democratically 
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elected Iraqi government is unlikely to be secular, and unlikely to be pro-Israel.  And 
frankly, moderately unlikely to be pro-American.”500  
Ayatollah al-Sistani was using his considerable authority to ensure Feldman’s prediction 
would come true.  Having won the Constitutional battle, he was now insisting that the 
elections that would determine the delegates to the convention be as direct as possible.  In 
both cases, his intention was the same:  empower the country’s Shiite majority to govern 
Iraq immediately and forever.  As Allawi explains, CPA officials already harbored a 
“genuine concern that an elected constitutional assembly would result in a majority of 
Islamists, both Shiite and Sunni, who would derail the entire project of enshrining 
Western constitutional and political principles in Iraq’s new Constitution.”501  They 
understood the importance of leveraging Western expertise when it came to the task of 
drafting Iraq’s foundational document.  Thus, the high importance advisors like Larry 
Diamond placed on the caucus method of selecting the politicians who would control the 
Constitutional Convention after Iraq’s first national election.   
Again, however, CPA planners caved in the face of Shiite Islam’s most important 
religious authority in Iraq.  In the face of Sistani’s objections, CPA planners considered 
nine alternative electoral systems.502  The White House and the Pentagon were pressuring 
Bremer to transfer authority to an elected body of Iraqis as soon as possible in the face of 
mounting public frustration, which made most of the alternatives logistically impossible.  	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On so short a timeline, single-member plurality elections were a non-starter insofar as 
census data did not exist; it would be impossible to draw up fair districts without a long 
postponement and considerable groundwork.503  Iraq almost had to be treated as a single 
electoral district to hold elections quickly.  It was determined that the parties would put 
forth their own lists of candidates.  Candidates would be elected to the national assembly 
from those lists in proportion to the share of the national vote each party received.  As 
Diamond explains, the decision, though far from ideal, “was understandable, considering 
the political, administrative, and time pressures.”504  Open party lists might have yielded 
more moderate candidates.  But mounting security concerns precluded the organization 
of some type of caucus through which ordinary Iraqis could be empowered to determine 
the make-up of the lists.505  Sistani, moreover, would reject any electoral system that 
failed to translate Shiites’ numerical superiority into concrete political gains, and the CPA 
feared the consequences of alienating him to Iraq’s fragile and deteriorating security 
situation.  The best available electoral alternative seemed to be a single district closed-list 
election according to the principles of proportional representation.  
The decision turned out to be catastrophic.  Instead of privileging moderates (who were 
spread across the country) in contrast to sect-based parties which tended to have highly 
localized support, the electoral system instead ensured the election of the most assertive 
members from each party.  Iraq’s first election was also its first census; virtually everyone 
voted according to sectarian loyalty.  Iraq’s competing factions naturally put forth lists of 	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candidates that located the most zealous defenders of partisan interests at the top.  The 
election was all but destined to yield a highly polarized and dysfunctional government.  
John Agresto explains that the error was, in part, traceable to notions popular among 
bien-pensants committed to diversity above all who insist that the best democracy is the one 
that best mirrors the population.  What matters most, on this interpretation, is that the 
population’s demographic diversity, its plethora of sexual orientations, members of every 
socio-economic class, etc., etc., etc., are represented in the legislature in proportion to 
their share of the population.  Insofar as proportional representation advantages the most 
assertive members of each group—and ensures that each group wins representation—its 
tendency is to radicalize political disputes.  As Agresto explains, 
Proportional representation… leads us away from containing and 
moderating the passions that so often drive people and popular groups, 
passions and interests often antagonistic to the rights of individuals and 
destructive to what once we called “the common good.”  Proportional 
representation was certainly not the kind of restrained and liberal 
democracy the Founders of this country had hoped to give us.506   
To make matters worse, Sistani worked to ensure religious affinities would determine 
Iraqis’ voting behavior.  Aware of this possibility, and fearful that Sistani’s considerable 
influence over Iraq’s Shiites could swing the election, Ayad Allawi (again with U.S. 
support) publicly challenged the Shiite scholarly establishment to remain neutral, or at 
least quiet, as the election approached.  Some had asserted that Sistani’s quietism 
differentiated him markedly from the religious scholars in Iran who headed its theocracy.  
Far from remaining above the political fray, however, Sistani played a determining role, 
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actively pressuring Shiite Islamist leaders to consolidate their support behind a single 
party, ultimately known as the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA).  Sistani himself led the effort 
to elaborate a platform around which the various Shiite parties could unite.  The Shiite 
religious leader proceeded to make clear he expected the Shiite rank and file to vote en 
masse along sectarian lines.   
As the election approached, the mosque became the center of the Shiite world in Iraq 
and its influence spilled into the political sphere.  Influential preachers were overtly 
political in their demands and reached thousands through their sermons, which also 
circulated on cassette tape (a tactic borrowed from Ayatollah Khomeini, who incited the 
Iranian revolution from Paris via in the same way).  Preachers extolled “the ‘rights of the 
majority’” which, as Ali A. Allawi notes, amounted to “nothing less than a demand for 
Shi’a rule.”507  The same passions and hatreds that fuelled the insurgency quickly came to 
define Iraq’s affairs of state; democratic institutions and new rights—even the 
constitutional process and the document it yielded—became weapons in the pursuit of 
narrow sectarian influence.  As the Inspector General notes in his report on Iraq’s 
reconstruction, “Iraqi politics was reduced to a battle for control among sects, none of 
which was directly accountable to voters for the delivery of services or other basic 
government functions.”508  U.S. soldiers and the American treasury remained responsible 
for governing the country long Iraqi politicians officially gained sovereignty.  
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Allawi marvels at the “remarkable” political accomplishments of Ayatollah al-Sistani over 
the period of CPA rule.  He ensured the future Shiite domination of Iraq’s politics by 
mobilizing Iraq’s Shiite community at a time no compelling national leader existed to put 
forth a competing view.  Somewhat perversely, he achieved this in large part by appealing 
to the authority of Islam even as he argued from democratic, majoritarian, principles.509  
American planners’ failure to understand Sistani and his motivations made all of this 
possible.  Policymakers (including, it seems, Bremer himself)510 were eager to link him to 
the “quietist” tradition in Shiite Islam, some going so far as to attribute to him “a belief in 
the separation of ‘mosque and state.’”511  Allawi calls this a “ludicrous interpolation of a 
western secular concept into an entirely different tradition.”512  While Sistani had never 
argued for the political supremacy of the scholars on the Iranian model, he did condemn 
Iranian President Khatami’s experiment in reformist Islam in “scathing” terms.  As 
Allawi explains, Sistani has always been skeptical about the possibility of religious 
pluralism and while he has never demanded the direct rule of the scholars, he has always 
maintained the state’s duty to protect Islam.513  This requires, moreover, a guardianship 
of the jurisprudent over the social and political matters of the state.  Scholars are not 
expected to manage the state in any practical sense (in fact, he believes the direct 
intersection of power and religion tends to corrupt the “reputation and authority of the 
ulema”).  Politicians are, however, expected to defer to the religious hierarchy in matters 
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social and political, as indeed they deferred to Sistani as they jockeyed to mold the new 
Iraqi regime.514  
Allawi is no doubt correct about Sistani’s achievement.  Although the sitting Prime 
Minister, Ayad Allawi, ran the best campaign according to most observers, the Sistani-
backed UIA “got out the vote” and crushed Allawi’s more secular, more experienced, and 
more representative party in the country’s first democratic election.  A Shiite coalition, 
supported by the main Kurdish parties as necessary, has ruled Iraq since 2005, through 
three national elections.  In the end, the 2005 elections and the transfer of authority did 
not quell the insurgency as many had hoped, but instead led to its dramatic 
intensification.  As Ali A. Allawi notes, free and fair elections had nothing to do with 
liberalism, reconciliation, or limited government, as Western audiences expected and 
politicians hoped:  “They were about the empowerment and disempowerment of entire 
peoples; rectifying historical wrongs and affirming age-old verities; suppressed national 
rights and the identity of an entire country.”515   The Special Inspector for Iraq 
Reconstruction made a similar observation.  Far from improving the security situation, 
the 2005 election—which was to have been a crowning achievement and harbinger of 
Iraq’s promising future—instead “institutionalized an imbalance of power that was to 
deepen mistrust among Shi’s, Sunni, and Kurdish communities.”516 
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Politicians Putting Sectarian Interests Ahead of the Nation 
Iraqi politicians, almost without exception, have used their authority to advance narrow 
sectarian aims at the cost of the national interest or common good. 
Ahmed Chalabi, the man Pentagon planners initially favored to lead a provisional 
government made up of Iraqi externals, was one of the only Iraqis charged with 
significant responsibility when Bremer opted instead for a protracted period of U.S. rule.  
A Shiite with a checkered past, and by all accounts highly intelligent and quite 
competent, he spearheaded Iraq’s de-Ba’athification committee.  Chalabi’ approach was 
more aggressive than planners expected, what helped create the perception that the U.S. 
was supporting a Shiite-led initiative to de-Sunnify Iraq.  Bremer himself acknowledge 
that deBa’athification had been applied “unevenly and unjustly” under Chalabi and 
adjusted the policy in order to permit some teachers and professors to return to work.  
Chalabi described Bremer’s move as tantamount to “allowing Nazis into the German 
government after WWII”—words, apparently, calculated to inflame.517  Sunni demands 
(generally supported by the U.S.) that Iraq’s Shiite-led governments undo the damage he 
caused in the first months of the occupation, and Shiite counter-efforts to stymie any 
serious reversal of Iraq’s deep de-Ba’athification, convulsed Iraq for years.  Legislation 
permitting the reincorporation of former Ba’athists into public life was not passed until 
2008, and even now, the Shiite-dominated administration continues to discriminate 
against Sunnis systematically. 
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To wit, those who have obtained position in Iraq have repeatedly sought to leverage their 
authority in order to advance decidedly illiberal and polarizing agendas.  In particular, 
the Shiite-led government used its strong electoral showings in the January 2005 and 
December 2005 elections to advance policies that intensified the insurgency and further 
radicalized the government: 
• It immediately invited a Shiite militia, the Badr Organization, to join Iraq’s 
national security forces.  The Badr corps was ultimately responsible for brutal 
atrocities committed against Sunnis by Shiites (in some cases, wearing government 
uniforms). 
• The UIA stipulated that only an Iraqi with Islamist credibility and a close 
relationship to Sistani and the Shiite scholars based in Najaf could be an 
appropriate candidate for Prime Minister.   
• Saddam Hussein’s execution did not proceed according to Iraq’s constitution 
(which requires the signature of both Iraq’s vice-presidents), but on Nouri Al-
Maliki’s authority alone.  The execution, moreover, was carried out on the day 
Sunnis begin to celebrate Eid-a;-Adha, a period during which Iraqi law stipulates 
executions shall not take place.  The rushed execution also ended, prematurely, 
Saddam Hussein’s trial for the Anfal genocide, thereby depriving the Kurds of a 
similar catharsis.518   
A state that employs the authority of the government to advance the aims of one 
community at the expense of others (in contravention of existing legal protections) is, 	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by definition, tyrannical.  The UIA-led government in Iraq fuelled the insurgency by 
utilizing powers ostensibly derived from popular consent to benefit select communities 
at high expense to others.  Nor does this trend show any sign of abatement post-
Surge, making political reconciliation and genuine progress toward functional 
government unlikely in the near term: 
• the Maliki government has opposed the significant alterations to Iraq’s de-
Ba’athification laws Sunnis reasonably demand.  (Even the 2008 law continues to 
limit Sunni influence over the country’s administration, and was in fact opposed 
by most Sunni leaders for this reason).    
• The National Police, an elite counterterrorism force made up of 85 % Shiite 
officers, was implicated in a “prison torture scandal,” its victims, Sunni 
prisoners.519  Recent reports indicate that security forces that report to Prime 
Minister Maliki continue to operate secret prisons in which torture is regularly 
utilized to extract confessions from Sunni Iraqis.520  A 2012 UN report on human 
rights violations in Iraq reported that there were 467 reported instances of 
prisoner/detainee torture in 2011 alone.521 
• The same government has repeatedly obstructed the integration of Sunnis fighting 
AQI, the Sons of Iraq, into the national security apparatus.  Iraq’s security services 
and its powerful Ministry of the Interior remain dominated by Shiite appointees 	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to the prejudice of Iraq’s Kurdish and Sunni populations.  As the Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction has notes, the ministry is “viewed by many as a 
protector of Shi’a interests” and “became notorious for discriminating by sect in 
its hiring practices.522  Even paychecks have been, at times, distributed on the 
basis of ethnicity. 
• In the lead up to the January 2009 provincial elections, Prime Minister Maliki 
used the power of his office to establish new militias in the Southern Shiite regions 
loyal to his Da’awa party in an effort to increase his influence in the Southern 
provinces.  In addition to using the power of the national government to mobilize 
loyal voters in the provincial elections, he has systematically appointed Da’awa 
party officials to important administrative positions in the local governments to 
improve his party’s prospects in 2009 and 2010.523 
• In the lead-up to the 2010 national elections, Maliki supported a blatantly 
partisan decision by the Shiite-dominated Accountability and Justice Commission 
that disqualified 500 candidates standing for election, most of them Sunnis.524  
One of the lists banned by the Commission was likely to caucus with Ayad Allawi 
after the election, what might have changed the ultimate result.525  In the end, 
while Allawi’s list won two seats more than Maliki’s party in the 2010 elections, 
Maliki was able to form a government after nine months of negotiations when the 
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Kurdish Coalition threw its support behind him in exchange for political favors.526  
The compromise called for Ayad Allawi to oversee the Defense Ministry.  Prime 
Minister Maliki reneged on the commitment; much of the domestic security 
apparatus continues to report directly to him in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief.527  Since, he has only continued to centralize power.  After the 2010 
election, Maliki brought the Independent Higher Election Commission and the 
Anti-Corruption Commission under his cabinet’s supervision, a move Iraq’s pliant 
Supreme Court affirmed.528  As International Crisis Group has noted, “the 
judicial system (in particular the Federal Supreme Court, supposedly the arbiter of 
all constitutional disputes) has been highly vulnerable to political pressure.”529  It 
has ruled in Maliki’s favor on a number of controversial issues, giving his regime 
“a freer hand to govern as it pleases, unrestrained by institutional checks.”530 
• As the Special Inspector for Iraq Reconstruction has noted, civil servants of all 
varieties (from service providers to judges) have found it “difficult to shed their 
sectarian identity when on the job.  For many, loyalties to sect or tribe competed 
with their willingness to serve the Iraqi state.”531  Moreover, as political and 
administrative authority has been devolved to the provinces and local 
governments, the same practices have been evident at the local levels.  Tribal 	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sheiks have used their authority to hire tribesmen or funnel government funds to 
friends though “Ghost” employees.532  Today, Iraq is one of the most corrupt 
countries on the face of the planet; only Somalia, Afghanistan, and Myanmar 
rank lower on Transparency International’s 2010 list.533 
• One day after U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, Prime Minister Maliki called for the 
arrest of Iraq’s Sunni Vice President, Tariq al-Hashimi, on charges that he had 
been involved in the death squads that terrorized the Shiite population at the 
height of the insurgency.  The same day, he deployed tanks to the front yards of 
Sunni politicians.534  Hashimi fled to Kurdistan before leaving the country, 
deepening the country’s political crisis and raising fears that Iraq’s sectarian 
hatreds could reignite its civil war.535  As Ned Parker explained in an article 
subtitled “Welcome to the World’s Next Failed State,” the incident also 
underlined Maliki’s tyrannical proclivities:  “No political figure, ho matter how 
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An Illiberal Constitution and the Misuse of New Liberties 
 
Far from quelling violence and unifying the country, elections and the constitutional 
process have been employed to secure sectarian interests to the detriment the national 
interest and the rule of law.  Iraqis’ new rights and liberties, moreover, have been abused 
in ways that have contributed to both political dysfunction and sectarian violence. 
Sistani’s brazen intrusion into the constitutional process is the best example of this.  By 
way of religious proclamations, and his thoroughgoing personal influence, he has not only 
ensured Shiite control of Iraq along Islamist lines, but in addition to this, he managed 
ensure the constitution would support his vision of Iraq, not America’s.  Ayad Allawi’s 
interim government was originally delegated the responsibility of writing Iraq’s 
constitution in consultation with Bremer and CPA advisors.  Recall that the Allawi 
government had been deliberately constituted of liberal-minded, generally secular and 
Western-leaning, Iraqis from a wide variety of backgrounds.  Only one of its members 
could be characterized as an Islamist.537  As a result of Sistani’s fatwa and the success of 
the Shiite umbrella group in the December 2005 election, the committee that ultimately 
wrote Iraq’s Constitution was dominated by them. 
Over and over, Sistani and Islamist Shiites embraced the outward trappings of 
constitutional democracy not from a commitment to its ideals, but because they provided 
a means to empower Iraq’s majority faction and solidify a place for Islam in Iraq’s 
founding document.  The Najaf hierarchy even opposed, vociferously, the provisions 	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enacted to protect Iraq’s minorities in the Transition Administrative Law (TAL), the 
document drafted by Iraqis on Bremer’s insistence to govern the constitutional process 
once it became clear Western experts would not be writing the Constitution itself.  The 
Shiite scholars opposed the TAL on the argument that its minority protections contravened 
democratic (majoritarian) principles and managed to insert a number of illiberal provisions.538  
Larry Diamond memorably relays the frustration of Coalition officials; their efforts to 
build a modern and moderate government in Iraq were frustrated again and again—by 
sectarians arguing for power on democratic grounds! 
For the fourth or fifth time—I was losing count—the United States was 
finding itself on what appeared to be the less democratic side of an 
argument with Iraqis over the transitional procedures.  Sistani had called 
for an elected constitution-making body.  Bremer said an appointed body 
would do.  Iraqis (and many CPA officials) wanted to conduct direct 
elections for local governments.  Bremer and top governance officials 
vetoed them.  The CPA proposed an opaque, convoluted, process for 
choosing a transitional government [the provincial selection caucuses], and 
Sistani, along with many Iraqis, again demanded direct elections.  Now the 
CPA and the Governing Council were saying to Iraqis—and I myself was 
saying—Here is your wonderful interim constitution, and a great many 
Iraqis were responding, Don’t we have a voice in shaping the rules that will 
govern us for the next eighteen months and will guide the making of our 
permanent constitution?  Beyond the exigencies of time and practicality, 
there was no good answer.539  
Contra Diamond, there was a good answer.  He, Bremer, and the President were trying 
to build in Iraq not so much a democracy, as a liberal constitutional regime.  
Policymakers sensed as much, but the extent to which liberalism and popular government 
are separate things—held together in the West by indispensable sacred opinions are mores 
that do not spring into existence with elections—was not clearly appreciated.  Had it been 
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recognized, it would have been impossible for policymakers to profess a grand intention 
to build a liberal constitutional regime in Iraq while calling for elections, the elaboration 
of a constitution, and the transfer of authority to Iraqis as soon as humanly possible.  The 
rhetorical appeal of majoritarian democratic principles, moreover, was overwhelming and 
it was wrested from the Coalition by a faction with self-serving and illiberal intentions.  
Time and time again, the CPA failed to hold its ground when their efforts to build a 
limited constitutional regime came into conflict with the goals of Islamists who were 
proudly invoking the rhetoric associated with popular government. 
Ayatollah al-Sistani’s organization went on to lead a public relations battle against the 
TAL, one that began immediately after its passage.540  Although the TAL had satisfied 
most of Sistani’s demands, the section of the TAL that raised a problem, 61(c), stipulated 
that a 2/3 vote against the constitution in three of Iraq’s eighteen provinces during the 
ratification plebiscite would constitute a rejection of the entire document.  The Kurds 
fought for the provision because it would give them an effective veto over the constitution 
as a whole insofar as they dominated precisely three provinces.  Kurdish negotiators 
slipped the provision into the TAL at the very last minute, the Shiite delegation 
apparently failing to understand its significance at the time.541  In the end, the jihad 
against the TAL failed against the more urgent background of rising violence in Iraq; its 
provisions did, in the end, guide the elaboration of Iraq’s constitution. 
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At the convention itself, 61(c) ensured cooperation between the Shiites and the Kurds, but 
not toward the establishment of a national compact.  On this, commentators are 
unanimous.  There was no effort by any party to build a united, pluralistic and tolerant 
constitutional regime.  Every faction acted in its own interest, which yielded a 
compromise document through and through.  As Ali Allawi sums up, “The Iraqi 
constitution of 2005 was not the national compact that many had thought necessary and 
desirable, but a document arising from a series of political deals.”542  The deals that were 
struck were between the Kurds and the Shiites, and the document met the dominant 
concerns of both factions, at the expense of Iraq’s Sunni population.  Sunnis had 
boycotted the 2005 election—and were, thus, underrepresented at the ensuing 
convention—nor could they muster a 2/3 vote in three provinces.  Far from 
accomplishing its purpose in the eyes of American policymakers—it is not a unifying and 
liberal document, nor did the end of the occupation its adoption portended affect slow the 
rate of violence—Iraq’s constitution permanently advantages the partisans who 
dominated its enactment. 
• At Shiite insistence, Islam is the country’s official religion, “no law may be enacted 
that contradicts the established provisions of Islam,” and a provision for judicial 
review by a committee of “experts in Islamic jurisprudence and law” is enshrined 
in the nation’s founding document.  As Peter Galbraith has pointed out, in this, 
Iraq’s constitution bears more resemblance to Iran’s than to America’s.543  
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Solidifying formal recognition of Islam’s role, and the scholars’ authority to 
interpret its requirements, was reportedly one of Sistani’s priorities.544 
• Insofar as power is devolved to the provinces in Iraq to significant extent, and the 
constitution’s protections for individuals and minorities applicable only to the 
national government’s enumerated powers, the clauses that bear the most 
resemblance to a bill of rights (and which were championed by Bremer and the 
Bush administration) mean next to nothing in practice. 545   In the terms of 
American Constitutional law, the protections for individuals and minorities in 
Iraq do not apply to the provinces or local governments, and they have not been 
incorporated.  This was deliberate.  The Shiite provinces in the South have every 
constitutional authority to enact laws that violate ostensibly “protected” civil 
liberties, as indeed many routinely do by having replaced, to varying degrees, 
Iraq’s civil code with sharia law.546  To wit, “honor” remains a mitigating defense 
to a murder charge in Iraq according to the country’s criminal code.547 
• Protections for vulnerable minorities are next to non-existent in the public civil 
sphere.  Before the outbreak of war, Iraq was home to 1.4 million Christians.  
Violence targeting Christians is still widespread, however, and has led many 
Christians to leave Iraq or move North to Kurdistan.  By 2012, Iraq’s Christian 
population had dwindled to less than 500,000.548  Honor killings remain an issue 	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in Iraq, though the number of women affected is nearly impossible to 
determine.549  International audiences were horrified when news surfaced than a 
dozen (and perhaps as many as 90) young male Iraqis were killed for dressing and 
grooming themselves in a Western “emo” style.  After the Interior Ministry 
denounced the subculture as Satanic and encouraged community police to stamp 
it out, Shiite Iraqis stoned the young men to death and circulated lists identifying 
those who would be next.550  A leaflet containing 24 names included this warning:  
“We strongly warn you, to all the obscene males and females, if you will not leave 
this filthy work within four days the punishment of God will descend upon you at 
the hand of the Mujahideen.”551 
• The Kurds looked at the Constitution as an opportunity to solidify their 
independence, not as an opportunity to build a document reflecting (and 
solidifying) a national compact.  Arguably, they achieved more at the convention 
than any other group.  Diamond calls the concessions they won a “remarkable 
political victory.”552  They include radical decentralization, the promise of a 
referendum on the status of Kirkuk (a disputed city), limited regional authority 
over the development of new oil resources, and the incorporation of the pesh merga 
(the Kurdish militia) into the Iraqi armed forces.  Most of these issues remain 
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important factors Iraq’s intractable political paralysis today.553  The Kurds refuse 
to compromise on these provisions because they guarantee de facto Kurdish 
autonomy; moreover, they are perceived as essential to the preparation of any 
future bid for complete independence.   
• The Sunnis, in turn, are demanding revisions to the Constitution they did not 
have opportunity to affect in 2005.  The problem:  the alterations the Sunnis are 
demanding would erode the very provisions the Kurds fought hardest for, and 
absent which they would never have ratified the constitution.   Today, some are 
concerned Kurdish-Arab tensions—over territory (especially the status of Kirkuk) 
and over oil—could provoke new civil discord.  Documents released by WikiLeaks 
revealed American commanders in the region fear that long-simmering tensions 
in the North may turn violent when U.S. forces begin to withdraw.554  
International Crisis Group has devoted two recent reports to the same concern.555 
• The Sunnis, who boycotted the 2005 elections and therefore had limited influence 
over the committee that drafted the constitution, rejected it in staggering numbers 
when it was put to popular referendum on 15 October, 2005.  Whereas the three 
Kurdish governorates approved the constitution by a 99-1% margin, with the 
nine Shiite governorates voting “yes” each in proportions exceeding 95%, every 
Sunni-dominated governorate voted “no,” narrowly missing the threshold 	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required to defeat the constitution altogether.  Anbar Province rejected the 
constitution 97-3%; Salahaddin, 81-19%; with Nineveh (a mixed province, 60% 
Sunni Arab) barely failing to muster two-thirds opposition at 54-46%.556   
In other words, the constitution is a compromise document acceptable to the Shiite and 
Kurds only because it permits each faction to live in relatively autonomous regions, and in 
radically different ways.  As Peter Galbraith plainly puts it, “they have made a deal:  the 
Kurds would let the Shiites run Arab Iraq in exchange for Baghdad not interfering in a 
de facto independent Kurdistan.”557  The Bush administration lobbied Kurdish leaders to 
support Ayad Allawi instead of the Shiite bloc in 2005, but to absolutely no avail. 
American officials argued that by supporting Allawi, the more secular Kurdish bloc 
would be able to build a new, modern, Iraq.  The Kurds, however, were not at all 
interested in a new Iraq; they preferred to defend the autonomy of Kurdistan and so 
struck a deal with the Shiites that permitted them to do just that.  Indeed, on the day of 
the January 2005 elections, the Kurds held a separate but simultaneous (non-binding) 
vote on independence; two million Kurds participated with 98% voting in favor of 
independence.558  The Kurds chose the same side faced with the same choice in the wake 
of the 2010 elections; this time, their support made the difference and continued Maliki’s 
reign. 
Iraq’s new political openness has also been a mixed blessing.  The dismantling of Saddam 
Hussein’s fear society and intelligence apparatus in favor of new personal liberties had 	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unanticipated and pernicious consequences, contributing not a little to Iraq’s 
radicalization.  The end of systematic censorship precipitated a flood of Islamist literature 
from Iran on the one hand, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, on the other.  The wide availability 
of the most extreme Salafi and Iranian propaganda no doubt contributed to the 
increasing fanaticism of Iraq’s Sunni and Shiite populations.  Suddenly, preachers were 
allowed to say anything, and they marshaled the authority of Islam against the Coalition 
and to fan the flames of sectarian hatreds.  New press freedoms, an underdeveloped 
concern for objectivity, and a dearth of libel laws, meanwhile, permitted an entire 
industry devoted to fanning the flames of sectarian hatreds to emerge under the name 
“news.”  Saddam Hussein prohibited independent media outlets outright.  Within months 
of liberation, every faction had its own propaganda instrument.559 
Similarly, the explosion of satellite and internet access made it possible for Iraqis to get 
their news about Iraq not from sources set up by the CPA, but from jihadist websites as well 
as television stations dedicated to vilifying anything and everything American.  
Organizations like Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, and the Iranian-backed Al-Alem (conceived 
expressly to influence Iraq’s Shiite) fuelled the insurgency for the sake of ratings.  Yet 
another uneasy question is thus raised: would it have been possible to win Iraqis’ hearts 
and minds while ceding the power to inform (and to misinform) the population to 
elements with a clear interest in thwarting America’s attempt to build a stable 
constitutional regime?  Can a liberal democracy be built by liberal means? 
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S E C O N D   P A R T 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY’S REQUIREMENTS AND IMPEDIMENTS 
 
C H A P T E R   V 
THE DEPENDENCE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY ON  
SACRED OPINIONS AND SOCIAL HABITS 
 
For all the discussion of regime change, it is startling the term was so badly 
misunderstood.  Regime means something more than the institutional structure of a 
particular government—it is not enough to ask “who rules,” nor even “in the service of 
whom” and “according to what rules and structures,” though these are no doubt 
important questions.   One cannot understand a given regime without understanding how 
the institutional structure of government is connected to the purpose for which it exists.  
Ostensibly similar institutional structures can be employed to very different ends:  to 
make possible every individual’s self-directed pursuit of happiness, to conquer the known 
world, to bring about an equality to conditions, to instantiate God’s law, etc.   These 
guiding purposes, moreover, are intimately related to the means by which a given regime 
achieves its objective—through public participation and love of country, through the 
encouragement of productive behavior, by the power of government and the fear it can 
inspire, thanks to a common dedication to shared religious convictions or their 
enforcement by violence and fear, by the separation of the moral and political spheres, 
etc.  The regime, then, is more than a collection of laws and institutions.  It includes these 
things.  But as importantly, a regime is defined by the way of life its institutions exist to 
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protect and promote.  Its success ultimately depends not simply on the structures and laws 
alone, then, but on the spirit that guides and animates their application.  Whether a 
regime achieves its professed purpose therefore depends most importantly on factors 
external to its rules, institutions, and constitution:  above all, the character of the people. 
No doubt, a regime—its constitution, its leading men, its educational infrastructure, its 
political discourse—affect the character of the people who inhabit it.  But other influences 
external to the regime often play an even larger role.  Let us say, with Samuel 
Huntington, that an individual’s most deeply ingrained opinions and social habits are in 
some sense an artifact of, and constitute his membership in, a community that is generally 
broader than a single state—his civilization:  “a civilization is thus the highest cultural 
grouping of a people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that 
which distinguishes humans from other species.”560  As Angelo Codevilla elaborates, a 
civilization “is a package of habits and precepts that not only affects the way people live 
but to some extent defines what it means to be happy”; “the world’s major civilizations,” 
meanwhile, “are more or less coterminous with its major religions and, much more 
roughly, with its major races.”561   Put another way, a civilization is the authoritative 
moral and aesthetic convictions its members share:  communal dedication to notions of 
right and wrong, good and evil, noble and base, decent and obscene, permitted and 
impermissible, beautiful and ugly—judgments in the context of which an individual 
conceives of his happiness and the sort of life it is worth aspiring to, the judgments absent 
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which any such consideration is bound to be empty. Civilizations provide “pattern[s] of 
life.”  Isaiah Berlin conveys the magnitude of the concept this way:   
The history not only of thought, but of consciousness, opinion, action too, 
of morals, politics, aesthetics, is to a large degree a history of dominant 
models.  Whenever you look at any particular civilization, you will find 
that its most characteristic writings and other cultural products reflect a 
particular pattern of life…562 
By the totality of its constituent influences, a civilization thus sets the moral boundaries 
within which, the standards according to which, and the ideals for the sake of which, 
people live.  Most of the time, a civilization’s pattern of life remains more or less stable 
across generations.  This is certainly not to suggest every member of every civilization 
agrees completely on every important matter all the time.  But they more or less agree.  
Those who do not are the outcasts. 
What, then, is the relationship between civilization and political regime?  If “regime” 
refers to the overall political organization of a social body—including the end to which it 
is organized and the manner in which that organization is sustained—“civilization” refers 
to the collection of influences that are usually (but not always) extraneous to the regime 
itself, influences that have antecedently formed the subject matter, which is to say the 
people, the regime seeks to organize in a certain way.  These guiding opinions and social 
practices can only be changed against considerable resistance.  Regimes can exert a 
steady and potentially transformative effect over the character of the citizenry; regimes 
can even affect the tenor of the civilization they overlap, or parts thereof.  But civilization-
defining forces, especially religion, almost always exert a stronger influence on a people’s 	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social character, thereby affecting the sort of regimes suited to given peoples, and the 
manner in which this or that set of laws and institutional arrangements will operate in a 
given time or place.  As Codevilla notes, “Regimes do not spring up with particular sets of 
characteristics just anywhere on the planet.  Strong as the influence of regimes on 
people’s lives is, the influence of civilizations tends to be greater.  Civilizations set the 
bounds within which regimes exercise their powers over human habits.”563  
It follows that regimes and civilizations are more and less distinct.  Some peoples will be 
more amenable, and others less, to various forms of overarching political organization.  
This is true because the social habits and beliefs ingrained by different civilizations 
support and repel systems of laws in different ways.  This means that a regime will only 
achieve its purpose where the citizenry is, by the totality of the civilization-level influences 
at work, morally disposed to bring about an identity of the regime’s political arrangement 
and its professed purpose.  As a corollary, the degree to which the social habits and beliefs 
that define a given civilization mandate a specific species of political regime (and 
discourage the establishment of others) varies across civilizations.  Some civilizations have 
proven very flexible, capable of various modes of political organization; others have 
proven quite inflexible.  Here again, Huntington and Codevilla agree.   As the latter puts 
it, no civilization has “given greater evidence of malleability than the Japanese, who, 
within a century after their leaders’ decision to abandon feudalism and isolation, were led 
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rather easily to adopt three ways of life vastly different in tone and substance:  obedient 
pupils, aggressive militarists, and single-minded producers”564565   
In some cases, opinions elemental to the civilization can become so strong as to make 
difficult or impossible certain ways of organizing society.  Islam may well fall at the end of 
the spectrum opposite the Japanese with respect to flexibility.  That Islam’s 
commandments go so far beyond man’s spiritual relationship with God, to the point of 
mandating a particular legal code—a way of organizing society revealed by, and 
mandated by, God that is to be instantiated by the temporal authorities—necessarily gives 
rigidity to peoples where the population is wholeheartedly committed to those 
commands.  To dwell on the example of Islam, as interpreted by leading Salafi voices 
today, in addition to a very specific political regime, laws regulating minute details of 
hygiene, dress, and cuisine are dictated to the political community on the authority of 
God.  Where these views have been internalized at full strength, an attempt to build a 
regime that departs from Islam’s mandate—not just constitutional democracy, but as the 
latter half of the twentieth century well demonstrated, liberal mixed regimes held together 
by nationalism and socialist utopias as well—have met with considerable resistance in the 
Muslim world (a subject considered at length in Chapters 7 and 8).     
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In sum, some civilizations are flexible enough to accommodate a number of different 
political regimes easily; others are hospitable to some, and inhospitable to others.  
Reigning patterns of life can close off political possibilities from the standpoint of 
statecraft.  This is not to say transformation is impossible in the more difficult cases; it is 
to say that changing a regime where influences external to the regime itself are very 
strong also requires affecting civilization-level influences.  As we will see, Atatürk 
understood this vis a vis Turkey; as we have seen, American policymakers understood it 
less well vis a vis Iraq. 
The regime’s dependence on the character of its citizenry has, in the past, been well 
appreciated even if it is not today.  Machiavelli, for example, makes much of the fact the 
Roman Republic had in fact disintegrated even before Caesar crossed the Rubicon.566  Its 
constitutional arrangement—the divisions and tensions that kept Rome free—were no 
longer operating more than a century before Caesar’s ascent.  Machiavelli explains that 
moral decline in Rome made possible the rise of a tyrant by constitutional means—the 
organizational features of the regime (its offices and institutions) employed to demolish it 
(in terms of the regime’s guiding purpose:  the citizens’ liberties and their patriotic 
participation in government).  Once the mores graven into Rome’s Republican hearts no 
longer governed Romans, nor as a result, Roman politics, Rome ceased to be the republic 
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of Cato and Coriolanus and the rise of a Caesar was inevitable:  “where [the people] are 
corrupt, well ordered laws do not help…”567 
In this context, it is easy to understand what Rousseau meant by his observation that 
peoples have two founding moments:  that which makes them a people with a certain 
social character, and that which gives them laws suitable to their temperament.  The 
second type of lawgiver aims to give a people laws:  a constitution graven in bronze and 
immortalized by political poetry, suited to the people’s moral temperament, and in the 
best cases, one that contains provisions for sustaining the noblest aspects of the people’s 
character going forward.  The legislator of the higher order—the one who forms a 
people’s character, who builds a civilization, in the first place—is much more rare.  This 
species of lawgiver is the source of the most important mores and sacred beliefs:  the laws 
and customs graven into the hearts of men upon which, in Rousseau’s words, “the success 
of all the others depends.”  Rousseau stresses in the Social Contract and elsewhere that 
“morals, customs, and above all opinions… form the immovable Keystone” of any 
regime.568  From the examples of this higher order lawgiver Rousseau elucidates—Numa, 
Moses, and Lycurgas—it is clear he believes religious beliefs are generally the most 
important element of a people’s ideational makeup.569   
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Hamas and Illiberal Democracy 
It follows, then, that democratic laws and participatory institutions will not yield liberal 
government everywhere; it takes a liberal citizenry.  The contemporary relevance of 
Republican Rome’s decline is demonstrated by recent democratization experiments in 
Iraq and beyond.  No single event better demonstrates the truth of Huntington’s 1993 
insight that “in the Arab world… Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political 
forces” than the 2006 elections in Gaza.570  Once free and fair elections propelled Hamas 
to power, Islamists emboldened by their victory at the polls immediately began 
consolidating their power to establish a new political order and route their more 
moderate political opponents.  No part of the public bureaucracy has maintained its 
independence.  Hamas’ armed wing, the Matyr ‘Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, used the 
rift with the Palestinian Authority created by the election to transform itself from 
“underground guerilla organization into a uniformed military force” that today exerts a 
virtual monopoly on the means of violence in Gaza.571  Gaza’s internal security forces are 
today more efficient and more brutal than ever before; they, too, are entirely beholden to 
the Hamas leadership.   
Hamas routinely uses the coercive power of government to suppress political dissent and 
route support for its chief political rival, Fatah.  It has achieved this by brutal means.  
Security forces have been used to intimidate and even kill Fatah members and their 
supporters, to seize the property of political opponents, to take charge of courts and 	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hospitals, and to raid and often close altogether pro-Fatah radio stations and 
newspapers.572  Meanwhile, government ministries were purged of administrators 
affiliated with Fatah.  In a word, Hamas leveraged its electoral victory to completely 
transform Gaza’s regime, with terrible consequences for its long-suffering inhabitants. 
As International Crisis Group sums up, “the new order came at significant cost to 
ordinary Gazans.”573  The rule of law in Gaza, never a shining example of due process 
and respect for minority rights, verges today (again, thanks to elections) on non-existent.  
After Hamas’ electoral at the polls, lawyers were denied access to clients; many of those 
accused of fanciful crimes for political reasons were only released after spending months 
in prison, the payment of bail, and on promise not to discuss their imprisonment or seek 
treatment for injuries sustained during their incarceration in government hospitals.  
Police summons were backed by threat of maiming:  “if you don’t come, say goodbye to 
your knee.”  Gaza’s dysfunctional court system was, for a time, replaced with religious 
rule enforced summarily by police on the guidance of ad-hoc religious councils.  When 
the court system was reestablished, it was reestablished with a contingent of newly 
appointed, mostly Islamist, judges.  Senior Hamas operatives and Gaza’s jurists openly 
assert their desire to see “the courts… apply Sharia law.”574  
Meanwhile, no effort was spared to transform the public bureaucracy and the religious 
sphere it controls in light of Hamas’ radical interpretation of Islamic law. Dissent was 
suppressed down to the level of individual mosques—“about 300 preachers, 25 percent of 	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the total” were “dismissed from their mosques, sometimes by force”—as Hamas 
operatives sought to exert tighter control over Islamic practice.   Unsurprisingly, the 
preachers who remain have reported the further politicization of the pulpit.  To this same 
end, schools must today devote more time to teaching a more fundamentalist 
interpretation of Islam.   Observers agree the practice of Islam has grown noticeably 
more conservative, and is increasingly enforced by the coercive authority of the state.  
One preacher complained that “Hamas is turning a religion of tolerance into a religion of 
terrorists.”575  For its part, Hamas counts what it calls a “morality campaign that [has] 
cleansed Gaza of alcohol and prostitutes” among its great successes.576   Opponents of 
Hamas concede that with the election of Hamas, Gaza had “‘enter[ed] a new era’” in 
which it was in the grip of ‘single-party rule.’”577  Crisis Group concluded in the summer 
of 2008 that, “the public appears to have understood that at his point there is no space for 
political opposition”; or as one intellectual they cited put it, “There is nothing in Gaza 
except Hamas.”578  Nor are Gazans likely even to have the opportunity to remove their 
governors by regular vote any time soon.  Since 2006, three sets of elections have been 
cancelled either by Hamas or the Palestinian authority.579  Hamas seems intent to prove 
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Bernard Lewis’ quip about the character of Islamists’ enthusiasm for democracy:  “One 
man (men only), one vote, once.”580 
As though things were not bad enough, around 2009, ultra radical groups—angry that 
Hamas has neither fully instituted sharia law nor launched a new intifada against Israel—
began to splinter from the leadership to found new violent jihadist organizations.581  While 
estimates of their number vary from 500 to 5000 (a leader of one of the groups puts the 
number at 11,000),582 it does not take an army to exert a powerful political effect by way 
of terrorism.  In addition to high profile strikes in Egypt, the new jihadi groups have 
actively sought confrontations with Hamas, some of which have turned bloody.  Hamas 
not only routinely imprisons and tortures their new rivals; they’ve used the authority of 
the government to crush them, in some cases killing as many as two dozen in a single 
engagement.583  So much for the giddy expectations that elections might well save Gaza 
by forcing Hamas to become a responsible civic-minded organization!  In fact, Hamas 
has governed badly, but not badly enough for a small and assertive minority intent to 
further radicalize and destabilize all of Gaza.  Their complaints about the insufficiently 
Islamist nature of Hamas as governing entity have had the further political effect of 
pulling Hamas in the direction of their ideology.  As International Crisis Group explains,  
The significance of these groups comes not from their military capabilities 
but from the constraints they impose on Hamas:  they are an ideological 
challenge to the movement, not simply from without but also, and more 
dangerously, from within; they appeal to members of Hamas’s military 	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wing, a powerful constituency… by criticizing Hamas for failing to fight 
Israel and to implement Islamic law, they exert pressure toward greater 
militancy and Islamisation.584 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Gaza’s experiment with democracy has failed.  
Elections can be held anywhere.  But liberal government only results when the electorate 
is, for the most part, made up of voters touched by a host of durable liberalizing 
influences.  Nor is Gaza unique.  As Elie Kedourie has shown decisively, attempts to 
establish constitutional democracy in the Middle East have been frequent over the course 
of the twentieth century; coups d’etat, and authoritarian counterrevolutions have, 
unfortunately, been equally common.  Iraq’s first attempt at parliamentary government 
(long before Saddam Hussein), as well as similar endeavors in Syria, Egypt, Libya, 
Algeria, and the Sudan all failed on short order—as a result of sectarian hatreds, bloated 
military apparatuses, and totalitarian ideologies inhospitable to liberal democracy 
including pan-Arabism, communism, and Islamic fundamentalism.  As Kedourie sums up 
his landmark study, 
This survey of what might be called the varieties of democratic experience 
in the Arab world cannot but give a dismal impression.  This is because the 
successive attempts to institute constitutional and parliamentary 
government were generally made in good faith.  Their realization was 
believed to be practicable and to lead, moreover, to the prosperity and 
happiness of the countries which adopted them.  Regardless, however, of 
aspirations and good intentions, the failure was uniform… 
To what may this fatality be ascribed?  First and foremost, no doubt, to the 
fact that these ideas of constitutionalism and representation belonged to, 
and had their rise in, a political tradition and in political arrangements 
very different from those to which these countries had been long 
accustomed.585 
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As he puts it earlier in the same work, “the age in which these events happened was not a 
liberal age.”586 
 
Guiding Ideals and Founding Documents 
Where constitutional democracy works to promote liberal goals—where it promotes 
stability, durably establishes the rule of law and equality before it, to the end of protecting 
the rights of individuals and minority—it is the fruit of a rare and delicate union:  the 
moral character of a people and their democratic regime are mutually dependent, vital co-
requisites.  Nascent America is an illustrative example.  It is both true that America’s 
Constitution would not have been suitable for any but a morally upright—in the 
Founders’ words, a “Christian”—people (as Adams and Washington argued, and even 
Hamilton later came to appreciate); and that reverence for America’s Constitution and 
founding principles has helped to form, and supported the endurance of, a citizenry 
capable of governing itself according to liberal democratic principles.  In other words, 
Americans were favorably disposed to moderate constitutional government from the 
beginning (for a constellation of historical, geographical and religious/ideational reasons); 
at the same time, however, America’s constitutional soul, an indispensible support for the 
endurance of our form of government and admirable way of life, is today to an important 
extent rooted in, and sustained by, a parchment document and our collective reverence 
for the ideals it represents.   
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Abraham Lincoln understood this.  As he put it in a debate with Stephen Douglas in 
1858, “public sentiment is everything.  With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, 
nothing can succeed.  He who moulds public sentiment is greater [or “goes deeper”] than 
he who makes statutes.”587   It is a vital point, underappreciated today, Lincoln returns to 
again and again:  political regimes depend on, cannot function as designed without, 
enduring sacred commitments that are in turn nurtured and sustained by the political 
poetry and foundational laws of the regime, often as celebrated by the rhetoric of its 
greatest leaders.  Elsewhere, he calls this a people’s “political religion.”588  In America, it 
consists of the ideals expressed in Declaration of Independence, reified by popular 
reverence for the Ante-Bellum Constitution, and memorialized again in the Gettysburg 
Address.  Of the United States, Lincoln thus opined:  
Without the Constitution and the Union, we could not have attained the 
result [free government]; but even these, are not the primary cause of our 
great prosperity.  There is something back of these, entwining itself more 
closely about the human heart.  That something, is the principle of 
‘Liberty to all’…. 
The expression of that principle, in our Declaration of Independence, was 
most happy, and fortunate.  Without this, as well as with it, we could have 
declared our independence of Great Britain; but without it, we could not, I 
think, have secured our free government…589  
On Lincoln’s metaphor, the principles of equality and liberty for all are the “apple of 
gold”; the Union and the Constitution constitute its frame, “the picture of silver.”  He goes 
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on to explain “the picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and 
preserve it.”590 
Only in light of the recognition that liberal democracy depends on a widespread 
commitment to the ideals espoused in the Declaration of Independence as much as the 
Constitutional arrangement designed to protect them does one fully understand the 
magnitude of the Lincoln-Douglas debates.  Steven Douglas argued that democracy was 
committed, at its core and above all else, to the sovereignty of the people.  The principle 
of popular sovereignty, moreover, permitted—no, entitled—the people of a state or a 
territory to determine for themselves whether slavery ought to be protected or prohibited 
within its boundaries.  The Confederacy, moreover, claimed a right to secede from the 
Union on ostensibly democratic grounds:  it was withdrawing its consent, previously 
freely given, to be governed according to the institutions established by the U.S. 
Constitution.   
Lincoln, in contrast, understood that liberal democracy is indistinguishable from tyranny 
where the sovereign people, the majority, is free to charge itself with determining which 
inhabitants count as people and which do not.  Lincoln argued that liberal democracy is 
impossible absent the devotion to a common set of sacred principles that helps buttress a 
kind of collective self-control.  That all men are created equal is the most important of 
these; it moderates the use the majority permits itself to make of its tremendous legislative 
authority.   Lincoln further recognized that America’s constitutional arrangement would 
cease to produce free government if the principles of the Declaration were permitted to 	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erode, a danger he believed Dred Scott and the expansion of slavery into the territories on 
popular sovereignty grounds represented.  Thus, the repeal of the Missouri compromise 
not only threw down an important legal barrier to slavery.  More important, as Harry 
Jaffa explains, “was the implicit repeal of the moral condemnation” of slavery the 
compromise had expressed.591  The war was worth fighting not simply to assert the 
permanency of the Union; above all, it was worth fighting to rededicate the nation to the 
truths of the Declaration. 
 
First Sources 
But what is the first source of those ideals?  And why did they prevail in America?  No 
student of history would assert that the principles so beautifully articulated in the 
Declaration of Independence sprung, unfertilized, from Jefferson’s head.  The words of 
the Declaration did not create the sentiments they so beautifully expressed.  Far from it:  
Encomnia to universal equality, to liberty, and to the rights of man suffuse state 
constitutions, some of which pre-date 1776.  Not legislators, then, but the constellation of 
(not always altogether compatible) new ideas put forth by the thinkers of three intellectual 
revolutions—the Enlightenment, the Reformation, and European Romanticism—
constitute the modern West’s original character-imparting founders and lawgivers.  They 
crafted our tolerant, liberal, democratic souls and in the process built a civilization, 
Western Civilization.  Though we do not always realize it, the laws upon which our 
Constitutional arrangement depends are, in a sense, airy nothings—opinions, ideas, 	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habits, and social practices imbued by citizens with the air, simply by living in the regime 
(so long, that is, as the regime itself remains healthy and confident).  First advanced by 
our great philosophers, then reified by our regimes’ great founders and the legal strictures 
they established, they rely for their continued transmission on our system of education, 
our political discourse, our shared moral and political values as taught in the home. 
Tocqueville makes a similar point with particular emphasis in L’Ancien Regime (1856).  He 
argues that the political revolutions of Eighteenth Century Europe and in America could 
not have occurred in the Fifteenth for the simple reason that the ideas and social practices 
so essential to liberal democracy were not yet capable of taking hold in men’s minds; 
Europeans and Americans were not ready for democracy because they had not 
internalized a suitable moral character.  As Tocqueville explains, “[f]or doctrines of this 
kind [the natural rights of man] to lead to revolutions, certain changes must already have 
taken place in the living conditions, customs, and mores of a nation and prepared men’s 
minds for the reception of new ideas.”592  He goes on to point out that the opinion that 
lies at the root of liberal democracy, and which seems so self-evidently true to us today—
that all men are created equal and endowed with inalienable rights—is a truth, or sacred 
opinion, that will be for many peoples in many times impossible to accept:  
there are periods in a nation’s life when men differ from each other so 
profoundly that any notion of ‘the same law for all’ seems to them 
preposterous.  But there are other periods when it is enough to dangle 
before their eyes a picture, however indistinct and remote, of such a law 
and they promptly grasp its meaning and hasten to acclaim it.593   	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For Europe, the precondition of the people’s receptivity to these opinions, and the form of 
government based upon it, was the popularization of Enlightenment ideas—not only their 
wise articulation, but as important, their widespread acceptance.   
Tocqueville devotes a chapter of L’Ancien Regime to the near-universal revolution in the 
social consciousness of Euro-American peoples that made constitutional democracy 
possible in the West.  When Tocqueville famously declares in Democracy in America that the 
democratic revolution sweeping Europe is “irresistible,” he is referring to the inevitable 
political impact of Europe’s new political consciousness.594  Locke taught that human 
beings had natural rights; Voltaire, that superstitions promulgated by the Church had to 
be jettisoned in favor of the free human intellect; Rousseau, the that “sacred” conviction 
that legislative authority resides in the people; Spinoza, that the Gospels properly 
understood demand liberal government.  If the Enlightenment’s great thinkers did not 
agree about everything, Tocqueville is right that their basic motivation and thrust, 
certainly as synthesized for a popular audience then and since, can be boiled down to this:  
“what [they] wanted was to replace the complex of traditional customs governing the 
social order of the day by simple, elementary rules deriving from the exercise of the 
human reason and natural law.”595  The Reformation pulled the West in the same 
direction, arguing on the basis of scripture that individuals are entitled to a personal 
relationship with God according to their own lights. 
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The reason they succeeded, he argues, is that men of letters popularized liberalism’s 
founding tenets.   Intellectuals like Voltaire and Diderot were public celebrities.  
Rousseau’s Julie had outsold every book in print, save perhaps the Bible; his Social Contract 
boldly denied that any government to which the people do not consent can be legitimate.  
More important, the ideas resonated, ultimately vanquishing their predecessors.  For the 
revolutionary opinions that support popular government were advanced under political-
social circumstances that made them seem true, self-evident.   According to Tocqueville, 
Enlightenment political ideals captured hearts and minds because  
there was no taxpayer aggrieved by the injustices of the taille who did not 
welcome the idea that all men should be equal; no farmer whose land was 
devastated by a noble neighbor’s rabbits who did not rejoice at hearing it 
declared that privilege of any kind whatever was condemned by the voice 
of reason.  Thus, the philosopher’s cloak provided safe cover for the 
passions of the day and the political ferment was canalized into literature, 
the result being that our writers now became the leaders of public opinion 
and played for the while the part which normally, in free countries, falls to 
the professional politician.596   
This is why, as Tocqueville goes on to explain, ideas developed first in the minds of the 
era’s intellectuals penetrated the psyche of the society at large, why,  
instead of remaining as in the past the purely intellectual concept of a few 
advanced thinkers, [it found] welcome among the masses and acquire[d] 
the driving force of a political passion to such effect that the general and 
abstract theories of the nature of human society not only became daily 
topics of conversation among the leisure class but fired the imagination 
even of women and peasants.597   
America was the place, as he had put it in his earlier work, that these “boldest theories of 
the human mind, which undoubtedly no statesman then had designed to be occupied, 
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were brought into practice.”598  Freedom and equality reigned in America from the 
beginning, not simply because they were legislated into existence, but because sacred 
opinions conducive to freedom permeated the social state.  An unusually adamant 
Tocqueville insists “the reign of freedom cannot be established without mores, nor mores 
founded without beliefs.”599  Thus, to little avail, the inhabitants of Mexico “copied 
almost entirely” America’s Constitution.  “But in transporting the letter of the law to 
themselves,” Tocqueville observes, “they could not at the same time transport the spirit 
that enlivened it.”  The result:  “Mexico is still no incessantly carried along from anarchy 
to military despotism, and from military despotism to anarchy. 
 
Tocqueville on Islam and Liberal Democracy 
 
In addition to Enlightenment ideas, it is well known that Tocqueville thought America’s 
depoliticized Christianity would prove a further invaluable support for liberal democracy 
insofar as the Gospels’ guiding tenets support liberal democracy’s founding principles.  It 
is less well known that Tocqueville studied the Qur’an and Algeria as well.600  His most 
explicit discussion of Islam and Christianity with an eye toward their compatibility with 
democracy comes in Volume II of Democracy in America: 
Mohammed had not only religious doctrines descend from Heaven and 
placed in the Qur’an, but political maxims, civil and criminal laws, and 
scientific theories.  The Gospels, in contrast, speak only of the general 	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relations of men to God and among themselves.  Outside of that they teach 
nothing and oblige nothing to be believed.   That alone, among a thousand 
other reasons, is enough to show that the first of these two religions cannot 
dominate for long in enlightened and democratic times, whereas the 
second is destined to reign in these centuries.601    
Islam is in theory totalitarian in scope, determining the structure of government, civil 
laws, the penal code, the economic system, even the proper manner of worship.602  On 
Tocqueville’s understanding, the comprehensive legal code prescribed by Mohammed is 
antithetical to the sacred laws that reign in democratic centuries.  Tocqueville discusses 
this subject in greater detail in little-known notes he prepared in 1839 and 1840 upon a 
careful study of the Qur’an.  France’s interest in Algeria was a hot topic of debate in Paris 
and Tocqueville considered himself an expert on the subject, one of the only prominent 
Frenchman who understood Algeria’s high importance to France.  He even made two 
trips to North Africa at high risk to his personal health.603  Revealingly, Tocqueville’s 
notes are contemporaneous with the publication of the second volume of Democracy in 
America, the part of that work focused most explicitly on the relationship between 
democratic ideas and democratic government.  As Christopher Kelly has noted, 
Tocqueville’s interest in Algeria’s Muslim communities extended to, among other things, 
“their ability to accept the European democratic political principles and way of life.”604    
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Tocqueville’s findings?  For having put forth a legal code demanding political 
establishment of religious authority, Islam is less hospitable to democracy because the two 
powers—(“les deux puissances”):  the prince and the high priest—are inextricably 
confounded and intermingled (“complètement confondu et entremêlé”).  Religious diktat 
mandates the combination, which, when established, prevents separations of authority in 
the society, the very separations that limit government in the West in the service of 
individual freedom.  The problem of political Islam is somewhat akin to the problem of 
Papists in Europe:  where people believe religion conveys political authority and establishes 
the whole of the temporal law, limited government is impossible.  
It is for this reason that Tocqueville makes so much of the fact Puritanism in America was 
“as much a political theory as a religious doctrine.”  He is particularly impressed that 
New England settlers believed it a religious duty to “combine [themselves] together into a 
civil body politick” for the sake of governing themselves under “just and equal laws” 
determined in common.605  In America, religious authority actually supported 
government of the people by the people by the people’s lights.  Even American 
Catholicism, he later notes (unlike Catholicism in eighteenth century Europe) had 
become uniquely supportive of the establishment of limited participatory government for 
having embraced the notion that “God had abandoned” temporal political concerns “to 
the free inquiries of men.”606   Furthermore, vitally important democratic virtues, 
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independence and equality, were taught in great measure by American Protestantism and 
Catholicism respectively.   
The Qur’an, in contrast, endows a representative of the Prophet, a Caliph, with temporal 
power to enforce His, and only His, laws.   In addition to delegitimizing laws made by 
men by way of (say) democratic institutions, such laws stand in the way of independence 
of mind and action.  The comprehensive character of the legal code, moreover, shrinks 
the sphere within which a private life is possible; as Tocqueville explains, “more or less 
every aspect of civil and political life is subject to the religious law.”607  A comparable 
transformation of interpretation would have to occur in the Islamic world in order for its 
dominant opinions to be conducive to political liberalism. 
A further problem for Tocqueville:  all of the regime’s prominent men—its priests, its 
rulers, its lawyers, its doctors, its philosophers—are steeped in, and loyal first and 
foremost, to the same religious beliefs.  For they have all had an education based on the 
same religious principles:  “le Coran est la source commune dont sont sorties la loi 
religieuse, la loi civile et meme en partie la science profane.”608  Moreover, their vocations 
depend for their legitimacy on fidelity to holy writ, and so the entire professional class 
(which is to say society’s elite) performs its social and political functions guided by the 
same prevailing loyalties.  In other words, actors beholden to the same set of religious 
commandments perform virtually all of society’s important temporal functions.  All 
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earthly authority is thereby concentrated in an elite that is invariably a religious elite.609  
This tends ultimately toward despotism because the civil character thereby established 
does not conduce—does not permit!—divisions and separations durably sustained by 
conflicting opinions and loyalties. 
The emphasis placed on submission—of mind and action—in Islam is problematic for 
the possibility of political liberalism.  As Christopher Kelly explains, religion “dominates 
political life” on Tocqueville’s understanding, “and makes its adherents blind in their 
obedience to their rulers.”610  The self-conscious abdication of reason and creative will 
annihilates personal initiative thereby ensuring economic weakness insofar as the people’s 
productive and creative capacities cannot be unleashed for lack of the freedom and 
incentive to create, accumulate and innovate.  In Tocqueville’s words, 
This concentration and confusion of the two powers established by 
Mohammed… is the primary cause of despotism and social immobility 
that has, almost always, characterized Muslim countries and accounts for 
the fact that these countries always finally succumb to those that have 
embraced the opposite arrangement.611 
Even justice takes on a different meaning:  
Religion and justice have always been intermixed in Muslim countries, just 
as ecclesiastical tribunals attempted to mix the two in Christian Europe 
during the Middle Ages.  Determining what is just is not within a king’s 
rights, but left to God much more than to the prince.  Rules of state are 
not the purview of civil law, but derived from the Qur’an and its 
commentaries.612 
That there is no distinction in Islam between what we might today call political (or 
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impediment to liberal democracy in the Islamic world.  Christian kings once claimed 
unlimited power to determine guilt and sentence prisoners according to authority claimed 
in God’s name.  Popes claimed unlimited political authority.  It was the dethronement of 
politicized Christianity accomplished by the diffusion of Enlightenment opinions among a 
population tired of religious extremism that made possible tolerant participatory 
government devoted to freedom in the West.  Tocqueville even ventures the suggestion 
that popular enlightenment might prepare Islamic lands for liberal democracy if modern 
opinions can take hold.613  This revolution in psychic outlook has not, unfortunately, 
occurred in the Islamic world to date.  In fact, in the Middle East, diametrically 
countervailing ideational trends are today discernable, the result of ominous winds that 
have been gathering for the better part of a century:  Islam has, in fact, been further 
politicized over the last century by powerful thinkers who have exerted a tremendous 
impact.  Before we turn to the origins, history, and dominant intellectual currents of 
contemporary Islamism, it is necessary to consider first in more careful detail the sacred 
opinions of a democratic citizenry and how they emerged. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 Alexis de Tocqueville, Oeuvres Complètes, III, pp. 325. 
	  	   325	  
C H A P T E R   V I 
THE SACRED OPINIONS OF A DEMOCRATIC CITIZENRY 
 
Charles Kesler has noted that “it is difficult, though not impossible, to have an enduring 
liberal democracy unless it gets its first principles right, unless it cultivates them by means 
of a good constitution and civic character.”  Those democracies that “just happened,” 
even in the absence of a deliberate founding and shared civic commitment, he continues, 
“could just as easily unhappen.”614   What Kesler means is that liberal, limited, and stable 
government is not an inevitable outcome of free elections and participatory institutions.  
For government according to the will of the majority to be tolerant, just, and good, the 
people must first be tolerant, just, and good.  Moreover, the foundational laws must be 
written in such a way as to animate the best in the people, and guard against the worst 
they are capable of.  Absent this, free and fair elections can very easily lead to tyranny of 
the majority, dysfunctional government, and the brutal persecution of minorities, what 
Fareed Zakaria has famously termed “illiberal democracy.” 
As Zakaria went on to explain in The Future of Freedom, a host of historical and economic 
factors help determine whether democratic government in a given time and place can be 
enduringly tolerant and liberal.  While his analysis is no doubt correct so far as it goes, it 
does not go quite far enough.  He focuses almost entirely on economic and historical 
factors—a large middle class, a favorable array of natural resources, a history of local 
autonomy—to the neglect of ideational factors.  For example, Zakaria is surely right that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614 Charles Kesler, “Iraq and the Neoconservatives,” Claremont Review of Books, Summer 2007. 
http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1383/article_detail.asp 
	  326 
a per capita GDP of $3000 or better correlates with stable liberal democracy.615  It is not 
particularly hard to understand why.  Levels of wealth and material comfort associated 
with “middle class” existence—sufficient to give people stake in the regime and permit 
them some level of economic security—affect the character of that person’s political 
demands and political participation.  So, too, those with an economic interest in a state’s 
continued existence are less likely to destabilize it for reasons of personal interest.  What 
Zakaria does not emphasize is that the features he identifies as correlating with stable 
popular government that is also liberal are important because they instill a particular 
political character, one which induces the people to exercise the rights and responsibilities 
of democratic citizenship in a moderate and public-spirited way. 
 
What, then, are the other, non-economic, sacred opinions, on which the possibilities of 
liberal democracy in the West rest?  Many are so basic that citizens born and raised in 
functioning constitutional democracies fail even to appreciate they could be otherwise.  
They are more than just taken for granted:  they are automatic and ubiquitous, 
internalized with the air, beliefs so self-evidently true (or at least true for us) that to reject 
them is to place oneself outside of polite and decent society.  That all men (and women) 
are created equal and endowed with unalienable rights, that this equality means 
legitimate government is derived (and can only be derived) from the consent of the 
governed, that the authority of government is properly limited and individuals by right 	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free to live and seek happiness as they please within very generous limitations protected 
by law, that matters of conscience are properly private affairs and deservedly insulated 
and protected from governmental intervention, that individuals should tolerate manners 
of pursuing happiness they emphatically believe to me immoral as a condition of 
citizenship—these commitments, though automatic for the citizens of Western 
democracies and vital to constitutional democracy—are not simply automatic and do not 
obtain everywhere.  They had to take hold of minds, and for that, they had to seem—or 
be made to seem—“spiritually plausible.”  Their prevalence in the West today is the 
product of a series of long and difficult revolutions in public consciousness that has not 
occurred in the Islamic world.  The Enlightenment, the profound impact of European 
Romanticism, and the Reformation of European Christianity are responsible for a cluster 
of convictions and sacred opinions that give democratic government in the West its 
unique character.  They are the ideas that account for the functioning of our laws and 
institutions; they are the spirit behind laws written on parchment. 
 
The Natural Rights of Man 
 
That “All men are created equal” and “endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights” are perhaps the most important phrases from America’s 
revolutionary era.  Jefferson, by immortalizing these words in the Declaration of 
Independence, helped to ensure they would be celebrated by future generations of 
Americans, thereby to endure in hearts and minds.  He, like many of the founders, 
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believed the principles underlying the American regime were indispensable to liberal 
democracy; and be believed the American experiment, by its success or failure, would 
help determine whether human beings are capable of establishing governments according 
to reflection and choice dedicated to preserving liberty on equal terms.  He wrote of the 
Declaration, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of America’s independence, these 
words in a letter to Roger Weightman: 
May it be to the world, what I believe it will be, (to some parts sooner, to 
others later, but finally to all,) the signal of arousing men to burst the 
chains under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded 
them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self-
government.  That form which we have substituted, restores the free right 
to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion.  All eyes are 
opened, or opening, to the rights of man.616 
Political poetry of this sort, amplified by reverence for the founding generation and its 
heroic accomplishments, helps perpetuate the guiding ideals of the regime founded to 
protect and instantiate them.  Before the American Revolution, the ideas had never 
before guided political life at the national level.  They represent nothing short of a 
transformation in public consciousness, one that emphasizes the dignity of the individual 
and ultimately roots the legitimacy of government itself in its protection of individual 
rights.  But how is it possible to transform individuals’ self-conception of their own 
dignity?   
The words of the Declaration expressed ideas that were in the air at the time, drawn 
largely from the political philosophy of John Locke, no doubt.  They got some measure of 
traction because Locke argued that human beings have natural rights.  That individuals 	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retain a right (a legitimate claim) to life, liberty, and estate (things held in common with 
which they’ve mixed what is undeniably theirs:  their labor) is demanded, required, 
legitimate, and proper according to the new conception of justice he convincingly puts 
forth.  To a population persuaded of this, a just regime is one that protects those rights.  
No other can be legitimate.  Furthermore, everyone knows that Locke proves the 
rightness, the justice, of this arrangement by an appeal to nature.  By positing a state of 
nature that looks nothing like the Garden of Eden—one prior to the establishment of 
human governments and the myriad unjust institutions and power relationships they 
erect—he offers a new North Star for the evaluation of government.  Man’s new natural 
state is one in which all men are free and equal.  Liberty and equality, then—to which we 
are, by right, entitled—can only legitimately be given up where to do so is rational:  
necessary to secure, so far as possible, the rights and liberties men had before the 
establishment of government.  Men enter into a society in order to protect their rights; 
what is given up is only justly given up because men consent to give it up; thus, a right of 
revolution is implied where the government, erected by the people’s consent to pool their 
force and resources, exceeds the boundaries the population consents to allow it.  This 
constitutes precisely the kind of public education that leads a people to demand a role in 
government; it is the kind of public education that produces prickly citizens, perpetually 
on guard against unjust accumulations of authority of encroachments upon their liberties.  
In a change, all of a sudden tyranny—which has always been bad but used to mean 
unjust government—means the unjust usurpation of rights and liberties property retained 
by individuals without their consent. 
	  330 
And yet, the difficulty is not entirely, nor even mostly, solved by proposing a conception 
of man’s nature that man should find so appealing.  For standing in the way of 
widespread acceptance of this new idea—that man has an unalienable right to life, liberty 
and his property—is man’s concern for the only thing that should be, and in most times 
and places is regarded to be, more important:  his soul.  Insofar as eternal hellfire for the 
damned deprives of liberty and makes existence altogether unendurable, moreover, tales 
of Hades appeal most powerfully to those moved first and foremost by considerations of 
pleasure and pain, precisely the audience likely to be impressed by Locke’s new teaching.  
Where the intermediation of a priestly class is believed (or widely known) to be required for 
Salvation, and where kings claim the authority to rule by Divine right, what pull over 
men’s hearts and minds should doctrines such as Locke’s, rooted in nothing better than a 
theoretical account of a primitive state of nature without religion or political authority, be 
able to muster?  Should they not appear to be a road to hell paved by pride?  Tyranny, 
after all, has an older counterpoise:  just rule.  Where kings can claim just rule requires 
Heaven’s assent, a right to rule given to the descendents of Adam by God himself, and 
where a priestly class—guardians of personal Salvation—affirms the teaching, why should 
Locke have ever imagined, even for an instant, that his radical ideas might prove 
politically translatable? 
This is the reason the First Treatise precedes the second.  It also is the reason the First 
Treatise has been called the more radical book.  Locke had first to refute the teaching that 
a king’s claim to this-worldly sovereignty is justified by divine right—that is, given by 
God—not only on rational grounds that compel the intellect, but, more importantly, on 
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theological grounds that would persuade believers and the guardians of the faith.  Thus, 
his tactic is to reduce to absurdity the argument in favor of the divine right of kings as put 
forth by the thinker who had “brought the argument to perfection.”617  To this end, he 
shows that Filmer’s Patriarcha neither follows from its own premises, nor adheres to 
Biblical history.  What is worse, it creates a political situation in which rival claims to 
temporal authority—impossible to finally adjudicate to the satisfaction of each—will 
continually convulse the Christian world, preventing both peace and honest forms of 
worship (an argument taken up in greater detail below with respect to Locke’s Letter on 
Religious Toleration).618  Locke sees that wherever reigning opinions can move armies of 
men in the name of God, ambitious princes and churchmen will manipulate believers in 
service to their own personal advantage, amassing for themselves untold wealth and 
political power while corrupting the faith and destabilizing the regimes involved.   
What is important for our immediate purposes is that Locke’s arguments—perhaps the 
best theoretical argument in favor of the natural rights of man—were also being espoused 
in Reformed tradition churches, both in Europe and (especially) in America.  While 
scholars have long argued that Americans of the Revolutionary era “had absorbed 
Locke’s works as a kind of political gospel”619—or as Michael Zuckert has it, that 
“Locke’s political doctrine… contains all the defining doctrines of the American 
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Declaration of Independence”620 —Mark Hall has recently demonstrated that the 
churches of New England played at least as important a role in generating the new 
political consciousness that would support America’s constitutional regime, an influence 
that has been, for the most part, underappreciated.621 To take two of the examples he 
cites, consider first one of the most famous works of resistance literature, Vindiciae, Contra 
Tyrannos (1579).  As Hall explains, “the Vindiciae contends that men originally existed in a 
state of natural liberty, and that ‘the natural law [ius Naturale] teaches us to preserve and 
protect our life and liberty—without which life is scarcely life at all—against all force and 
injustice.”622  It is not hard to see why Hall cheekily remarks that most commentators, in 
attributing responsibility for the ideas that made America to John Locke, “ignore the 
possibility that Locke’s political philosophy is best understood as a logical extension of 
Protestant resistance literature rather than as a radical departure from it.”623 
In the American context, a most remarkable example comes from Henry Wolcott’s notes 
of an election Sermon attributed to Thomas Hooker, a member of Connecticut’s 
founding generation:  
Doctrine. I. That the choice of public magistrates belongs unto the people 
by God’s own allowance. 
 II. The privilege of election, which belongs to the people, therefore 
must not be exercised according to their humors, but according to the 
blessed will and law of God. 	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 III. They who have the power to appoint officers and magistrates, it is 
in their power also to set the bounds and limitations of power and place 
unto which they call them. 
 Reasons. 1. Because the foundation of authority is laid, firstly, in the 
free consent of the people.”624   
Hall argues both that “Reformed thinkers had embraced these concepts long before 
Locke wrote his Second Treatise” and that it is likely they exerted a much more powerful 
popular influence than Locke did.  In support of this contention, he shows, on the one 
hand, that by 1776, “84% of the region’s churches were in the Reformed tradition,” and 
on the other, that “with very few exceptions, Locke’s works were not even available in 
America until 1714,” at which point their availability and influence was more or less 
limited to society’s elites.625  In other words, John Calvin is at least as responsible as John 
Locke for the new political consciousness that constitutes this important aspect of the 
liberal democratic character.  Thomas Jefferson may have had Locke’s Second Treatise in 
mind when he wrote the Declaration of Independence, but it resonated with Americans, 
particularly so with New Englanders, because the ideas were familiar to them from 
Sunday sermons and their own congregations. 
None of this would come as a surprise to Tocqueville.  Of the Puritan settlers in New 
England he says,  
Proportionately, there was a greater mass of enlightenment spread among 
those men than within any European nation of our day.  All, perhaps 
without a single exception, had received a quite advanced education…  
[W]hat distinguished them above all from all the others was the very goal 
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of their undertaking…  in exposing themselves to the inevitable miseries of 
exile, they wanted to make an idea triumph.626 
That idea:  the political community should rule itself according to the principle of consent 
under just and equal laws.  Now should it come as any surprise that this species of “mass 
enlightenment” is spread more easily among neighbors worshipping at such a church 
than through the wide dissemination of abstract philosophical treatises.  Tocqueville goes 
on assert that “Puritanism was not only a religious doctrine; it also blended at several 
points with the most absolute democratic and republican theories.”627  He gives an 
example from Nathaniel Morton’s history of New England according to which one of the 
first colonies to establish itself in northern Virginia did so with an act stating that reads as 
follows: 
 
We whose names are under written… do by these presents solemnly and 
mutually, in the presence of God and one another, covenant and combine 
ourselves together into a civil body politick, for our better ordering and 
preservation, and the furtherance of the ends aforesaid:  And by virtue 
hereof, do enact, constitute and frame such just and equal laws, 
ordinances, acts, constitutions and officers, from time to time, as shall be 
thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the colony; unto 
which we promise all due submission and obedience.628 
It only remains to note that these ideas would only resonate the more furiously—and 
more widely—when the revolution broke out.  Urgent situations increase the appeal of 
ideas that prove the righteousness of one’s cause (a fact we will return to in greater deal in 
the context of the Islamic Resurgence). 
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Independence of Mind and Will 
If Reformed theology taught what Tocqueville calls the “dogma of the sovereignty of the 
people” particularly well, we should nonetheless begin with what it teaches in common 
with other strains of Protestantism.  Among these, the most important must be the notion 
that every individual is entitled to his own unmitigated relationship with Christ and that, 
according to the doctrine of sola scriptura, the Bible—not a priest and certainly not the 
Church—is the final source of religious authority.  To internalize the notion that one can 
read the Bible for oneself and be saved, or to seize upon the natural rights teaching of 
Locke, is simultaneously to transform one’s self-conception of the reach and authority of 
the human intellect.  An individual’s confidence that he can, on the basis of his own lights 
determine for himself how best to conduct his life—even that he might only unlock 
nature’s mysteries and discover her laws by his own reason—was a powerful new idea.  In 
the modern West, it was retrieved and asserted by the great minds of the Reformation 
and the Enlightenment, what amounted at the same time to an attack on entrenched 
religious authority in the name of the dignity of the individual.   
The Enlightenment, of course, went further, much further.  As one intellectual historian 
has noted,  
 
What the entire Enlightenment has in common is denial of the central 
Christian doctrine of original sin, believing instead that man is born either 
innocent and good, or morally neutral and malleable by education or 
environment, or, at worst, deeply defective but capable of radical and 
	  336 
indefinite improvement by rational education in favorable 
circumstances…629   
A further psychological blow for equality and independence is thus struck.  The doctrine 
of original sin tied man to God and his community’s traditions.  For the requirements of 
Salvation demand to large extent, in practice at least, the subordination of the individual 
to his political community and the prevailing moral demands.  Where original sin is taken 
for granted as a central fact of life, man does not belong to himself, as it were; his life is 
devoted to a great task set for him which he cannot—which it should not interest him to—
escape.  The alternative view—that every individual is uniquely competent to best 
arrange his private affairs to his own advantage, in fact, that no individual, neither priest 
nor magistrate, can be trusted to better arrange his private affairs for him—both implies 
an equivalence of human capacities and undermines the moral authority of established 
hierarchies. This species of confidence in the human intellect amounts to a presumption 
of moral and rational sufficiency; it presumes every man and every women is constituted 
well enough to choose for him or herself a meaningful and redeeming way of life.  The 
view could not appeal absent the rejection of original sin.  Its rejection paves the way for a 
kind of moral egalitarianism that lies at the root of contemporary liberal democracy.  The 
generous individual freedoms, resolutely defended by political regimes in the Western 
world today depend, for their legitimacy, on this same sacred opinion:  the notion that all 
men are women are equally capable (in principle at least) of putting their freedoms to 
good (or good enough) use.  That the state itself should be dedicated to protecting 
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individual rights, including the right to each to pursue happiness however he or she 
defines it, is unthinkable absent this transformation in social consciousness.   
 
 
The Dogma of the Sovereignty of the People 
As important, the notion that just government can only be derived from the free consent 
of those subject to the laws is a proposition that is only intelligible if it is widely 
acknowledged that human beings are constituted in such a way that their private 
judgments on questions facing the community are all, in some sense, equally valuable.  
The notion that “all men are created equal” is, in the end, the theoretical basis for the 
legitimacy of government by consent (and therefore, the illegitimacy of all other forms of 
authority).  Few societies have ever made the presumption of political equality the 
founding principle of government.  The reason for this:  the dogma is counter-intuitive in 
the extreme.  Given the ineradicable differences among men—in terms of intellect, 
wealth, virtue, rearing, etc.—the justice or propriety of the one-person-one-vote principle 
is hardly obvious.  And yet, that legitimate legislative authority resides with the people is 
one of the most basic tenets of democracy.  Tocqueville asserts that the “dogma of the 
sovereignty of the people” is at the foundation of more or less every human political 
institution, although in most times, it “dwells… almost buried.”630   
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Its benefits are numerous.  A deep commitment to this notion encourages citizens to 
demand a voice in government (in modern democracies, by way of representation, 
elections, and political participation).  Citizens’ belief that it is their right to impact 
policy—which is to say, the government’s utilization of the power and resources citizens 
confer to it—exerts a limiting influence.  Where the people believe it is their right, even 
their responsibility, to restrain government—and believe at the same time that they have 
a natural right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—they are mush more likely 
actively to guard the liberties they believe government exists to protect.  
The principle of consent cuts in another, equally important, direction.   So long as the 
rules established to ensure citizens have had opportunity to exert fair and equal influence 
are respected, the vast majority are also prepared to recognize the legitimacy of, and to 
consent to uses of, the state’s collected authority for purposes they do not always 
personally support (and in many cases vigorously oppose).  That powerful minority 
factions, and even in some cases majority factions, willingly consent to constitutionally valid 
government initiatives prejudicial to their own interests is not automatic.  But it is the 
prerequisite for a durable social contract among men whose interests rarely coincide 
perfectly, but who nonetheless share an abiding interest in stable government. 
What lies at its root of this powerful idea?  What persuades self-interested men, even 
majorities, not to revolt against measures they vehemently oppose, not to use (or seek to 
use) the authority of the government for personal or partisan gain at the expense of 
weaker minorities if a rule previously agreed upon prohibits it?  Why should the stronger 
peacefully submit to a form of government that puts them on a level playing field with 
	  339 
those of inferior talent, intelligence, virtue, and closeness to God?  That men (and women) 
who are manifestly unequal in virtually every respect of any significance for political life 
should participate politically on equal terms would seem, on the face of it, to be entirely 
unnatural.   
 
 
Christianity as Original Source 
Early democratic theorists, especially in the wake of the French Revolution, believed the 
species of depoliticized Christianity that had flourished in America was an indispensable 
support for liberal democracy.  While Christianity had first to be reformed to free the 
individual and break the authority of religious hierarchies, many of the Gospels’ guiding 
tenets were nonetheless important supports for liberal democracy’s guiding principles.  As 
Alexis de Tocqueville puts it in Democracy in America, “Despotism may govern without 
faith… but liberty cannot.  Religion… is more needed in democratic republics than in 
any other.”631  Sanford Kessler argues that Tocqueville, in fact, “believed that the 
Christian faith was the source of the basic principles of liberal democracy and was the 
only religion suitable for maintaining liberty in democratic times.”632  This is certainly a 
plausible interpretation.  Nothing conveys more powerful authority than religious 
conviction, as we have seen.  And New Testament Christianity teaches fundamental 
democratic principles as simply true; thus, they gain widespread credibility absent rational 	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proofs that compel the intellect.  Most import among these principles, one finds the 
sacred commitments that form the indispensable keystone of modern liberalism: “all 
members of the human race are by nature equal and alike” and “all men have a common 
birthright to freedom.”633  Or as Tocqueville puts it, “Christianity, which has rendered all 
men equal before God, will not be loath to see all citizens equal before the law.”634  
Perhaps no living political scientist has devoted more careful study to the character of 
liberal democracy, to its sustaining principles and the conditions under which those 
principles will endure, than Harry Jaffa.  He goes so far as to attribute to the Gospels the 
popularization, if not the discovery, of the sacred opinion that all men are created equal.  
It is worth emphasizing again that the idea of human equality is not self-evidently true in 
the sense of its being automatically recognizable as such.  The respects in which human 
beings are unequal—in size, strength, intelligence, virtue, creativity, inherited wealth, 
nobility of rearing, etc.—are surpassing evident.  That these inequalities of character, 
ability, and resources should not be translated into political inequality does not 
automatically follow.  And indeed, for most of the history of the West, those who thought 
themselves superior in some respect sought political power and utilized terrible means to 
achieve it—many Popes among them.  Jaffa’s point is that the idea took hold of men’s 
minds throughout the West thanks to Christianity.  Of course, Christianity had to be wrested 
from those who used its tremendous power for self-serving political ends, a point to be 
dwelled upon in some detail.  For now, it is important to note that Rome’s imperial 
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conquest of the known world had as its consequence the dissemination of the Gospel 
throughout the known world.  The result – though it took centuries – was that “the 
equality of human souls in the sight of God” was finally translated “into a political 
structure of equal political rights [that] has come to be regarded as the most authentic 
interpretation of the Gospel.”635 
Jaffa invokes Bourke Cockrane, a spokesman for the Catholic Church in America at the 
turn of the twentieth century, to further elaborate this point.  Cockrane explains with 
inimitable beauty: 
The essential principles of democracy were not first formulated in our 
Constitution, nor in our Declaration of Independence, nor in the English 
Bill of Rights, nor in Magna Carta, nor in the institutes of King Alfred, nor 
in any monument of human wisdom, evolved from human experience.  
They were first revealed by the Divine Author of Christianity when he 
taught that all men are brothers, children of the same father, equal heirs to 
the same immortal heritage beyond the grave.  As the political institutions 
under which men live always reflect the beliefs they cherish, a government 
built on the principle that all men are equal in the eye of the law resulted 
inevitably from the general acceptance of the religious doctrine that all 
men are equal in the sight of God.   
While democracy was the inevitable, it was not the immediate fruit of 
Christianity.  But this only shows that men find it easier to accept a truth 
than to regulate their lives by it.  It took less than four centuries to convert 
pagan temples into Christian churches, but it took eighteen centuries for 
the religious beliefs of Christians to bear fruit in political institutions of 
freedom.636 
It is not hard to appreciate the further respects in which New Testament Christianity (and 
the Christian ethic distilled from it and still politically important today) continues support 
tolerant liberal government:  charity, forgiveness, and neighborliness are virtues of 	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character; impartiality is a prerequisite of just judgment; a distinction between the 
obedience properly owed to Caesar and to God is explicitly sanctioned and so therefore, a 
separation between church and state; and both the Old and the New Testament place a 
high value of human freedom—in the Old Testament, the Israelites are liberated from 
Egypt (and directed thus:  “thou shalt not oppress a stranger: for ye know the heart of a 
stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt; Exodus 23:9), and in the New, 
God’s creatures are free to seek their own salvation (“Stand fast therefore in the liberty 
wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of 
bondage”; Galatians 5:1).  As Remi Brague has observed, “Outside the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, it has been rare for thinkers to suppose that God endowed us with a nature of 
our own, that freedom is part of that nature, and that it is through the exercise of 
freedom, and the errors that inevitably stem from it, that we fulfill God’s plan.”637  
To dwell further on a political virtue supportive of liberalism, consider neighborliness.  
Consistent with the notion that all of God’s creatures are brothers is a willingness to treat 
strangers well, as we would prefer ourselves to be treated.  This inclination—hardly 
automatic insofar as it resists the natural preference individuals have for their own—
thereby cuts against the most pernicious political effects of tribalism.  If a willingness to 
treat strangers as one would treat members of one’s own community—one’s neighbors—
is not precisely a prerequisite of liberal democracy, it is certainly a support.  Allow an 
anecdote to clarify the point and underline the unusualness of the disposition.  John 
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Agresto dedicates his book on Iraq to an Iraqi who worked for the Coalition and 
ultimately died for his country.  Ali al-Hilfi, touched by a favor Agresto was able to 
bestow upon his sister, “decided to change his life… he would start becoming ‘an 
American.’”  To become an American, Ali announced, “Everyday I will try to do 
something good for someone I don’t know, like you did for my sister.  That’s all.”638  Not 
a few of Iraq’s political problems (detailed in Part I) are partly explained by this fact:  
doing good works for those who are not related by blood or by kin is unusual enough to 
stand out.  
 
Separating Church and State 
In spite of their near universal acceptance in the West today, these sacred views—that 
legitimate legislative authority is derived from consent, and that the majority’s authority 
over those who have consented to be governed is nonetheless limited —are relatively 
new.  On the traditional understanding, legislative authority, the authority to give a 
people its laws, comes not from popular consent but directly from God, nor is there any 
predetermined limit to their reach into the lives of men.  The reason for this:  men are 
fallen, disappointingly constituted; the guidance of revelation is, thus, the essential 
component of a worthwhile life.  Traditional moral codes often required the strict 
regulation of human behavior—for the sake of justice, righteousness, piety, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638 John Agresto, Mugged by Reality, 3. 
	  344 
salvation—and for most of history, political authority has been utilized in support of that 
end.  
Many of the modern opinions essential to limited government on the principle of consent 
are simply incompatible with this traditional understanding according to which the 
authority of God (and those who claim the right to rule on his behalf) extends deep into 
the temporal sphere.   In the West, modern government first required a revolution in 
social consciousness generally referred to as the separation between church and state.  
This is a relatively new idea, no more than four hundred years old.  For Jefferson, who 
coined the phrase, the notion that “religion is a matter which lies solely between man & 
his god” and that men’s consciences were rightly free of state interference, is nonetheless a 
central “maxim of civil government.”  In matters of religion and state, he argued that 
“divided we stand, united, we fall.”639    
What we, somewhat lazily, call the separation of Church and State in the West implies a 
great deal.  It mandates nothing less than the establishment in legal code of a far-reaching 
species of moral indifference toward the beliefs and behavior of fellow citizens.   It 
constitutes a minimum tolerance threshold established in law and maintained by the 
state’s determined refusal to allow the community’s collective authority and power to be 
utilized to instantiate a particular moral code.  This unusual ethical disposition, a 
collective high-minded indifference to the moral choices of those we care about and live 
amongst, helps solidify other aspects of limited constitutional government including the 	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recognition of universal equality and so, equality before the law, as well as the 
containment of government to a very limited sphere beyond which individuals are free to 
pursue happiness however they personally define it.640  The separation is sustained by the 
emphatic collective denial that only the laws given by God are legitimate, and that they 
alone ought therefore to determine temporal laws.  This belief is a reversal of the 
relationship between divine law and temporal legislation posited by Judaism and Islam. 
Put another way, we believe that matters of conscience are, for the most part, properly 
private affairs.  It would be rare to find someone who believes everything that is legal (just 
in one sense) is also right (just in another, arguably higher, sense).  We believe it is right—
required by the dictates of political justice—to tolerate a variety of moral outlooks, even 
those with which we do not entirely agree, and in many cases, even those with which we 
emphatically disagree.  A person can believe that certain behaviors are simultaneously 
legal (and properly so), even if he is certain the behavior in question is repugnant, 
immoral, base, ugly, worthless, and wrong.  To take a concrete example, a man of 
profound religious faith cannot be a judge in a liberal democracy if he is unwilling or 
unable to subordinate the moral demands of his faith to the laws of state it is his first duty 
to uphold.  Laws with nothing behind them but the flimsy assent of the (oftentimes fickle, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640 Beyond this, the extension of legal indifference to all but the most basic questions of justice and 
morality (the punishment of murder, theft, rape, etc.) inevitably sets a powerful precedent for 
citizens’ private dealings with one another.  Limited government in the name of separating 
church and state—ostensibly equivalent to a political community’s refusal to sanction the use of 
the state to enforce or condone a particular moral code —in fact provides a moral education by 
its very absence: the decision not to enforce a collective morality is in practice to indicate no 
moral code need be, no moral code is worth being, promoted.  When the public declines to 
enthusiastically endorse a moral code it (unintentionally) creates the impression no collective 
morality is required. 
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selfish, shortsighted, unenlightened) majority determine what is just from the perspective 
of the state even when that legislation comes into conflict with laws (an individual believes 
are) given by God.  Minimizing our expectations of political justice—the standards of 
right enforced by the regime through its laws—to a set of rules and procedures applied 
equally to all, and that allow a generous space for private action, belief, and worship, is a perquisite 
of religious toleration.   
As Mark Lilla has pointed out, this kind of legislated moral indifference is a truly 
remarkable, and historically unusual, achievement.  For it requires a prior, and not easily 
accomplished (even unnatural) transformation of society’s moral outlook.  It requires that 
a political community deemphasize the concerns that have traditionally been most 
important to human beings:  the soul, its immortality, and the requirements of salvation.  
Lilla calls this the “Great Separation” and explains that at the root of political liberalism is 
first and above all an “intellectual separation”: 
We speak frequently of the separation of church and state as being 
fundamental to any modern democratic system of government.  But for it 
to be successful, a prior, and much difficult, separation needs to be made in 
a society’s habits of mind.  Letting God be is not an easy thing to do, and 
cannot be induced simply by drawing a line between church and state 
institutions within a constitution, or dictating rules of toleration.  For many 
believers in the biblical religions, today as in the seventeenth century, 
sundering the connection between political form and divine revelation 
seems a betrayal of God, whose commandments are comprehensive.  
Intellectual separation is difficult to accept and requires theological 
adaptation to be spiritually plausible; God must be conceived more 
abstractly, as having imposed upon himself a certain distance from the 
mechanics of political life.  Such a theological transformation is 
unimaginable in many religious traditions, and difficult in all of them…  
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But it does seem to be a necessary condition of political liberalization and 
democratization as we understand [the terms].641 
In another work, Lilla goes so far as to note that Western civilization is the historical 
anomaly in this respect.  The dis-integration of political theology and political theory—
that is, the complete severance of careful thought about the demands of God revealed in 
holy books from man’s theorizing about the best political arrangement—is the hallmark 
intellectual achievement of the modern West.  No other major civilization shares the 
assumptions underlying it.  This singular achievement has made tolerant secular 
government possible in only a handful of Western democracies today.642  
 
Liberalizing Christianity in a Spiritually Plausible Way 
That aspects of Christianity are conducive of political liberalism does not mean the 
Christian world was always liberal.  It is worth recalling that the flood of religious refuges 
moved from West to East during the wars of religion in Europe.  Indeed, the crimes 
committed by Christians—Papists and Protestant alike—in the name of Christianity 
equal in ferocity, if they do not exceed, the crimes committed in the name of Islam today.  
Christianity has proven itself no less susceptible than Islam to being hijacked and utilized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
641 Mark Lilla, “Coping with Political Theology,” Cato Unbound.  8 October, 2007. 
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2007/10/08/mark-lilla/coping-with-political-theology/ 
642 Lilla goes so far as to suggest this audacious departure from the historical norm, at once the 
precondition of modern liberalism, has simultaneously imparted to Western civilization an 
intellectual and moral fragility only superficially concealed by its military might (Lilla, 2007).  The 
public abandonment of the pursuit of moral certitude makes possible, on the one hand, a new 
level of tolerance for different moral outlooks and ways of living; on the other, however, it 
undermines the possibility of widespread confidence in the righteousness of a particular way of 
life, in this case even the one it makes possible:  tolerant liberal democracy. 
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for illiberal political purposes by vain and enterprising men—be they princes or priests.  
Moderating Christianity’s theocratic, fanatical, and absolutist tendencies was a long and 
difficult process.  The first act, the Reformation, in fact set off the very religious wars that 
convulsed the Christian world for more than a century.  How, then, was this “Great 
Separation” brought about in the West?  How we were able, how were we persuaded to, 
‘let God be?’  
The indispensable step was a reinterpretation of scripture that actually authorized or “made 
plausible” a separation between the affairs of God and the affairs of men.  The 
Reformation struck the first blow.  Luther’s radical insistence that salvation was attainable 
to individual Christians without the intermediation of the Catholic Church helped 
establish the dignity of the individual—his moral capacity to rule himself—in the 
Christian world.  Erasmus’ high profile disagreement with Luther—on the question of 
free will—amplified the argument in favor of individualism, and demonstrated in fact the 
power and the propriety of the application of human reason to theological questions.  
Their ideas are remarkable in many respects, not least for their immediate political 
impact.  Though he did not support it, Luther’s ideas inspired the Peasants Revolt in 
Germany, the largest popular uprising in history until the French Revolution; their Ten 
Points, a manifesto justifying political action, called for the establishment of democratic 
government on the basis that the teachings of the Gospels demanded it.  Similarly, with 
memories of the Crusades, ostensibly undertaken in the name of Christianity scarcely 
faded, the Christian world’s theologians were expounding the virtues of tolerance; Luther, 
for instance, advised “tolerance toward Muslims and their rights” and “respect for their 
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commendable qualities and conduct.” In putting forth these views, however, Luther 
inadvertently helped to open a schism in the Christian world that would be used by 
power hungry priests and princes to set sect against sect for the sake of material and 
political gain. 
By the time Benedict Spinoza made his contribution, religious wars among Christians 
had been raging for well over one hundred years.  This is one of the main reasons why 
he, and later John Locke, advance more radical, expressly political, arguments about the 
propriety of freedom of conscience.  On the professed authority of the Gospels, they also 
propose a new way of interpreting scripture that would emphasize tolerance and 
neighborliness as requirements of faith.  Spinoza, in particular, insists that the New 
Testament properly understood supports, even requires, a tolerant and democratic regime 
devoted to securing the freedom of its inhabitants.  For this reason, Martin Yaffe, among 
others, regards Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise as “the philosophical founding-
document of both modern biblical criticism and modern liberal democracy.”643  Steven 
Nadler goes as far in his analysis, but from a different (perhaps more fundamental) angle; 
with Spinoza’s Ethics, the Theologico-Political Treatise contains the “analyses” that would 
“contribute to undermining both the practical ability of religious authorities to control 
our emotional, intellectual, and physical lives and the theoretical justification they employ 
for doing so.”644  That Locke, too, professed to argue from religious principles, not against 
them, is similarly the reason his project to normalize the toleration of a diversity of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643 Martin Yaffe ed, “Translator’s Remarks” in Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise (Newburyport, 
MA: Focus Publishing, 2004), vii. 
644 Steven Nadler, A Book Forged in Hell, 32. 
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religious sects in a civil commonwealth succeeded.   
It is worth dwelling on Spinoza’s method insofar as he revolutionized political life—and 
man’s conception of himself—in the West.  Most important, Spinoza reads the Bible 
critically, taking liberties no pious commentator had ever dared.  Theologians at the time 
condemned the work in the harshest possible terms:  “a godless document”; one that 
“ought to be buried forever in an eternal oblivion”; an “atheistic book… full of 
abominations… which every reasonable person should find abhorrent.”645  And yet 
Spinoza’s approach won the day, in large because he appeals to both man’s reason and 
religiosity to advance an argument the reader should find attractive.   
He begins by justifying his approach, that is, by denying that the divine law as revealed 
through the Prophets and the Apostles must be interpreted literally in all respects.  With 
the exception of Moses and Christ, he musters scriptural evidence to support his claim 
that “no one received what was revealed of God except through the imagination”; that is 
to say, “God manifested himself to the Apostles through the mind of Christ.”646  He goes 
on to make the rather irreverent assertion that the Prophets were, on the whole, quite a 
disappointing group; God had to “accommodate[] revelations to the grasp and opinions 
of the Prophets.”647  In particular, Spinoza demonstrates that the Prophets were 
“ignorant of matters that have to do with theory alone and not with charity and the 
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conduct of life.”648  As a result, what they reported was mainly a result of their own 
idiosyncrasies; much of the Bible, therefore, is but a product of their overactive 
imaginations.  This is how Spinoza professes to show that their accounts cannot be taken 
as literally true.  Since scripture is clear on a further point – that “God poured his Spirit in 
human beings” – even without clerical supervision, “we too might perceive the mind of 
God… since natural knowledge is common to all his beings.”649  By taking this last step—
that is, by alleging that the word of God and the laws of nature are identical—Spinoza 
professes to show that according to God, we are all so constituted as to access knowledge 
of God and nature quite as well as the Prophets were.  
Spinoza underlines this point in his radical refutation of miracles.  Miracles, he tells us, 
are supposed to be important “signs” certifying the truth of particular revelations.650  
Weakly citing Exodus, however, he equates “God’s direction” to a “fixed and 
unchangeable order of nature.”  Thus, God’s decrees are nothing more than “the 
universal laws of nature, in accordance with which everything comes to be and is 
determined.”651  What men call miracles are really aberrant accounts concocted by 
deficient minds to make sense of the things they cannot explain.  The real proof of God is 
that nothing contrary to his decrees (nature’s fixed and eternal order) could ever occur.  
God’s will is thereby identified with his understanding.  A perfect understanding never 
changes.  If such an eternal order can be known by the human intellect—and Spinoza 
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has already asserted that it can be—then human beings are capable of knowing the truth 
by their own lights.  What follows from this is important from the perspective of liberal 
democracy:  the authority of divine law is seriously undermined if the accounts in the 
Bible cannot be trusted; but since human beings are capable of apprehending the world 
for themselves by their natural lights, they constituted in a way to give themselves 
reasonably good laws, even on the principle of consent. 
With this, the “goal I am aiming at,” as Spinoza puts it, “namely separating Philosophy 
from Theology,” would seem to be all but complete.652  Indeed, there is evidence to 
suggest the primary purpose of the Treatise is to free philosophy from the domineering 
master that was Medieval Scholasticism; he insists reason should no longer “serve as 
handmaid to theology.”653  His project is achieved by doing three things simultaneously:  
he casts doubt on the substance of the better part of scripture as it had been interpreted 
by religious authorities (by, in particular, denying the infallibility of revelation and 
rejecting miracles outright); he asserted the identity of God and nature; and he presumed 
its knowability by the human intellect which has infinite reach.  If he did not quite prove 
each proposition, he did offer novel scriptural justifications at key junctures.  But keeping 
in mind his goal is not a pious one, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that what Spinoza 
has shown is not, on an honest interpretation, actually mandated by the scripture; at best, 
it is tolerated by scripture.  In other words, he has claimed the alternating authority of 
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both reason and revelation for his assertions, but neither reason nor revelation mandates 
the entire result.   
In this connection, it is important to note two further things.  First, by his selection of a 
verse from the Book of John to adorn the title page, he may well mean to communicate 
his belief that Christianity is well suited, perhaps uniquely so among the monotheistic 
religions, to permit the coexistence of rational and religious faith in the same political 
community.  John begins “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, 
and the Word was God.”  The Greek word for “word” is λογος (logos), which means 
something closer to “rational speech.”  The specific verse Spinoza chooses (I John 4:13) 
invokes again God’s special gift to man (“He has given us of his Spirit”) in order to 
emphasize man’s affinity to God, and therefore man’s ability to know God (“we know 
that we remain in God and God remains in us”).  In the face of this implied identity—of 
God and reason—it is possible to dispute suggestions that there is a diametric opposition 
between reason and revelation on the grounds of the New Testament.  While early 
Islamic theology made a deliberate place for reason following Islam’s encounter with 
Greek philosophy, later theologians and jurists forbade the application of reason to 
human questions, a development with no shortage of pernicious repercussions, not a few 
of which are discussed in the next chapters.  Second, Spinoza was aware that most men 
are not, and will never be, philosophers; those who live according to opinion and 
superstition (those he calls the vulgar), moreover, are susceptible to the inflaming arts of 
clever demagogues.  It follows that the character of the political community’s sacred 
opinions matters a great deal, especially if one is particularly concerned about the 
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regime’s stability.  Thus, Spinoza’s work is far from finished.  Persuading the masses—
whose gullibility is, on Spinoza’s account, the reason religion is so powerful in the 
world—is not, in the end, as easy as presenting a philosophically-sophisticated new way to 
read the Bible.   
For this reason, Spinoza does not appear to be an arch rationalist on the model of a 
Voltaire.  For he wants to emphasize, even to champion, those aspects of the Christian 
faith that are conducive to stable, gentle, well-ordered politics.  Thus, in authorizing 
man’s application of reason to the natural order and the word of God, he appears to hold 
something back: “We accordingly conclude that we are not bound to believe the Prophets 
in anything else besides what is the aim and substance of the revelation.  In the rest, each 
is free to believe as he wants.”654  What is the overall “aim and substance” of the New 
Testament, an area in which he seems to reserve at least the trappings of divine 
authority?  Spinoza had earlier said that while Prophets were “ignorant” of theoretical 
matters, they were sufficiently well equipped to communicate the revelations they 
received from Christ concerning “charity and the conduct of life” without distorting 
them.  For the “vulgar,” then, Spinoza labors to show with copious references to Biblical 
verse that what can be known with certitude from sacred scripture essentially amounts to 
this:  “there exists a highest being who loves Justice and Charity and whom all, so that 
they may be saved, are bound to obey and adore by the cultivation of Justice and Charity 
toward their neighbor.”655  Thus, he distills a very gentle “catholic faith” from scripture, 
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one that is perfectly suited to supporting tolerant liberal democracy.   
And this, Spinoza explains at the end of his book, was his intention all along.  Reason 
must be liberated as we have seen.  But for that, the hatreds and anger that can be turned 
against philosophers, especially well by those claiming philosophy undermines the 
community’s religion, must be quelled.  Freedom—of thought and action—is both the 
end and the way. 
The aim of the Republic is not, I say, to make human beings from rational 
beings into beasts or puppets, but, on the contrary, it is for their mind and 
body to function safely in their functions and for them to use free reason 
and not struggle in hatred, in anger, or with a ruse, and not bear an 
inequitable spirit toward one another.  The aim of a Republic, therefore, is 
really freedom.656 
Freedom of conscience is thus more than simply a good to be desired.  It is, in fact, the 
precondition of stable and gentle politics—the condition of securing all manner of 
freedoms—because freedom of conscious and religious pluralism effectively tame religious 
belief, and thereby, the violence it can inspire.  Spinoza’s key insight in this respect:  
people do not become fanatical about beliefs they themselves are free to choose or not to 
choose.  People become attached to beliefs all the more fervently in proportionate to their 
fear someone might attempt to take them away, or to punish them violently for believing 
the impermissible.  As Spinoza puts it at the outset of his book (in reference to the wars of 
religion, the atrocities committed by Christians of one sect against those of another), “As 
for the seditions that are aroused by a show of religion, they in fact arise in that laws are 
set down concerning theoretical matters, and opinions are considered a crime and 
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condemned as though they were wicked deeds.”657  
Spinoza’s point:  religion welded to coercive authority leads to fanatical belief; private, 
un-coerced, religious belief does not.  Moreover, violence committed in the name of 
fanatical belief proceeds to further amplify fanatical belief among other believers.  By 
asserting the intellect’s authority and its capacity to discern “theoretical matters” for 
itself—that is, by marshaling divine authority in the service of freedom of conscience—
and by simultaneously emphasizing charity and gentleness as cardinal virtues, he has 
offered an interpretation of the Bible, new sacred opinions, that cannot become a weapon 
of the vain churchmen and ambitious princes who would abuse scripture’s tremendous 
authority to amass political power and wealth for themselves (corrupting both politics and 
religion in the process).  Put another way, an interpretation of Christianity that denies the 
legitimacy of compelling obedience—one that recommends neighborliness above all—
can never become a tool of terror and oppression.  To sunder the link between politics 
and religion, it suffices to persuade Christians that the overlap is unchristian, a corruption 
of the true teaching.  As a corollary, a political regime in which “only what is done were 
reproved and what is said were said with impunity” will rarely see controversies rooted in opinion 
turn violent.658  Again, very few become so fanatically attached to opinions they are free 
to hold or not hold with impunity as to be willing to fight and die for them. 
John Locke’s Letter Concerning Religious Toleration follows the same logic.  For present 
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to persuade his audience that True religion “is not instituted in order to the erecting of an 
external pomp, nor to the obtaining of ecclesiastical dominion,” but for personal spiritual 
reasons:  “to the regulating of men’s lives, according to the rules of virtue and piety.”  
Since the Gospels authorize little overlap between earthly and ecclesial authority, he 
posits two separate spheres:  one devoted to the civil interests of men (“life, liberty, health, 
and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things”) 659 which is therefore 
properly “confined to the care of the things of this world”;660 and a second devoted to the 
things of “the world to come.”  The latter is the sphere of the church, which, Locke 
emphasizes, is “a voluntary society” one that joins men together for purposes of worship 
and “the salvation of their souls.”  After all, “penalties are no way capable to produce 
[genuine] belief” (force and fear cannot “convince the mind”),661  and since only minds 
freely convinced of the God’s truth will achieve salvation, there is no conceivable 
scriptural justification for the compulsion of outward religious observance. Princes, 
furthermore, who are “certainly less concerned for my salvation than I myself am,” can 
make no special claim to knowledge of “the one only way which leads to heaven.”662  The 
conclusion Locke underlines: “In vain, therefore, do princes compel their subjects to 
come into their Church communion, under pretence of saving their souls.  If they believe, 
they will come of their own accord, if they believe not, their coming will nothing avail 
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them.”663  
The same argument annihilates any clerical claim to temporal authority.  For there is no 
legitimate ecclesiastical use for coercive power:  first, it has been established that 
obedience of conscience cannot be compelled; and second, Locke explains that New 
Testament Christianity is properly a personal faith; “[Christ], indeed, hath taught men 
how, by faith and good works, they may obtain eternal life; but He instituted no 
commonwealth.  He prescribed unto His Followers no new and peculiar form of 
government.”664  Thus, just as magistrates are confined to the civil sphere, so priests 
“ought to be confined within the bounds of the Church,” that voluntary organization; 
from this it follows—again, on the authority of Biblical teachings—that “the boundaries 
on both sides are fixed and immovable.”665  Force rightfully “belongs wholly to the civil 
magistrate”666 to be used exclusively for the limited purposes it is good for:  for civil 
purposes.  The civil purposes which in the first place oblige “men to enter into society 
with one another, that by mutual assistance and joint force they may secure unto each” 
their lives, their liberty and their property, has the further effect of establishing a limit 
beyond which the deployment of force drawn from the collective is not legitimate.  The 
limit, of course, is established by the judgment of the consenting parties; only the 
incursions they judge necessary to securing life, liberty, and property are permissible.   
One further consequence of Locke’s line of argument deserves emphasis:  if no human 	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authority can verifiably claim Divine knowledge, “a controversy between [two] churches 
about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on both sides equal.”  
Furthermore, since nothing is more important than salvation, and since no one cares 
about a particular individual’s salvation more than he himself, religious toleration is 
“agreeable… to the genuine reason of mankind”667; that is, a rational actor will insist on 
“ecclesiastical liberty” because it is “necessary to the salvation of [his] soul.”668  On this 
question, scripture agrees with reason, or so Locke would have us believe; for he 
proceeds, now, to insist religious toleration is “agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ” 
and even “the chief characteristic mark of the true Church.”669  Sundering the link 
between high priest and prince means no priest, no prince, can claim the authority to 
arbitrate religious disputes with any claim to confidence.   
From all of this it follows that there are only two species of opinion, expressions of which 
are not to be tolerated according to God and reason:  atheistic, and those which are 
“contrary… to the preservation of civil society.”670  Atheists are noxious because “the 
bonds of human society”—promises, covenants, and oaths—“can have no hold upon” 
them.  An opinion impermissible for being poisonous to the legitimate purposes of civil 
society is any that might “tend to establish dominion over others.”671  Locke is crystal 
clear on this point:  no religion that requires specific “ecclesiastical laws do there 
unavoidably become part of the civil,” or that reserves this-worldly obedience to an 	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authority other than the civil magistrate, can claim the privilege of being tolerated.672  
Religions that deny the legitimacy of the separation of church and state cannot demand a 
place in the commonwealth on the basis of its having separated church and state. 
It remains, at this point, only to consider how Locke has resolved the problem of religious 
fanaticism.  He takes up the objection to his entire schema that would have been obvious 
to all the time he wrote it:  religious toleration should seem a recipe for disaster; it is to 
advocate the intermixture of the very sects that have demonstrated themselves most 
“inclinable to factions, tumults, and civil wars.”  Locke’s reply:  “Is that the fault of the 
Christian religion?”673  If it is, no commonwealth should tolerate Christianity!  For on the 
argument Locke has advanced, a religion “turbulent and destructive to the civil peace” is 
both impermissible and unchristian.  Since Christianity, his readers would no doubt 
agree, “is the most modest and peaceable religion there ever was,” the cause of the wars 
of religion in Christian Europe must lie outside religion itself.   
And it does.  It lies, for Locke, in “the refusal of toleration to those that are of different 
opinions.”674  Not Christianity, but the leaders of the Church are to blame.  For “moved 
by avarice and insatiable desire of dominion,” they manipulated princes by appealing to 
their ambition for worldly conquest and dominion; together, prince and high priest 
preyed on “the credulous superstition of the giddy multitude,” for the sake of amassing 
power and wealth.  They used believers’ faith in another world to achieve their own 
worldly ambitions.  They did so, moreover, by corrupting Christianity.  Only by ignoring 	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“the laws of the Gospel” and its “precepts of charity,” and preaching lies (while claiming 
divine authority) were they able to so inflame Christians that Protestants came to view 
Catholics as “schismatics and heretics… to be outed of their possessions and destroyed” 
(and vice versa).  Those suffering such evils naturally thought it “lawful for them to resist 
force with force.”  Locke now underlines what Spinoza noticed earlier:  crimes committed 
in the name of fanatical belief tend to amplify fanatical belief.  There is but one solution:  
render Christianity itself insusceptible to such manner of abuse by vain and fallen men by 
reinterpreting scripture in such a way as to make fanaticism itself the greatest evil.  This is 
what Lock’s Letter professes to do.  It establishes on the basis of reason and the Gospels 
that the most intolerable belief is that Christianity legitimates violence in the name 
coercing belief.   
The novel rereadings of the Bible proposed by Spinoza and Locke exerted a profound 
influence, both in Europe and America.  In his monumental history of Christianity, 
Diarmaid MacCulloch credits Spinoza with being the first to demand “the Bible be 
treated as critically as any other text.”675  By addressing theologians and preachers in 
addition to philosophic readers, moreover, he hoped his ideas would trickle down.676 
They did.  Within a few decades, ordinary believers in the West felt free to mock Jesus—a 
startling new development for the time.677  What is more, a revolution in criticism, one 
that built upon the efforts of Luther and Erasmus, was the beginning of a new spirit of 
toleration in Europe.  MacCulloch observes that 	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[a]s a result of this new scrutiny of the Bible, there was a growing feeling 
among some Western Christians that not merely other Christianities or 
even Judaism, but other world religions, might provide insight into truth…  
This new spirit of reverent openness directly related to the worldwide 
reach of Western power and trade by 1700.  Islam seemed much less 
threatening politically as the Ottoman, Iranian and Moghul empires fell 
into decay.  Now educated Europeans had a much better chance of 
understanding this other monotheism.678  
Brad Gregory has gone even further.  In the context of Spinoza’s Theologico-Political 
Treatise, he observes that even the Church embraced the Enlightenment’s metaphysical 
and epistemological assumptions without realizing their magnitude or consequence for 
religious authority: 
 
[M]ost theologians could not see how the construction of the ‘academic 
Bible’ and the ‘Enlightenment Bible’ was displacing scripture in the service 
of novel ideologies of self, society, and the state because nearly all of them 
unself-consciously held univocal metaphysical beliefs in common with the 
rationalizing biblical scholars…   
The vast majority of theologians seem simply to have been unaware of the 
implications of their own metaphysical assumptions for the ways in which 
the relationship between the natural and the supernatural was being 
construed.  Even Catholic theologians were unlikely to see how deeply the 
Enlightened rejection of the biblical God, whether in aggressive or subtle 
forms, impinged on their sacramental worldview.679 
In its denial that theology monopolized the entire intellectual sphere (and therewith, by 
denying that revelation was the only source of just law), this new manner of interpreting 
the Bible—proposed by Spinoza among others—made a place for the new political 
teachings of the Enlightenment and later, the more radical contributions of the Romantic 
Movement.  Liberal government, as we know it today, would be impossible absent this 
transformation of mind. 	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Locke’s contribution was equally important.  It is impossible to read James Madison on 
religious freedom and not think of the Letter.  As Mark Hall has shown, Lockean ideas 
were ubiquitous in America in the decades leading up to the Constitutional Conventional 
Convention; more often than not, they were united to the Gospels and expressed from the 
pulpit itself.  Such profound influence can be attributed to mere words only because the 
arguments could credibly marshal the authority of Christianity.  They did not simply 
condemn princes who sought to inflame religious passion for political gain, nor did they 
blame religion itself for the crimes committed in its name; they were successful because 
they cited the Gospels to support their proposition that princes cannot legitimately claim 
religious authority, nor churchmen, secular authority.  They were successful because they 
demonstrated that the Bible mandates freedom of conscience and there too, the toleration 
of a plurality of religious sects.  Thus, the diffusion of new sacred opinions legitimized the 
proposition that church and state are properly confined to separate spheres. 
 
Locke only hints that of the monotheistic religions, New Testament Christianity may be 
particularly well suited to this separation.  His examples of religions pernicious to a civil 
state based on consent were Islam (likely also a stand-in for the Papists) and “the 
commonwealth of the Jews” which was once an “absolute theocracy.”680  Christianity, in 
contrast, emerged while Rome was, politically and militarily, at its zenith.  The Empire 
was powerful, but decadent and debauched; it needed moral reform, not political reform.  
Thus, Christianity emerged as a system of morality in a world dominated by a single 
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powerful state.  A historian might put it this way:  New Testament Christianity made no 
claims to comprehensive political authority because it could not credibly have done so.  
Worship and adherence was, in the beginning, a private and voluntary affair because it 
had to be.  Christians, far from receiving state support, were persecuted for their beliefs, a 
dynamic that would have immense political consequences.  Moreover, as Bernard Weiss 
explains, Christendom was not built on anything that can be termed “Christian law”; 
rather, the Christian world absorbed, if it did not grow out of, Rome’s legal strictures 
(which were, themselves, republican in origin).  As Weiss puts it, 
When during the fourth century Christianity finally prevailed politically, it 
took over the empire within which it had spread, including its law.  Thus 
Roman law would become the foundational law of the Christian world.681 
That Christianity was, at its beginning, a system of morality that made no claims to total 
political authority may be one important reason the reinterpretations put forth during the 
Reformation (as well as by Spinoza and Locke) proved to be spiritually plausible.682  
Islam, in contrast, emerged in a barbaric time—as a complete moral, political, and 
economic order—and was spread from the beginning at the sword of a great conqueror.  
With the religious commandments He revealed, Mohammed brought order and justice to 
an expansive territory, what required the enforcement of a comprehensive legal code. 
Where Jesus denied the appropriateness of wielding total temporal authority in God’s 
name, Mohammed demanded nothing less.  The Biblical injunction “Render Unto 
Caesar What is Caesar’s” has no operative equivalent in the Qur’an.  In fact, Weiss 
explains that Islam’s self-understanding is almost precisely the opposite: 	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In the world of Islam, all such consciousness was resisted.  Islam spread 
throughout the world with a very different kind of consciousness, a 
consciousness of bringing a new law and polity to areas it overran, of 
inaugurating a new religiopolitical era.  The Muslims did not appropriate 
an empire but rather created one.  For Christians, the Roman empire 
remained Roman.  The caliphal empire was decidedly not Roman (nor, 
for that matter, Sassanian); it was Arab and Islamic.  Islam’s mission was 
precisely to bring to the world a new polity and law, replacing all 
outmoded polities and laws.683 
 
 
The Dependence of American Republicanism on Christianity 
 
The American Founders agreed with the understated aspects of Locke and Spinoza’s 
assessment of Christianity, admittedly somewhat obscured by their manner of criticism:  
free government depends on specific virtues of character best cultivated by a depoliticized 
Christianity.  Just as Locke and Spinoza intimated Christianity’s importance to the 
continued cultivation of honesty and neighborliness, so American statesmen have long 
believed public religiosity to be an important support for republican citizenship.   
The maintenance of morals was so important to the Anti-federalists, in particular, that 
one of their most urgent arguments against the establishment of a large commercial 
republic with a powerful central government was that it might reduce the political 
importance of Christianity by locating national politicians too often too far from the 
watchful eyes of their congregations.  Less well known is the fact that even the most 
prominent Federalists identified Christianity as an important support for the 
Constitutional arrangement that made America.  George Washington, for instance, urged 
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Americans in his first message to Congress “to discriminate the spirit of liberty from that 
of licentiousness—cherishing the first, avoiding the last.”  In his Farewell address, 
America’s foremost model of a man of first character exhorted his fellow citizens to 
practice their faith for the sake of the country. 
…Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, 
Religion and morality are indispensable supports.  In vain would that man 
claim the tribute of Patriotism who should labor to subvert these great 
pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of Men and 
citizens.  The mere Politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect 
and to cherish them.  A volume could not trace all their connections with 
the private and public felicity.  Let it simply be asked where is the security 
for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert 
the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice?  
And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be 
maintained without religion.  Whatever may be conceded to the influence 
of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience 
both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of 
religious principle…684  
John Adams agreed.  As he famously put it, “We have no government armed with power 
capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion. Avarice, 
ambition, revenge, or gallantry, would break the strongest cords of our Constitution as a 
whale goes through a net. Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious 
people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.”  Even Alexander 
Hamilton, upon leaving government some eight years after the Constitution was ratified, 
made this ominous declaration:  “Ah, this is the constitution… Now mark my words!  So 
long as we are a young and virtuous people, this instrument will bind us together in 
mutual interests, mutual welfare, and mutual happiness.  But when we become old and 
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corrupt, it will bind us no longer.”685   Upon reading of the horrible excesses of the 
French Revolution, he is said to have gone even further, remarking in George 
Washington’s home that “Religion and morality are essential props” for the arrangement 
established by the American Constitution.686 687  
The Tocquevillean articulation never fails to leap to mind on occasions such as these. 
Christianity not only helped make essential principles of political liberalism “spiritually 
plausible” in the first place; American Christianity also supported mores and opinions 
conducive to the maintenance of freedom.  Tocqueville perceived that as political 
freedom increases, moral bonds must be tightened.688  In America, the dangers that 
spring from individualism—tyranny of the majority and mild despotism, especially—are 
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mitigated where the citizens remained bound to one another, and to higher ideals, thanks 
to shared religious convictions.  Rampant materialism was one of Tocqueville’s fears.  By 
equalizing all citizens in political impotence, while simultaneously protecting property 
and contracts, “democracy favors the taste for material enjoyments.”  For Tocqueville, 
religiosity combats this insofar as it is the “general, simple, practical means of teaching 
men the immortality of the soul.”689  That men and women continue to believe they have 
a soul is important because once they come to believe “that all is nothing but matter,” 
theoretical materialism transforms individualism—what draws people to put their own 
concerns ahead of their community’s—into a selfish and narrow materialism.  It is a short 
step from theoretical nihilism to practical hedonists and for a hedonist, there is no reason 
to pursue or refrain from anything unless the result will be increased pleasure.  That is not 
a good citizen.  Tocqueville thereby echoes the concern expressed by Washington and 
Locke:  without a powerful support for honesty and neighborliness—opinions that tie 
people to their communities and keep them good—democracy very quickly degenerates 
into an ugly brand of tyranny of the majority, citizens using the rights and privileges of 
citizenship to advance the interest of their narrow coteries.  Upright democratic 
government requires that the citizens love their commonwealth and exhibit an impressive 
degree to self-control.  Christianity teaches self-restraint while simultaneously teaching 
men to love their fellows, even those they do not know personally.690 
Edmund Burke conveys Tocqueville’s essential point with art and concision: 
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Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition to put 
moral chains upon their own appetites,—in proportion as their love to justice is 
above their rapacity,—in proportion as their soundness and sobriety of 
understanding is above their vanity and presumption,—in proportion as they are 
more disposed to listen to the counsels of the wise and good, in preference to the 
flattery of knaves. Society cannot exist, unless a controlling power upon will and 
appetite be placed somewhere; and the less of it there is within, the more there 
must be without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of 
intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters.691 
 
 
How European Romanticism Gave Birth to Tolerance and Hyper-tolerance 
 
And yet, the opinions put forth by Enlightenment and Reformation thinkers—though 
sufficient to depoliticize Christianity—did not alone suffice to build the social 
consciousness of the contemporary West.  For the presumption that certainty on the most 
difficult questions is possible—whether it is achieved by reason or revelation—leads 
inexorably to attempts to instantiate those truths by force, to use the public appeal of 
professed truths to accumulate and deploy political authority.  Enlightenment thinkers, 
none more than Spinoza, tended to believe all of nature—its natural laws and its moral 
laws—could be discovered by rational investigation, that human beings were sufficiently 
endowed to discover those laws without divine help, and that all of nature’s truths were 
consistent.  What they did not sufficiently appreciate is how little room they had left for 
disagreement among those who were absolutely certain their opinions were the right 
ones.  Or put another way, the assumption that an ordered nature can be known entirely 
by unaided human reason opens the way to fanatical attachments to rational accounts of 
what is best for mankind, while at an instant undermining centuries of tradition—the 	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moral convictions built over time on the authority of revealed teachings—that might 
otherwise have stood in the way of this new species of certitude.   
Certain answers to the most important moral and political questions, professedly achieved 
by reason, can inspire both utopian political treatises and dangerous political ambition—
quite as well, in fact, as religious certainty can lead to fanaticism when political authority 
is intermingled with it.  Thus, Enlightenment ideas helped to fuel the French Revolution 
and its terrors.  The terrible totalitarian movements of the twentieth century in the 
West—National Socialism and Soviet Communism—were, likewise, inspired by atheistic 
ideologies that sought to engineer totally new societies on the basis of theories and the 
theorists who believed they had discovered truths worth instantiating.   
To move from certitude that there is single unalterable truth according to which all of 
society should be organized, whether derived from revelation or discovered by human 
reason, to the acceptance of the possibility that a variety of ways of living may be 
worthwhile, and that the political arrangement should protects individuals’ freedom to 
pursue happiness as they themselves conceive of it within very generous boundaries 
protected by law, a further revolution in social consciousness was necessary.   Isaiah 
Berlin calls European Romanticism “the greatest single shift in the consciousness of the 
West that has occurred.”692 Its new emphasis on sentimentality and emotion, the charms 
of aesthetic life, love, all the things men and women feel—in a word, the inner (and not 
always fully rational) life of the individual—represents a dramatic step away from the 
thitherto accepted assumption that public life should, so far as possible, be organized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692 Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, 1. 
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according to a single coherent system of morality.  This privileging of the sentimental side 
of man, so long suppressed by authoritative conceptions of good and evil, noble and base, 
decent and obscene, would progressively replace what had for a long time been the North 
Star of European civilization:  the search for truth, rational or religious, and the belief 
that the community should be organized according to it.   
European Romanticism—ironically made possible by the Enlightenment’s assault on 
authority—amplified it from a new, and arguably more powerful, direction.  If truth 
cannot be known, other excellences are elevated:  creativity, genius, beauty, passion, the 
sublime, depth of feeling, etc.  Thus, from the middle of the Eighteenth Century, worthy 
action—the meaning of “noble”—comes increasingly to be interpreted in light of a loose 
constellation of often incompatible standards, and less and less, measured against a man’s 
fidelity to truth or his righteousness.693   Suddenly grand action—(insert your own 
definition)—means more than the pursuit of wisdom or virtue, both of these things, 
irreparably rooted in thought.  It became possible, perhaps for the first time, to admire 
another’s dedication to ideals one did not share, and in some cases, ideals one 
emphatically rejected.694  Only the arts that speak directly and so powerfully to sentiment 
could ever have achieved so thorough a revolution in our pattern of living. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693 Isaiah Berlin, The Roots of Romanticism, 10. 
694 Berlin’s illustrative example here is Voltaire’s portrayal of Mohammed.  It is, for us, possible to 
admire a person’s dedication to a standard of human virtue or excellence that contradicts our 
own entirely.  The admiration many bien-pensants today reluctantly express for Palestinian 
terrorists – whom admirers, of course, call “freedom fighters” – is a modern, and equally 
illustrative, example.  
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The resultant toleration of significant disagreements on the most fundamental questions 
of justice and morality is perhaps the most impressive (i.e., the most difficult) achievement 
from the perspective of limited and liberal government.  To accept with indifference that 
fellow citizens, family members, clansmen, etc.—people to whom one is united by 
powerful bonds of affection—will disagree profoundly on the most fundamental 
questions, and should in those cases be absolved of their fellows’ and the political 
community’s censure while maintaining all the protections and benefits of membership, is 
not in any way an automatic disposition.  Where individuals care deeply for one another, 
one would rather expect great efforts to be made to save those who stray from the right 
path.  Put another way, it is not unusual that those who care about us take an active 
interest in the morality or propriety of our decisions; it is far more unusual to expect that 
those who care most for us will muster passive indifference in the face of choices they 
believe to be profoundly misguided.   
For all the respects in which the Enlightenment and the Romantic Movement’s dominant 
minds disagreed, their effect coalesced in two respects of decisive political consequence.  
First, existing moral and intellectual sources of authority were undermined.  Percy 
Shelley, a poet of the Romantic era, remarks quite beautifully in this connection as 
follows:  
authority began to be shaken, not only in poetry but in the whole sphere of 
[arts and letters]…  The subtle skepticism of Hume, the solemn irony of 
Gibbon, the daring paradoxes of Rousseau, and the biting ridicule of 
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Voltaire, directed the energies of four extraordinary minds to shake every 
portion of the reign of authority.695    
Second, this erosion of confidence in old opinions and old sources of authoritative moral 
guidance (and even the possibility thereof) made possible, as the logic of Romantic ideas 
unfolded into relativism, a dramatic radicalization of individualism.  Romanticism, by 
progressively divorcing the definition of worthy action from any single conception of 
virtue or excellence apprehended by the intellect, appears in practice to legitimate the 
freer and freer and freer pursuit of happiness.  Thus, the private sphere continues to 
expand in the American mind.  
When the American Founders spoke of the pursuit of happiness, happiness bore an 
essential connection to virtue understood along classical or Christian lines.  By 
disconnecting the idea of happiness from notions of excellence (whether intellectual or 
moral), which depend for their continuation across generations on confident espousal by 
the regime’s respected voices, liberty too came to take on a new meaning.  Originally, 
liberty meant freedom from interference by the state, and implied a right to help guide 
the polity by patriotic participation in government; most important, perhaps, for the 
American founders it meant the freedom to pursue ones own salvation free of interference 
from the state.  As Romantic ideas took hold, it came to mean the freedom to freely will 
and live a law apprehended by reason (or some other way) for oneself; for progressive 
political reformers, this justified active state support for individuals in the name of helping 
them to realize their potentials.  Most recently, however, liberty has become an unlimited 
and unbridled license to indulge whatever passions, whatever inclinations, whatever 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
695 Percy Shelley, “Defense of Poetry,” 56. 
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whims, one prefers, with the expectation that no one will judge the resultant behavior 
according to anything resembling an exacting moral standard.  Where action matters 
most, and everything is permitted according to someone’s conception of “noble,” it 
should not come as a surprise that inclination and majority opinion will guide most 
people most of the time.  Freedom from government interference remains important, but 
no more important than freedom from public disesteem.  It is only necessary to mention 
this unhappy development because we are about to turn attention to Islamist thinkers 
who dwell on it. 
In the end, religious toleration and exuberant pluralism, no less than our championing of 
every type of diversity today, is traceable to commitments to the dignity of the individual 
and the sufficiency of his or her moral and intellectual endowments.  If these ideas were 
born during the Enlightenment and the Reformation, they have been decisively and 
importantly individualized and emotionalized by European Romanticism, a process that 
continues to this day.  It is possible, however, that an intellectual movement that helps, in 
it infancy, to create a tolerant personality well suited to liberal democracy might, as it 
unfolds, become pernicious to upright representative government.  In particular, those 
aspects of Christianity that helped keep democracy noble and good—from the confidence 
human beings are endowed with natural rights to the certainty human beings have a 
soul—seem to be undermined by the Romantic Movement’s relativistic fruit.  To put it 
another way, to account for the rise of the twenty-first century liberal personality is not to 
choreograph the only path to liberal democracy.  Indeed, there may well be other, better, 
roads.  Impressive modernizers in the Islamic world believe a reformed Islam is better 
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suited to serve as the ideational foundation for a pluralistic democratic regime than the 
West’s reformed and romanticized post-Christian personality. 
For our purposes at this point in the argument, however, the most important points are 
these:  the sacred opinions that built the modern liberal personality (today, the 
postmodern personality) make liberal democracy possible as we live it today; and these 
intellectual commitments—what amount to our time’s sacred opinions—did not come 
from nowhere.  Nor, are they static.  Rather, they are traceable to revolutions in political 
consciousness that have deep and deliberate roots, and whose inertia will continue to 
form and reform our sacred opinions as the movements themselves continue to evolve, 
develop, and fade away.  As a civilization’s sacred opinions change, so do the tenor and 
character of the regimes that can comfortably function within that civilization.  Particular 
regimes, their political institutions and laws—and to the greatest extent in democratic 
times—cannot but continue to be animated by the spirit of the people.    
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C H A P T E R   V I I 
THE RESURGENCE AND RADICALIZATION OF ISLAM 
 
 
In his signal work, The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington famously pointed to the 
revival of Islamic commitment in the latter part of the twentieth century as a historical 
event of massive, albeit generally underappreciated, significance.  “The Islamic 
Resurgence,” he writes (insisting the capitalization is more than merited), is an event “at 
least as significant” as the French, Russian, and American Revolutions.  “[I]n its extent 
and profundity,” he continues, it 
is the latest phase in the adjustment of Islamic civilization to the West, an 
effort to find the “solution” not in Western ideologies but in Islam.  It 
embodies acceptance of modernity, rejection of Western culture, and 
recommitment to Islam as the guide to life in the modern world.696  
Nor was Huntington the first to notice the revival.  Bernard Lewis anticipated 
Huntington’s title and argument in a short article he published in 1990 entitled “The 
Roots of Muslim Rage.”  He wrote that the appearance of an increasingly assertive, and 
often violent, Anti-American movement claiming the authority of Islam represented “no 
less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an 
ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide 
expansion of both.”697  He went on to explain that a series of humiliations—military and 
non-military—at the hands of the West was galvanizing an increasingly large numbers of 
Muslims behind a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
696 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 109. 
697 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage.”  The Atlantic.  September, 1990. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/4643/ 
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For a long time now there has been a rising tide of rebellion against this 
Western paramountcy, and a desire to reassert Muslim values and restore 
Muslim greatness. The Muslim has suffered successive stages of defeat. 
The first was his loss of domination in the world, to the advancing power 
of Russia and the West. The second was the undermining of his authority 
in his own country, through an invasion of foreign ideas and laws and ways 
of life and sometimes even foreign rulers or settlers, and the 
enfranchisement of native non-Muslim elements. The third—the last 
straw—was the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from 
emancipated women and rebellious children. 698 
Put another way, the West had barged into the Islamic world uninvited, and was 
transforming it not just from without, but from within.  For centuries, progressive military 
defeats had eroded the size and power of the Ottoman Empire.  After World War I, 
however, things got even worse.  The great powers of Europe had carved up the empire 
leaving Muslims to live almost as subject peoples.  Worst of all, Western ideas were 
creeping into everyday life in a way that undermined the one thing many Muslims 
believed could continue to distinguish the Islamic world from the West:  its moral 
superiority.  Fundamentalism, on this view, is the result of a civilization’s desperate 
attempt to preserve, emphasize, and amplify the artifacts of its culture that can plausibly 
continue to define and ennoble it.  In other terms, fidelity to literal and demanding 
interpretations of Islamic law became increasingly popular because they gave “aim and 
form” to the “resentment and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces that have 
devalued their traditional values and loyalties.”699  Fundamentalists attributed the decline 
of the Islamic world not to the West’s technological superiority, but to its own loss of faith, 
a deficiency the infiltration of Western ideas was in part responsible for.  The solution:  
more intense fidelity to Islamic law. 	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This chapter will show that the renewed religious enthusiasm in the Islamic world is not 
simply attributable to resentment and frustration easily vented toward the West.   Nor is it 
the result of the failure of our new value-neutral social sciences to guide political and 
moral life in a satisfactory and fulfilling way, as some have argued.700  It is, rather, the 
result of a powerful attack on the modern West in the name of pre-modern ideas about 
how the world should be organized, an attack led by intellectuals that has since gained 
considerable popular support.  While the fact Islam has Resurged has long been 
recognized, the character of the resurgence – that is, its impact on the political 
consciousness of the Middle East and its significance to American interests in the region 
beyond terrorism – has yet to be fully articulated.  
As we have seen, neoconservative supporters of regime change in Iraq, especially those 
who optimistically predicted it could be a harbinger of an Arab Spring, explicitly denied 
that this Resurgence carried any real political significance.  Important members of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700 In 1994, Giles Kepel made a similar, if more general, argument.  He suggested that the 
apparent triumph of the attempt to separate religion and politics along Enlightenment lines 
reached its apogee sometime after World War II, but had begun to unravel by the mid-1970s 
(Giles Kepel, The Revenge of God, 1-2). Now came the inevitable counter-revolution; in the Muslim 
world,   
A new religious approach took shape, aimed no longer at adapting to 
secular values but at recovering a sacred foundation for the organization of 
society—by changing society if necessary… the aim was no longer to 
modernize Islam but to ‘Islamize modernity.’ 
Although Kepel originally insisted his analysis applied to the Judeo-Christian world no less than 
the Islamic world, his subsequent research has focused on the most extreme case, the Resurgence 
of Islam.  And while Kepel contended that new enthusiasms for religious commitments did not 
“spring from a dethronement of reason” but were rather the consequence of “a deep malaise in 
society that can no longer be interpreted in terms of our traditional categories of thought,” there is 
evidence that in the case of Islam, the rejection of Enlightenment ideas was especially conscious 
and deliberate, and at the same time, one of the most important sources of its contemporary 
weakness.  Giles Kepel, The Revenge of God, 11.  
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Bush administration—including Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz, David Frum, Richard 
Perle, Kenneth Adelman, Condoleezza Rice, and President Bush himself, in addition to 
the prominent public intellectuals who enthusiastically supported the effort to 
democratize Iraq (most important among them, Bill Kristol and Charles 
Krauthammer)—all adamantly denied that the region’s prevailing religion posed any 
special impediment to constitutional government. 
This chapter investigates this key assumption in the context of the sacred opinions 
elucidated in Chapter 6.  Its argument is that the resurgence of Islam is an event of 
considerable political significance for the West, particularly so from the perspective of 
U.S. foreign policy.  For it represents not simply a revival or resurrection of religious 
sentiment in the Islamic world, but the dramatic radicalization and politicization of the 
opinions and social practices that guide, for all political purposes, a significant and 
increasing proportion of the world’s Muslims.   
At this point, it is important to underline that Islam itself is not the problem.  A radical 
manner of exegesis, favored by a small but assertive minority, is.  As Ignaz Goldziher 
explained in his landmark study of Islamic law long before politicized Islam burst forth in 
its modern incarnation,   
Whenever a religion derives its beliefs and practices from definite sacred 
texts, the exegesis devoted to those texts illustrates at once the legal and 
dogmatic development of the religion.  In such cases, the history of 
religions is also a history of the interpretation of scripture.   This is 
especially true of Islam…701  	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Hamori.  (New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1981), 55. 
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The interpretations of Islamic law discussed in this chapter, and so politically important 
today, are historically very unusual.  Ali A. Allawi observes that the radical political and 
intellectual currents so potent today in the Muslim world “cannot seriously claim any 
continuity with the historical intellectual traditions of Islamic civilization.  In this sense, 
fundamentalist Islam is an eminently modern phenomenon.”702  As another scholar 
notes, the most extreme aims and statements of twentieth century Islamists “are 
inconceivable without the influence of Western totalitarianism.”703  Twentieth century 
theorists undertook a dramatic radicalization of even the most literalist theologians of the 
tradition, welding to that understanding modern—totalitarian—notions of the scope and 
role of the state, ideas borrowed from the atheistic political ideologies that convulsed the 
West in the twentieth century.  Speaking of the politicization of Shiite Islam, in particular, 
Said Amir Arjomand notes that this “pouring of Islam into the ideological framework 
borrowed from Marxism amounted to a ‘colossal redefinition of Islam.’”704  For most of 
history, Islam’s jurists expressly permitted a disjuncture between the totalitarian demands 
of sharia in theory, and the extent of the state’s enforcement of Islamic law in practice.  In 
some instances, this even permitted relatively limited government. 
It should go without saying, moreover, that Islamists—that is, those attempt to inject 
literalist interpretations of the Qur’an and the Sunna into politics (what is also referred to 
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as politicized Islam)705 –do not speak for all Muslims.  Nonetheless, it remains the case 
that the most domineering manner of interpreting a legal code, especially one that claims 
the authority of God, can be of greater political consequence than those that strive for 
honest or pious interpretation of sacred texts, even where the domineering and disfiguring 
interpretations are not the most pervasive.706  To put it another way, one can be 
persuaded that Islam has been hijacked, perverted, radicalized, and corrupted by a 
minority seeking to use its authority to inspire terrorists and enliven political movements, 
while remaining simultaneously convinced that the minority matters most from the 
perspective of U.S. foreign policy. The question is not whether their interpretations are 
correct, but whether they are sufficiently powerful to affect this country’s pursuit of its 
interests in the Arab-Islamic world. 
While there have almost always been Islamic theorists who advocate ultra-literalist 
interpretation of Islam’s holy books, this chapter means to show that their influence over 
the zeitgeist of the Arab-Islamic world has increased significantly over the course of the 
twentieth century thanks largely to the deliberate efforts of a handful of twentieth century 
theorists.  From the perspective of constitutional democracy and the possibility of modern 
and moderate government in the Middle East, their impact has been unambiguously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
705 Ahmed Bouzid helpfully defines Islamism as “the injection of Islam in society and politics, 
whether by the state or by popular movements.”  Ahmed Bouzid, Man, Society, and Knowledge in the 
Islamist Discourse of Sayyid Qutb.  Dissertation submitted to VPI.  April, 1998., 5. 
706 Joseph Schacht makes this point in his seminal study of Islamic law in somewhat more 
technical language.  Having pointed out that Islamic legal theorists typically recognize four bases 
or principles of Islamic law—the Qur’an, the sunna of the Prophet, reasoning by analogy, and the 
consensus of the scholarly community—he points out that this latter source, the ijma, “is the 
decisive instance; it guarantees the authenticity of the two material sources and determines their 
correct interpretation” (Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law, 114).  I would only add that the word 
“correct” should probably be substituted with “prevailing” or “dominant”. 
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pernicious.  The interpretations of Islamic law that are part and parcel of the Islamic 
Resurgence are antithetical to the sacred opinions necessary to sustain a liberal 
democracy.  As Andrew McCarthy cogently explains:  “Fundamentalist strains of Islam… 
have been developed by extraordinary minds.  It is not that these Muslims fail to 
comprehend our principles; they reject them.  They have an entirely different conception 
of the good life.”707  What Westerners value—above all, limited government, freedom, 
and the right to participate in the law-making process—is not esteemed on the Islamist 
view.  In fact, the sacred opinions integral to liberal democracy are rejected one and all.  
On the Salafi interpretation, Islam is a totalitarian legal code that manages every aspect 
of an individual’s life; the propriety of a separation of church and state is resolutely 
denied; legislation established on the principle of consent is equated to the basest form of 
slavery; freedom is defined as complete submission of mind to revealed law; and the 
principle of universal political and moral equality is rejected out of hand.  To the extent 
opinions such as these prevail, liberal democracy cannot.   
Most date the Resurgence and Radicalization of Islam to the 1970s.  There are obvious 
reasons for this:  the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 presaged a decade of increased 
Islam-inspired violence leading up to the events of 1979.  That year marked both the 
Iranian Revolution and the beginning of the mujahideen resistance to the Soviet Union, 
which had invaded Afghanistan.  The decades following were characterized by a 
progressive intensification of violence against Western targets perpetuated in the name of 
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Islam culminating in the events of 11 September, 2001.  And yet, to date the Resurgence 
of Islam to these momentous events is symptomatic of an inadequate understanding of 
the character and origin of the fundamentalist movement.  While it is certainly true that 
Egypt’s ignominious defeat at the hand of Israel in 1967, and the difficult decades that 
followed, played a role in popularizing more conservative strains of Islamic thought, active 
efforts to rehabilitate and spread the ideas themselves can be traced back to 1928, and 
indeed yet further.  1928 is important because it is the year the Muslim Brotherhood was 
founded in Egypt.  The Brotherhood has done more to spread the opinions of the 
Resurgence than any other contributing factor.  Properly understood, moreover, the 
Resurgence is not defined by spectacular political events, but by the ideas it has 
promulgated.  Those ideas, in turn, have transformed the moral-political outlook of the 
region.  By their deliberate efforts to transform the region’s political consciousness, Salafi 
thinkers have also changed the region’s political possibilities.  In fact, this is precisely what 
they set out to do. 
To understand how, one must begin almost one hundred years ago.  The end of World 
War I led to Atatürk’s abolition of the Caliphate and the British occupation of Egypt.  
These events, viewed by Muslims across the Middle East as assaults on the Islamic world 
that threatened its continuation as a distinct civilization, prompted a cadre of thinkers to 
revitalize and disseminate the literalist interpretative approach of Ibn Taymiyya (1263708-
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1328), a thirteenth century Sunni thinker.709  His brand of Islam was “entirely Sharia-
defined”:  he advocated absolute literalness of interpretation; he rejected the spiritual 
focus of the Sufi orders; and he was “implacably hostile and aggressive” toward the Shiite 
for what he viewed as their idolatry.710  Taymiyya’s influence, though he had many 
followers during his own lifetime, waned quickly after his death.  In 1910, the great 
German scholar of Islam, Ignaz Goldziher, could write (in what remains a seminal study 
of Islamic theology and law) that the Hanbali school of legal thought—with which 
Taymiyya is associated—was on the verge of extinction:  “Finally, the school of the imam 
Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855) is represented today in relatively the smallest numbers 
[of the four main Sunni schools].”711  And yet, Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments in favor of 
absolute obedience to the Qur’an and the Sunna—to the utter exclusion of centuries of 
scholarly commentary, some of it moderating—form today (in a further radicalized form) 
one of the most important roots of politicized Islam.712   
Taymiyya’s approach to Qur’anic interpretation was rehabilitated first by Abd el-
Wahhab, the founder of the Wahhabi movement in eighteenth century Arabia, and later 
by Rashid Rida in Egypt, an early champion of the Salafi movement active at the end of 
the nineteenth century into the twentieth.  Rida’s efforts in Egypt yielded greater 
dividends.  His widely read al-Manar newspaper became an influential pan-Islamic vehicle 
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for fundamentalist opinions.713  The paper, along with Salafi bookshops in Cairo, were, 
for a time, the center of gravity in a relatively small fundamentalist universe.  Hasan al-
Banna, one of the most important modern Islamists, was an avid reader of al-Manar in his 
early years.  Not only did he seek out its editors, ultimately to take over its publication; he, 
more than any other single figure, is responsible for the dramatic growth of the 
movement over the course of the twentieth century.714   
An Egyptian schoolteacher by profession, and active politically during the early twentieth 
century, al-Banna’s most important legacy is the organization he founded in 1928, the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  Through it, he devoted his life and energies to reviving and 
purifying Islam.  His aim was a noble one:  he sought to help build just and pious 
communities in a world which, dominated by the Western powers, seemed neither just 
nor pious.  He conceived of the project in expressly anti-Western terms, as a direct 
response to, and repudiation of, the moral-political outlook of the North-Atlantic states.  
In the name of fidelity to Islam’s founding tenets, al-Banna came to reject virtually every 
distinctive feature of liberal democracy:  nationalism, state sovereignty on a secular basis, 
the confinement of religion to a limited political sphere, unfettered capitalism, a 
constitutional separation of powers, the notion that social and political equality mandate 
government according to consent in which participation is widespread, the primacy of the 
individual and his rights, the notion that individuals are entitled to pursue happiness as 
they themselves define it within a very generous sphere protected by law.     	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The Islamic revival he sought to catalyze would, he believed, exceed in scope both the 
French and Russian Revolutions.715 Al-Banna aimed not simply to lay down new 
organizing laws; he sought nothing less than to bring Egypt’s moral, intellectual, and 
political life into harmony with a purified interpretation of Islamic law, which is to say, to 
subordinate all aspects of life to strict religious decrees.  In an essay entitled “Our 
Mission,” al-Banna explains that “Islam is an all- embracing concept which regulates 
every aspect of life, adjudicating on every one its concerns and prescribing for it a solid 
and rigorous order.”716   
Al-Banna and those who celebrate him today understand, above all perhaps, the high 
importance of education broadly construed:  they are conscious, as most in the West are 
not, that regimes function properly only where their criminal, civil, and foundational laws 
are supported by the morals, habits, and sacred opinions of the people.  To build an 
Islamic state on the most solid foundation possible, one begins by shaping the beliefs and 
the manner of worship of the umma. Al-Banna recognized (in direct contradistinction to 
those who led the U.S. endeavor to build a liberal democracy in Iraq!) that the possibility 
of successful political reform rests first and foremost on soul-craft:  where the opinions and 
social habits internalized by the citizens (or subjects) of the regime do not support it, no 
form of government can persist except by repression and force.  As the Brotherhood 
explained in a 1951 Egyptian periodical, al-Da’wa, “Law does not perform its function 	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unless it rests on principles accepted by the people and in which the individuals and 




Building Fully Islamic Personalities 
 
 
For this reason al-Banna emphasized widespread proselytizing.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood, an organization of global reach today, was explicitly tasked with the 
“shaping of fully Islamic personalities”—of shaping souls now to prepare society for 
bottom-up political reform in time.718   According to al-Banna’s biographer, a verse from 
the Qur’an emphasizing the importance of individual spiritual reform as a way to 
currying God’s favor for the sake of wider political reform became a favorite:  “Verily 
never will God change the condition of a people until they change it themselves (with 
their own souls).719 As al-Banna explained in 1933, a “renascent nation” needs a very 
special kind of education; teaching literacy, history, and concrete skills is not sufficient. 
 
The solution is the education and moulding of the souls of the nation in 
order to cerate a strong moral immunity, from and superior principles and 
a strong and steadfast ideology.  This is the best and fastest way to achieve 
the nation’s goals and aspirations, and it is therefore our aim and the 
reason for our existence.  It goes beyond the mere founding of schools, 
factories and institutions, it is the ‘founding’ of souls.720 
Lest it be thought the organization has strayed far from its roots, consider a recent 
initiative. On its (Arab-language) website, the Brotherhood’s recent “Reform Initiative,” 
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launched in March 2004, expresses the organization’s ultimate goal in terms al-Banna 
might himself have put forth at the organization’s inception: 
 
We have a clear mission—to implement Allah’s law, on the basis of our 
belief that it is the real, effective, way out of all our problems—domestic or 
external, political, economic, social or cultural.  That is to be achieved by 
forming the Muslim individual, the Muslim home, the Muslim 
government, and the state which will lead the Islamic states, reunite the 
scattered Muslims, restore their glory, retrieve for them their lost lands and 
stolen homelands, and carry the banner of the call to Allah in order to 
bless the world with Islam’s teachings.721 
Only after “fully Islamic personalities” have been molded in large numbers can an 
Islamic state or states—dedicated to enforcing sharia—be durably and successfully 
erected.  Political reform presumes prior moral reform.  And moral reform takes time.  
The ultimate political goal of fundamentalist Islam is nothing less than the 
reestablishment of an expansionist pan-Islamic Caliphate on the strongest possible moral 
foundations.  Such an ambition will seem far-fetched to Western audiences with the 
political attention span of an election cycle.  For the Brotherhood, however, it simply 
requires patience.  As Mustafa Mashhur, the Supreme Guide or official leader of the 
Egyptian Brotherhood from 1996 through 2002 explains in a work called “The Laws of 
Da’wa,” 
He [Hassan al-Banna] felt the grave danger overshadowing the Muslims 
and the urgent need and obligation which Islam places on every Muslim, 
man and woman, to act in order to restore the Islamic Caliphate and 
reestablish the Islamic State on strong foundations.722 
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Later in the work, he explicitly acknowledges that the project is not a short one, then goes 
on to insist the Brotherhood has not grown tired or weary in the face of adversity: 
 
[T]he [Muslim] Brotherhood is not rushed by youth’s enthusiasm into 
immature and unplanned action which will not alter the bad reality and 
may even harm the Islamic activity, and will benefit the people of 
falsehood… 
The [Muslim] Brothers know that hastiness without proper preparedness 
may be like an aborted [action].  Likewise, they know that the negligence 
and hesitation after the right time [for Jihad] has come… might bring 
spiritual death.723 
A previous Supreme Guide made a similar point, emphasizing education in times political 
reform is impossible. 
The general atmosphere [at present] is not conducive to the establishment 
of an Islamic state…  The most important thing is to work for the 
implementation of the Islamic Shari’ah and to try to persuade the 
authorities to abolish the freedom-restricting laws…  Everything can be 
done on [the basis of the Shari’ah] from education to the methods of 
government.  Islam should govern all aspects of activity.  That is what we 
ask for.724 
The Brotherhood’s progress toward their goal of educating disseminating this manner of 
belief has been nothing short of astonishing.  Thanks to virtually limitless Saudi funding, 
and the Salafi takeover of important universities in Saudi Arabia and North Africa in the 
1960s and 1970s,725 schools and mosques inspired by the Brotherhood’s aims exercise a 
near-monopoly over the education of young Muslims in vast communities throughout the 
Islamic world, its reach extending even to neighborhoods in London, Paris, and Toronto.  
Since the 1980s, a steady stream of “scholars” steeped in radical Islamist ideas has 
literally spread out across the Middle East and North Africa, some as far as the immigrant 	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neighborhoods of the major European metropolises.726  Their quest to gain adherents was 
aided by the youth bulge; young people, especially young men, are most likely to be 
seduced by revolutionary fervor and there were more of them than ever.  The texts that 
advance the attendant ideas are widely available from mosques and on an ever-
multiplying number of websites, many of them hosted by Muslim Student Associations 
and similar organizations in the West.   
“Religious outreach activities,” the deliberate dissemination of literalist, sometimes 
violent, Islamic practice, has been a self-conscious aim of the Saudi government since the 
1960s.727  According to one prominent scholar Islamism, “there is not a single significant 
Muslim population in the world that has been untouched by Saudi funding,” the effect, 
“mostly… negative.”728  The total financial contribution of the Saudi state and wealthy 
Saudi oil tycoons to Salafi organizations around the world is thought to be upwards of 4 
billion dollars per year.729  Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani nuclear Physicist, claims radical 
interpretations of Islam are much stronger than most recognize: 
Fundamentalist movements have come to dominate intellectual discourse 
in key Muslim countries and the Muslim modernist movement, which 
emphasized Islam’s compatibility with science and rationalism, has lost its 
cultural and ideological hegemony.  The modernist has been effectively 
banished from the political and cultural scene and the modern educational 
system, which was nascent 50 years ago, has visibly collapsed in key 
Islamic countries.  Orthodoxy has arrogated to itself the task of guiding the 
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destiny of Muslims.  But their prescription for society is an invitation to 
catastrophe and possibly to a new Dark Age for Muslims.730 
The result of this “triumph” of the Wahhabi/Salafi school of interpretation has been 
characterized by at least two scholars as “the closing of the Islamic mind” in modern 
times.731  A further consequence of the fundamentalists’ intellectual victory:  millions of 
hearts and minds dedicated to the literalist species of Islam (for moral and political 
purposes) Hassan al-Banna sought to rehabilitate.  Issam al-Aryan, one of the 
Brotherhood’s leaders, recently explained that over time “reforming the Muslim 
individual, the Muslim home and the Muslim society” leads to “restoring the 
international entity… and ends with being masters of the world through guidance and 
preaching.”732  
Having briefly outlined the ongoing intellectual event referred to as the Resurgence of 
Islam, this chapter investigates the dominant tenets of the three most widely read 
twentieth century Salafi theorists—Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and Sayyid Abul A’la 
Mawdudi—with an eye toward the compatibility (more often, the incompatibility) of their 
teachings and the sacred opinions of a democratic citizenry as identified in Chapter 6.  
While the Muslim Brotherhood has repudiated violence, other aspects of the ideology put 
forth by these thinkers have been popularized by Brotherhood-affiliated organizations 
and the more radical groups that have sprung from it.  Together, their teachings 
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constitute “the new writ” of Islamism, both in their jihadist and politicized forms.733  
Chapter 8 has two related purposes that build on the present discussion.  First, it 
examines the political-historical circumstances that abetted the wide dissemination of 
these views.  For just as Tocqueville acknowledges that democracy’s sacred opinions 
could not have gained traction in the sixteenth century, so we must recognize that 
“Islamism… is not a sudden phenomenon, but one that ebbed and flowed depending on 
immediate political machinations.”734  Political events, some of them catalyzed by 
Western powers, made possible a sudden shift in the Sunni world’s intellectual and moral 
centre of gravity.735  Second, Chapter 8 ends with a brief consideration of the (ultimately 
failed) efforts of those thinkers who sought to liberalize or reform Islam in order to render 
it more compatible with the modern world and they reasons they failed.736 
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they believed to be the precondition of virtue and excellence in the world.  It is a tragic truth of 
history that utopian projects have been indistinguishable from totalitarian projects; perhaps it is 
inevitable that this be so where fallen men are in charge.  Even so, a willingness to understand the 
movement through its founders’ eyes, at least as the point of departure, is important.  It is not 
equivalent to taking an uncritical attitude toward that movement; it is, on the contrary, the 
prerequisite of a truly informed criticism. 
Second, some will say that it is impolite, improper, politically incorrect, or even impossible, for a 
Westerner—in this case, a proud liberal (in the old sense of that term)—to comment on prevailing 
currents in Islamic thought and their relationship to liberal democracy.  Reservations of this sort, 
very prevalent today, stem from a number of things.  Our noble commitment to tolerance and 
freedom of conscience—so important to our form of government—can lead one to deny the 
possibility of making any sort of normative evaluation.  Taught to tolerate so much, we are losing 
confidence in the bases or standards that would permit us to distinguish what is properly tolerable 
from that which is properly intolerable.  Liberal democracy, however, cannot afford to be 
indifferent to ideologies that reject its sacred opinions; it certainly cannot be founded where those 
ideas do not hold sway.  
Moreover, those who retain a confidence in the righteousness of our way of life in the West have a 
duty to defend it, and to promote it, given the generous freedom we have to do so.  As Bernard 
Lewis has written, 
There was a time when scholars and other writers in communist Eastern 
Europe relied on writers and publishers in the free West to speak the truth 
about their history, their culture, and their predicament. Today it is those 
who told the truth, no those who concealed or denied it, who are respected 
and welcomed in these countries. Historians in free countries have a moral 
and professional obligation not to shrink the difficult issues and subjects 
that some people would place under a sort of taboo; not to submit to 
voluntary censorship, but to deal with these matters fairly, honestly, 
without apologetics, without polemic, and, of course, competently. Those 
who enjoy freedom have a moral obligation to use that freedom for those 
who do not possess it. We live in a time when great efforts have been 
made, and continue to be made to falsify the record of the part and to 
make history a tool of propaganda; when governments, religious 
movements, political parties, and sectional groups of every kind are busy 
rewriting history as they would wish it to have been, as they would like 
their followers to believe that it was. All this is very dangerous indeed, to 
ourselves and to others, however we may define otherness - dangerous to 
our common humanity. Because, make no mistake, those who are 
unwilling to confront the past will be unable to understand the present and 
unfit to face the future.  (Bernard Lewis, “Other People's History," in Islam 
in History).  
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Jihadist Islam and Politicized Islam 
Sayyid Qutb, a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt mid-century, 
did more than any other individual to radicalize Al-Banna’s teachings.  He was 
imprisoned and later executed in 1966 by Nasser’s regime for his political activities and 
the extremist views his popular works were popularizing.  Though Qutb’s political 
influence during his lifetime was impressive, his ideas have exerted a much greater effect 
in the decades since his death.  He influenced Al-Qaeda’s top leaders directly:  Ayman 
Zawahiri was one of his students, and through the latter’s mentorship, Qutb’s thought 
exerted a deep influence on Osama Bin Laden as well.  Like al-Banna, Qutb worked for 
the establishment of an Islamic state or states governed entirely according to sharia.  And 
like al-Banna, he placed high emphasis on the importance of education.  Unlike al-Banna, 
however, he put forth a justification for violent jihad against the West as well as rulers in 
the Islamic world who were not working to bring about the establishment of a sharia, 
literally construed. 
Put another way, if Al-Banna and Qutb were motivated by similar aims, they imagined 
attaining them by different roads, and have therefore had somewhat different effects.  At 
the risk of oversimplifying the difference, it is Qutb’s thought that has inspired jihadist 
Islam; Al-Banna’s, politicized Islam.  Violent Islamists cite Qutb’s criticism of the West 
and its pervasive influence on politics and morals in Arab states to justify terrorism.  One 
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commentator, writing in the New York Times not long after 9/11, went so far as to label 
Qutb “The Philosopher of Islamic Terror.”737 
Qutb radicalized many aspects of al-Banna’s thought, and thus, deeply affected 
politicized Islam; but his most spectacular contribution is the rehabilitation and 
popularization of the idea that the contemporary Islamic world could be declared 
jahilliya—plagued by a ubiquitous ignorance reminiscent of Arabia before the spread of 
Islam.  The Prophet Muhammad had first to alleviate the condition (by force and 
conquest) before fully Islamic communities could be given laws.  The West’s corruption of 
everything—the ubiquitous nihilism and materialism spread by economic and military 
conquest without historical precedent—had come to constitute an invincible impediment 
to the proselytizing approach al-Banna preferred.  For Qutb, “All Jewish and Christian 
societies today are… jahili societies”;738 in fact, “the jahili society is any society other than 
the Muslim society; and if we want a more specific definition, we may say that any society 
is a jahili society which does not dedicate itself to submission to God alone.”739  Thus it 
follow that “Islam has a right to remove all those obstacles which are in its path so that it 
may address human reason and intuition with no interference and opposition from 
political systems.”740    
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It would be difficult to overstate the significance of his radical new teaching.  The 
traditional schools of Islamic law had forbidden rebellion against temporal rulers, even 
where they transgressed against Islam.  If commanded to sin, a Muslim was not obliged to 
obey the ruler; but neither did Islamic jurists countenance revolution against insufficiently 
Islamic political regimes.  Injunctions against supporting civil strife (fitna) – whether by 
words or by deeds – were forceful and unambiguous.741  Sayyid Qutb set for himself an 
audacious goal:  “to legitimize revolt in terms of mainstream Sunni thought.”742  
Qutb’s justified this radical departure from orthodoxy by claiming that Western “political 
systems” represented an imminent threat to Islamic civilization.  Thanks to Western 
weapons and capital, Islamic lands were ruled by godless tyrants; worse, Western ideas—
about the relationship between religion and politics, man’s place in the universe and 
relationship to God, even the structure of the family—had been invading the Islamic 
world for centuries.743  For this reason, in addition to Western power and its godless 
ideologies, Qutbists fiercely oppose the region’s corrupt rulers as well as virtually all 
modern Qur’anic interpretation and commentary.744  That the Islamic world has fallen 
into a condition of barbarity and ignorance justifies—nay, demands—violent jihad against 
Arab rulers (for despoiling Islam by adopting the outer trappings of modernity), foreign 
powers operating on holy soil (for supporting the corruption), even adherents to apostate 
strains of Islam and members of other religions (for the crime of spreading disbelief).   
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Qutbists believe contemporary conditions mandate violent jihad insofar as the prevailing 
barbarism makes a return to wholesome Islamic life impossible by gentler means; it 
becomes a religious duty to remove every impediment to the dissemination of the kind of 
literal interpretation of Islamic law his writings celebrate.  Islam, moreover is a catholic 
religion in the sense of its being universal.  Qutb emphasizes again and again that “It is 
essential for mankind to have new leadership”:745 “Islam [is] a universal message, 
ordained… as the religion for the whole of mankind,” one that “cannot be restricted 
within any geographical or racial limits.”  In other words,  “Jihad in Islam is simply a 
name for striving to make this system of life dominant in the World.”746   
The traditional seat of Islamic civilization, the Arab world, is the first concern.  
Ultimately, however, Islam “strives… to abolish all those systems and government which 
are based on the rule of man over men,” chief among these, the Western democracies.747  
He goes so far as to assert “the foremost duty of Islam in this world is to depose Jahiliyyah 
from the leadership of men, and to s the leadership into its own hands and enforce the 
particular way of life which is its permanent feature.”748  Thus it is that organizations like 
Al-Qaeda came to understand their mission in Messianic terms.  Qutb even warns against 
“defeatist-type people” who contend jihad in Islam is to be interpreted as countenancing a 
non-violent spiritual struggle or defensive war.  On the contrary,  
When writers with defeatist and apologetic mentalities write about ‘Jihad 
in Islam,’ trying to remove this ‘blot’ from Islam, then they are mixing up 	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two tings:  first, that this religion forbids the imposition of belief by force, as 
is clear from the verse, ‘There is no compulsion in religion (2:256), while 
on the other hand it tries to annihilate all those political and material 
powers which stand between people and Islam, which force one people to 
bow before another people and prevent them from accepting the 
sovereignty of God.  These two principles have no relation to one another 
nor is there room to mix them.749 
In other words, it is a duty to “annihilate all those political and material powers” which 
stand in the way of the establishment of an Islamic state devoted to enforcing sharia.   
It is not for nothing that Qutb has been called “a seminal thinker[] in Islamism,”750 “the 
most potent of the religious intellectuals,”751 and “one of the most influential architects of 
contemporary Islamist political thought.”752  He provided “the ideology incarnated in the 
terrorist organization that allows terrorists” to advance “murder to the level of a moral 
principle”; Qutb’s line of argument “is the source of their moral legitimacy.”  As Robert 
Reilly continues, “Without it, they or their organizations cannot exist.”753 Or, to put it 
another way, “terrorists are produced by a totalitarian ideology justifying terrorism.  That 
is its ‘root cause’.”754  Absent the concept of jahilliya, by which Qutb marshaled a divine 
justification in defense of the slaughter of innocents, Islamic terrorism would not be the 
problem it is today.  His radical new exegesis of sacred texts was all the more significant 
for anchoring “its political certainties in the ineffable text of the Quran” which gave his 
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call for violent jihad “a legitimacy in the eyes of the wide Muslim public which the 
movement would not have enjoyed otherwise.”755 
The jihadist contours of Qutb’s thought have has explored by Western scholars and its 
political consequences are relatively well appreciated today.  For obvious reasons, 
scholars in the West focused on his criticism of the West as justification for and inspiration 
to terrorism in the years following 9/11.  While it is certainly the case that far too many 
policymakers continue to cling to the belief that U.S. foreign and economic policy is the 
root cause of terrorism—whether American intervention in the Middle East, or its 
support for Israel, or the depressed socio-economic conditions for which capitalism and 
the neo-imperialist economic policies of the West are blamed—the most spectacular 
impact of Qutb’s ideology has at least been explained to Western audiences that are 
willing to listen. 
The Resurgence of Islam is relevant to U.S. foreign policy in ways that extend well 
beyond terrorism, however.  Islamism’s wider political significance is best demonstrated 
by the Muslim Brotherhood and its proselytizing mission.  The Brotherhood has two 
main branches:  an expressly political branch (very active in Jordan and Egypt, and the 
basis of Hamas in Gaza), and a missionary branch.  The first, much less radical than 
those who have answered Qutb’s calls for violent jihad, ostensibly accept the modern state 
system and embrace some of its institutions, at least those that represent a potential road 
to political influence or authority.  The second, proselytizing, branch (which best reflects 
Al-Banna’s vision) inspires tepid concern in the West today, probably because Westerners 	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are inclined to view it through a distinctly liberal lens—one that tolerates very much from 
a well-meaning commitment not to judge what others believe on freedom on conscience 
grounds.   
And yet, the branch of the Brotherhood devoted to missionary work has realized Al-
Banna’s vision to astonishing extent, creating individuals, families, and communities in 
massive numbers wholly committed to living according to a literal interpretation of 
Islam’s holy texts—as well as to their further dissemination—throughout the Arab Middle 
East and North Africa. By creating fully Islamic personalities in sufficient numbers, 
moreover, to constitute a majority (or at least an intimidating plurality) in some countries, 
this comparatively innocuous accomplishment of the Brotherhood has begun to exert a 
staggering political influence. That effect will be magnified—not diminished—the more 
participatory the region’s governments become.   
The 2006 elections in Gaza is but another reminder that where a considerable faction of 
the citizenry is dedicated to propositions popularized by Salafi thinkers, the people tend 
not to use their democratic rights, privileges, and legislative authority to support the 
species of liberal government Western audiences identify with democratic institutions.  In 
sum, where guiding moral and political convictions deeply internalized by the people are 
antithetical to the sacred opinions upon which constitutional government in the West has 
been built, democratic elections will yield consistently illiberal, and often destabilizing, 
results.  Political instability is a serious possibility because a government elected on an 
ideological platform, whose supporters are above all devoted to seeing that ideology 
realized, might well find they have an interest in acting in ways that undermine regional 
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stability. For instance, incoming Salafi members of Egypt’s popularly elected parliament 
have mused publicly about revising Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel.  
 
Salafi Islam as a Totalitarian Code and the Impossibility of a Private Sphere  
We take for granted today that a regime based on consent and devoted to the 
establishment and protection of a generous personal sphere within which autonomous 
individuals are free to behave as they like, free of the state’s interference, is the only 
legitimate form of political regime.  Westerners believe it obvious—they “know”—that 
they have a right to the unencumbered pursuit of happiness so long as they do not harm 
anyone along the way.  It is not too much to say that safeguarding the establishment of 
such a sphere—in which the individual is free to pursue happiness however he or she 
defines it—is a guiding purpose of liberalism in the modern age and is taken to be the sole 
purpose of our form government.  As we have seen, beliefs such as these did not come 
from nowhere. 
On the Salafi understanding, in contrast, Islamic law is all-encompassing in scope and the 
coercive authority of the state exists to enforce laws that reach deep into the lives of 
individuals.  Al-Banna’s definition of Islam is oft-repeated to make this point:  Islam is 
nothing like Christianity (post-Reformation) according to which an individual’s private, 
spiritual, relationship with God is paramount; rather, Islam is “creed and state, book and 
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sword, and a way of life.”756   As Sayyid Qutb proudly and emphatically explains, Islam, 
properly understood, is nothing less than a totalitarian code according to which every 
aspect of life is to be ordered; human life is redeemed in proportion to the degree the 
individual subordinates himself to religious decrees.  Triumphant assertions that Islamic 
law determines every facet of life litter Qutb’s work:  Muslims should “arrange [their] 
lives solely according to… the Book of God”; “From [the Qur’an] we must also derive 
our concepts of life, our principles of government, politics, economics, and all other 
aspects of life”; “people should devote their entire lives in submission to God, should not 
decide any affair on their own”; “The only principle on which the totality of human life is 
to be based is God’s religion and its system of life.  If this principle is absent, the very first 
pillar of Islam… will not be established nor its real influence felt.757  
“Totalitarian” is not, on this understanding, equivalent to “tyrannical.”  That is, 
deprivation of freedom by government (totalitarianism) is not the worst thing a 
government can do.  In fact, as not a few commentators have underlined, there is no 
Arabic word for freedom in the sense the West understands the term.758  The term for 
“freedom” traditionally designates a rather narrow concept:  freedom is the condition 
opposite servitude.  It connotes the absence of physical restraint, not the harmony of an 
individual’s unfettered mind with his will; the term freedom, in other words, has in Arabic 
nothing to do with an individual’s capacity to author his own thoughts and actions. 
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The opposite of a tyrannical government is not, therefore, a free society; for the opposite 
of tyrannical rule can also be believed to be just rule.  Where freedom is not the cardinal 
political ideal, totalitarian regimes can be just.  Just rule can, in fact, require totalitarian 
methods.  On this understanding, a just regime is the kind of regime that nudges and 
coerces—by the totality of its laws and its cultural influences—the people living in 
common under its laws to become just, pious, noble, good, etc.  As we have seen in the 
Christian context, however, where men claim God’s authority for laws instituted on 
earth, the result is usually a corruption of both religion and politics. 
Salafi thinkers agree that sharia was properly enforced under the rightly-guided Caliphs.  
The problem, Qutb explains, is that only the first generations of Muslims properly 
appreciated “that every moment of their lives was under the continuous guidance and 
direction of the Almighty Creator.”759  Purifying Islam requires a renewed commitment 
among the community of Muslims to strictly literal interpretation of the Books of God for 
they are the only legitimate source from which to derive “our concepts of life, our 
principles of government, politics, economics and all other aspects of life.”760  The 
consequences of this view are radical.  There is no need for a science of politics or 
economics.  Insofar as they aim in principle to uncover the optimal manners of 
organizing social and economic activity, they are superfluous; any system of political, 
economic, or social organization not derived from Islamic law is, by its nature, bereft of 
any value.  Nor is there any need for the modern theoretical sciences; they, too, are 
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superfluous and corrosive, the Qur’an having already “explained to man the secret of his 
existence and the secret of the universe surrounding him,” including “Who brought him 
from nonexistence into being,” the truth about “the nature of the things which he can 
touch and see” and much else besides.761  Most radically, perhaps, he delegitimizes 
virtually all previous “Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought” contending that it, too, 
amounts to nothing better than “constructs of Jahiliyyah!”762 
For leading Salafi thinkers, the legal code does not simply exist to maintain order and 
ensure individuals are treated equitably in the political community’s application of 
coercive force; the legal code exists to enforce uniformity of thought and behavior 
according to a strict, God-centered, legal code.  There is no place left for privacy or 
freedom of conscience.  Vices that would not amount to a breach of law in any Western 
society should, on this interpretation, be punishable offenses, where necessary by severe 
corporal penalties.  There is no place for the free pursuit of happiness as personal 
autonomy, no private sphere protected from interference by the state.  These concepts 
are not just alien to the pattern of life politicized Islam prescribes.  They are its vices, only 
possible where God’s commands are ignored.  Allawi makes the same point in gentler 
terms.  To “claim the right and the possibility of autonomous action without reference to 
the source of these in God is an affront, and is discourteous to the terms of the 
relationship between the human being and God.”763  It is to place too much confidence in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
761 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, 17. 
762 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, 14. 
763 Ali A. Allawi, The Crisis of Islamic Civilization, 11. 
	  405 
one’s own intellect, to become too pliant to one’s own inclinations; it is to place them 
above the revealed teachings of God—the ultimate act of pride. 
What we call the private sphere is a modern, Western, invention.764  It was unknown to 
the ancients, and the Islamists reject it.  Any code of ethics or a morality—standards of 
good, noble, just, virtuous, worthy human action—that is not justified on the authority of 
revelation borders on the incomprehensible.  What we call freedom, they interpret as 
slavishness to desire and moral weakness.  The propriety of a zone within which the 
individual is entitled to ‘discover himself,’ or seek to realize his own potential, or as Kant 
would have it, will for oneself a rationally apprehended law, has nothing to latch onto.  As 
a result, the notion that “justice” (in the highest sense) and “law” should not make 
identical demands is rejected out of hand:  why should something be legal that is not also 
just or moral?  As Schacht explains,  “None of the modern systemic distinctions, between 
private and ‘public’ law, or between civil and penal law, or between subjective and 
adjective law, exists within the religious law of Islam; there is even no clear separation of 
worship, ethics, and law proper.”765  Where modern liberalism privileges the individual—
what required a revolution in moral and intellectual outlook—fundamentalists put forth 
an inextricably God-centered understanding of the political community.  The community 	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has an infinitely higher dignity than any particular piece of it.  As Ali A. Allawi helpfully 
observes, individualism is so alien to Islamic civilization that no Arabic word quite 
captures the Western meaning.  The term “individual” has little to do with personal 
autonomy or authenticity derived from a capacity for intelligent self-direction; instead, 
the Arabic term connotes “singularity, aloofness or solitariness.”766 
Whereas the permissive laws of liberal democracies aim to prevent one individual from 
interfering with the rights or property of another, sharia attempts to enforce compliance to 
a singular conception of virtue throughout the entire community.  Sharia, therefore, 
regulates minute aspects of conduct down to personal relationships, behavior in the 
home, intimacy between consenting adults, even the way individuals present themselves 
in public and what they eat.  Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi does a particularly good job of 
explaining the relationship between morality, law, public esteem, and the penal code on 
the Salafi understanding.  In seeking to “eradicate evils from its social scheme by 
prohibiting vice, by obviating the causes of its appearance and growth, by closing the 
inlets through which is creeps into society, and by adopting deterrent measures to check 
its occurrence,” Mawdudi suggests that sharia utterly depends on both a closed society and 
terrifying punishments for those who transgress its customs.767  
Though he is aware of Westerners’ visceral reaction to “severe and exemplary 
punishments” such as stoning and dismemberment, he nonetheless explains that they are 
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an integral part of sharia’s legal architecture, even in contemporary times and especially in a 
healthy and well-constituted Islamic state.  The natural fear of violence and pain holds 
the entire system together; the community’s moral influences are induced to apply the 
powerful levers of honor and dishonor in the right way for fear that the failure to do so 
will result in horrible this-worldly consequences.  And the participation of the entire 
community is important in this respect.  Qutb, citing a hadith, emphasizes that the entire 
community of believers is responsible to help enforce proper conduct:  “Every individual, 
again, is charged with the duty of putting an end to any evildoing which he sees.”768   
There is no immunity from the reach of the state’s coercive authority, nor even from the 
judgment of one’s fellows.  The kind moral indifference to the choices and behavior of 
others celebrated as tolerance in the West finds no equivalent expression. 
Thus one perceives, yet again, why the coercive power of the state—to maim, to 
disfigure, to stone to death—is inseparable from laws ostensibly sanctioned by God.  
Mawdudi explains the interconnectedness of the system this way: 
[T]he Sharia is… divided into many parts.  Aspects of it do not need any 
external force for their enforcement; they are and can be enforced only by 
the ever-awake conscience kindled by his faith in a Muslim.  Other parts 
are enforced by Islam’s program of education, training of man’s character, 
and the purification of his heart and his morals.  To enforce certain other 
parts, Islam resorts to the use of the force of public opinion:  the general 
will and pressure of the society.  Still other parts have been sanctified by 
the traditions and the conventions of Muslim society.  A very large part of 
the Islamic system of law, however, needs for its enforcement, in all its 
details, the coercive power and authority of the state.  Political power is 
essential for protecting the Islamic system of life from deterioration and 
perversion, for the eradication of vice and the establishment of virtue, and 
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for the enforcement of all those laws that require the sanction of the state 
and the judiciary for their operation.769 
This helps to explain the Islamist obsession with sexual morality—what amounts to the 
cloistering of, and often the brutal treatment of, women.  While it is their argument that 
unity of purpose among the community’s entire constellation of moral influences is 
necessary in order to form “fully Islamic personalities,” nothing is more important than 
upright models of virtue in the home.  Women are a community’s most important 
teachers; they cannot be permitted to attach value to independence of mind or freedom 
of any kind.  As Qutb explains, “the family system and the relationship between the sexes 
determine the whole character of a society and whether it is backward or civilized, jahili 
or Islamic.”770  On the (eminently distasteful) Islamist view, sexual desire is so powerful 
that in whatever proportion a community permits it to influence women’s behavior—if 
women are allowed, for example, to choose their own sexual partners—in that same 
proportion, women will cease to fulfill their vital role as instillers of wholesome values.   
Qutb contends that 
[i]f the family is the basis of the society, and the basis of the family is the 
division of labor between husband and wife, and the upbringing of 
children is the most important function of the family, then such a society is 
indeed civilized. In the Islamic system of life, this kind of a family provides 
the environment under which human values and morals develop and grow 
in the new generation; these values and morals cannot exist apart from the 
family unit. If, on the other hand, free sexual relationships and illegitimate 
children become the basis of a society, and if the relationship between man 
and woman is based on lust, passion and impulse, and the division of work 
is not based on family responsibility and natural gifts; if woman's role is 
merely to be attractive, sexy and flirtatious, and if woman is freed from her 
basic responsibility of bringing up children; and if, on her own or under 
social demand, she prefers to become a hostess or a stewardess in a hotel or 	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ship or air company, thus spending her ability for material productivity 
rather than in the training of human beings, because material production 
is considered to be more important, more valuable and more honorable 
than the development of human character, then such a civilization is 
'backward' from the human point of view, or 'jahili' in the Islamic 
terminology.771 
On the Salafi interpretation, then, nothing is as corrosive to a society’s morals than the 
equality of women.  To ensure women play their important roles as indoctrinators of 
future generations, no measure is too extreme.  Genital mutilation—designed to make the 
derivation of pleasure from sexual intercourse impossible—allegedly helps to ensure the 
integrity of the family unit.  Although the practice did not originate with Islam, it is 
recommended by in a number of hadiths and has been welded to Islamic practice in the 
parts of Africa where Salafi interpretations are widespread (it is less common in the 
Middle East and has been reported in Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, and even Muslim-
majority areas in Western Europe).772  The harsh penalties for adultery mandated in 
Islamic law, the enforcement of female modesty of dress, and the separation of women 
and men (which amounts to the exclusion of women from wider society) are similarly 
designed to discourage the kind of sexual dalliance, or discovery of alternative ways of life, 
that might undermine a woman’s commitment to her faith and its continued 
dissemination.  If fundamentalists seem particularly fanatical (and incomprehensible to 
ordinary Western sensibilities) on the issue of sexual morality, it is because they view the 	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dissemination of Western ideas concerning the equality of women—and the sexual 
liberation it portends—as a potentially cataclysmic virus, one capable of wiping out their 
entire way of life.  In fact, it was not until Sayyid Qutb visited the United States and 
witnessed for himself Americans’ debauchedness that his most radical views began to 
form.773  His depictions of Western corruption subsequently “became a regular part of the 
vocabulary and ideology of Islamic fundamentalists.”774  He even influenced the Iranian 
Revolution.  Ayatollah’s Khomeini’s image of America as the Great Satan—as a 
seductive temptress who leads men astray—is derived from Qutb’s denunciations of 
Western ways, a subject to which we will return in Chapter 9.775  
 
No Dethronement of Religion 
What virtues are to be publicly commanded and what vices prohibited under threat of 
violent punishment?  The singular conception of virtue to which the state is devoted is 
allegedly derived from the Qur’an and the Sunna—which is to say, verses and accounts 
carefully selected by Salafi scholars wedded to the ideas of thinkers like Qutb, and 
Mawdudi.  Thus defined, the sharia contains directives on  
such varied subjects as religious rituals, personal character, morals, habits, 
family relationships, social and economic affairs, administration, rights and 
duties of citizens, judicial system, laws of war and peace, and international 
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relations.  In short, [sharia] embraces all the various departments of human 
life.776   
In a word, “Islam is a way of life for man prescribed by God.”777  Thus, the notion of a 
separation of church and state borders on nonsensical; it is an alien concept, imported 
from the West at high cost to Islamic civilization.  The state exists for one reason and one 
alone:  to instantiates sharia; it is only legitimate to the extent that it does so successfully.  
With particular emphasis, Al-Banna, Qutb, and Mawdudi insist that the dethronement of 
religion—so important to modern constitutionalism in the West—cannot even be 
contemplated in the Islamic world.  “Wherever an Islamic community exists… it has a 
God-given right to step forward and take control of the political authority so that it may 
establish the Divine system on earth.”778 
Even before Qutb’s radicalizing influence, the Muslim Brotherhood was emphatically 
opposed to acknowledging the propriety of any division of authority between church and 
state.  Al-Banna insisted that it is not an open question, that the very concept of Islam 
encompassed every important aspect of life—religion, politics, economics, morals, 
society.779  In fact, Atatürk’s secularizing reforms, the “‘non-Islamic’ currents in the newly 
reorganized Egyptian university,” and the “secularist and libertarian” social and literary 
tendencies he discerned on his arrival in Cairo prompted al-Banna to establish the 
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Brotherhood.780  He explains in an essay entitled “Toward the Light” that while he 
understands why “some of the Eastern nations” chose to “deviate from Islam” in 
imitation of the Christian West, it is neither desirable nor permissible for an Islamic 
people.  For while admiration of the West, and the study of its Renaissance and 
Enlightenment “made by [the] leaders” of those countries led some to imitate the West’s 
definitive separation of religion from the day-to-day administration of the state (he surely 
has Atatürk in mind), al-Banna argues that the very “nature of Islamic doctrines” utterly 
prohibits a similar course of action in Egypt.781   Elsewhere, al-Banna explained that  
politics is a part of religion, that Islam encompasses the ruler and the ruled.  
Thus there is not in its teachings a rendering to Caesar that which is 
Caesar’s and to God that which is God’s.  Rather… Caesar and what 
belongs to Caesar is for God Almighty alone. 
Separately, he adds 
There is no authority in Islam except the authority of the state which 
protects the teachings of Islam and guides the nations to the fruits of both 
religion and the world…  Islam does not recognize the conflict which 
occurred in Europe between the spiritual and temporal [powers]… 
between the Church and the state.782 
Al-Banna refuses to give ground on this question, insisting instead that state support for 
religion is particularly important in modern times (“Seldom, if ever, has Islam needed the 
state more than today”).  Instead of an acknowledgment that modernity might require the 
erection of a different kind of state, in which the role of religion might be circumscribed, 
he insists that as a result of the imperialistic tendencies of European ideas Islam needs the 
protection and support of political authority more than ever.  Absent concrete measures 	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to shore up belief—what only the material and coercive resources of the state can 
achieve—“Islam is threatened with extinction in a world where only the strong can 
survive.”783  
Qutb, too, raises the post-Reformation Christian model explicitly—“a society in which 
God’s existence is not denied, but his domain is restricted to the heavens and his rule on 
earth suspended”784—and goes on to explain that the Qur’an utterly prohibits any such 
division of authority.  Thus, when asked by Nasser’s police “What are the major 
divergences between the present regime and the one you aspire to,” Qutb answered that 
human beings made laws under Nasser’s regime.  The separation of church and state was 
his primary complaint:  “the Sharia is not the sole source of all legislation.  I would like it 
to be installed as such.  This is the major divergence, all others are derivative.”785   Where 
Christian Reformers had cited the Biblical injunction to “Render unto Caesar what is 
Caesar’s,” Qutb cites the following verses from the Qur’an to justify his demand that all 
earthly authority be reserved for God: 
It is He Who is Sovereign in the heavens and Sovereign in the earth 
(43:84).786    
The command belongs to God alone.  He commands you not to worship 
anyone except Him.  This is the right way of life (12:40).787 
And yet, this reservation of temporal sovereignty for God, this requirement that He alone 
command, raises not a small problem where no established priestly class exists.  Whose 	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interpretation of holy writ is authoritative?  As we will have occasion to note, the 
ossification and radicalization of Qur’anic interpretation—also, in important part, a 
consequence of the Salafi movement—has displaced the tradition schools of Islamic law 
(which at times have proved flexible enough to accommodate changing historical 
circumstances).  Radical Salafi and Wahhabi scholars have, rather successfully, anointed 
themselves final interpreters of Islamic law, and thus, the effective determiners of what a 
society governed by Islamic law will look like.  In another proof that ideas that are true 
and/or best for men do not always win out, the Salafi movement’s cunning usurpation of 
this role helps to explain the otherwise inexplicable extent of fundamentalist influence 
today. 
 
The Illegitimacy of Temporal Legislative Authority  
Islamic law construed in this way leaves no space for consultative participatory 
government.  Where everything is already decided by God, the notion that consent and 
participating individuals can properly make laws is alien if not sacrilegious.  Where Locke 
and Spinoza sought to legitimize liberal, tolerant, and participatory government by 
arguing that New Testament Christianity demands a sphere for human law-making, 
Islamist thinkers have argued, in persuasive terms, that Islam positively forbids it.  
It would be difficult to overemphasize the significance of this difference.  The notion that 
the people are sovereign lies at the root of democratic government.  To say that the 
people is sovereign is to say that its rule-making apparatus (the legislative authority) is the 
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primary political master; the parliament or the congress (with some power reserved to the 
president or the prime minister) is not subject to the commands of any outside authority.  
That democratic citizens are simultaneously constituent elements of this highest authority, 
and subject to the laws they have a hand in determining or otherwise consent to, is a 
defining feature of constitutional government in the West.  This model of citizenship and 
government is completely impossible, however, where Islamist ideas are strictly adhered 
to insofar as the people themselves deny that they can constitute the legitimate and 
sovereign political authority.   
The aim behind the prohibition is a noble one.  Human wellbeing depends on a good 
ruler, that is, a ruler who is pious and just on the Salafi understanding.788  Only a ruler 
dedicated to brings about the laws revealed by God can institute just laws.  Qutb goes so 
far as to insist that any political order that is not “based on submission to God alone” 
cannot never be come close; any such society is de facto a jahili society.789  Wherever 
societies of men claim the authority to live according to laws they themselves establish, a 
cardinal tenet of Qutb’s Islam – utter submission to what has been revealed – has been 
violated.  “Men cannot change the practice of God in the laws prevailing in the universe” 
because human beings are, he argues, utterly incapable of making laws worthy of guiding 
their own lives. 790   He denies that human beings are free by nature; more important, he 
denies that men are sufficiently well constituted—morally or intellectually—to make laws 
that would permit a worthwhile way of living.  In short, men are too stupid and too self-	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interested to legislate well.  And since the sharia is in principle totalitarian, any law made 
by human institutions is also an unjust usurpation of divine authority.  In Qutb’s words, 
Man cannot understand all the laws of the universe, nor can he 
comprehend the unity of this system; he cannot even understand the laws 
which govern his own person, from which he cannot deviate by a hair’s 
breadth.  Thus he is incapable of making laws for a system of life which 
can be in complete harmony with the universe or which can even 
harmonize his physical needs with his external behavior.  This capability 
belongs solely to the Creator of the universe and of men…”791    
Nor is this an altogether new idea.  As Schacht explains in his classic study of Islamic law, 
interference with tenets of the sharia (even additions to them) by a legislative body (or any 
non-ecclesiastical body) “presupposes the reception of Western political ideas.”792  The 
notion that the people have the right and the legitimate authority to enact laws on the 
basis of their preferences, needs, or opinions is unthinkable where the extent of God’s 
sovereignty is properly appreciated.  Thus, as Schacht elaborates, “a traditional Muslim 
ruler must, by definition, remain the servant of the sacred law of Islam.”793  Positive law 
must, so far as possible, be derived from (if not identical with) divine law.  The reason:  
what is good in the universe is good because it is the word, or rather the will, of God.  The 
people of a state can never be sovereign; they are always, rightfully, and self-consciously, 
subjects of a higher authority.  Bernard Weiss elucidates the most important political 
consequences of this fact.  Muslims are, in effect, the slaves of Allah:  “The Creator…. 
possesses full property rights over his creatures…  God’s saves in fact have no original 
rights whatsoever, no rights apart from those granted by God, who alone possesses 
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original rights.”794  In contrast, “a modern government, and particularly a parliament, 
with the modern idea of sovereignty behind it, can constitute itself its master” precisely 
because the people no longer believe legislative authority properly resides with a being of 
purportedly higher dignity.795  As noted in Chapter 6, the new “sacred” opinions carefully 
put forth by Locke and Rousseau among others include the idea that human beings are 
endowed with natural rights, and that the people constitute the only legitimate sovereign 
authority.  This tenet—central to liberal government—is utterly rejected in Islam, and 
vehemently so by those who have politicized it. 
To wit, even the constitutions America has helped to write in the Islamic world—both 
Iraq’s and Afghanistan’s—expressly specify that the legitimacy of legislation is contingent 
on fidelity to Islamic law.  In Iraq, legislation is unconstitutional not where it contravenes 
a right enumerated in a charter of rights and freedoms, but rather, where it contravenes a 
principle of Islam.   The replacement of divine right by natural right in the hearts and 
minds of men has not even been seriously attempted.  Aside from God, only scholars are 
believed to have any legitimate political authority, and then, it is declarative authority 
insofar as they are bound to help operationalize the commands of the Qur’an and the 
Sunna, which amount to earthly manifestations of God’s unlimited legislative authority.796  
That Qutb underlines the more radical implications of this proposition should not come 
as a surprise.  In fact, he derives from it one of his most sophisticated criticisms of liberal 
democracy.  Government according to the principle of consent, far from being a 	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precondition for the maintenance of free government, is, in fact, the worst kind of 
tyranny.  For it reduces individuals to serving vain and selfish men who govern not 
according to what is just and pious, but according to what their base animal appetites 
demand.797  Majoritarian government is no better than servitude to a corrupt master 
where the people are not upright Muslims living according to Islamic law.  Furthermore, 
even obedience to a government based on the principle of consent is impermissible 
insofar as submission to a jahili society is tantamount to a rejection of God.798 
Qutb demands the implementation of sharia with a view to “actually freeing people from 
their servitude to other men”799; for “in the sight of Islam, the real servitude is following 
laws devised by someone else.”800   Thus, the “abolishing of the dominion of man” and 
“the abolition of man-made laws” is the first step toward reestablishing upright 
government, which is equivalent to “the dominion of God on earth.”801  As we have 
noted once before, Qutb departs from al-Banna in his insistence that a proselytizing 
approach is insufficient on its own:  the material obstacles in the way of establishing 
Islamic government can only be removed by force. 
In the Arab states where Salafi interpretations have taken hold, notably Saudi Arabia, 
neither freedom of worship, nor anything resembling the Western separation between 
church and state can exist.  Houses for the worship of religions other than Islam are 
expressly forbidden.  In fact, the Saudi Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the 	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Prevention of Vice forbids all non-Islamic religious practice.  Planes flying into Saudi 
Arabia are swept not only for bombs, but for Bibles.  Only Muslims can become citizens 
of the Kingdom.  The religious establishment or state sponsored ulema, funded generously 
by the regime, exerts a deep influence over the way the royal family governs the state; no 
law can be enacted that it does not first approve.   
 
Faith as Submission 
At the personal level, submission to revealed commands is absolute.  In fact, this is the 
first substantive teaching of the Qur’an.  Following only the opening prayer to Allah (“In 
the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate.  Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the 
entire universe…”) is the verse “you alone do we worship.”  As Mawdudi explains in his 
influential commentary,  
the term [for worship] ‘ibadah is used in three senses:  (1) worship and 
adoration; (ii) obedience and submission; and (iii) service and subjection.  
In this particular context the term carries all these meanings 
simultaneously.802    
His commentary on the verse ends with the observation “none but [God] may be the 
subject of man’s worship and total devotion, of man’s unreserved obedience, or man’s 
absolute subjection and servitude.”  In this light, it is not hard to appreciate that Islam 
literally means submission to the will of Allah.   
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Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s biography demonstrates the pervasive emphasis on abdication of free 
intellect and will in a particularly powerful way.  Ali is today an outspoken critic of the 
treatment of women is the Islamic world; in fact, she wrote the film—Submission—for 
which Theo van Gogh, its producer, was assassinated on an Amsterdam street.   Born in 
Somalia, she found her way to the West almost accidentally after having being swept up 
for a time by “the new wave of Brotherhood Islam.”803  In her memoirs and in her 
interviews, she emphasizes time and time again that this assertive strain of Islam is “a 
doctrine that requires from the individual to become a slave,” one that “limits the 
imagination to what you can find in the Qur’an.”804  Growing up in Somalia, she recalls 
that the Brotherhood was “cool,” even that her generation “wanted religion…  They 
wanted Islamic law.”805  Arab oil money flowed in to palpable effect.  Groups of young 
people, Ali among them, “thrilled to new movements” and established “small groups of 
true believers, as we felt ourselves to be.”  They read al-Banna and Qutb in particular.  
As Ali recalls,  
[t]he Islam that we were imbibing stemmed from the hard, essentialist 
beliefs of thinkers seeking to revive the original Islam of the Prophet 
Muhammad and His disciples in the seventh century.  The intention was 
to live according to the ancient ways in every detail of our lives…  
Everyone was convinced that there was an evil worldwide crusade aimed 
at eradicating Islam, directed by the Jews and by the whole Godless West.  
We needed to defend Islam.  We wanted to be involved in the jihad… 806   
In the end, the glimpse at Western ways Jane Austen’s novels provided—especially the 
strange notion than women are equal to men—broke the monopoly politicized Islam held 	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over her own mind, ultimately to inspire in her enough unease and doubt to seek asylum 
in the Netherlands.  She roused the courage to get off the plane in Amsterdam on the way 
to meet, for the first time, the Canadian man she had been given to.  Needless to say, she 
did not look back.  Ali’s accounts help Western readers to understand the reality of 
Qutb’s assertions, in particular, the emphasis on utter submission so central to “the new 
wave of Brotherhood Islam.”  In Somalia, Ali too seems to have believed that “no 
individual or group of individuals can be truly Muslim until they wholly submit to God 
alone in the manner taught by the Messenger of God.”807 Qutb goes so far as to assert 
that searching for reasons to believe sullies the believer’s faith.  One does not submit to 
Islam’s commands because, on reflection, one determines them to represent the best way 
of life; belief or “love of the Divine Law” has to come “without any question” and as a 
“consequence of pure submission to God and of freedom from servitude to anyone 
else.”808  It is worth underlining that the act of giving oneself over without question or 
reservation or limit is an essential, perhaps the essential, element of faith on Qutb’s 
understanding. 
The basis of the message is that one should accept the Sharia without any 
question and reject all other laws in any shape or form.  This is Islam.  
There is no other meaning of Islam.  One who is attracted to this basic 
Islam has already resolved this problem; he will not require any persuasion 
through showing its beauty and superiority.  This is one of the realities of 
the faith.809 
Roger Scruton points out that to observers Islam indeed seems to be defined as much by 
“constant rehearsals of the believer’s submission to God” as by its guiding tenets.  The 	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repetition of sacred words, the regular and precise performance of commanded gestures, 
the obligatory prayers five times daily, the annual fast, the observance of strict dietary 
laws, the pilgrimage to Mecca—all are important not so much for their content or what 
they represent, but insofar as they constitute a believer’s total submission to commands 
without question or reservation. 
As a corollary, according to literalists, both the Sufi manner of practicing Islam and 
liberal-minded ijtihad—the application of reason on the text, for the sake of 
accommodating Islam to the modern world or working out apparent inconsistencies—are 
expressly forbidden.  Where the Enlightenment and Reformation proceeded first to free 
men’s minds (what was believed to be a precondition of free government), Salafi doctrine 
teaches that men’s minds are rightfully bound, that genuine piety requires complete 
abdication of intellect to the will of God (and in women’s case, their husbands and fathers 
too).   
Precisely as a result of the centrality of submission, Islam cannot be construed as a 
private, personal, relationship with God.  According to its radical interpreters, as well as 
many moderates, the individualized spirituality familiar to worshippers in the West today 
(Christian and otherwise) is anathema to Islam.  To separate worship from strict 
adherence to an established moral code, publicly enforced by the community’s honors 
and dishonors if not its laws and penalties, erodes its foundation.  “[B]ecause of its very 
nature,” Qutb explains that Islam “abhors being reduced to pure thought”;810 “it cannot 
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come into existence simply as a creed in the hearts of individual Muslims”;811 as Qutb 
emphasizes over and over, “Islam cannot fulfill its role except by taking concrete form in 
society.”812 
Where outward demonstrations of belief (and submission) are believed to be inseparable 
from a religion’s personal spiritual elements, the separation of religious observance from 
politics and the state’s laws can never be considered legitimate.  And where worship is not 
believed to be, in principle, a private matter, but rather an integral component of 
membership in a wider community (one that extends, moreover, well beyond the borders 
of any single state) tolerance of those who do not worship in the same way becomes 
problematic at best.  Those who do not participate in the public aspects of the religion 
will never be considered full members of the community by those who do.  It bears 
repeating that the separation of church and state and all that springs from it—religious 
tolerance, the liberation of the human intellect, the free pursuit of happiness—requires a 
prior, and much more fundamental, separation in a “society’s habits of mind.”  Qutb 
devotes tremendous energy to shoring up the very opinions that would make it impossible 
to sunder “the connection between political form and divine revelation”813 in the Islamic 
world, always taking care to root his arguments in holy text. 
It is for this reason that radical Salafis contend that the Sufi orders, championing an 
“inner-worldly variant of Islam than stresses emotive and personal experiences of the 
divine,” amount to a corrupted, even a deviant, form of Islam.  One Saudi-based 	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foundation, al-Haramain, goes so far as to indict Sufi orders for spreading opinions that 
undergird liberal democracy, including the notion “that all religions are valid” as well as 
other “pacifist views.”  Sufi Muslims, according to al-Haramain’s website, are insufficiently 
intolerant; they teach “that work and family is the greatest Jihad, rather than establishing 
Allah’s religion on Earth through the use of the sword.”814  It is not hard to appreciate 
why tolerance for religious minorities where Salafi opinions prevail is bound to be fragile 
if it exists at all.    
The submission demanded by Islam, in the ideal case, is willing.  Willing submission—to 
God, or to those whom the community of believers confer divine authority—is especially 
important in Islam because God is the source of all valuable (as in inherently worthy, 
dignified, or redeeming) human action.  Submission to what is noble is therefore noble.  
Pushed to the extreme, however, nothing else can be.  To internalize any other moral 
code is to separate oneself from the community’s decent and upright citizens.  According 
to Ali Allawi, the very core of Islamic civilization is its complete devotion to—i.e., the 
community’s internalization of, and society’s organization around—tenets revealed by 
Islam’s prophets.   
At [Islam’s] heart was an act of willing submission—the literal meaning of 
‘Islam’—to the divine reality from which all manifestations of its 
civilization ultimately derived.  This ideal has remained intact ever since 
the inception of the religion, and in the final analysis it has been the 
bulwark which has so far stood against the dissolution of Islam into 
modernity.815  
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Allawi emphasizes willing submission.  So, in fact, to Qutb and Mawdudi. And insofar as 
true faith cannot issue from compulsion of conscience, submission to divine command is 
ipso facto free and willing.  But because worship cannot be private on this interpretation, 
submission to Islamic law can easily become much more severe in practice whether or not 
the mind gives free consent.  The problem is that where complete submission to God is 
not freely given, those claiming religious authority on earth have shown themselves more 
than willing to compel its outward appearance, brutally where necessary.  It is not a 
coincidence that where the most radical Salafi elements have achieved political 
authority—Afghanistan under the Taliban, Iraq’s Al-Anbar province at the height of the 
insurgency, and Saudi Arabia—one also witnesses the most brutal and widespread 
atrocities committed in the name of religion today.  If the conscience cannot be 
compelled, obedience to a public moral code certainly can.    
Add to this the monopoly over educational and cultural influences the Muslim 
Brotherhood seeks to establish as part of their proselytizing project.  And suddenly the 
line between freely choosing Islam and indoctrination begins to blur.  Recall Mawdudi’s 
insistence that in order to built fully Islamic personalities, the entire schema of the 
community’s moral, intellectual, and cultural influences—from its schools, to its religion, 
to its customs, to its honors and dishonors, to its music, to its art, to the laws and the penal 
code—must pull in the same direction.  Recall in this connection Qutb’s insistence that 
the first requirement of a pure faith “is that God’s sovereignty alone extend over hearts 
and consciences in human relationships and morals, in lives and possessions, in modes 
and manners,” or as he later puts it, that “belief ought to be imprinted on hearts and rule 
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over consciences” so thoroughly, in fact, that “it seeps into the depths of the human 
soul.”816  If willing, unreflective, submission constitutes the very heart of Islam, and if the 
modern West—our science and industry as much as constitutional democracy—is built 
on the proud, self-confident, emancipation of the human mind and will, an important 
tension between Islam thus understood and a guiding precept of the modern West is 
revealed. 
Perhaps sensing that complete intellectual submission of mind constitutes the lynchpin of 
their program, conservative religious authorities in the Islamic world have preemptively 
forbidden any accommodation of sharia to the conclusions of human reason freely 
exercised.  The Saudi Arabian Directorate of Ifta’, (Preaching and Guidance) has issued 
the directive condemning as kafir, or unbeliever, anyone who “believes that there is a 
guidance (huda) more perfect than that of the Prophet.”817  It has gone so far as to 
elucidate a list of opinions that are to “be regarded as a serious departure from the 
precepts of Islam, punishable according to Islamic law.”  The problem:  the opinions 
prohibited by the religious authorities are among those that are essential for the 
establishment of a liberal democracy.  As Fauzi M. Najjar conveniently summarizes, 
proscribed beliefs include: 
(1) institutions and laws enacted by human beings are superior to the Sharia; 
(2) Islam has been the cause to the backwardness of Muslims; 
(3) Islam is not applicable in the 20th Century; 
(4) Islam is limited to one’s relation with God, and has nothing to do with the daily affairs of 
life 	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(5) the application of the hudud (legal punishments decreed by God) is incongruous with the 
modern age; and 
(6) it is permissible not to rule according to what God revealed.818     
In the same vein, Muhammad al-Ghazali, a leading Egyptian theologian, has stressed the 
impropriety of anything resembling the establishment of a private moral sphere durably 
protected from state interference.  Again, to entertain such notions makes one a 
disbeliever, what for someone born a Muslim is equivalent to apostasy. The cleric is 
unambiguous:  “As separation of religion and state, secularism is unadulterated kufr.”819  
 
Inerrancy  
Unfortunately, the illiberal aspects of literalist interpretations of Islamic law gaining 
resonance today cannot easily be combated by liberal and modernizing interpretations.  
The second line of Qur’an’s second surah—what amounts to the book’s second concrete 
teaching (the first was about submission)—announces that nothing in the text is to be 
questioned:  “This is the Book of Allah, there is no doubt in it.” In addition to proving 
that the Qur’an is undoubtedly the word of God, the verse is taken to prove “there is no 
room for doubt about its contents.”820  This proposition is widely held; even Ali A. Allawi, 
a very moderate interpreter, avers that the very “bedrock of any Islamic sensibility must 
be the textual certainty of the Quran as the unaltered and unalterable word of God.”821   
This, the invincible commitment to, and faith in, the inerrancy of Islam’s sacred texts, is 	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one of the most powerful impediments, if not the most powerful impediment, to Islam’s 
transformation on anything resembling the Enlightenment/Reformation model.  As a 
result of this verse, any attempt to reinterpret the Qur’an that can be portrayed as 
straying even a little distance from the words on the page literally construed are easily 
painted as transgressions against God and thereby discredited.   
Recall that Spinoza inaugurated critical interpretation of the Bible by professing to 
demonstrate that the Apostles were so ordinary (and so creative) that their accounts of the 
revelations they received cannot be trusted (human beings, he went on to show, have 
equivalent access to God’s laws directly by their reason).  They even suggested that 
Biblical accounts and commands were best understood as allegorical moral tales 
counseling neighborliness above all.   This assertion that the Qur’an is infallible stands as 
but one of the barriers in the way of any such critical interpretation of Islam’s laws.  For 
rooting their objections to reformist and modernizing theorists so powerfully in holy writ, 
Salafi thinkers are able to marshal tremendous authority in service to their view.  As Qutb 
insists, the Qur’an is not to be considered a “book of stories or history,” which was 
precisely what Spinoza professed to demonstrate in his Treatise; the Qur’an is to be 
interpreted as prescribing “a way of life.”822  Elsewhere, Qutb calls efforts to “supply a 
modernized version of Islamic jurisprudence” a “vulgar joke on Islam.”823  Muslims are 
duty-bound to “reject this ridiculous proposal,” for it would effectively plunge Islamic 
civilization further into ignorance when what is necessary is a literalist revival. 
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Intellectual Suicide and the Closing of the Gates of Ijtihad  
The difficulty, of course, is determining what precisely a literalist interpretation of Islamic 
law requires.  Who is the final arbiter where learned scholars disagree?  Modernist 
reformers no less than jihadists can cite Qur’anic verses to buttress their calls for political 
reform.  What determines which interpretations get traction?  Traditionally, Islamic law 
is based on four principles or roots (usul):  the Qur’an, the sunna of the prophet, the 
consensus of the scholars on the meaning of the Qur’an and the sunna (ijma), and the 
application of reason to these latter sources (kiyas).824  Kiya means analogy, and ijtihad is 
the term for the application of an individual’s reason to draw conclusions by analogies to 
three prior sources.  This was, from the beginning, the most controversial of the usul.  
Some schools of Islamic law, notably the Shafi’i and the Hanbali schools, originally 
subordinated it to the first two principles.  While reasoning by analogy was, in the final 
analysis, formally acknowledged as one of the four usul, a consensus emerged about 900 
A.D. that the gates of ijtihad had closed.  Scholars from all four major schools of Islamic 
law “felt that all essential questions had been thoroughly discussed and finally settled,” in 
effect, that the application of human reason to questions of law was no longer necessary 
or proper.825  The scholars would be, henceforth, confined to the explaining, applying, 
and at most interpreting the doctrine thitherto laid down and established.  As Schacht 
explains,   	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This ‘closing of the door ijtihad,’ as it was called, amounted to the demand 
for taklid, a term which had originally denoted the kind of reference to 
Companions of the Prophet than had been customary in the ancient 
schools of law, and which now came to mean the unquestioning 
acceptance of the doctrines of established schools and authorities.826 
In other words, Islam’s eminent scholars and theologians were, henceforth, to be bound 
to earlier legal interpretations and determinations.   By way of analogy, imagine that the 
judges who make up the U.S. Supreme Court believed themselves bound to the 
precedents and legal reasoning of their predecessors.  Now imagine that the gates of ijtihad 
closed on the Court in the era of Plessey, or worse yet, Dred Scott.  The American regime 
would look very different today. 
Something analogous has happened in the Islamic world.  Modernist reinterpretation is 
forbidden.  And the Salafi/Wahabbi strains of Islam gaining adherents and influence 
today follow Ibn Taymiyya in their rejection of each of the four traditional schools of 
Islamic law, schools of interpretation that were “inherently moderate, restrained and 
subtle in their decisions, and allowed for considerable flexibility and leeway in their 
implementation.”827   Put another way, they adopted the position that the gates of ijtihad 
are closed, but they have nonetheless rejected much of the more flexible and moderate 
legal reasoning that ought to have survived to guide the interpretation and application of 
Islamic law. 
At this point, something more must be said about Ibn Taymiyya whose authority Salafi 
scholars invoke in support of their rigid fundamentalist interpretations.  He was a 
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traditionalist from the Hanbali school, but he rejected what he believed was an 
overreliance on the consensus of the scholars (ijma), a position that put him in 
considerable tension with the prevailing orthodoxy.  He taught that liberal interpretation 
of the Qur’an and the Sunna had permitted the corruption of Islam.  The religious 
establishment, moreover—he is said to have complained of “rationalistic theologians, lax 
judges, Sufis, and dervishes”—was complicit.  Required above all, on his analysis, was “a 
return to the pristine purity of the first four decades of Islam.”828  To achieve this, he held 
that the only interpretative consensus that mattered was the consensus reached by the 
prophet and his own companions.  Of course, this amounted to a rejection of the 
established role of the scholars and left only a very narrow space for the operation of 
reason.   
If Taymiyya was, in effect, applying his own judgment to the principles of Islamic law—
though only to reject the consensus of the scholars as it had emerged, and thus, the new 
taklid as well, all on the basis of a more literal reading of the Qur’an and the sunna —he 
“did not explicitly advocate the reopening of the ‘door of ijtihad,’” or at least, he supported 
opening it no further than his own immediate purposes required.  In fact, he offered a 
justification that is not outlandish on its face, teaching, as Schacht explains, that it is 
“unauthorized and dangerous to follow blindly the authority of any man, excepting only 
the Prophet, in matters of religion and religious law.”829  In other words, Ibn Taymiyya 
reasoned his way to a rejection of the scholarly consensus, a rejection of the community’s 
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application of reason to matters of law and its application, in favor of a more 
thoroughgoing submission to the first two principles of Islamic law interpreted as literally 
as possible—the Qur’an itself, and the sunna.  In this connection, Goldziher makes a very 
important point in his seminal study.  At the turn of the twentieth century, the important 
contemporary Islamic jurists and theologians, while in agreement on the dignity of 
revealed text (it is the ultimate source of truth), nonetheless left open an important place 
for reason:   
Not long ago, the recently deceased Egyptian mufti Muhammad ‘Abduh 
(d. 1905) could still… declare it as a principle of Islam that ‘when reason and 
tradition are in contradiction, the right of decision rests with reason.’  ‘This 
is a principle,’ he says, ‘which very few people oppose, and only people 
who are of no account.830 
He goes on to acknowledge that this ascription of considerable dignity to the human 
intellect, which ultimately dates back to the Mu’tazila tradition and their enthusiastic 
reception and incorporation of Greek philosophy,831 was anathema to traditionalists:  “it 
was unavoidable that their assertion of the preeminence of reason over tradition [the 
sunna] in theological proof should be an abomination in the yes of the intransigent old 
school.”832  Citing Taymiyya, Goldziher explains that the traditionalists rejected reason 
tout court because those who reasoned their way to a divine truth would nonetheless fail to 
achieve the divine reward (which comes not from rational investigation but from faithful 
submission), and because reliance on reason can “easily lead to error, and so to 
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unbelief.”833  As Goldziher sums up, reason—whether it is being used to seek after eternal 
moral and political truths, or as an instrument to shed light upon scripture or resolve the 
apparent paradoxes it contains—must therefore be forbidden.  And since “reason is not 
required for the grasping of religious truth,” it follows that “belief is bound to the letter of 
the received texts, solely and exclusively.”834  
This somewhat heterodox view quickly came to dominate the Hanbali school.  Perhaps as 
a consequence, the Hanbali school was on the verge of extinction, and Taymiyya (who 
radicalized it) forgotten, by the eighteenth century, as we have seen.  It was around this 
time that Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, in cooperation with the House of Saud on 
the Arabia peninsula, set a revival in motion the consequences of which ultimately led to 
problems now associated with politicized and jihadist Islam.835  The overwhelming 
emphasis Qutb and Mawdudi place on literal interpretation of the Qur’an and the ways 
of the prophet as reported by those who knew Him, as well as their rejection of virtually 
all previous Islamic philosophy and Qur’anic commentary, is a product of their 
rehabilitation of Taymiyya’s approach.   
Today, Salafi councils, clerics, and theologians, seizing upon the verses of the Qur’an and 
the sunnas that suit their political purposes, put forth arguments such as Qutb’s claiming 
for themselves almost unquestionable authority.  To make matters worse, in large thanks 	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to Saudi support and their capture of institutions of higher education and theology 
throughout the Arab world, the Wahabbi/Salafi school has exploded in size and 
influence, gaining so many adherents that it now claims the effective “right” not only to 
say what Islamic law is, but also, “to determine who [is] within the faith.”836   This is the 
“crisis of Islam” Allawi and others have identified.  A domineering “church-like” religious 
order, claiming ultimate authority over the universe of Sunni believers, is increasingly 
becoming the center of intellectual and theological gravity in the Arab-Islamic world.  
(The reasons for its resonance are discussed in the subsequent chapter.) 
While Robert Reilly acknowledges the pernicious and radicalizing impact of Salafi 
thinkers,837 as well as the decisive impact of Ibn Taymiyya,838 he traces the closing of the 
Muslim mind to an epistemological debate that ended around 1195, less than a century 
before Taymiyya’s time.839  At issue was the relationship between reason and revelation.  
Confidence in the authority of the human intellect—in particular, man’s ability to know 
the world by his own lights—rested uneasily against Qur’anic descriptions of an all-
powerful, willful, God.  Where the Gospels had been taken to imply an identity of reason, 
God’s understanding, and a knowable nature order by men like Spinoza, the Qur’an was 
invoked to deny the authority of reason insofar as the positing of a knowable world 
governed by permanent natural laws makes the simultaneous existence of a willful and 
omnipotent God nonsensical. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
836 Ali A. Allawi, The Crisis of Islamic Civilization, 120. 
837 Robert Reilly, The Closing of the Muslim Mind, 173-204. 
838 “Ibn Taymiyya did to theology what al-Ghazali did to philosophy; he exiled it” (Reilly, 123). 
839 1195 is the year Averroes books were burned and the teaching of philosophy was banned in 
Cordoba.  (Reilly, 121).  
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It was not always this way.  The Islamic world’s discovery of Hellenic thought “opened 
the Muslim mind in a way it had never before been in the spirit of free inquiry and 
speculative thought.”840  Avicenna and Averroes represent the peak of Islamic philosophy 
and are generally considered to rank among the greatest philosophers simply.  Averroes 
taught that reason and revelation are not only compatible; more than this, the Prophet 
himself compels men to reason.  Averroes concludes from this that reason cannot lead to 
conclusions that contradict what has been revealed.  Commenting on a verse from the 
Qur’an—“Summon to the way of your Lord by wisdom and by good preaching, and 
debate with them in the most effective manner” (XVI, 125) —he puts it this way: 
Now since this Law is true and summons to the study that leads to 
knowledge of the truth, we the Muslim community know definitely that 
demonstrative study does not lead to [conclusions] conflicting with what is 
given in the Law; for truth does not oppose truth but accords with it and 
bears witness to it.841 
Al-Ghazali’s assault on philosophy and reason in the name of faith (understood in terms 
of submission of mind to Allah’s will as revealed by the Prophet) was, nonetheless, 
successful.  The impact of epistemic closure seeped from philosophy to law to literature:  a 
kind of ubiquitous and thoroughgoing traditionalism, utterly incapable of justifying its 
own practices, emerged as a result.  What can only be described as the ossification an 
entire civilization’s intellectual life is, for Reilly, the root cause of the region’s many 
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political, social, and economic problems today.842  Put another way, the crisis of Islamic 
civilization—manifest in everything from suicide bombings committed in the name of 
Islam, to the ubiquity of autocratic government in the Middle East, to the region’s 
seemingly incorrigible economic stagnation, to the paucity of Nobel Prize winners and 
literary geniuses of Arab descent—is traceable to this “intellectual suicide” committed in 
the name of faith more than a millennium ago.843 
Refusing to recognize this, Salafi thinkers reject outright any reincorporation of Western 
philosophy into Islamic civilization.  Qutb turns Reilly’s argument on its face, contending 
that the intermingling of Greek philosophy and Christian theology with early 
commentaries on the Qur’an is responsible for corrupting Islamic jurisprudence and its 
guiding principles.844  Athens and Jerusalem are responsible for Islam’s corruption.  
Qutb, for this part, understands that the West was built by its philosophic and religious 
traditions.  He is adamant, for precisely this reason, that it has no place—or almost no 
place—in a properly ordered society.  The only exception he allows is students steeped in 
“pure Islamic thought” (which he distinguishes from “Islamic philosophy,” presumably 	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on the basis the vast majority of Islamic philosophy is both cause and consequence of 
jahilliya).  His intention seems to be to help prepare a generation of thinkers like him.  
Qutb read the Greeks and rejected them.  Advanced students of “pure Islamic thought,” 
will, similarly, be inoculated against being “too much influenced” and will therefore read 
Western philosophy “critically,” “prepared to reject all that does not agree with the 
fundamental modes of thought of a Muslim people.”845   
No reader of Plato’s Republic can fail to be struck that Qutb’s metaphor for Islam is a great 
tree that blocks out the sun.846   Islam provides guidance for life, as we have seen, but also 
“gives information about the Unseen as well as about the visible world.”  In order to be 
sufficiently “tall, strong, [and] wide-spreading… clearly its roots must go down deep and 
be in proportion to its size.”847   This is the perfect metaphor for politicized Islam:  its 
originators radicalized religious practice is such a way that as communities devoted to 
these ideas spread and grew, they increasingly shielded those same communities from 
exposure to alternative ways of living that might break Islamists’ monopoly over the 
community’s formative influences. 
 
Islamic Law as a Limit on Executive Authority? 
As for that other pillar of constitutional democracy—the rule law (and citizens’ equality 
before the laws)—some, notably Noah Feldman, have argued that secular Arab 	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dictatorships restore limited government according to law by instituting sharia as limiting 
principle.  Feldman points to the Ottoman Empire before efforts to reform its legal code to 
demonstrate that a ulema deriving its authority from its guardianship of sacred religious 
tenets can effectively limit government.848  This was indeed the dynamic in the Ottoman 
Empire prior to the Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth century.  The scholars and 
Caliph, whose legal judgments exerted a concrete check on the exercise of executive 
power in practice, effectively limited the Sultan’s power.  Bernard Lewis noted the same 
dynamic in The Emergence of Modern Turkey.849  Where Feldman goes further than Lewis is 
in suggesting that the relationship might be reestablished today. 
What Feldman fails to appreciate is that a government limited in this way, according to 
laws interpreted by an authority independent of the executive, is only durable where the 
division of authority between the interpreters of the law and its executors is strong:  the 
independence of each authority guaranteed by the widespread perception of its 
legitimacy, and animated by an ambition to see its role enacted. Unfortunately, the 
division of authority necessary to translate limiting rules on parchment into effective 
limitations of state authority has not been, and is unlikely to be, duplicated where the 
politicized Islam of Qutb and his acolytes has gained influence.  The propriety of any 
such division is rejected out of hand.  Fundamentalists seek to utilize the moral authority 
of Islam to gain and maintain political authority.  In the two countries where committees of 
scholars play the largest political role, moreover—Iran and Saudi Arabia—their influence 	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is decidedly illiberal; they more often stand in the way of liberalizing measures, and rarely 
if ever restrain the government’s authority in the name of Islam.  Often, they demand the 
enforcement of a puritanical moral code. 
To put this in the terms of Islamic law, influential scholars have not always demanded the 
intersection of religion and politics on religious grounds in the same way fundamentalists 
do today.  Nor have they always insisted on so thoroughgoing an application of sharia.  
For most of Islam’s history, calls for the unification of the coercive power of the state with 
the religious authority had little effect.850  In most places, and for the better part of 
Islamic history, a bargain was struck between the guardians of Islamic law (who 
recognized its totalitarian claims in theory), and the rulers governing increasingly large 
and complex Muslim states (who recognized the practical impossibility of deriving an 
entire legal code from the Qur’an).  As Joseph Schacht explains in his classic exposition, 
[A] balance established itself in most Islamic countries between legal 
theory and legal practice; an uneasy truce between the ‘ulama’ (‘scholars’), 
the specialists in religious law, and the political authorities came into being.  
The ‘ulama’ themselves were conscious of this; they expressed their 
conviction of the ever-increasing corruption of contemporary conditions 
(fasad al-zaman), and, in the absence of a dispensing authority, formulated 
the doctrine that necessity (darura) dispensed Muslims from observing strict 
rules of the Law.  Whereas traditional Islamic governments were unable to 
change it by legislation, the scholars half sanctioned the regulations which 
the rulers in fact enacted, by insisting on the duty, already emphasized in 
the Qur’an (sura iv. 59, 83, and elsewhere), of obedience to the established 
authorities.  As long as the sacred Law received formal recognition as a 
religious ideal, it did not insist on being fully applied in practice.851  
As we have seen, Salafi thinkers sought to delegitimize every aspect of this compromise.  
It is a testament to their success, moreover, that there is insufficient appetite to see the link 	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between enforcer of law and interpreter of law sundered.  Iran’s Council of Guardians 
determines who can run for office, and exerts a heavy influence on whoever occupies the 
country’s highest offices.   The Islamic scholars who, not long ago, constituted Yasser 
Arafat’s domestic opposition, today (thanks to elections) rule Gaza and have gone not a 
short way toward enforcing sharia under the banner of Hamas.  So, too, Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
and the Taliban claimed the right to rule on religious grounds and erected some of the 
most totalitarian states the likes of which have not been seen outside of the twentieth 
century.  Rather than vesting a potentially limiting prerogative of review in a powerful 
and independent body, those claiming the authority of politicized Islam have sought to 
marshal religion’s authority over men’s hearts and minds in order to monopolize coercive 
force.  The story always ends the same way:  government becomes despotic, 
dysfunctional, and inhuman; and religion is corrupted by the abusive use vain claimants 
to ecclesiastical authority make of it.  
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C H A P T E R   V I I I 
WHY THE RESURGENCE TOOK HOLD 
 
Ideas are important.  But ideas alone do not a revolution in social consciousness make, 
not even when they have taken over academia and are supported by the limitless 
resources of wealthy patrons.  Ideas persuade widely when events give them footholds in 
men’s lives and minds.  Just as the European wars of religion left terrorized Europeans 
longing for a depoliticized Christianity, and just as Enlightenment notions concerning 
political equality resonated against the rampant social injustice of the old regime in 
France, so the political and social environment in the Middle East today has created an 
environment in which the ideas put forth by Salafi thinkers have a natural widespread 
appeal.  
For new ideas cannot gain traction without upending the status quo, without the prior 
discrediting of the dominant opinions they would replace. Fouad Ajami’s beautiful 
intellectual history, The Arab Predicament, helps to demonstrate why politicized Islam has 
become more and more popular as the decades since WWI have elapsed.  He highlights 
the most important arguments advanced by proponents of the ideologies and political 
movements that have battled to shape the politics of the Middle East over the course of 
the twentieth century, and in so doing, helps to illustrate the Arab world’s mighty 
struggle, ultimately a dismal failure, to come to terms with the modernity.  The most 
radical proposals never quite stuck.  In every case, the failure of meaningful reform, and 
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the wars, revolutions, and political dysfunction that ensued, have instead solidified the 
place of radical manners of interpreting Islamic law.  
Attempts to modernize the Middle East in the twentieth century can be organized into 
five distinguishable groups, virtually every one driven by elites intent on a top-down 
approach to reform:  the liberal nationalist post-WWI model inspired by Europe’s nation-
state system and presided over by the imperial powers; Nasser’s assertive Arab 
nationalism in Egypt; the socialist-communist popular-welfare program that initially 
inspired the Ba’ath movements in Iraq and Syria; the oil-financed contract model—an 
uneasy hybrid of secularized jet-setting elites and a people deeply impacted by Wahhabi 
ideas—epitomized by Saudi Arabia since the 1980s; and, most recently, the American-led 
attempt to promote liberal democracy in Iraq.  The promise of each burned out in 
spectacular fashion, however, because reformers effectively tried to push the state beyond 
its society.   The failures were revealed in spectacular fashion:  the first withering as a 
result of Israel’s creation and the loss of the Palestine in 1948; the second as a result of 
Egypt’s crushing defeat in 1967, and subsequently, its willingness to pursue a separate 
peace with a Jewish state; the third, as a result of dismal failures of the Ba’ath regimes to 
live up the promises their socialist founders made to justify revolution, and, of course, the 
Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, triumphantly repelled by Islamists hailing from 
across the region; and the fourth, because it has become impossible to brazenly finance 
and promote radical Islam and remain on reasonable terms with the United States in a 
post-9/11 world.   
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In every case, the outer trappings of modernity have been embraced.  States in the 
Middle East participate in the global economy, employ Western technologies, organize 
the administrative apparatus of the state along ostensibly Western lines, and in some 
cases, have even established ostensibly democratic institutions.  But the ideas that 
underpin these features of life in the West were never completely internalized, at least not 
in any major Muslim-majority country other than Turkey.  This created a vacuum for 
Islamist sentiment.  In each case, it grew. 
The Arab world’s would-be revolutionaries failed to appreciate what a few of its 
luminaries did:  political reform unaccompanied by cultural reform is doomed to failure.    
Ajami invokes Ali Ahmad Said, a Syrian poet and public intellectual, to make the point as 
plainly as possible:   
We must realize that the societies that modernized did so only after they 
rebelled against their history, tradition, and values…  We must ask our 
religious heritage what it can do for us in our present and future…  If it 
cannot do much for us we must abandon it.852   
Nadim Bitar, a Western educated Sociologist, made a similar point.  He believed the 
people’s loyalty to Islam was the reason for Egypt’s defeat in 1967, that Arabs would have 
to “stand naked before history” in order to remedy their predicament.853   Bitar was 
calling for the renunciation of Islam in favor of Marxism, as though deeply held religious 
beliefs could be annihilated at an instant, and an alien ideology thoroughly adopted just 
as instantaneously.  His solution is no doubt far-fetched—as, indeed, every of the radical 
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top-down approach to remaking the Middle East has been—but in locating the resistance 
to successful political reform in beliefs that go deeper than politics, he identifies an 
obstacle in the way of modernizing reform those seeking to affect regime change in the 
Islamic world would be ill-advised to ignore. 
Ajami’s goes on to point out that each failed attempt to confront modernity also 
contributed to the resurgence and radicalization of Islam by delegitimizing alternatives 
amidst intense public frustration and resentment (or in the case of the Soviets’ expulsion 
from Afghanistan by the Mujahideen, and the Islamic Revolution in 1979, by inspiring 
tremendous pride and a newfound confidence.)   Together, the disappointments 
energized the men and women impatiently inveighing “Islam is the solution… The 
Qur’an is our constitution” and gave wide resonance to their message.854  This, 
incidentally, is the reason Saddam Hussein launched a faith campaign after the first Gulf 
War, one that permitted a dramatic intensification of religious sentiment in Iraq in the 
decade preceding the 2003 invasion.  To shore up his regime’s legitimacy in a world of 
intensifying conviction, he, too played Islam’s champion.  
Unfortunately, it is a barren kind of pride that animates groups like the Muslim 
Brotherhood, one that can tear down but cannot build up.  Saudis welcome the American 
companies that extract the country’s oil that to make the Kingdom’s princes wealthy 
beyond measure, but they, in turn, use their wealth to fund the spread of anti-American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
854 This is derived from the official creed of the Muslim Brotherhood, and is often chanted 
enthusiastically at their demonstrations:   “Allah is our objective.  The Prophet is our leader.  The 
Qur’an is our law [constitution].  Jihad is our way.  Dying in the way of Allah is our highest 
hope.” 
	  445 
fanaticism.   The educated, wealthy, jihadist, willing to die if he can use the fruit of 
Western science to kill untold civilians is another example of the pathology.  In Ajami’s 
words, 
Thus the seeming contradiction between the reassertion of Islamic 
fundamentalism… and the unprecedented integration of the Arab world 
into the world economy and the extensive political and cultural advances 
of the United States into the region is no contradiction at all.  The two 
phenomena are twins.  There comes a time in the life of nations when the 
outside world intrudes, when it appears with all its threats and temptations.  
People either respond to it coherently and competently or they lose their 
bearings.  And if they do the latter, they need all kinds of psychological 
devices.  Reassertion and chauvinism alternate with self-doubt and 
mimicry.855  
Ajami published his book long before America’s recent interventions in Iraq.  But in the 
context of the framework he provides, there is every reason to fear that this most recent 
encounter with the modern world—the U.S.-led campaign to help bring constitutional 
democracy to Iraq—has been so effectively frustrated by the very force it now seems to be 
strengthening:  a radicalized and politicized Islamic Resurgence.  The terrible difficulty, 
the predicament of the work’s title, is this:  there is a world of difference between 
delegitimizing a government and building a successful one.  The first is easy; the latter 
task takes the rarest of political gifts, enlightened statesmanship.  As Ajami puts it in the 
context of Ayatollah Khomeini’s appeal in the Arab world (something Iran current 
president has managed to duplicate):  “Fundamentalism may be too incoherent to govern, 
but it can topple the world of the elites, shatter their illusions, demonstrate that they have 
surrendered to the ways of the aliens.”856 
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History, in other words, has never been governed by an invincible arrow pointing the way 
forward; “progress” is not automatic.  In moments of societal stress or crisis, it can be 
easier to cling to sacred traditions long deteriorated, even when they are a cause of the 
crisis.  It follows that where the sharia has been enforced – Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq’s 
Anbar province – its enforcers have very often appeared deficient, even (or especially) to 
devout Muslims:  in part, because religion becomes a means to power that corrupts; and 
in part because a society organized along traditional Islamic lines is no better than the 
modern alternatives at confronting the exigencies of the modern world.  And yet, the 
appeal of radical Islam grows and grows.  For pride tinged with resentment can lead men 
to cling to those things that define them, by which they can claim any kind of superiority; 
it is much harder to admit defeat and “stand naked before history” than it is to claim that 
with redoubled devotion, the implacable enemy can finally be overcome.  And so the 
failures are blamed on the American and Israel and the moral superiority of Islam is 
trumpeted. Memories of the Crusades, Atatürk’s betrayal of Islam, the Six Days War (and 
more recently, American intervention in Iraq and apparently unconditional support for 
Israel) are reawakened; taken together, they “created a deep need for solace and 
consolation, [for which] Islam provided the needed comfort.”857  Thus, Islamic 
fundamentalists have leveraged persistent Arab angst masterfully to make “an eloquent 
and moving case” that the Arab world has declined so far from its apogee “because 
[Arabs have] lost their faith and bearings.”858    
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The Inevitable Impact of Western “Meddling” 
These is another dynamic at work, however, that lends no end of energy to the 
movement.  The perception—not without some basis in fact—that America and the West 
meddle in the Islamic world with complete and utter impunity to pursuit their interest 
enrages fanatical attachment as only the perception of an existential threat can.  And this, 
it must be recognized, is precisely what the West is as a consequence of its emphasis on 
promoting liberal democracy.  Fundamentalist recognize what Westerners refuse to 
admit:  Islam understood as comprehensive legal code is incompatible with liberal 
democracy.  If the West succeeds at what it professes to want to do, it will by transforming 
the practice of Islam, by vanquishing the Islamist movement.  To Islamists, the limitation 
of religion to a private sphere is tantamount to an alien religion; it is a radically 
incommensurable pattern of life.  As Spinoza and Locke taught, nothing animates 
fanatical belief as well as the perception some other sect is trying to come between you 
and your God, especially where they are (or can be portrayed as) using coercive force to 
do it.   
Eric Hoffer wrote in his classic study of the psychology of mass movements that the 
strength of a movement “is [usually] proportionate to the vividness and tangibility of its 
devil.”859  In this light, it is not hard to see why America and the West—all of 
modernity—make for a “Great Satan.”  America’s military power is unmatched in history 
and she has legitimate security interests in the region.  But that is not the narrative the 
fundamentalist understands.  With carrier groups in every sea, cruise missiles that can 	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pick a window, drones that see everything, and taps on every phone, America seems an 
empire that bestrides the world like a colossus indulging its every whim abroad so that the 
indulgence and debauchedness can go on at home.  That is how they understand the 
threat.  And to the excesses of modernity best represented by the West, the 
fundamentalist attributes all the region’s problems.860  There is no appetite to modernize 
because they believe excessive modernization to be at the root of their problems. Thus, 
the solution is always the same:  renewed commitment to a purer, militant, Islam.   
 
Efforts to Modernize 
The great Iranian thinker, Abdolkarim Soroush, has stated plainly that theological reform 
is a prerequisite of liberal democracy in the Islamic world. 
You need some philosophical underpinning, even theological 
underpinning in order to have a real democratic system.  Your God cannot 
be a despotic God anymore.  A despotic God would not be compatible 
with democratic rule, with the idea of rights.  So you even have to change 
your God.861 
There are, indeed, thinkers in both the Sunni and Shiite worlds trying to accomplish this.  
A brief look at contemporary liberal movements in the Islamic world will reveal that not 
even those fighting to transform the Middle East from within are optimistic today.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
860 Lest I be misunderstood, it is possible to explain the psychology of a thing without in any way 
endorsing or excusing it. 
861 Interview with Abdolkarim Soroush, available at: 
http://www.drsoroush.com/English/Interviews/E-INT-HomaTV.html. 
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Most agree that a liberalized Islam can only be achieved through ijtihad.  The problem:  
ijtihad, or the application of independent reasoning to Islamic doctrine, is not always 
governed by a rationalistic or humanist attitude.  New interpretations of Islamic law in 
light of human reason that aim to render religious practice more compatible with other 
aspects of modernity have been much less influential than those dominated by the 
fascistic impulse to forcibly mold every aspect of the individual, the religious community, 
and the state they live in according to the most radical interpretations.  The most 
important and the most impressive liberal thinkers, moreover, have generally been deeply 
touched by the European Enlightenment and its dominant intellectual currents.  Not 
surprisingly, this fact does not always endear those thinkers to their constituencies.  If 
reforming the practice of Islam—the character of the umma, of citizenries—is a vital 
prerequisite of enduring political transformation, the fact liberal reformers are viewed 
with suspicion before their views are even seriously considered bodes ill for the prospect of 
meaningful reform in the short term.  
In fact, that liberal and modernist reformers are loosing ground against the background 
of the Resurgence of Islam is more or less the consensus view.  Ali A. Allawi’s contention 
that the fundamentalist Wahabbi/Salafi strain of interpretation has become dominant 
has already been noted.  Bernard Lewis agrees, observing in a recent work that while 
“liberal theology has been an issue among Muslims in the past, and may be again in the 
future.  It is not at the present time.  The literal divinity and inerrancy of the Qur’an is a 
basic dogma of Islam, and although some may doubt it, none challenge it.”  More 
pointedly, a 2008 RAND Institute study concluded that “liberal intellectuals who propose 
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the establishment of Western style democracy”—men of a disposition and motivated by 
aims reminiscent of Locke and Spinoza in the West—are “voices in the wilderness” with 
“little mass support in the Middle East” today.862  Most recently, Robert Reilly has 
contended that “fundamentalist movements have come to dominate intellectual discourse 
in key Muslim countries” while the modernist movement—which “emphasized Islam’s 
compatibility with science and rationalism”—has effectively “been banished from the 
political and cultural scene.”863 
 
Algeria’s Malek Bennabi 
Modernists’ contentions are, nonetheless, worth examining, not least because of their 
tremendous influence in Turkey in the lead-up to its reinvention (which is the subject of 
Chapter 10).  One of the most impressive liberal Islamic theorists of the twentieth century 
is a man virtually nobody has heard of.  In fact, whereas the works of the three 
fundamentalist Islamist theorists discussed above are available in more than a dozen 
languages, instantly and free in the form of convenient pdf files, Malek Bennabi’s corpus 
has not yet been translated entirely into English, and the original French texts are in 
important cases almost impossible to locate.   
Born to a wealthy family in Algeria, Malek Bennabi (1905-1975) attended both a local 
madrassa and a French Academy growing up.  His parents’ wealth and his knowledge of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
862 RAND, The Muslim World After 9/11, 79-80. 
863 Robert Reilly, The Closing of the Muslim Mind, 199. 
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French permitted him to attend university in Paris.  His education afforded him an 
intimate acquaintance with Islam’s major works of theology and philosophy and a 
thoroughgoing familiarity with “Western civilization and its classical and modern 
thinkers.”864   Though a profound respect for the European Enlightenment’s brightest 
lights is clearly discernable throughout his writings, he is no Europhile, and certainly not 
an uncompromising admirer of the modern (or post-modern) West.  He argues that 
Islam—properly understood—supports, even demands, a form of democratic 
government.  But not necessarily a democracy built according to the Western model.  On 
his argument, the moral capital generated by Islam permits a higher form of participatory 
government, one less susceptible to the vagaries of selfish and narrowly concerned 
majorities.  His works are well argued and compel the imagination.  One contemporary 
American scholar calls him “one of the most significant intellectuals in modern… Islamic 
history.”865  Unfortunately, commentators agree that his influence has been 
disproportionately limited.866  According to Allawi, “he was the last of the pre-radical 
thinkers of his generation”; his ideas—even in his home country—were more or less 
ignored against the impatient calls of Islamists and jihadists.867 
Perhaps the problem was his criticism of Islam, even though he offered it in the spirit of a 
friend.  An Algerian nationalist and a devoted Muslim, Bennabi believed Islamic 
civilization was in need of rehabilitation, a Renaissance and Reformation.   He argued 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
864 Mohammad Mohaddessin, Islamic Fundamentalism (Washington, D.C.:  Seven Locks Press, 
1993), 166. 
865 Phillip Naylor, “The Formative Influence of French Colonialism on the Life and Thought of 
Malek Bennabi,” French Colonial History, Vol. 7 (2006), 129. 
866 cf. Zoubir, 4 
867 Ali Allawi, The Crisis of Islamic Civilization. 69. 
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that the weakness of the Islamic world glaringly revealed by Napoleon’s conquest of 
Egypt (and repeated over and over throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
and indeed into the twenty-first) was not simply the fault of malicious external forces—
Western aggression, imperialism, now neo-imperialism as Al-Banna, Qutb, Mawdudi, 
and other Islamists insist.  He makes a much bolder argument (one that, for obvious 
reasons, was not universally embraced).  While the popularizers of a militant jihadist-
inclined Islam argued that Western civilization had grown decadent (if dangerously 
seductive and powerful) as it declined, Bennabi argued that it was Islamic civilization that 
was, in fact, decaying.  This, in turn, accounted for the weakness of modern Muslim 
states, for the fact their territories were ripe for conquest and colonization.  Muslim lands 
were colonized by the Western powers because the Islamic world had grown 
“colonizable”; consequently, “to liberate oneself from… colonialism, it is necessary to 
liberate oneself first from its cause—colonizability.”868  The economic and political 
dysfunction that continue to grip the Islamic world are the result of “deep-seated 
intellectual and socio-cultural causes”; one commentator goes so far as to argue that the 
Arab world will have to come to terms with key elements of Bennabi’s thought before 
meaningful political and economic progress are likely to be achieved.869  
Bennabi boldly argues that from the time of Averroes (he gives the extinguishing of the 
Almohad dynasty in Morocco in 1269 as the precise date), Islam’s intellectual vitality has 
been slackening.  Religion—which is also the primary spring (i.e., the source of energy 	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Thought of Malek Bennabi,”136; his translation. 
869 Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi 
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and direction) for society and culture in the Islamic world—had effectively been sapped of 
the capacity to inspire worthy political and cultural undertakings.  In an arresting line 
that reminds of one of Leo Strauss’ dominant teachings—namely, that a civilization’s 
vitality is extinguished with the expiration of the tension between reason and revelation—
he writes “Où l’âme fait dèfaut, c’est la chute et la décadence, tout se qui perd sa force 
ascensionnelle ne pouvant plus que descendre, attiré par une irrésistible pesanteur…  
L’impulsion coranique s’étant peu à peu amortie, le monde musulman s’est arêté, comme 
un moteur s’arrête quand il a consommé son dernier litre d’essence.”870    
That Bennabi chooses to date Islam’s decay to the vanquishing of Averroian thought is 
no doubt significant.  Whatever one ultimately thinks of his philosophy, Averroes, deeply 
familiar with and influenced by the works of Plato and Aristotle, sought to reconcile the 
confident employment of man’s rational capacities with the revealed teachings of the 
Qur’an.  His approach to religion and theology—which Leo Strauss, not unrevealingly, 
compares to Spinoza’s871—was, in the thirteenth century, vanquished by Al-Ghazali’s 
ultra-literalist approach to the interpretation of revealed texts.  In Incoherence of the 
Philosophers, Al-Ghazali argued that Islam is true, that the philosophers cited by Averroes 
had not proven their doctrines, and that, as a result, those philosophers were to be 
rejected; where revelation and reason do not agree, revelation is always to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
870 Quoted in Roger Le Torneau, “Problèmes Musulmans d’Aujourd’hui,” Revue francaise de science 
politique, Année 1955, Volume 5, Numero 2, 414. 
871 Leo Strauss goes so far as to assert that Averroes’ criticism of religion is at the root of the mode 
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privileged.872  It should go without saying that in the Christian world Averroes’ approach 
won out, not least because of the later decisive influence of men like Spinoza and Locke.  
Robert Reilly’s recent The Closing of the Muslim Mind is a thorough examination of this 
insight; he agrees with Bennabi that a millennium-old epistemological debate between a 
philosopher and a theologian is the proximate cause of the current crisis of Islamic 
civilization.  It is a testament to Bennabi’s obscurity that Reilly has written a book about 
Bennabi’s “colonizability” thesis without once mentioning the Algerian thinker. 
For Bennabi, too, the enervation of intellectual life leads inevitably to a civilization’s 
decay.  What Bennabi calls the “post-Almohadien” era is defined, then, by what it is 
missing—intellectual and moral seriousness or vigor.  The consequence, as Roger Le 
Torneau summarizes: “une société musulmane qui ne vit plus que de routine.”873  A 
civilization attached to its deepest intellectual and moral commitments by rote repetition 
and routine expressions of fidelity—one that clings to its sacred teachings from alternating 
respect for and fear of authorities’ decrees where the authorities themselves are blindly 
shackled to tradition rather than genuine engaged with the place of their inherited beliefs 
and habits in a changing world—will inevitably lack both the confidence to defend itself, 
and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances.  Believers continue to profess the 
traditional beliefs and appear to live the old life, but in the shallowest possible way:  
without commitment, engagement, or understanding.   It will lack these things first 
because it has lost a genuine appreciation for the reasons the way of life is worth 
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defending, even sacrificing for.  And it will be unable to revitalize itself because absent 
such an appreciation, it is impossible to say which elements of a way of life are essential 
and which not, which tenets are properly subject to adaptation to meet new exigencies, 
and which non-negotiable because they are of central and overriding importance to an 
inherently valuable system of beliefs.   
In the case of Islam, the challenges posed by the ascendance of modernity and the 
dramatic increase of the power of the West aggravated the problem.  The civilization was 
caught between unreflective adherence to traditions and diktat on the one hand, and the 
exigencies of a modern world, its terms increasingly defined by a civilization with a not 
altogether compatible set of sacred opinions on the other.  Attempts to assimilate with the 
West through the 1970s did not succeed outside of Turkey—where we will see they 
succeeded imperfectly and at great cost—but instead provoked a fierce counter-
revolution, its extent and potency apparent in starker relief every day.   
Bennabi stands between those modernizers who sought to join the modern world at the 
cost of jettisoning elements essential to the civilization to which they were heirs, and those 
who today wish to destroy the modern West and all it stands for in the name of a 
radicalized but ultimately shallow understanding of Islamic law.  At both extremes, he 
feared Islamic civilization would be unable to justify and defend itself.  Either for failing to 
understand the worth of Islamic civilization and internalizing the mores of a more powerful 
but increasingly Godless and decadent rival (his colonizabilité thesis), or for unreflectively 
clinging to tradition from residual respect combined with a furious resentment of the 
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alternative, he believed the spiritual and theological vitality of Islamic civilization was 
imperiled. 
Bennabi recognized, moreover, that modernity—the technologies, interconnectedness, 
wealth, and new appeals made possible by Western science and industry—precluded the 
simple recovery of a way of life and worship lost for almost a millennium, and therefore 
sought to prod the Islamic world willingly to embrace a “modus vivendi compatible avec les 
conditions d’une vie nouvelle”—a way of living inspired by Islamic tenets and compatible 
with the modern world.874  For this, in stark contrast to the twentieth century’s dominant 
Islamists, he argued that “une reform religieuse est necessaire.”875  Far from advocating 
the literal interpretation (and enforcement) of Islamic law, he argues for religious reform 
in the Muslim world so thoroughgoing as to be character transforming.  Sacred opinions, 
habits, and social practices in the Islamic world would have to be transformed in much 
the same way the ideas promulgated by the West’s Enlightenment thinkers helped to form 
liberal democrats, our mores since sustained by our regime’s everyday educational 
institutions and influences.  For he understood, with the West’s democratic theorists 
(Locke, Rousseau, Tocqueville), that the possibility of worthwhile democratic government 
rested on internalized ideas and habits.    
He believed those ideas could be categorized in three ways:  “as a feeling toward one’s 
self… as a feeling toward others… as a cluster of social and political conditions necessary 
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for the formulation and blossoming of similar feelings in the individual.”876  Taking 
England’s democracy as an example, he understood, as we often do not today, that “ce 
n’est pas un texte constitutionnel qui guarantit les droits et les libertés du people anglais, 
mais la longue tradition démocratique britannique, c’est-à-dire en fin d’analyse l’esprit 
britannique lui-même.”877  For Bennabi, a people’s written constitution is less important 
than its spirit, a fact of immense consequence for the possibility of democratic reform in 
the Arab world.  “La démocratisation n’est donc pas une simple transmission de pouvoirs 
entre deux partis, un roi et un peuple, par exemple, mais la formation de sentiments, de 
réflexe, de critères qui constituent les fondements d’une démocratie dans la conscience 
d’un peuple, dans ses traditions.”878  As Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi, who translated 
Bennabi’s The Question of Ideas in the Muslim World, explains, nothing is more important to 
the character of a civilization and the individuals who make it up than a system of 
“impressed” ideas.  Transmitted by the civilization’s cultural and educational influences, 
they all but constitute the civilization; this 
  
category of ideas makes up what he [Bennabi] considers the archetypes of 
society; these archetypes are the fundamental ideas and everlasting values 
constituting the axiomatic principles and ideational matrices handed down 
by successive generations almost intact or in their pristine state.  Thus, they 
provide the essentials of the common character and cultural and historical 
continuity of civilization.  In other words, the archetypes or impressed 
ideas constitute the core of civilization, and it is at this level that differences 
between civilizations really matter.  In Bennabi’s view, the advent of any 
civilization in the true sense of the term can never be conceived without 
the existence of such archetypes or core ideas and enduring values whose 
prime role in sparking off human spiritual forces and channeling man’s 
vital energies has always been testified by history.  To put in slightly 	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different terms, the impressed ideas constitute the necessary foundations 
for the socio-historical existence and cultural identity of any human 
community.879 
Bennabi sought to help establish in the Muslim world a new religious-political 
consciousness precisely because the vitality of Islamic civilization was disintegrating.  He 
was at the same time adamant, however, that the importation of Western ideas and habits 
would be insufficient—in the first place, because they would stand little hope of taking 
hold (what salience or relevance could they possibly have in alien soil?);880 in the second, 
and perhaps more importantly, because he believed them to be fatally flawed and 
ultimately an insufficient support for the species of regime he hoped to help lay ground 
for.  According to Bennabi, modern Europe had been “excluded from the religious 
phenomenon”; Europe’s civilization was, as a result, all but defined by what it lacked and 
could not accommodate; Europe, Bennabi tells us, has “no place for the divine.”881  For 
that reason, modern Europe (here, Bennabi has in mind the Europe of Machiavelli, 
Bacon, and Hobbes) is “a power-driven culture with technical materialistic roots.”  A 
man influenced by such a culture “will populate his solitude with objects, since his 
domineering look drives to acquisition” (Ibid., 3).  The regimes of the West have, indeed, 
been organized to precisely this end:  by freeing man’s avarice from all moral constraints, 
and by bestowing upon man the freedom to define good for himself and pursue that good 
(most often greed) at infinitum, the modern West is today wealthier and more powerful 
than any previous civilization could have conceived of becoming. 	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Bennabi sought to move the Islamic world in the direction of democracy—of limited 
democracy even—but he sought to do while returning to and rehabilitating key elements 
of Islamic doctrine long dispensed with by its popular exponents.  Islam could improve 
the Western model by imparting to our form of government “le sens de la valeur morale 
qui manque au vieil esprit moderne.”882  It is not enough to allow individuals the 
unfettered freedom to pursue goods; the political community must confidently maintain a 
role in shaping its members’ conception of what is good.  As Bennabi puts it, Muslim 
society has to do more than merely distribute ‘goods’; “is has also to distribute ‘good.’”883   
In other words, Bennabi believed a better form of democracy—solidly buttressed against 
tyranny as well as morally upright—could be erected on a foundation appropriate to the 
region’s citizenries:  “in the spirit of Islam in general,” as he puts it.884   Thus, Zoubir 
summarizes, Bennabi’s “efforts were concentrated on creating a genuinely democratic 
psychology,” what he believed could be accomplished from a “rational understanding of 
Islam.”885 By undoing the damage al-Ghazali had done in the philosophic sphere, and 
which Ibn Taymiyya had done in the legal sphere—by opening the Muslim mind and the 
gates of ijtihad by reasserting the authority of reason—meaningful political reform could 
ultimately be built on a suitable societal sensibility.   
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He locates in Islam’s sacred texts support for consultative government, individual political 
rights, a guarantee of privacy and private property vis a vis the government, even 
protections for minorities (religious minorities—even Jews—in particular).886  He 
accomplishes this by following Averroes’ mode of scriptural interpretation:  tension 
between revealed moral absolutes and the fruit of rational investigation (even of sacred 
tenets) is permissible; in fact, it is an indispensable source of cultural vitality.   
Most fundamentally, Bennabi, like Averroes, differs from his modern Salafi counterparts 
in his rejection of the claim that genuine faith demands the complete subordination of the 
human intellect to God’s will as revealed by the Qur’an and the hadiths (interpreted with a 
brutal literalness).  Where revealed teachings contradict honest and good-faith rational 
investigation—into the propriety of commandments, even the appropriateness of those 
commandments in the modern world—Averroes and Bennabi argue that it is proper for a 
pious Muslim to interpret the former allegorically.  As Phillip Naylor explains, “‘of the 
utmost concern for Bennabi is the conception of reason and science as utterly antithetical 
to religion and revelation’”—an argument that was being made with increasing frequency 
by fundamentalists; “in a theme common to all his publications,” Bennabi, in contrast, 
“believed in the virtues of the rational intellect and saw it as compatible with 
spirituality.”887   This flexibility, taken together with Bennabi’s emphasis on those Islamic 
teachings most compatible with liberal democracy, could, he argues, form the basis of a 
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social psychology appropriate to liberal democratic government that is at once liberal and 
moderate, and hospitable to modern science and industry.  
Bennabi is the only Islamic thinker Qutb takes the time to engage directly in Milestones.  
He does not mention Bennabi by name, but rather calls him “an Algerian author who 
writes in French,” no doubt to discredit him in the eyes of those who have been touched 
by the ideas expressed by Muslim Brotherhood thinkers.888  Qutb attributes Bennabi’s 
errors to his Eurocentrism (though he does not use the term) and even admits having once 
fallen into the same trap.  It is tempting to be seduced by the glitz of the West, Qutb 
effectively admits, to come to associate civilization itself with Western civilization.  That, 
Qutb believes, is Bennabi’s mistake.  He tried to make Islam more conducive to Western 
ways of organizing society for becoming infatuated by its charms.  Qutb goes on to 
explain that wiping that impression from his own mindset—the prerequisite of his 
realization that the civilization really means universal “obedience to the Divine law”—
was what allowed his thought to mature. 
It is worth repeating that Allawi is articulating the consensus view when he states that 
“Bennabi’s sensibilities never reached a wide audience in the Muslim world.”  In so many 
ways, Islamists today have inoculated large populations against the ideas of modernizers.  
Why does Qutb resonate while Bennabi is more or less ignored?   Allawi suggests that his 
dearth of influence is largely attributable to the fact his “programme was not couched in 
political terms.”889   International Crisis Group explains his dearth of influence along the 	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same lines:  for divorcing his writing from the pressing political exigencies of the Muslim 
world, he seemed a disconnected intellectual elite and was therefore “influential only in 
the universities.”890  In other words, the most impressive feature of his thought—the 
emphasis on the importance of anchoring political transformation to the prior emergence 
of a new social consciousness—also accounts for his failure to exert influence on the scope 
of the radical Islamists.  Bennabi was a careful thinker forced to confront demagogues 
lamenting the fierce urgency of now.  Their louder, apparently more pressing complaints, 
were bolstered both by the very obvious political and economic frustrations endured by so 
many in the Muslim world (what was especially the case in Algeria), as well as by their 
willingness to seize power, and elsewhere advocate its seizure, to impatiently enact the 
reforms they were demanding.  Bennabi had to be measured and patient because he 
believed it necessary to affect sacred opinions; winning hearts and minds is not a task 
accomplished over night.   
 
Islamists’ Use and Abuse of Democratic Institutions in Algeria 
Their disproportionate influence of fundamentalist Islam as compared to modernist Islam 
is especially apparent even in Bennabi’s Algeria.  In their heyday between 1989 (the 
beginning of party pluralism in Algeria) and 1992 (the exclusion of the most radical party 
from the system), Algerian Islamists went to great lengths to delegitimize democracy as a 
form of government utilizing the constitutional and institutional features of the regime 	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itself.  The Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) had the most political success of the Islamist 
factions, actually contesting elections on a platform harshly critical of the country’s new 
democratic constitution and institutions.  Their anti-democratic platform ultimately 
proved much more influential than Bennabi’s brand of religious reform, the latter put 
forth for the sake of ennobling democracy in the Islamic world.   
In Algeria, the Islamist populism that burst forth in the 1990s grew out of the “free 
mosques” initiative that had permitted the establishment of independent mosques by the 
thousands the decade before.  Much as new liberties contributed to religious 
radicalization in Iraq, so it did in Algeria almost two decades before.  Fiery priests 
embraced the Salafi tradition, radicalizing the population, calling for political action in 
service of fundamentalist beliefs.  Significantly, their radical outlook gained traction even 
though the state was not suppressing, but rather tolerating—publically and legally—their 
Islamic opposition.891  
Incredible though it seems to us in the West on its face, though it is an increasingly 
common tactic in the Muslim world, Islamists in Algeria sought power by democratic 
means while promising to undo important elements of the country’s democratic regime.  
As International Crisis Group summarizes, “the FIS [ISF in English] tended to subvert 
the 1989 constitution to which it owed its own legal existence, not only by advocating an 
Islamic state, but equally by denouncing democracy as ‘infidel’ (kufr).”892  Much could 
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have been learned from Algeria’s political traumas since independence; in fact, the 
incessant violence and political paralysis endured by Algerians for nearly a half century as 
the country struggled to become independent, and subsequently democratic, illustrate 
very well the dependence of a regime’s written constitution on supportive social habits 
and political opinions.  A leader of Algeria’s ISF, Ali Benjadj, explained Islam’s 
incompatibility with democracy in terms that are often repeated by fundamentalists 
throughout the Muslim world today, but with a specificity unique to Algeria and Iraq, 
Arab regimes with ostensibly democratic constitutions: 
Article 6 [of the Algerian Constitution] proclaims that the people is the 
source of all power.  This means that political parties which will emerge 
could, God forbid, lead the people in an anti-religious path.  The only 
source of power is Allah, through the Qur’an.  The people intervenes to 
choose a chief of state, and at this level only does it become a source of 
power.  If the people votes against God’s Law, this is nothing but 
blasphemy.  In this eventuality, the ‘ulema’ order the killing of the infidels 
because the latter wishes to substitute their authority for that of God.893 
As noted previously, Sunni Islamists in Iraq not infrequently made similar arguments as 
the country tried to elaborate a democratic constitution against the backdrop of a brutal 
insurgency.  The Algerian experience ought to have foreshadowed exactly this problem.  
A recent report dedicated to the effects of Islamism in North Africa summarizes its 
findings thus:   
 
the rise of Islamist movements in North Africa has not been predicated on 
the absence of reform, but has generally occurred in conjunction with 
ambitious government reform projects…  the spectacular rise of the 
Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria in 1989-1991 occurred in the context of 
the government’s liberalization of the political system. 
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…how democratic reform in North Africa can be achieved without 
destabilizing the region’s political systems is a fundamental and entirely 
valid question which has received far too little attention.894   
In other words, the rise of radical Islamism in Algeria was not the consequence of a lack 
of political liberties and participatory government, but rather, as has been the case in 
Iraq, the new political rights and freedoms extended to groups and individuals as a part of 
the democratizing process actually helped to fuelled the radicalism.  In the eyes of a 
significant proportion of the population, the institutions of participatory government 
amount to little more than peaceful means by which to attain political power.  Factions 
with radically different conceptions of what the regime should pursue as its raison d’etre are 
thereby forced to share power.  Dysfunction is the best of the likely outcomes. 
If the appeal of jihadism in the Qutbist model ebbs and flows,895 no observer can deny that 
“the Society [the Muslim Brotherhood] has been inhibited from breaking clearly with the 
illiberal aspects of Al-Banna’s thought.”  As a result, Islamist groups that today tolerate or 
embrace participatory government tend do so with the expectation that elections will 
empower them to establish regimes that are in important respects distinctly illiberal.  The 
institutions of democracy are used to gain power.  Unfortunately, the ill use of that power 
proceeds to further undermine the regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of those who are not at 
its helm.   
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C H A P T E R   I X 
AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI’S POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, THE IRANIAN 
REVOLUTION, AND A PROPOSAL FOR AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION 
 
The doctrinal similarities between the twentieth century Sunni Islamists responsible for 
the resurgence of Islam in the Arab world, and Ayatollah Khomeini, the most important 
exponent of an assertive form of political Islam among contemporary Shiite scholars, are 
remarkable in character and extent.  In fact, the writings of Qutb and Mawdudi are said 
to have exerted a profound influence on the disaffected students who led the Iranian 
Revolution, even in spite of their anti-Shiite aspects; Ayatollah Khomeini himself 
acknowledges his familiarity with Qutb in his own writings, and he is said to have met 
Mawdudi personally in the late 1960s.896  Though Khomeini’s thought was more radical 
than the vast majority of his contemporaries in Iran (especially in his insistence on the 
establishment of a theocracy),897 his ideas gained increased salience in Iran, both among 
scholars and the wider population, in the years leading up to the Revolution and 
especially in the decades since.898  Just as political frustrations increased the salience of 
radicalized interpretations of Islamic law on the Sunni side, so it was the Shah’s ambitious 
program to secularize Iran, followed by a long war with the brutal secular dictator next 
door, that rallied many Iranians behind Khomeini’s radical platform.899  The popular 
uprisings that convulsed Iran in 2009 demonstrated that the Revolution’s Islamist 	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ideology is far from homogenous; commentators are, nonetheless, agreed that the 
ideology of the Revolution has a wide following in the country, especially outside its 
urban centers. 
Khomeini, whose thought remains the best expression of that ideology, agrees with Sunni 
Islamists on most points of political consequence:900  the separation of church and state 
along Western lines is anathema to Islam, properly understood; the state’s coercive 
authority should be utilized to enforce sharia, often by threat of terrifying corporal 
punishment; the scope of government authority and its reach into the lives of men and 
women should be almost unlimited; Islamic government is only possible where the people 
have more or less universally internalized Islamic mores, a process that should be 
ubiquitous and begin at an early age; sharia is, by its divine nature, both anti-democratic 
and illiberal; the legacy of the enlightenment—man’s confidence in the sufficiency of his 
intellect—is the great impediment to faithful submission; the West—in particular, the 
glorification of indulgence and our rampant materialism—represents a seductive and 
existential threat to Islam, in particular, and religiosity, in general; Muslims are duty-
bound to participate in a violent struggle against non-Islamic rulers in the name of 
establishing fully Islamic political communities; modern reinterpretation of the Qur’an 
and the hadiths is expressly prohibited by the dictates of Islam itself, and would-be 
modernizers, imposters with nefarious intentions; etc., etc., etc.    
Sunni and Shiite Islamists agree, then, on the overall spirit and purpose of Islamic 
government:  Khomeini, like Qutb, insists that the establishment of a totalitarian Islamic 	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state—that is, a government that regulates every aspect of economic and social life, 
reaching deep into the lives of individuals—is the prerequisite of establishing justice on 
earth.  His purpose, like theirs, is without doubt a noble one.  For Khomeini, bringing 
about justice on earth so far as possible and raising human beings above the level of a 
beast, are the reasons the Qur’an was revealed.  Throughout his political writings, but 
especially on this point, the sophistication of Khomeini’s understanding is philosophically 
more impressive than those advanced by his Sunni counterparts.  In fact, his argument in 
favor of Islamic government hinges on an understanding of man’s nature very similar to 
those advanced by the great modern philosophers of the Western tradition:  man’s 
selfishness and his egoism are a—perhaps the—central problem of political life.  The 
solution he proposes, however, has a fair bit more in common with the surface political 
teachings presented in Plato’s utopian dialogues.901  It is not enough to build a regime in 
which the deficiencies of human nature are harnessed to communal benefit (greed used to 
incentivize labor and drive production), or otherwise well enough contained to prevent 
the crimes dwelling in the hearts of men from exerting pernicious real world effects.  
Rather, man’s bestial nature must be refined and improved in an environment crafted, 
from top to bottom, through and through, in light of a superhuman—that is, a divine—
understanding.  The redemption of man and the political community in which he lives 
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depends entirely on the real-world instantiation of God’s laws, precisely as they were 
revealed.  
Khomeini’s most important disagreement with contemporary Sunni commentators 
concerns the scholars’ role in bringing about such a political community.  Owing in part 
to the doctrinal disagreement that yielded the split between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in 
the first place (on the question of the fourth Caliph’s rightful successor), Khomeini argues 
that morally upright religious scholars may today —indeed, must in the present age—
claim temporal authority equivalent (or almost equivalent as we will see) to that of the 
Prophet and the first twelve Imams.  This does not imply equality of station or status (a 
point the scholar underlines); their political roles must, however, be comparable at the 
current juncture.  As Khomeini puts it in Islamic Government, 
When we say that after the Occultation, the just faqih [experts in Islamic law] has 
the same authority that the Most Noble Messenger and the Imams had, do not 
imagine that the status of the faqih is identical to that of the Imams and the 
Prophet.  For here we are not speaking of status, but rather of function.  By 
‘authority’ we mean government, the administration of the country, and the 
implementation of the sacred laws of the shari’a.902  
Thus, in Iran today, as a consequence of the Constitution bequeathed by Khomeini, a 
council of conservative religious experts oversees every official, every election, every law, 
every coercive instrument of the state, every important political decision.  The 
interpretation of Islamic law that informed the Iranian Revolution and the country’s 
present constitution, and which has exerted a profound influence on Iraq’s Shiite 
communities (among other Shiite enclaves from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan) is, like its 	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radicalized and politicized Sunni cousin, inhospitable to majoritarian government that is 
at once limited and tolerant—a point those who led the Iranian revolution themselves 
continue to emphasize.  Unlike its Sunni counterpart, however, Khomeini demands that 
scholars play a preeminent political role—not just guiding the people, but arranging all of 
human society in such a way that virtuous human behavior has the support necessary that 
it become habitual and ubiquitous.  The powerful arguments he advances to support 
these claims, on behalf of which he asserts the authority of Islam, have both helped to 
demonize the United States in the minds of many pious Muslims while simultaneously 
delegitimizing essential ideational prerequisites of liberal democracy. 
 
Un-Separating Church and State in Iran 
The argument that Islam prohibits separating the affairs of God from the affairs of a 
temporal government, thereby to reduce an individual’s practice of his faith to a private 
relationship with God, is familiar by now.  Khomeini goes even further than Qutb and 
other Sunni thinkers, however.  In his political expressions, he claims that the separation 
of church and state is not only un-Islamic, but unchristian too, a long running and 
deliberate attempt by the Godless West to weaken, even to destroy, Abrahamic 
civilization.   His criticism of the Shah (whose reforms were modeled on Atatürk’s) tracks 
this line exactly:  efforts to secularize Iran’s government and its universities were not well-
meaning efforts to liberalize and modernize society and the state, but rather, deliberate 
attacks on Islam designed to weaken Iran.  In particular, Khomeini condemns the Shah’s 
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efforts to marginalize the clerical class, what he equates to an attempt to replicate the 
Western separation between religion and politics, which would be at the same time to 
destroy Iran’s Islamic identity.903  Speaking in Iraq one year before he returned to Iran to 
replace the Shah, Khomeini encouraged followers gathered in Najaf to reject the notion 
that religious practice is rightfully a private activity, and to instead support the 
intensifying unrest in Iran in the name of their Islamic faith: 
The imperialists know full well how active the religious scholars are, and what an 
activist and militant religion Islam is.  So they drew up a plan to bring the 
religious scholars into disrepute, and for several centuries propagated the notion 
that religion must be separated from politics.  Some of our akhunds [clerics] came 
to believe it and began asking, ‘What business do we have with politics?’  The 
posing of this question means the abandonment of Islam; it means burying Islam 
in our cells in the madrasa.  It means burying Islam in our books!  The imperialists 
dearly wish that religion could be separated from politics, and our politicians, in 
turn, have filled people’s mouths with these words, so that some of us have come 
to believe them and ask, ‘What business do we have with politics?  Leave politics 
to those whose business it is, and if they slap us in the face, let us turn the other 
cheek.904 
According to Khomeini, to relegate Islam to the private realm would be to neutralize the 
most powerful galvanizing force available to the Muslim world, thereby leaving it ripe for 
conquest.  Moreover, Khomeini recognizes that this noxious modern idea would, if it 
spread, undermine the power of the scholars, both “prevent[ing] religion from ordering 
the affairs of this world and shaping Muslim society,” and creating, as a result, “a rift 
between the scholars of Islam, on the one hand, and the masses” on the other.905  He 
repeats, in a number of places, that “this slogan of the separation of religion and politics 
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and the demand that religious scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have 
been formulated and propagated by the imperialists” for self-serving political reasons.  
On his account, the West was willing to destroy Islam “to gain dominance over our 
people and plunder our resources.”906  With the example of what some have called the 
“post-Christian” West in mind, Khomeini alleges that devotion to God and public 
observance of sharia will inevitably atrophy absent assertive state support for religion given 
the self-indulgent nature of man.  He goes so far, in fact, as to deny that Jesus taught 
Christians to render unto Caesar authority over a large temporal sphere within which the 
claims of God were legitimately limited.907  To do so, Khomeini claims, would be 
tantamount to teaching followers to accept unjust rule and oppression.  Jesus was “sent to 
root out injustice” like all prophets; Khomeini argues here (and frequently elsewhere) that 
the teachings of the Gospels were distorted by those seeking to appropriate the power of 
religion for self-aggrandizing ends—in this case, to extend the sphere of the secular state. 
It is tempting to accuse Khomeini of doing the same thing, of marshalling the power of 
Islam in the service of personal ambition, as, indeed, many of his contemporaries among 
Iran’s religious elite did in the years before he assumed unquestioned leadership of the 
Revolution.908  His repeated use of Islam to substantiate arguments that would enhance 
his own political position (and the importance of the scholarly class generally) do not, 
however, appear merely to be overblown rhetorical devices crafted for narrowly self-
serving political reasons.  Khomeini does not come across as a demagogue interested in 	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power for the sake of power; rather, he appears to be genuinely committed to the 
righteousness of his cause, and believes his role to be indispensable.  Indeed, he makes 
clear that he would prefer the scholars play a supervisory role; he foresaw the possibility 
of direct political engagement, but saw it as a last resort (a necessary corrective where the 
community’s politicians failed to perform their tasks in the correct spirit). In his words, 
“yes, the religious scholar will have a role in government.  He does not want to be the 
ruler.”909  Moreover, Khomeini purports to prove that Islam, properly construed, is an 
assertive political religion by the interpretative methodology most Islamic scholars have 
considered to be determinative:  by understanding Muhammad’s actions at the dawn of 
Islam, as reported in the Qur’an and by hadiths of most trusted provenance.  Proving this 
is not a heroic task.910  Time and time again, Khomeini emphasizes that Muhammad was 
a warrior and a ruler, a man who lay down laws and drew his sword to ensure his laws 
were observed, and their reach, extended.  When he appointed a successor, moreover, he 
appointed a man who would execute the law, not a man who would limit himself to 
expounding and interpreting the articles of faith:911   
He began his mission alone, prepared himself for thirteen years, and then fought 
for a decade.  He did not ask himself, ‘What business do I have with politics?’  
Instead, he administered the entire Islamic realm.  The same was true of the 
Commander of the Faithful [Abu Bakr] (upon whom be peace):  he ruled, 
engaged in politics, and fought wars, never saying, “Let me sit at home and 
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devote myself to prayer and devotional reading; what business do I have with 
politics.”912 
In short, to relegate Islam to dusty books, to reduce it to a religion of personal devotion or 
theological argumentation, is to abdicate Islam’s vital this-worldly role.  It is sacrilegious.  
The notion that the political sphere should abandon efforts to see virtue instantiated in 
human beings who are, by nature alone, no better than beasts is equivalent, for 
Khomeini, to welcoming injustice into the world with open arms—an intolerable and 
impious position.   
 
Justice Requires Totalitarian Government  
It bears repeating that on the Islamist understanding, tyrannical government is not 
necessarily the antithesis of free government; tyrannical government is the antithesis of just 
government.  Just laws, in turn, are not dedicated to preserving individual freedom; rather, 
just laws promote virtue and piety in the political community, what often requires the 
significantly restriction of man’s liberty (and therewith, pointedly, his liberty to sin).  As 
Khomeini explains in Islamic Government, a regime that uses the coercive authority of the 
state to enforce “evil” laws—laws not given by God—and which, therefore, makes human 
beings worse by its laws, is the genuinely tyrannical regime (one which Muslims are duty-
bound to struggle against).913  Khomeini’s many disagreements with modern liberal 
political theorists are nicely encapsulated by his belief that no form of government that 
fails to regulate every aspect of life according to Islam’s revealed teachings has established 	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the conditions under which decent political life can flourish on earth.  (The degree of 
coercion required depends on the degree to which the community is upright enough to 
obey the laws willingly and induce obedience by communal application of ‘peer 
pressure’.)  This conclusion follows from his assessment of mankind in its original state—
that is, the state of man absent the guidance of the Qur’an—an assessment that is at least 
as pessimistic as Hobbes’:   
In his unredeemed state, man is like an animal, even worse than the other 
animals.  Left to his own devices, he will always be inferior to the animals, 
for he surpasses them in passion, evil, and rapacity.  As originally created, 
man is superior to all other beings, but at the same time, his capacities for 
passion, anger, and other forms of evil are virtually boundless.914 
Limited forms of government, those which are “concerned only with the prevention of 
disorder and not with the moral refinement of the people,” deserve his opprobrium not 
only for failing even to try to raise members of the political community above the level of 
beasts, but for permitting—even abetting!—mankind’s decline beneath the merely 
bestial.915  According to Khomeini, by securing a generous private sphere, limited forms 
of government inevitably amplify the selfish passions of man, his avarice and egoism.  
Furthermore, the repeated indulgence of low appetites serves to strengthen their pull, 
thereby amplifying the accompanying vices, many of them corrosive to decent political 
life.  The individual is harmed too.  Khomeini repeatedly asserts that the kind of 
debauched self-indulgence so characteristic of life in the West—and so naturally 
appealing to the young—thus serves, in the end, to weaken the soul’s capacity for 
refinement and salvation. Those who do not commit (who are not forced to commit) to 	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his brand of Islam early in their lives will, he fears, become unmovable by its promises 
and incapable of its hard demands later on.   
On this view, it is liberty that corrupts above all.  The principles to which the American 
regime is devoted constitute, for Khomeini, conditions sure to promote vice and 
debauchedness among men and women.  Thus, the West’s seductive appeal, especially to 
the insatiable and burning appetites of young men, constituted a special problem in his 
mind; America, for Khomeini as for Qutb, represented the great seductive Satan, the 
powerful corrosive force standing in the way of the establishment of just and pious 
political communities on earth.  Divine government, in stark contrast to Western models, 
improves human beings and political communities alike by encouraging, cajoling, and 
(where necessary) forcing men and women to practice virtue—by, in a word, limiting 
liberty rather than government.  This is why Islam was revealed; as Khomeini puts it, “it 
was the task of the prophets to reform the natural dimensions of man in order that it 
might become the means of his ascent.”916 
Politics on earth is thus the means by which Islam can have transformative effect:  “Law 
is a tool and an instrument for the establishment of justice in society, a means for man’s 
intellectual and moral reform and his purification.  Law exists to be implements for the 
sake of establishing a just society that will morally and spiritually nourish and refined 
human beings.”917  Legitimate laws are those given by God.  Lawmaking is far too 
important to be relegated to the purview of human beings, far too important to be left to 	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a temporal sphere durably cut off from the divine.  To reemphasize a previous point of 
considerable importance, human beings are so disappointingly constituted on this view 
that absent the political establishment of a very demanding moral code—one that induces 
obedience by fear of horrific punishments in this world and the next—man’s lowest 
appetites will always prevail to disastrous political effect, destroying everything good and 
noble in the political community.  As a result, like Qutb, Khomeini denies that human 
beings are constituted in such a way as to be able to make their own (just or edifying) laws 
by democratic means.918  Left to fallen men, the laws will become mere tools, crafted to 
serve passion and appetite.  Islam is the only edifying constitution available to man.  What 
could be worse—what could make an individual worse—than being forced to obey laws made 
by the vice-ridden selfish and egotistic majority?  This, for Khomeini, is the difference 
between Islamic government and modern forms of democracy and constitutional 
government.  As he puts it,  
the fundamental difference between Islamic government… and 
constitutional monarchies and republics… is this:  whereas the 
representatives of the people or the monarch in such regimes engage in 
legislations, in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws 
belongs exclusively to God Almighty.  The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the 
sole legislative power.919  
Only God is sufficiently intelligent, upright—in a word, Godlike—as to give laws that will 
improve men.  Revelation constitutes the way to a just and virtuous regime.  It is not up 
to man to pick and choose among commandments; they must all be instituted.  The 
Qur’an, Khomeini emphasizes again, was not revealed simply for the speculative pleasure 
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of a religious class, nor was it revealed merely to guide the individual’s private 
relationship with God.  On his account, to reduce the political role of Islam in the way 
contemporary Christians constrain the religious sphere to private spiritual matters is 
effectively “to deny prophethood,” what amounts to a rejection of the first pillar of faith 
and the ultimate sacrilege.  In stark contrast, the Qur’an “was revealed to make men into 
men,” and its purview is unlimited:  “all matters of worldly and social concern are means 
to this end.”920   
Much as the Sunni Islamist thinkers insisted that Islamic law should regulate the totality 
of human life, so Khomeini explains that the character of the sharia requires the 
establishment of a state that administers the “political, economic, and cultural affairs of 
society.”  To convey the scope and reach of revealed law in a properly organized Islamic 
state, Khomeini lists the spheres regulated by sharia, a litany that touches on the 
individual’s dealings with neighbors, clansmen, children, relatives; “the concerns of 
private and marital life”; war and peace; commerce; the state’s penal law; trade; 
agriculture; courtship and procreation; prenatal care; breastfeeding; childrearing; etc.921  
Hardly anything remains outside the purview of Islam; there is no properly private 
sphere.  In addition to laws and norms that regulate the totality of social life, Khomeini 
insists on the necessity of both fear-inspiring corporal punishments and a species of 
education that verges on programming. 
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Far from aspiring to assure equal treatment before laws that protect against unjust 
deprivations of life, liberty, and property, the goal of Islamic government is to make men 
and women virtuous and good, what often requires limiting liberty and extracting 
obedience by fear, force, and indoctrination.  Khomeini goes so far as to assert that the 
imposition of “certain bonds on the evil forces present in man”—that is, restraints on 
individuals’ freedom to act according to their desires, passions, inclinations, etc.—is 
responsible for “whatever good and blessedness exists in this world.”922  The best 
restraints are those mandated by God; thus, the cleric regrets that the terrifying penalties 
mandated by the Qur’an and the Sunna—80 lashes for drinking, 100 for adultery—“have 
virtually become part of the occult,” discussed out of an antiquarian curiosity, but rarely 
ever enforced systematically.923  This, too, is a symptom of decline, yet another 
consequence of Western ideas that have been infiltrating the Islamic mind for centuries.  
The punishments mandated in Islamic law represent, for Khomeini, “the best penal code 
ever devised for humanity,” and his condemnation of those who have forgotten and 
ignored those aspects of sharia is particularly harsh.924   Noting that the Prophet himself 
enforced Islam’s penal code, he insists that no Muslim can justifiably ignore those 
provisions, however uncomfortable they may be to modern (Western) sensibilities.  For 
they are both mandated by God and absolutely essential:  both to the establishment of 
order in society and to the overriding “duty to preserve Islam.”  Islam, Khomeini insists 
again and again, is not just a private spiritual faith; it is a comprehensive system of laws, 
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punishments, mores, and daily practices that determine every facet of life.  Preserving 
Islam means reifying its commands through and through, down to the last lash.  This 
latter obligation—the preservation of Islam (which he raises in the context of preserving 
its penal code)—is, for Khomeini, “one of the most important obligations incumbent 
upon us… more necessary even than prayer and fasting.”  Muhammad did not “content 
himself with the promulgation of law; rather, he implemented it at the same time, cutting 
off hands and administering lashings and stonings.”925  Khomeini makes a point of 
emphasizing that “bringing into being the Islamic state” requires following the Prophet’s 
example in all matters.  And as he goes on to explain, “it is for the sake of fulfilling this 
duty that blood must sometimes be shed.”926   
It is the sad reality, on this understanding, that brutal corporal punishments are needed in 
modern times more than ever.  Like Qutb, Khomeini is particularly concerned about the 
prevalence of “sexual vice” today, and notes that it has reached “such proportions that it 
is destroying entire generations, corrupting our youth, and causing them to neglect all 
forms of work,” first among these, one presumes, strict adherence to religious 
obligations.927  The purpose of public stoning, flogging, and dismemberment, 
furthermore, is not so much to correct the one being punished or to exact a just 
punishment, as it is intended to deter others from falling into vice:  “Why should it be 
regarded as harsh if Islam stipulates that an offender be publicly flogged in order to 
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protect the younger generation from corruption?”928  If an individual is corrupt or evil 
beyond the possibility correction, to make an example of him in a way that improves 
those who can be improved is, perhaps, the best possible use of such a man.  Spectacular 
punishments are a part, an essential part, of the kind of demanding environment most 
likely to nurture virtue and discourage vice in the greatest number of men and women.  
The failure to establish such an environment, especially in the name of gentleness, would 
be the greater crime. 
 
Khomeini’s Attack on Enlightenment Rationalism 
Khomeini’s conception of education is equally shocking to liberal minds.  His dismissal of 
the entire Enlightenment project verges on absolute.  “Learning has had entirely negative 
effects on our souls,” he contends, explaining that modern science—far from increasing 
our knowledge of the most important things—in fact erects “a dark veil, an obstacle in the 
path of man preventing him from attaining that goal for the sake of which all the 
prophets came.”929  He condemns the Western university, (once) the great bastion of 
Enlightenment rationalism, as particularly pernicious among imperial inventions.  For the 
intellectually vain especially, reason closes the soul to the very influences that can improve 
it.  Khomeini thus echoes Rousseau’s surface argument in the First Discourse:  the political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
928 Khomeini, Islamic Government, 35. 
929 Ruhullah Al-Musavi Al-Khomeini, “Third Lecture on Surat Al-Fatiha:  Veils of Darkness, Veils 
of Light,” in Hamid Algar, trans., Islam and Revolution I, (Berkeley:  Mizan Press, 1981), 396. 
	  482 
community cannot permit—let alone encourage—unrestrained rational inquiry and 
expect to remain morally upright.   
The over-cultivation of man’s rational capacity—and the supposition that human reason 
is sufficient to guide life and politics—is ruinous for two reasons.  First, it inclines men to 
presume that the realm of knowledge is restricted to what can be discovered by rational 
investigation of nature’s laws (that is, it promotes a materialistic understanding of the 
world and, therefore, an overly narrow epistemology).  As Tocqueville well understood, a 
theoretical materialist—sure that his soul or “psyche” is annihilated with his last breath—
will inevitably be a practical hedonist, dedicated to maximizing pleasure or “utility” on 
earth, however he defines those terms.  Khomeini repeats the saying “Knowledge is the 
thickest of veils” because the Enlightenment conception of learning “causes man to be 
preoccupied with rational… concepts” and, thus, to self-confidently reject out of hand the 
possibility that revelation might also yield important truths.930  Second, scientific learning 
almost ineluctably promotes a kind of intellectual vanity or arrogance that closes a man’s 
mind to modes of inquiry (and entire subject areas) other than the ones he pursues 
personally; the scholar arrogantly imagines “that the knowledge he has achieved 
rationally represents everything,” thereby closing in him an honest or open disposition 
toward other kinds of learning, in particular, revealed truths.931  It is learning, therefore, 
that closes minds—and worse, hearts—creating a deficiency of soul that amounts to an 
insurmountable obstacle in the way of faith.  That modern scholars are peculiarly 
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susceptible to this problem is demonstrated by the more or less ubiquitous assumption 
that there is only one road to certain knowledge today:  the extraction of nature’s secrets 
by torture, that is, by the modern scientific method and its devotion to controlled 
experimentation and data collection.  In areas of study that do not conduce to the 
methods of the natural sciences, we doubt the possibility of certain knowledge altogether.  
In this allegedly subjective realm of “values,” knowledge is at best probabilistic.  Needless 
to say, this assumption is an obstacle to the species of moral certitude and firm religious 
commitment Khomeini believes to be essential to the establishment of a well-ordered 
political community.  
For Khomeini, the existence of modern scholars in Iran is only a part, a small part, of the 
problem.  Had they kept to themselves, they would have been useless as members of an 
Islamic state, but not particularly pernicious to the political health of the regime.  Their 
activity as teachers is the more serious problem on Khomeini’s account.  By sharing their 
basic epistemological assumptions and methods with their students, scholars who embrace 
enlightenment rationalism—not just university professors, but so too, the primary and 
secondary teachers whom they educated—corrupt Iran’s youth, leading them from the 
right path and establishing in hearts and minds barriers in the way of submission to Islam 
and the state.  Thus, Khomeini’s urgent complaint: 
So, to repeat, we demand fundamental changes in our university system so 
that the universities come to serve the nation and its needs instead of 
serving foreigners.  Many of our schoolteachers and university professors 
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are now effectively serving the West by brainwashing and miseducating 
our youth.932 
Following the Revolution, one of Khomeini’s first acts was to close Iran’s universities.  
Reforming them took three years.  Khomeini did it because he understood the political 
importance of ideas, as well as the universities’ preeminent role in determining the 
intellectual tenor of a place; he realized, unlike many in the West, that all roads lead back 
to the university.  To allow the infiltration of Enlightenment rationalism was inevitably to 
erode “Islamic morality” and make impossible the endurance of an “Islamic culture” in 
Iran.  Khomeini goes so far as to accuse the universities, as reformed by the Shah, of 
causing a “gravitation of one part of our young people… toward the West.”933  Khomeini 
recognized that the proliferation of Western ideas about knowing and knowledge 
represented perhaps the gravest threat to the possibility of an Islamic state built on a 
ubiquitous submission to Islam’s revealed laws.  Thus, he sought to transform Iran’s 
universities and to buttress the institutions that would help perpetuate an “Islamic 
culture,” in particular, the ulema. 
Khomeini’s criticism of modern science, nonetheless, stops short of being unqualified; out 
of ordinary political necessity, he has little choice but to make a place for “formal 
learning” in an Islamic state.  To avoid the dangers of enlightenment rationalism, 
however, “the universities… must change fundamentally.”  He cannot argue that they 
must be transformed into traditional madrassas—schools devoted entirely to the study of 
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Islamic theology and law934—but they must see to it that students’ hearts are purified by a 
parallel “Islamic education,” one designed to impart an “Islamic morality.”  A proper 
moral education is essential to help guide students’ pursuit of the rational sciences in such 
a way as to render the learning profitable, both personally and politically.  As Khomeini 
explained shortly after the Revolution in an address concerning his reorganization of 
higher education in Iran, “the universities must become Islamic in the sense that the 
subjects studied in them are to be pursued in accordance with the needs of the nation and 
for the sake of strengthening it.”935   
Students should come to conceive of the hard sciences not as theoretical, but as practical 
in nature—not as the way to truths about man, nature, and the universe, but as tools to 
be employed in service to higher ends determined by God.  Reason is, thus, the 
handmaiden of revelation; “philosophy itself is a means, not an end.”936  Avicenna, whom 
Khomeini admires, is likened to a blind man with a stick.  Reason is the stick:  a useful 
tool, but “narrow” in its scope, and on its own, terribly insufficient.937   The philosopher 
can apprehend important truths by the activity of his unaided intellect; Khomeini gives 
“divine unity” and “absolute perfection” as examples of the kind of fruit rational inquiry 
can bear.938  But the philosopher cannot attach substance of real consequence for human 
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life to those barren theoretical insights.  At best, philosophy prepares the heart to 
appreciate the truths of revelation, perhaps in a more honest or thorough way:   
One who has reached a rational perception of the truth by means of proof 
and argument must gradually inculcate in to the heart, spelling it, as it 
were, letter by letter and constantly repeating it…  When the fruit of 
rational perception is conveyed to the heart through constant effort and 
repetition, the heard begins to read the Koran itself and to learn the truths 
contained in it.”939   
 
 
Building fully Islamic Personalities 
Khomeini recognizes and insists that Islamizing society is the first prerequisite of Islamic 
government.  He agrees with his Sunni counterparts in the emphasis he places on 
proselytizing, especially when political activity is impossible.  Unlike Sunni thinkers, 
however, the scholars as a class are absolutely indispensable in this respect; for Khomeini, 
it is their most important “duty” to “disseminate[] the knowledge of Islam” and to 
“convey… the ordinances of Islam” as widely as possible.940  He agrees with Qutb on the 
further point too:  Islam is a universal religion meant “for all people in the world.”941  As 
he explains the duty in Islamic Government, 
You must teach people matters relating to worship, of course, but more 
important are the political, economic, and legal aspects of Islam.  These 
are, or should be, the focus of our concern.  It is our duty to begin exerting 
ourselves now in order to establish a truly Islamic government.  We must 
propagate our cause to the people, instruct them in it, and convince them 
of its validity.  We must generate a wave of intellectual awakening, to 
emerge as a current throughout society, and gradually to take shape as an 	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organized Islamic movement made up of the awakened, committed, and 
religious masses who will rise up and establish Islamic government.   
Propagation and instruction, then, are our two fundamental and most 
important activities.  It is the duty of the fuqaha to promulgate religion and 
instruct the people in the creed, ordinances, and institutions of Islam, in 
order to pave the way in society for the implementation of Islamic law and 
the establishment of Islamic institutions.942 
Political reform—and the success of any political regime—depends on the antecedent, 
and more or less ubiquitous, internalization of sacred mores and commitments:  “The 
mainstay of any government must be its people; if it lacks the support of its people, it 
cannot be a true government or enjoy stability and permanence.”943  Thus, proselytizing 
efforts come first.  To put it in a few words that encapsulate union of church and state:  
“popular devotion to Islam” must become the government’s “main source of support.”944  
Where political revolution is impossible, moreover, spreading the faith, “propagating 
activity,” remains both a possibility and a duty.  It is possible no matter the political 
environment (as the Brotherhood discovered in Iraq) and it is the requisite preparation for 
the later establishment of Islamic government, when circumstances permit.  This is, 
indeed, Khomeini’s advice to Muslim students in North America:  “With utter devotion, 
exert yourselves to diffuse and propagate Islam among non-Muslims… Devote greater 
attention to planning the foundations of an Islamic state and studying the problems 
involved…”945    
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The overwhelming emphasis on proselytizing efforts very likely accounts for Khomeini’s 
“populist” tone and “propaganda style.”946   Unlike many of his contemporaries—notably 
those in Iraq who were quiet while Saddam Hussein ruled (though not so quiet while the 
Constitution was being drafted)—Khomeini does not write in the ordinary careful and 
restrained manner characteristic of a jurist or theologian. His speeches, and even Islamic 
Government (his most widely read work and the one which circulated extensively in the 
decade leading up to the Iranian Revolution) are rhetorically charged in a calculated 
effort to exert maximum political effect.  He embraces such an obviously political role 
because he believed the religious scholars constituted the only institution that could 
present “a great barrier to foreign domination” and bring about the Islamic revolution he 
advocated.947  “It is the duty of Islam scholars,” Khomeini writes, “to put an end to this 
[the Shah’s] system of oppression… and form an Islamic government.”948  As we have 
noted already, Khomeini believes that absent state support for religion, public religiosity 
will inevitably atrophy, and that it is sufficient to destroy the clerical class to achieve this 
result. 
At the conclusion of his long list of the spheres sharia properly regulates, Khomeini 
explains that the political community he envisions will produce, by the totality of its 
influences, more or less unthinking beings, all of them living according to the laws and 
behavioral expectations conducive to virtue.   
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Islam provides laws and instructions for all of these matters, aiming, as it 
does, to produce integrated and virtuous human beings who are walking 
embodiments of the law…  It is obvious, then, how much care Islam 
devotes to government and the political and economic relations of society, 
with the goal of creating conditions conducive to the production of morally 
upright and virtuous human beings.949 
Coercive use of the state’s power to spread belief and extract obedience should, it follows, 
become less and less necessary as commitments to the tenets of his potent brand of Islam 
are strengthened and as the people employ the tremendous power of opinion to shape 
behavior.   
No less than for the Sunni Islamists, on Khomeini’s account, the essential tenets of 
modern liberalism are upended entirely.  There is no private sphere, no protection for 
freedoms and rights legitimized by the laws of nature and nature’s God, no presumption 
of the individual’s intellectual and moral sufficiently as autonomous agent.  Whereas the 
dignity of the individual is a core commitment of citizenries in the Western world—one of 
those sacred opinions more or less internalized with the air—for Khomeini, “everything is 
God’s,” “man has nothing in and of himself.”950  In other places, he cites the Qur’an 
directly, contending that the demands of God must always trump the desires, inclinations, 
and intentions of individuals:  “the Prophet has higher claims on the believers than their 
own selves (33:6).”951  Nor can any human achievement be attributed to mortal talent, 
intellect, or ability.  God created mankind and “Created things are nothing; if the divine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
949 Khomeini, Islamic Government, 44. 
950 Khomeini, “First Lecture on Surat al-Fatiha:  Everything is a Name of God,” 375. 
951 Khomeini, Islamic Government, 65. 
	  490 
manifestation is taken away from them, nothing of them remains…”952  This notion, 
which Khomeini emphasizes, is poisonous to individual initiative and personal 
responsibility.953  A teaching that denies man’s capacity to affect the world, or even to 
make important decisions for oneself, saps mankind of its creative and intellectual energy 
in proportion to the idea’s hold over the minds of men and women.  Far from teaching 
that the individual is capable of determining for him or herself a worthy plan of living, 
and therefore entitled and equipped to participate meaningfully in the collective self 
government of his or her community, submission of will and intellect are positive 
excellences on the Islamist view.  
 
Khomeini’s Criticism of the United States  
While Khomeini criticizes Western imperialist meddling in the Islamic world, the 
pernicious cultural effects of Western ideas are, by far, his most urgent complaint.  The 
combination of easygoing indulgence on a grand scale (made possible by the West’s 
economic prowess) and its dazzling technological achievements make the Western way of 
life incredibly seductive.  That Iranians, especially young Iranians, instinctively found 
Western habits and assumptions so attractive led Khomeini to fear that Islamic 
civilization was collapsing from within.  This explains his fierce antipathy to Western 
music:  Rock & Roll’s appeal is to the lowest in man, which it moves and gratifies without 	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demanding any effort on the part of the individual.  Khomeini well appreciates the 
addictive appeal and tremendous power of our easy and self-indulgent way of life, and 
understood its capacity to induce Iranians to leave Islam, just as Westerners progressively 
abandoned fidelity to assertive and demanding modes of practicing Christianity.  In spite 
of its brilliance, Khomeini insists the West cannot offer a worthy or redeeming way of 
living—neither virtue and salvation for the individual, nor a solution to the community’s 
“social problems” and the “relief of human misery” on earth.954  Moreover, the affluence 
and permissiveness of life in America and Europe contributes to an emerging weakness of 
Western civilization:  as a consequence of “material progress,” Westerners “lost all self-
confidence and imagined that the only way to achieve technical progress was to abandon 
their own laws and beliefs.”955  Khomeini believes that Islam provides the beliefs and the 
laws that relieve misery, promote individual happiness, and lead to salvation.  Their 
promise, however, was being obscured—even for Muslims—by the seductive glitz of the 
postmodern West, especially the United States, which Khomeini famously labeled the 
“Great Satan.”   
Satan, for Khomeini, exists in everyone in the form of man’s unredeemed soul.  Satan 
rules when man gives into his “vain desires” which are “a manifestation of him [Satan].”  
For Khomeini, the great task for every human being is the same:  “We must destroy the 
government of Satan [vain desires] within us.”956  Islamic government constitutes the 
great earthly support for man’s achievement of his proper struggle.  As another scholar 	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has pointed out, Khomeini emphatically agrees with Qutb and al-Banna on this point:  
they all “saw the liberation and self-assertion of the inward soul as being realized through 
contact with God.”957  For Satan to win, it suffices that men cease their struggle against 
appetite and passion, an outcome that would be assured if they came to forget the 
exacting commands of Islam.  Thus, in a lecture entitled “The Struggle Against the 
Appetitive Soul, or the Supreme Jihad,” Khomeini puts it this way:  “it is said that all the 
efforts of Satan are devoted to this one goal:  all his wiles and exertions, by day and by 
nights, have as their purpose to snatch away men’s faith.”958   
The West does not stand for liberty on this view, but rather, for the proud rejection of 
man’s great task:  winning the struggle within.  To celebrate liberty as we seem to 
understand the term today—according to which men and women are properly free to 
define happiness for themselves and pursue that definition within a very generous sphere 
protected by law—is, in almost every case (given the disappointing nature of man), 
equivalent to celebrating the conscious decision to live life enslaved to the ferocious and 
alternating demands of passion, desire, and vanity as they compete for the individual’s 
attention.  Khomeini calls the United States the “Great Satan” because, on his view, 
liberal democracy’s guiding ideals constitute nothing less than the most dangerous 
political teaching that has ever entered the human mind:  the right to indulge the 
appetitive soul free of interference, to pamper and feed the manifestation of Satan in us, is 
championed as the central and unalienable right legitimate government exists to protect!  	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To teach that, according to Nature and Nature’s God, man has an unalienable right to 
behave as he pleases—a right to selfishness and self-centeredness—is a powerful justification to 
neglect, to abdicate, even utterly to ignore the hard struggle that should define human 
life, and to the support of which, temporal politics is properly devoted.  Indeed, 
liberalism’s founding ideals (as they are widely understood today) purport to be high 
principles that justify and legitimate a way of life utterly incompatible with, and 
immeasurably more pleasant than, the way of life Islam demands.  Thus, Khomeini posits an 
antithesis between indulgence and religiosity and warns that when “love of the world and 
self-love begin to increase… Satan is able to take away your faith.”959  America—for the 
scholar, no more than a great monument to sexual licentiousness and conspicuous 
consumption—has an unambiguously pernicious impact in the world, eroding the pull of 
everything good and noble in man by its glorification of the freedom to indulge the selfish 
passions on an almost unlimited scale.  It does not help Khomeini that the West’s 
intellectual commitments have been so obviously successful as measured by their worldly 
fruit.  That our materialistic natural science had yielded unrivaled technical superiority, 
and our value-neutral science of politics and economics, unrivaled economic superiority, 
cannot fail to raise the possibility in many minds—both among the theoretically inclined 
and laymen—that Western civilization is right in all its intellectual commitments. 
Because Western ideas are so dangerous, Khomeini demonized the United States and 
taught that Muslims are duty-bound to struggle against the corruption and tyranny the 
country represents, a teaching that the Iranian regime continues to trumpet.  In 	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marshalling the authority of Islam to this effect, he sought to counteract the appeal of 
Western ways by rousing spirit against appetite:  it is hard to be seduced by something 
one hates in the name of moral commitments one believes to be of incomparably higher 
dignity.  By portraying the United States and the way of life for which it stands in such 
hyperbolic terms—as a threat to Islam itself—those committed to Islam can be inoculated 
against the charms of the West, their allegiance welded to Islam’s ostensible champion, in 
this case, the Iranian regime.  This, incidentally, explains Iran’s rhetorical bellicosity and 
its flagrantly provocative behavior on the international scene:  threats made, sanctions 
enforced, and military action taken by the can be portrayed by Iran’s leaders as assaults 
on Islam.  Western bellicosity serves to strengthen the Iranian regime by rallying Iranians 
around a state that masquerades as Islam’s great champion in a world order presented as 
implacably hostile to it. 
Islam purportedly mandates as much.  Citing the example of Islam’s Prophet again, 
Khomeini insists Muslims have a duty struggle—violently—against America and the 
West.  Indeed, justice requires destroying communities (both internal and external) “whose 
existence” is “harmful for Islam.”  It bears considering this shocking passage from Islamic 
Government at some length: 
The Most Noble Messenger (peace and blessings upon him) is the foremost 
example of the just ruler.  When he gave orders for the conquest of a 
certain area, the burning of a certain place, or the destruction of a certain 
group whose existence was harmful for Islam, the Muslims, and mankind 
in general, his orders were just.  If he had not given orders such as these, it 
would have been the opposite for justice, because it would have meant 
neglecting the welfare of Islam, the Muslims, and human society.960 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
960 Khomeini, Islamic Government, 89. 
	  495 
Similarly, Khomeini explains that Muhammad’s successor, Abu Bakr, turned to violence 
in the name of Islam:  “the Commander of the Faithful was also a man who would draw 
his sword when it was necessary—to destroy the workers of corruption—with all the 
strength he could muster.  This is the true meaning of justice.”961  Yes, on Khomeini’s 
understanding, justice positively requires the destruction of the forces that might 
undermine or otherwise interfere with (“corrupt”) the extreme interpretation of Islamic 
law he sought to disseminate.  In the terms of modern liberalism:  there are no protections 
for minorities or for heterodox opinions.  They must be rooted out.  In Khomeini’s 
words,  “Islam is prepared to subordinate individuals to the collective interest of society 
and has rooted out numerous groups that were a source of corruption and hard to human 
society.”962   It is hard to imagine a teaching more shocking to contemporary Western 
minds:  cleansing the community of pernicious heterodox opinions is a positive necessity, 
and the elimination of diversity, the very precondition of establishing a just political 
regime. 
Khomeini’s insistence that Islam countenances violence is ubiquitous.  His rationale, here 
again, echoes Qutb, this time, the latter’s distinctive jahiliyya teaching.  The present state 
of affairs in the Middle East, especially the prevailing state of mind, constitutes an 
impediment to the spread of more literal interpretations of Islam; thus, in much the same 
way Muhammad resorted to force to unify the Arabian Peninsula, so force will be a 
necessary component of the spread of Islam in contemporary times.  Removing what 
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stands in the way of the establishment of Islamic government, namely the tyranny and 
corruption associated with the West, is the first step toward this laudable end, and it can 
only be achieved by violence (“it is our duty to remove from the life of Muslim society all 
traces of kufr and destroy them”).963  Khomeini’s teaching bears such close resemblance to 
Qutb’s on this question that in an interview he gave after the Revolution, ten years after 
the appearance of Islamic Government, he invoked the term “jahiliyya” in exactly the way 
the Egyptian popularized:  to describe the intolerable situation Iranians faced under the 
Shah, and Shiite Iraqis, under Saddam Hussein’s brutal Ba’ath party dictatorship.964  
Readers will recall that this aspect of Qutb’s thought is responsible for inspiring the jihadist 
strains of Sunni radicalism in modern times. 
There is a connection, moreover, between the inner struggle that defines human life, and 
the struggle to spread Islam.  Those who have successfully overcome their own desires 
and passions—who have “waged a jihad against their selves”—are to become holy 
warriors dedicated to spreading the faith further:  “without the inner jihad, the outer jihad 
is impossible.”965  Khomeini insists Islam mandates as much.  Consider another 
remarkable passage from Islamic Government: 
If you present Islam accurately and acquaint people with its world-view, 
doctrines, principles, ordinances, and social system, they will welcome it 
ardently…  So, courageous sons of Islam, stand up!  Address the people 
bravely; tell the truth about our situation to the masses in simple language; 
arouse them to enthusiastic activity, and turn the people in the street and 	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the bazaar, our simple-hearted workers and peasants, and our alert 
students into dedicated mujahids.  The entire population will become 
mujahids.  All segments of society are ready to struggle for the sake of 
freedom, independence, and the happiness of the nation, and their struggle 
needs religion.  Give the people Islam, then, for Islam is the school of jihad, 
the religion of struggle; let them amend their characters and beliefs in 
accordance with Islam and transform themselves into a powerful force, so 
that they may overthrow the tyrannical regime imperialism has imposed 
on us and set up an Islamic government.966 
It his speeches, Khomeini went so far, in fact, as to claim that those who casually observe 
tenets of Islamic law, but who do not participate in its struggles (for instance, against the 
Shah) are not, in fact, Muslims.  Islam is an active religion.  Citing the example of the 
Prophet, the cleric claims that Muslims are obligated to fight, that “the true Muslim… 
clenches his fist…  If a Muslim shows no concern for the affairs of his fellow Muslims, he 
is not a Muslim.”967  It is not enough to identify oneself as a believer (as a Christian would 
in the West on the assumption that faith is properly a personal matter); to be a Muslim on 
Khomeini’s account requires total submission to demanding religious edicts, even the 
shedding of blood in the name of religious command under some circumstances.  
Conquest—Khomeini makes clear—is likewise for the sake of spreading Islam; unlike the 
imperialists, Muslims do not captures lands for their resources but for a much higher 
reason:  to convert the inhabitants, “to make men into true human beings,” just as the 
rightly guided Caliphs did as they extended the dominion of Islam by the sword.968  He 
insists that the Qur’an and the traditions make this clear beyond any doubt; much as 
Qutb had inveighed against modernizing apologists who have tried to present a gentle 
interpretation of Islam, analogizing away doctrinal support for violence, so Khomeini 	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dismisses those who claim Islam to be a peaceful religion:  only lazy cowards are willing to 
twist the word of God in order to justify their failure to live up to Islam’s noble demands.  
The traditions revisionists cite are rejected as “two weak hadiths” of dubious provenance, 
probably “forged by court preachers” in service to irreligious ulterior motives.969  In this 
context, too, Khomeini points to modern day Christianity as an exemplification of the 
fate he means to help Islam avoid.  Jesus, he alleges again, could not have intended to 
teach apathy in the face of unjust government; power-hungry advocates of secularism 
enervated Christianity to secure their own political position: 
Jesus (peace be upon him) was a great prophet…  This recommendation to 
turn the other cheek was invented by those who claim some affiliation to 
Jesus (we cannot call them Christians); they deceived the Christians and 




The Authority of the Scholars  
Recognizing, perhaps, that his own political authority (and intimately related to it, the 
endurance of the brand of Islam he means to solidify) depend on inoculating Muslims 
against calls for modern reinterpretation of Islamic law, Khomeini places high emphasis 
on the impropriety of any such interpretative liberty.  Unlike his Sunni counterparts, he 
asserts a radical disjuncture between the status of scholar and worshipper to achieve it; 
only the scholars can say what sacred texts mean.971  From this, they derive considerable 
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political authority.  In Islamic Government, Khomeini explains that the “scholars of the 
community—the ‘ulama’ are the heirs of the Imams in power and authority”;972 they are 
“ruler and judge, and these positions belong to them in perpetuity”;973 he goes so far, in 
fact, as to assert on the basis of his textual exegesis that “the same rule and governance 
that has been established for the Most Noble Messenger… is also established for the 
scholars.”974  In an interview after the Revolution, Khomeini restated this position, 
explaining that it remains the task of the religious elite to “guide the people in all 
matters.”975   
To prove the (controversial) contention that worshippers must systematically defer to the 
scholars, who are of much higher dignity, he invokes a series of traditions (of purportedly 
unimpeachable provenance), and devotes considerable space to their explication.  The 
following hadith, which Khomeini dwells on at particular length, captures his overall point 
exceptionally well: 
The superiority of the learned man over the mere worshipper is like that of 
the full moon over the stars.  Truly the scholars are the heirs of the 
prophets; the prophets bequeathed not a single dinar or dirham; instead 
they bequeathed knowledge, and whoever acquires it has indeed acquired 
a generous portion of their legacy.976  
On the basis of the Qur’an, too, Khomeini claims for the ‘ulama almost unlimited power 
over ordinary believers: 
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[W]e can infer from the [Qur’anic] verse:  ‘The prophet has higher claims 
on the believers than their own selves’ (33:6) that the ‘ulama possess the 
function of governance just as the prophet does…  The prophet, then, is 
empowered to rule and govern over the believers, and the same rule and 
governance that has been established for the Most Noble Messenger (peace 
and blessings be upon him and his family) is also established for the 
scholars…977 
It follows that novel reinterpretation of Islam’s tenets—for political purposes or personal 
worship—lies well beyond the competency of ordinary worshippers.  Insofar as the 
scholars’ most important inheritance from the Prophet is “knowledge derived from God 
Almighty,” their task is not creative in nature, but rather, the guardianship and 
dissemination of the original meaning.978  He preemptively rejects the legitimacy of any 
interpretive liberty, and he does so cognizant that those seeking to marshal the 
tremendous authority of religion in service of other, potentially irreligious, ends pose a 
severe danger to his own political-religious project.  To put it bluntly, Khomeini advances 
an understanding of Islam that will prove resistant to any attempt to reinterpret its tenets 
in light of humanist principles or a rationalist epistemology; to persuade believers 
themselves that Islam itself prohibits any such thing would render the community of 
believers intolerant of any such attempt.  Thus, he means to make it impossible for a 
would-be Spinoza to marshal the authority of Islam in the service of an alternative form 
of political regime, as Enlightenment thinkers managed in the West to propose a 
persuasive manner of interpreting the Gospels that supported, even demanded, political 
liberalism.  He raises the subject of precisely such a scheme at the beginning of a televised 
lecture broadcast shortly after the Shah’s overthrow, only to forbid it in forceful terms. 
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Recently, people have appeared who, without the slightest qualification for 
interpreting the [Qur’an], try to impose their own objectives and ideas 
upon both the [Qur’an] and the Sunna…  Their real interest is not the 
[Qur’an] or its interpretation, but trying to convince our young people to 
accept their objectives under the pretext that they are Islamic.  I 
emphasize, therefore, that those who have not pursued religious studies, 
young people who are not well grounded in Islamic matters, and all who 
are uninformed concerning Islam should not attempt to interpret the 
[Qur’an].  If they do so nevertheless for the sake of their own goals, no one 
should pay any attention to their interpretations.  One of the things that is 
forbidden in Islam is interpretation of the [Qur’an] according to personal 
opinion, or attempting to make the [Qur’an] conform to one’s own 
opinions.979  
By monopolizing interpretative authority on religious grounds, Iran’s Shiite scholars 
mean not only to propose, but to ossify, the radicalized theological and juridical 
understandings of the Qur’an and the Sunna they have advanced, and which subsequently 
inspired the Iranian Revolution.   
 
Islam and Democracy in Iran 
It should not be at all surprising that participatory politics in Iran have not yielded liberal 
policies of governance.  Since the Revolution, Iran has a better record of holding 
elections than any other state in the Middle East (excepting Turkey and Israel)—proof, 
once again, that elections do not a liberal democracy make.980   Mohsen A. Milani has 
argued that Iran entered its era of participatory politics at the beginning of the twentieth 
century.  More consequential, however, than the Constitutional Movement (1906-1911) 
or even the rise of the populist Mohammad Mossadeq (in the years immediately leading 	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up to his overthrow by the CIA in 1953), is the Islamist-led revolution of 1979.  The 
Iranian Revolution, Milani argues, was characterized by a “level of political 
participation” that was “astonishingly high;”981 since the Revolution, he continues, “the 
Islamic revolution has incorporated a relatively large segment of the population into the 
political process and has succeeded in institutionalizing its popular base of support.”982  
While he acknowledges that “the framers of the Islamic constitution were certainly not 
shy about admitting that popular sovereignty is not the foundation of the Islamic 
Republic,” he also demonstrates that the Islamists “used innovative methods to mobilize 
the masses,” most of which involved leveraging the authority of Islam for nakedly political 
purposes.983  Islamist leaders politicized the Shiite tradition of commemorating the dead 
forty days after their passing, and used the occasion to intensify popular antipathy; they 
turned public prayers and religious processions into political events intended to mobilize 
the people against the Shah; and they circulated Ayatollah Khomeini’s inflammatory 
speeches via cassette tape.984   
In the years following the Revolution, Khomeini incorporated his supporters into a 
“ministate” powerful enough to guide the rest of the state, and to transform it, in spite of 
the Revolution’s ostensible commitment to democratic political institutions.  As Milani, 
Kepel, Taheri and others have explained, Khomeini mobilized those who agreed with his 
program to further Islamize Iran:  the officials of the new government were drawn from 
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“Islamic republic”—whatever that meant—had affirmed Khomeini’s program (by a 
reported 98%-2% margin); supervisory committees (komitehs) acted as “vigilante police,” 
enforcing Islamic values and new laws derived from sharia by violent means (including, for 
example, a law mandating the veil and full Islamic dress);985 the revolutionary courts 
quickly Islamized the justice system; the University of Tehran was closed, purged, and an 
orthodoxy established in the intellectual sphere;986 Khomeini and the (typically younger) 
Mullahs who shared his belief that Islam is an active religion inundated the radio, 
television, and mosques with their radical ideas;987 powerful Generals were executed 
almost immediately (at least 70 in all), this in addition to the thousands of officers who 
were retired or otherwise removed from service;988 a loyal Revolutionary Guard was 
established to supervise the rest of the army with the aim of preempting a military coup; 
and the Pahlavi Foundation (with other wealthy nongovernmental organizations 
committed to the same ends) were allowed to dominate civil society, creating a kind of 
link between the people and the government.989   
The Iran-Iraq war, which broke out the year after the Revolution, necessitated the 
mobilization of (and permitted the politicization of) large numbers of the rural lower class, 
while the long and bloody contest with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq simultaneously distracted 
the population from the government’s utter mismanagement of the economy.  No doubt, 
war with a secular tyrant who was brutally oppressing a majority Shiite population did 	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more than a little to increase the resonance of Khomeini’s brand of political Islam.  
Domestically, Khomeini was crushing dissent vigorously, and by 1983 had banned every 
opposition political party.990  Thus, the familiar dynamic that led Spinoza and Locke to 
depoliticize Christianity reasserted itself again, this time, in the Islamic world:  political 
power, achieved by marshaling the power of religion, is employed to consolidate that 
authority even at the cost of further radicalizing religion and corrupting politics. 
Iran’s present constitution, bequeathed by Khomeini, formally separates political 
authority between a Supreme Guide (a divinely-inspired religious scholar) and a host of 
religious institutions on the one hand (the Assembly of Experts, the Council of Guardians, 
and the Expediency Committee), and ostensibly secular elected branches on the other 
(the president and a parliament).  In theory, the elected branches are separate authorities 
and to considerable extent independent of the clerical bodies.  In practice, however, the 
religious authorities supervise everything:  candidates for political office, the elections 
themselves, the judicial system, proposed legislation in draft form, the bureaucracy, the 
media, the education system, the powerful security apparatus, etc.991  The constitutional 
arrangement was deliberately crafted in such a way as to permit widespread political 
participation, but only so far as democratic institutions and practices would yield results 
compatible with the Revolution’s domineering brand of Islam.  As Milani sums up, 
“According to the majority of the framers of the Islamic constitution in 1979, Islam and 
absolute popular sovereignty are incompatible. They believed that people are free to 
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determine their own destiny provided they do not violate the Islamic laws…”992   In the 
end, then, Iran’s democratic institutions and the possibility of limited political 
participation amount to little more than a vent for people who are, from the perspective 
of the Revolution’s ideology, irredeemably disappointing.  For the sake of their own virtue 
and improvement, the people are believed to require the constant guidance of a religious 
elite—an elite that is armed with the full coercive and cajoling capacity of a modern state, 
and which supervises, at the same time, its legislative and judicial branches.   
 
Abdolkarim Soroush and a Proposal for an Islamic Reformation 
Hossein Dabbagh, writing under the name Abdolkarim Soroush, is Shiite Islam’s leading 
reformer.   Soroush was born in Tehran, but, like many of the most important 
modernizing voices in the Islamic world, he studied in the West, in his case, analytic 
chemistry, history, and the philosophy of science in England.  He credits his Western 
education for enabling him to straddle Islam and modernity, what he believes to be 
prerequisite to the creation of a kind of “hybrid” intellectual capable of reconciling Islam 
with the modern world.993  (Intellectuals who are a product of the “narrow and rigid” 
traditional education system tend not to be creative thinkers.)994  For Soroush, the 
modern Muslim intellectual rethinks the premises and claims of both modernity and 
Islam, with the aim of identifying Islamic solutions to the problems presented by 	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modernity.  By his writings and public lectures, he aims to lay down a theoretical basis for 
an Islamic democracy that is both liberal and morally upright. 
Tasked with helping to reshape the Iranian university, he returned to Iran in 1980 at the 
request of Ayatollah Khomeini himself.  His enthusiasm for the Revolution was quickly 
disappointed, however, as it became increasingly clear Khomeini was not interested in a 
regime in which a modernized or liberalized Islam enlivens the laws.  Nothing could be 
further from Khomeini’s condemnation of the modern university than Soroush’s 
enthusiasm for Western science and his commitment to see Islamic practice reformed in 
light of intellectual advances in other branches of learning.  Soroush resigned after three 
years and has since proven, from the Revolution’s point of view, an accidental enfant 
terrible.  He is the most influential advocate for political reform in Iran.  He criticizes the 
clerical political class in severe terms, and by his focus on human rights, freedom, and the 
dignity of the individual, it is clear that liberal democracy is his preferred regime type.  He 
has stated that Islam and democracy are compatible; but he believes the dominant 
interpretation of Islam must first change in fundamental respects.  Unsurprisingly, his 
willingness to identify in politicized Islam—and to attribute to clerical political 
interference, in particular—the most important obstacles to constitutional democracy 
present today in the Islamic world have made him a highly controversial figure.  He was 
tolerated for a time, his writings subjected to regular censorship.  By 1995, however, the 
regime had revoked his journal’s publishing license entirely and forbade him from giving 
public lectures.  (It had, by this point, already become difficult for Soroush to speak 
publicly in Iran on account of is many vociferous opponents, many of them young 
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students, who regularly interrupted his lectures, at times violently.)  The regime ultimately 
passed a law that imposed severe penalties on Iranians who associate with enemies of the 
Islamic Republic, a measure many believed targeted Soroush specifically.995  A short time 
later, he left Iran and has since lived in the United States where he has taught at 
prestigious universities including Princeton, Yale and Harvard, where he is currently 
visiting faculty.996  His intellectual contributions are regularly celebrated in the West.  
Most recently, Foreign Policy identified Soroush as one of the thinkers to whom it would do 
the world the most good to listen.  By his frequent interviews, his Persian-language 
website, and audio recordings of his arguments widely circulated in Iran today, he clearly 
intends to have a meaningful impact.997 
Commentators have gone to far as to call Soroush “the Luther of Islam” and “the Iranian 
Martin Luther.”  While the analogy is imperfect—Soroush’s approach is indeed very 
different (as detailed in what follows)—it is nonetheless indisputable that he is animated, 
in large part, by an anticlerical bent and that his aim is to depoliticize and personalize 
Shiites’ conception of the proper Islamic practice.  Most important for present purposes, 
Soroush rejects key elements of the regime’s ossified theology and jurisprudence outright, 
what amounts to an implicit, but unmistakable, questioning of “the very foundation of the 
Islamic Republic.”998  He denies that religious scholars constitute the ultimate 
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interpretation authority and goes so far, in fact, as to blame the Iranian clerical class for 
corrupting both politics and religion.  He advocates the humanist reinterpretation of 
sacred texts in light of the exigencies of modernity and the contributions of modern 
science and Western philosophy.  On his interpretation, the public and political aspects of 
Islam and its laws are deemphasized, and the individual spiritual component of religiosity, 
asserted.   Moreover, he asserts the possibility that truths can be derived from sources 
other than revelation, and that extra-religious truths have an important role to play in 
guiding political and moral life in the Muslim world. 
 
The Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge 
The cornerstone of Soroush’s entire system of thought is his theory of “the contraction 
and expansion of religion understanding,” which he calls “first and foremost, a 
theological theory.”999   He posits a distinction between religion—which is revealed, 
unchanging, and perfect—and what he calls “religious knowledge,” that is, the prevailing 
understanding of revealed texts in a given place and time.  As Soroush puts it, “It is up to 
God to reveal a religion, but up to us to understand and realize it.”1000  Since human 
beings—included the scholars who claim interpretative priority—are inherently defective, 
religious knowledge is inevitably “replete with error, conjecture, and conviction.”1001  
Islam itself is inerrant and perfect (“religion has no defect or flaw”); every human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
999 Abdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom & Democracy in Islam, trans. Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad 
Sadri (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2000), 38. 
1000 Soroush, Reason, Freedom & Democracy in Islam, 31. 
1001 Soroush, Reason, Freedom & Democracy in Islam, 34. 
	  509 
understanding of Islam’s revealed teachings, in contrast, cannot but be bound by the 
inevitable errors introduced by man’s inadequate capacities of apprehension and 
evaluation (“defects abound in exegeses”).1002  Soroush explains the distinction between 
religion and religious knowledge this way:  
Yes, it is true that sacred scriptures are (in the judgment of followers) 
flawless; however, it is just as true that human beings’ understanding of 
religion is flawed.  Religion is sacred and heavenly, but the understanding 
of religion is human and earthly.  That which remains constant is religion; 
that which undergoes change is religious knowledge and insight.1003 
His goal is to “explicate the process through which religion is understood and the manner 
in which this understanding undergoes change.”1004  According to his theory, various 
extra-religious factors, no less than the personal deficiencies of those professing to be 
authoritative interpreters, are responsible for the now- or then-prevalent interpretation. 
As Shireen Hunter helpfully observes, for Soroush, “the greatest part of what is 
understood as religion is of the ‘contingent’ type and as such is not the main goal of the 
Prophetic mission… [T]he contingent aspects of religion are those aspects that could have 
been different from what they are now, including language, social and cultural contexts, 
and legal aspects.”1005  Soroush’s theory is, thus, entirely historicist in its assumptions:  the 
character of what he calls “religious knowledge” in a given time and place is inevitably a 
consequence of the prevailing assumptions, pressures, and cultural/intellectual influences 
of the time.  Khomeini’s revolutionary brand of Islam is, on this account, but a part (if a 
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large part) of one branch of learning as temporarily constituted.  The whole of religious 
knowledge, similarly, is but one “branch of knowledge” among many other secular 
branches, “no less, no more.”1006  The Qur’an, from which religious knowledge is 
purportedly derived, is a text and “does not stand alone, it does not carry its own 
meaning on its own shoulders.”  Even Islam’s sacred texts must be “situated in a context;” 
they, too, are “theory-laden,” their interpretations “in flux”—all according to a 
concatenation of ideas, assumptions and pressures, many of them extra-religious, that are 
but constructs of the particular place and time.1007  
Soroush is, thus, making an argument that tracks Spinoza’s in its intention:  he claims 
that virtually all “religious knowledge” can be questioned by individual believers, 
especially in its theoretical claims.  Where Spinoza achieved this by purporting to marshal 
the authority of the New Testament in support of his irreverent propositions that the 
prophets were of disappointing mental cast, and, therefore, unable to accurately relay the 
revelations they received; that the miracles they relayed as signs of revelations’ truth are 
really but meandering imaginings of weak minds incapable of grasping nature’s true 
order; and that nature itself is entirely governed by natural laws that are identical to 
God’s will; Soroush aims to have the same practical effect by parachuting into the Islamic 
world a strange admixture of modern and post-modern thought.  
The lynchpin of his entire effort is the suggestion that religious knowledge is innately 
flexible.  Needless to say, he runs afoul of the Islamist understanding, which emphasizes 	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submission of mind to literal interpretations of Islamic law (which, with appropriate 
expert guidance, are presumed to be authoritative representations of God’s will).  On 
Khomeini’s understanding, there is no other way to knowledge properly so-called, and 
therefore, the other branches of learning are of dramatically inferior dignity.  The idea 
that extra-religious learning should influence religious interpretation is beyond 
blasphemous; Khomeini vehemently proscribed all such endeavors, and professed to 
marshal the authority of Islam itself to that effect.  It is worth considering how far 
Soroush pushes his heterodox line of argument: 
We are but a step away from acknowledging that the temporal nature of 
religious knowledge, a universally applicable precept, has no other 
meaning than the synchronization and adaptation of this branch of human 
knowledge with the sciences and needs of each age.  A transformation in 
the mode of knowledge and life of humanity is the remote cause of a 
transformation of religious knowledge.1008 
Thus, reinterpretation of the tenets of Islam—even in light of the other branches of 
learning—is inevitable, permissible and even commendable:  “To treat religious knowledge, a 
branch of human knowledge, as incomplete, impure, insufficient, and culture-bound; to 
try to mend and darn its wears and tears is, in itself, an admirable and hallowed 
undertaking.”1009  As he explained to Mahmoud Sadri after the publication of The 
Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge, his entire theory is inspired by Quine’s work 
in the philosophy of science, which seems to be a kind of historicist holism.  On the one 
hand, “truths everywhere are compatible…  One truth in one corner of the world has to 
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be harmonious and compatible with all truths elsewhere, or else it is not a truth.”1010  And 
yet, on the other hand, the various disciplines—philosophy, physics, theology, etc.—
pursue, perpetually and more or less haphazardly, little truthlets in quasi-isolation of the 
others.  Though each is guided by, and restrained by, discipline-specific forces and 
prejudices in a kind of blind Kuhnian meandering forward (Soroush acknowledges a debt 
to Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions) entire families of theories emerge as a result, 
many of them straddling more than one branch of learning.  On this basis, Soroush 
advocates a transformation of religious knowledge, one driven and guided by 
advancements in other spheres of learning.  As he explains, “modern theology, by its very 
nature, is in constant renewal, a process that highlights the relationship of modern 
theology to other sciences as well…”1011  Much as the infiltration of modern ideas (for 
instance, the Stalinist conception of the state as totalitarian in scope and role) contributed 
to the emergence of political Islam,1012 so can ideas borrowed from the West’s liberal 
tradition—and here, Soroush will emphasize human rights and the dignity of the intellect 
above all—affect religious knowledge in a way likely to have positive political 
consequences in Iran and the Muslim world generally.  Thus, it is better openly to 
acknowledge the inherently “temporal nature of religious knowledge” such that the 
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“synchronization and adaptation of this branch of human knowledge with the sciences 
and needs of each age” be allowed to run its course in the Islamic world.1013 
The theory of contraction and expansion Soroush advances thus allows him to claim that 
Islam as revealed is perfect and unchanging (an important homage to the powerful 
Islamist contention), and simultaneously, to advocate the transformation or advancement 
of inherently temporal “religious knowledge” (what, for Soroush, requires reinterpretation 
guided by extra-religious, liberal and humanist, commitments).1014   Unlike Khomeini 
and the conservative scholarly establishment, he recognizes that the Islamic world cannot 
operate in a pre-modern vacuum.   Modernity—experimental science, modern and post-
modern Western thought, the globalized economic system, the state-centered 
international system, etc.—has created an environment which, of necessity, limits or 
constrains the manners in which Islam can have productive real-world manifestation.1015  
Moreover, modernity has transformed human beings—their conception of themselves, 
their conception of legitimate government, their demands of the political community—in 
truly decisive ideational respects as well.  In Soroush’s words, “modern humankind is 
profoundly and fundamentally different from its forbears”; as such, traditional manners of 
organizing the political community cannot but fail to satisfy citizens who harbor, in some 
respects at least, distinctly modern expectations.1016  In another place, he clarifies the crux 
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of the difference between the classical and the modern “definition[s] of a human being”:  
the classical understanding of religion posits a “duty-bearing human being,” and the 
modern conception, a “right-bearing human being.”1017  Where the population has even 
partially internalized the notion that individuals have rights—if only the right to vote—a 
traditional legal framework will not be made to prevail easily, or unchallenged, nor will it 
function entirely as its elite guardians intend.  For Soroush (as for Plato, Aristotle, 
Machiavelli, Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Tocqueville, al-Banna, Qutb, Mawdudi, 
Khomeini, Bennabi, and virtually every political thinker of consequence until the 
twentieth century), a people’s beliefs, habits, and commitments are of overwhelming 
important from the perspective of statecraft. 
 
The Crisis of the Islamic World 
Although Soroush does not quite put it this way, he depicts a Muslim world in utter 
contradiction with itself, one in which the various prevailing branches of learning are in 
constant tension with one another, and in the end, utterly irreconcilable.  In terms of the 
formal constitutional structure of the state (there is no scriptural basis for an Islamic 
“Republic”),1018 its utilization of modern administrative techniques, the people’s 
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economic expectations, the enthusiastic employment of modern technology, and the 
embrace of the sciences that sustain these aspects of modern life, Western ideas prevail; 
but when it comes to the ends of the state and the moral character of political life, 
Islamists seek to impose a distinctly anti-modern ethic based on traditional notions of 
man’s nature, and the nature of the cosmos and its ruling God.  Where Islamists come to 
control the modern apparatus of the state, you get Iran—an untenable fusion of modern 
means, a semi-modern people, and a government devoted to the ends of a traditional 
society.  In Soroush’s terms, religious knowledge in its current state, so deeply impacted 
by Islamists like Qutb and Khomeini, cannot durably or profitably coexist with political 
life organized according to advancements in the other spheres of learning, so decisively 
shaped by the advances and assumptions of the modern West.   
Soroush calls this the “crisis of modernity.”  The “old equilibrium”—the kind of unity of 
intellectual life necessary for stable politics on the traditional model—has been shattered 
everywhere. 1019  Soroush traces the end of the possibility of an integrated traditional 
political community to the contributions of Western thinkers, specifically Galileo and 
Hobbes, and the political consequences of their revolutionary ideas.1020  Their ideas, 
“outfitted with the weapons of science and technology,” spread well beyond the Christian 
world, enchanting audiences and taking hold throughout the Islamic world in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  They succeeded in Persia and the Ottoman Empire 
because the Islamic world had grown “stagnant and feeble”—“we had nothing left in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1019 Soroush, “Tradition and Modernism,” trans. Roya Monajem.  Kian Monthly Review, Vol. 10: 
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storehouse of our religious and native cultures save a few dried up formalities, habits, and 
conventions,” as Soroush puts it—while the West was still “strong” and self-confident.1021  
Echoes of Malek Bennabi’s radical critique are unmistakable:  the West was able to 
colonize the East, and to some extent, the Eastern mind, because the East had grown 
“colonizable” for allowing the tension between reason and revelation to dissipate.  And 
yet, the Islamic world has not been allowed fully to embrace a new, modern, equilibrium 
across the branches of learning, and thereby, a modern form of constitutional 
government.  Anachronistic ideals, espoused so powerfully by Qutb, Khomeini, and the 
like, enliven the present resurgence of a deliberately anti-modern Islam.  Their teachings 
have taken partial hold in the context of the persistent political and economic failures of 
the last century—what seem to prove Western ways have failed in the Islamic world—
and they have resonated especially well in the context of persistent military humiliations 
at the hands of Western powers as well as the ongoing perception (deliberately fuelled and 
amplified by the same Islamists) that the imperialist West continues to meddle with 
impunity in Muslims’ affairs.  
The root of the crisis Soroush perceives is the invincible fact that the epistemological and 
metaphysical assumptions underlying Islamist ideologies are utterly irreconcilable with 
modern science and the edifice built to support it—a new conception of man, a new way 
of conceiving of knowledge, an understanding of nature as governed by unchanging 
laws—none of which can be wiped from the Islamic mind completely.  To put it another 
way, “the project of modernity” reached the Islamic world and it led to the 	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“demystification of the human being”;1022 politicized Islam presumes a world in which the 
traditional understanding of man’s utter dependence on God—his utter submission of 
mind to revelation as the only way to truth—remains more or less in tact. 
Islamists like Khomeini and Qutb were not oblivious to the antagonism; they interpreted 
Western “advances” as symptoms of decline and corruption—or worse, post hoc 
theoretical justifications for an easy, self-indulgent, and Godless existence inspired by 
Satan himself—and thus advocated minimizing or otherwise subordinating the 
incompatible spheres of learning to a literal interpretation of revealed doctrine.  (Of 
course, they had to acknowledge that a place for modern science, at least its technical 
fruit, would have to be made from calculations of ordinary political necessity).  Soroush 
reverses their argument.  He believes “religious knowledge” continues to stagnate in the 
Islamic world, even as learning elsewhere advanced, precisely because of Islamists’ vain 
and domineering claims to a monopoly over the entire intellectual sphere.  He agrees that 
the first source of the stagnation can be traced back further still, to the centuries-old 
theological and legal arguments upon which men like Qutb and Khomeini have based 
their programs.  Like other modernizers, he identifies the closing of the gates of ijtihad in 
the eleventh century—what amounts to the self-conscious abdication of reason and the 
utter subordination of mind to revealed teachings—as the first cause of today’s 
malaise.1023  His solution is to blow the gates open in a radical new way.  Soroush is not 
simply calling for “a critical reading of the corpus of Islamic texts and doctrine so that we 
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can begin to break free from the dogmas of the past” which, although relevant for 
Muslims in a pre-modern age, no longer provide useful political guidance.1024  Bolder yet, 
he demands that religious learning be allowed to reform itself in light of free and open 
dialogue with the other—Western—branches of learning.  As Valla Vakili has written, in 
Soroush’s thought, “there is an intimate connection—a ‘continuous dialogue’—between 
religious and nonreligious branches of knowledge.”1025  The reconciliation of Islam with 
the spheres of learning that have, by their advancement, created the modern West, will, 
he expects, ultimately have an inevitable sliming effect on Islam’s political claims.  
What is more, it is the role of intellectuals to bring about this transformation.  For 
Soroush, “[e]very change or revolution in society has two aspects:  one is the practical 
destruction and the other, the theoretical innovation.”1026  It is the intellectual’s task to 
“first and foremost, engage in theoretical innovation and the production of ideas.”1027  
Soroush’s own thought nicely demonstrates the kind of interplay among the various 
spheres of understanding he asserts to be so important.  He constantly refers to a wide 
array of thinkers—from classical Persian poets; to the great mystic, al-Ghazali; to the 
towering figures of classical Greek philosophy; to seminal thinkers in the philosophy of 
science; to contemporary political and literary theorists including Foucault, Habermas 
and Rorty—incorporating ideas drawn from each in his effort to present a modern and 
moderate manner of interpreting and living Islam.  Put another way, a lasting revolution 	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or “progressive movement” must present a coherent family of theories (stretching across 
the spheres of learning) that will resonate with the people when the old regime is 
discredited and its power structure overturned.  The theoretical dimension, Soroush goes 
on to explain, “is supplied by intellectuals (who have a commanding view of the rupture 
between modernity and tradition, and are privy to its secrets).  Without this theoretical 
dimension, a revolution is nothing but a temporary rebellion.”1028  Hassan Abbas sums up 
the Iranian’s “prescriptions” for the Muslim world this way:  “The crux of Soroush’s 
argument is that there is no shame in choosing to maintain or abandon certain elements 
of one’s culture on the basis of investigation, insight, and critical inquiry.  Here, he 
aggressively makes a case for rational choice in the world of ideas.”1029 
Asked by an interviewer whether he means, by his own (prolific) lecture schedule and his 
voluminous writings, to “create a social base for a particular school of thought,” Soroush 
qualifies his answer in an important respect.  He insists that he has no intention of 
building a school or inspiring a party of followers; in fact, he claims that “a keen audience 
already exists” in Iran.1030  Soroush denies interest in founding a school for at least two 
important reasons:  in the first place, he is adamant that worldly gain and the theoretical 
pursuits should not be combined; to the extent intellectuals (be they scholars of a secular 
mind or religious experts) are motivated by worldly gain—power, popular esteem, 
gaining partisans, money, etc.—their theoretical contributions are likely to be perverted 
in service to personal ambition.  (This, in the final analysis, is the lynchpin of his frequent 	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criticism of Iran’s theocrats:  the conservative religious establishment radicalizes religion 
and totalizes politics because they must twist and distort religion in order to justify and 
maintain political power on earth.1031  On this point, his argument tracks Locke and 
Spinoza’s criticisms of a politicized ecclesiastical class almost exactly.)  Second, and 
perhaps as important, he attributes his own intellectual activities to a debt he owes to 
those who continue to resist the orthodox religious dogmas of the Iranian Revolution in 
the name of liberal principles.  It is they—not him—who keep the possibility of renewal 
alive.  The intellectual’s role, it is worth emphasizing, is to refine and ennoble the guiding 
ideas or principles revolutions cannot be successful and enduring without.  
 
Reforming Islam in Light of Select Western Commitments  
Having proposed an authorizing meta-theory—his theory of the expansion and 
contraction of religious understanding purports to legitimate what Islamists forbid, 
namely, interpretative liberty in the realm of religious knowledge—Soroush presents 
three dominant ideals across his writings, mainly drawn from other spheres of learning, which he 
believes can help transform Islam in such a way as to reconcile it with the wider 
intellectual landscape and liberal democracy.  First, and most important, he restores an 
understanding of man that ascribes significant dignity of the human intellect; man’s 
capacity for reason is, for Soroush, innately connected to his capacity for freedom.  
Second, he posits, on extra-religious grounds, that human beings have natural rights and 
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that a government must above all things respect those rights; no government that fails to 
respect the rights of its citizens (a modern conception Soroush embraces) can be legitimate. 
Third, he argues that Islam should be understood as a personal and spiritual religion of 
love, as opposed to a political religion that has its effect through fear.   
These additions and adjustments are necessary, in Soroush’s opinion, to render Islam—in 
the places it has become politicized—compatible with liberal democracy.  (He even holds 
out hope that a reformed Islam might support a morally upright democratic regime, one 
that avoids the perils of relativism so apparent and damaging in the West.)1032  It is worth 
underlining, however, that Soroush believes the prerequisite of successful political reform 
in the Islamic world is a prior intellectual transformation:  Muslims’ sacred opinions must 
change where assertive Islamist ideologies have left so many adherents in contradiction 
with themselves.  He recognizes that liberal democracy requires a “philosophical 
underpinning, even [a] theological underpinning.”  Because a “despotic God would not 
be compatible with democratic rule, with the idea of rights,” Soroush acknowledges that 
in certain places political liberalism will require believers “to change [their] God.1033  He 
argues, moreover, that the indispensible commitments of the modern liberal personality 
are not latent in Islam; rather, they must be imported from the West.  Efforts to twist the 
tenets of Islam in such a way as to muster the power of scripture on behalf of liberal 
commitments is not an utterly useless endeavor—indeed, Soroush himself takes up the 
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tactic from time to time—but it is, in his opinion, insufficient to the great task at hand.  In 
this respect, Soroush’s thought is especially radical: 
The present argument, unlike the writings of some Islamic thinkers, makes 
no attempt to place the entire weight of the conceptual edifice of 
democracy upon the frail shoulders of such (intrareligious) precepts as 
consultation [shura], consensus of the faithful [ijma’], and oath of loyalty to 
a ruler [bei’at].  Rather, the discourse on religious government should 
commence with a discussion of human rights, justice, and restriction of 
power (all extrareligious issues).  Only then should one try to harmonize 
one’s religious understanding with them.1034 
In a later interview, Soroush expresses himself in even more assertive terms:  
I take strong exception to people who present the terms allegiance, 
consultative council and so on—which existed in the past—as the 
progenitors of the new concept of democracy.  My objection is that this is 
absolutely impossible, because the foundation stone of modern democratic 
thought is the concept of right and there was no such creature as the right-
bearing human being living on this in the past…  This is the enormity of 
the gap between the old world and the new, and this gap cannot be filled 
with ideas such as allegiance and consultative councils.1035 
Since Soroush cannot find in Islam proper grounding for the sacred opinions he believes 
to be indispensable to modern liberal democracy, he defends their importation on the 
basis of his expansion theory:  religious learning in the Islamic world should be allowed to 
expand in light of modern ideas.  The first revolutionary commitment Soroush means to 
instill requires transforming individuals’ conception of the reach of the human intellect 
and the dignity of reason.  The interpretation of Islam Soroush rejects—especially, the 
Islamists’ emphasis on utter submission of mind—is more like an “ideology” than a faith.  
By this, he means that the constituent ideas or dogmas that make up the ideology “have 
causes but no reasons.”1036  While it is easy enough to see where Islamist ideas came from 	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(Ash’ari theology; Stalinist ideas about the state’s scope and purpose; resentment 
engendered by, and reaction against, Western imperialism; and the vanity and power-lust 
of contemporary jurists all played roles) the politicized interpretation does not withstand 
rational scrutiny, which is what Soroush is calling for.1037  Thus, “in this sense ideology is 
the veil of reason; it is the enemy of rationality and clarity.  It contradicts objectivity and 
forces one to see the world through a single narrow aperture.”  Islamists’ denunciation of 
reason is thus a self-preservation mechanism; their ideology “conceals its falseness by 
placing it[self] above rational discourse.”1038  Soroush means to rehabilitate reason 
because reason defines man; human beings are rational creatures.  On this, his 
disagreement with Khomeini—for whom reason is usually a tool men employ to satisfy 
and amplify their bestial appetites, and at best, the handmaiden of theology—could not 
be more pronounced.  For Soroush, to the extent an ideology claiming religious authority 
interferes with man’s employment of his defining ability, the ideology deserves no 
deference at all.  What is more, freedom as worthy ideal springs from man’s defining 
capacity.  Protecting it is a justifiable end of the state insofar as it is both prerequisite for 
the employment of human reason, and because man’s rational capacity makes possible 
the good and noble use of liberty.  As Soroush puts it,  
We are impassioned about freedom and consider it the sine qua non of 
humanity because reason and freedom are inextricably intertwined.  The 	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absence of one would vitiate the existence of the other.  Freedom belongs 
to the rational human beings.  Reason requires the company of its close 
kindred spirit:  freedom.1039    
And yet, Soroush conceives of “internal freedom” in a manner similar to Khomeini:  he, 
like the Ayatollah, believes “internal freedom is achieved by liberating oneself from the 
reign of passion and anger.”1040  Soroush agrees, furthermore, that an important 
distinction is to be drawn between freedom and licentiousness; freedom does not mean 
“throwing caution to the winds” or giving oneself over to the demands of appetite, 
emotion, or vanity.1041  He departs company with Khomeini on the latter’s insistence that 
an indoctrinating education in service of complete submission of mind to revealed 
teaching is the essential prerequisite of this type of restrained self-mastery.  For Soroush, 
reason has an important role to play in the attainment of internal freedom:  man must 
have the liberty freely to choose the ideals according to which he will arrange his life and 
order his soul.  The prerequisite is therefore not a domineering religious education, but 
political freedom.  An intellectual marketplace of ideas is particularly important.  It both 
drives forward the advancement of learning across spheres of understanding and, at the 
same time, makes possible individuals’ attainment of internal freedom.  As Soroush puts 
it, “In a closed and oppressive system, there is no contest between the people, so the 
government arbitrarily promotes some to the positions of leadership.  People do not get to 
compete, and truths do not get a chance to shine against falsehoods.”1042  Soroush, thus, 
appears to work from a happier conception of human nature; human beings are 
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sufficiently well constituted, morally and intellectually, to choose for themselves a 
worthwhile plan of living where they permitted the opportunity.  While he believes 
religion is a vitally important part of the marketplace of ideas, only a gentler, 
depoliticized, religion can play a productive role.  Moreover, freedom of conscience—
that is, the separation of religion and coercive authority—is the prerequisite of genuine 
faith.  He agrees with John Locke’s contention that true belief is embraced willingly—
“not because it was imposed, or inherited, or part of the dominant local culture.”1043  It 
follows that Soroush’s opinion of a religious elite (in particular, Iran’s) is far more 
pessimistic than Khomeini’s.  “Excessive power” has “enormous potential to corrupt.”1044  
For Soroush, the nexus of religious authority and political authority is detrimental—not 
only to religious practice, which it radicalizes, but also to the open and vibrant intellectual 
sphere, which is, for Soroush, the real prerequisite of the virtue (internal freedom) both he 
and Khomeini profess to champion.   
Notice again that Soroush does not derive these principles from Islam.  This optimistic 
portrayal of man—as reasonable and free by nature—seems rather to be derived from 
classical philosophy fused with the Enlightenment rebellion against God.  Good 
democratic government, Soroush proceeds to argue, depends on citizens’ employment of 
their rational capacities within an intellectual climate that makes an important place to 
Islam.  Soroush’s solution to the perennial political dilemma faced by popular regimes—
ensuring a significant confluence of wisdom and legislative authority, while recognizing 
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that the people are sovereign—is drawn from yet another source.  On this, he is 
eminently a progressive.  He argues that the precondition of “democratizing religious 
government is historicizing and energizing the religious understanding by underscoring 
the role of reason in it.”1045  As he goes on to explain in terms that could almost have 
leapt from the pages of John Dewey, reason in its political manifestation has little to do 
with the political insights gleaned by the most impressive thinkers; rather, he means for 
public policy to be driven by “a collective reason arising from the kind of public 
participation and human experience that are available only through democratic 
methods.”1046  If Soroush’s thought seems at times to be a schizophrenic amalgamation of 
not-always compatible strains of Western thought, it is no doubt nonetheless more than a 
small improvement on the Islamist alternative.  
The second revolutionary commitment Soroush attempts to inject into Islam is a 
conception of individual rights that he self-consciously imports from the West.1047  He 
goes so far as to assert that the “foundation stone” of liberal democracy is the recognition 
that human being have rights, an idea he believes to be antithetical to the traditional 
conception of the human being as irreparably duty-bound.1048  Furthermore, the 
widespread belief that all human beings have these rights is, for Soroush, the most 
important prerequisite for what he calls “civil society.”  A civil society is one in which 
individuals are free to live and think as they please within very generous bounds.  To the 	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extent the recognition that human beings are endowed with unalienable rights is mutual 
and ubiquitous, the groups or factions that make up a political community “can live 
peacefully alongside one another, without any group having advantages of mastery over 
the others.”1049  Indeed, insofar as tolerant and limited government presumes every 
faction will refrain from employing the coercive authority of the state to instantiate a 
virtuous political order that restricts the rights and liberties of those living according to 
different conceptions of a good life, limited constitutional government depends on a kind 
of collective self-restraint born of the recognition that every human being is endowed with 
an equal claim to live as he or she pleases within a fairly generous sphere protected by 
law.1050  
Soroush admits that “this civil society is not really in keeping with our current religious 
thinking and the existing reading of religion,” and calls on Muslims under the sway of 
Islamist doctrines to amend their beliefs on the question of rights, which is to say he calls 
on those most powerfully attached to an illiberal religious ideology to adopt an altogether 
new conception of man’s very nature.1051  He acknowledges, furthermore, that the 
modern conception of human rights is a product of the European Enlightenment,1052 but 
maintains that the notion is compatible with (though certainly not mandated by) Islam, at 
least if one emphasizes the most conducive tenets.1053  On the question of a just regime, 
however, he is unambiguous:  no regime that fails to protect the rights and freedoms of its 	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inhabitant—its citizens—is “tenable” in the modern world.1054  He utterly rejects 
Khomeini’s conception of justice, according to which a just regime is a virtuous regime, 
and the prerequisite of virtue, the restriction of human liberty.  For Soroush, “no seeker 
of justice can be indifferent to the question of freedom.  If we define justice as the 
realization of all rights, it would be an affront to justice to neglect the right to be free.”1055   
In the aftermath of the 2009 public demonstrations, Soroush went so far as to write 
Ayatollah Khameini, the present Supreme Guide of the Islamic Republic and Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s successor.  In his letter, he blames the theocracy for turning Iran into a “grim 
land” and expresses the crux of his disagreement with the Ayatollahs this way:  “our deep 
difference lies in the fact that I believe that tyranny is bad by its very essence, whereas you 
believe that tyranny is fine as long as it is at the service of religion and that tyranny can be 
combined with religiosity.”1056  He goes on to accuse Khameini of embracing a 
“conception of religion which harks back to Sayyid Qutb.”1057  For Soroush, Islamists, on 
both the Sunni and Shiite side, are ultimately responsible for the crisis of modernity as it 
affects the Islamic world. Their powerful arguments—cloaked in pious garb and armed 
with compelling denunciations of the West—have prevented a large proportion of the 
Muslim world from enjoying the blessings of liberty and prosperity that are part and 
parcel of modernity.  Ideas, then, are to blame:  for the corruption of Islam, for the 
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continuing backwardness of a significant part of the world, and for the enduring suffering 
of millions. 
The third transformation of Islamic practice Soroush prescribes is not an alien 
importation but an adjustment of interpretation for which there is precedent in Islam.  He 
rejects politicized and ideological manner of practicing Islam that are based on fear.  Al-
Ghazali, who was largely responsible for closing the gates of ijtihad in the service of the 
establishment of a domineering legal code, exemplifies “fear-based mysticism in its most 
detailed and eloquent form.”1058  In the same spirit, and like Qutb before him, Khomeini 
emphasizes the vital importance of terrifying punishments to the establishment of an 
environment sufficiently hard that selfish and prideful human beings can be made to 
practice and internalize virtuous habits.  Soroush rejects this understanding and prefers, 
instead, a “love-based” mysticism, of which the best exemplar is Jalal ad-Din Muhammad 
Rumi.1059  It was Rumi, a poet, jurist, and mystic who lived in the thirteenth century, 
whom Soroush credits for reforming his own interpretation of Islam.  “Truly, had it not 
been for Rumi,” he admits, “perhaps no one could have freed me from al-Ghazali’s 
charm.”1060  In particular, Rumi taught Soroush that there is “such a thing as an 
individual religion based on personal experiences” in Islam.   
To personalize the practice of Islam—such that believers themselves conceive of worship 
as an individual’s private spiritual relationship with God—would go a long way toward 
moderating Islam’s capacity to dominate the political sphere.  “[T]he true place of 	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religion in society” is, on Soroush’s understanding, a fairly narrow one.  Since the 
Revolution, “the greatest pathology of religion… is that it has become plump, even 
swollen”; “purifying religion,” on his account, requires “making it lighter and more 
buoyant, in other words, rendering religion more slender by sifting, whittling away, 
erasing the superfluous layers off the face of religiosity.”1061  Islam does not contain a 
blueprint for government.  Indeed, Khomeini could only point at the general example of 
the Prophet and the Commander of the Faithful—and their exercise of unfettered 
political and military authority—in his effort to legitimate a totalitarian religious state; he 
cannot point to particular verses of the Qur’an, or specific traditions, as mandating Iran’s 
strange blend of an ostensibly parliamentary form of government suffocated by tyrannical 
clerical supervision.  As Valla Vakili helpfully sums up, for Soroush, “Islam at best 
contains certain legal commandments… [which] can only respond to a limited range of 
legal issues.”  Iran’s laws “must not violate religious values, but they cannot be derived 
from religion itself.”1062  Beyond this, Soroush is a proponent of modern liberal 
democracy and the expert administration of the state.  Government should be 
representative and limited; and administrative methods should be derived from the 
modern social sciences, including economics and public administration.1063   
Finally, it bears notice that Soroush is a believing Muslim and hopes the reforms he is 
advocating will save Islam from repeating the unhappy fate of Christianity in the West, 
while at the same time constituting a solid foundation for a kind of morally upright 	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constitutional regime.  On Soroush’s reading, the Islamic world can learn from the drama 
that built the modern—ultimately, the postmodern—West.  The Reformation, 
subsequent attacks on the Church, and the persistent erosion of Christianity are not 
inevitable consequences of liberal democracy or its indispensable ideational 
commitments; the erosion of religious belief in the West was, rather, the accidental 
consequence of a misdirected, though understandable, reaction to the corruption of 
Christianity by vain and prideful Churchmen, and the political fanaticism their 
politicization of religious beliefs made possible.1064  Soroush condemns Iran’s religious 
elite in such harsh terms for what it has done to Islam as much as for their political 
crimes; for he foresees the possibility Iran’s brutal theocracy will arouse a similarly 
vehement reaction in the Muslim world, one that might accidentally be directed at Islam 
itself rather than those responsible for its corruption.   
For Soroush, Islam has an indispensible public role to play in a decent and upright 
regime; but it should play that role through a genuinely sovereign people in their exercise 
of their legislative authority.  On this question, Soroush sounds very much like America’s 
founders, who doubted the possibility of upright constitutional government absent a 
vibrant—but independent—moral-religious sphere.  They believed religious 
commitments would inform government and policy—not directly, by an official 
establishment—but by nourishing civic virtue in a self-governing people, and by helping 
to mold morally upright lovers of the common good to lead it as elected statesmen.  As 
Soroush puts it, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1064 Vakil, “Debating Religion and Politics in Iran.” 
	  532 
[D]emocratic religious regimes need not wash their hands of religiosity nor 
turn their backs on God’s approval.  In order to remain religious, they, of 
course, need to establish religion as the guide and arbiter of their problems 
and conflicts…  Securing the Creator’s approval entails religious awareness 
that is leavened by a more authentic and humane understanding of 
religiosity and that endeavors to guide the people in accordance with these 
ideals.  In thus averting a radically relativistic version of liberalism, rational 
and informed religiosity can thrive in conjunction with a democracy 
sheltered by common sense…1065 
For Soroush, a radically secular and excessively permissive liberal democracy is scarcely 
more conducive to decent political life than a fanatical theocracy:  neither supports the 
kind of “internal freedom” that redeems human life.  He envisions “the reconciliation 
between the two [reason and religion],” what requires that both be fairly humble or 
restrained in their demands.1066  Soroush intends, in other words, to make a place for 
reason in the Islamic world without undermining the politically indispensable (and 
perhaps also the morally indispensable) claims of faith.  He argues for a depoliticized 
Islam – one inhospitable to abuse by a scholarly establishment on the one hand, and 
supportive of a natural rights teaching and the dignity of the human intellect on the other 
– that will nonetheless exert a guiding political impact by forming upright citizens within 
a private sphere kept at some distance from the levers of power, but not completely 
separated from the public sphere.  This explains why Soroush refrains from advocating 
reforms so radical as Spinoza’s in the West.  True, Soroush tends to cite Rumi as his 
inspiration and authority when he is espousing his most liberal interpretations of Islam.  
More importantly, however, he declines to arm his modernizing arguments with the most 
powerful rhetoric available to him; he deliberately avoids advocating religious reform in 
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terms that might corrode the moral authority of sacred text tout court.  Thus, there is no 
outright assault on the truth of prophecy, the possibility of miracles, or the divine dignity 
and legitimacy of sacred text.  Nor does Soroush believe it necessary to import the 
commitments and assumptions of European romanticism.  There is no room in an 
upright popular regime, on his account, for the radical species of relativism that an 
overemphasis on sentiment, feeling, aesthetics, and grand action risks inspiring. 
By his restraint, however, Soroush may risk limiting his popular impact.  Spinoza was so 
effective precisely because he marshaled the authority of the Bible in service of a radically 
individualistic way of conceiving of the individual, his rights, and his relationship to both 
God and political community.  His ideas took hold against the backdrop of political crises 
in Europe, the brutal wars of religion that were convulsing the Christian powers and 
horrifying Christians, many of them slaughtered or maimed by the excesses of fanatics.  
The Islamic world may well be in the midst of a similar crisis today.  Whether Soroush’s 
proposed reforms will seem respectable enough, on the grounds he has provided for 
them, that they too gain wide and enthusiastic adherence remains an open question.  It 
took a more radical approach to build modern Turkey, a question that is taken up in the 
following chapter. 
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C H A P T E R   X 
A DELIBERATE FOUNDING:  TURKEY’S MIXED REGIME 
 
Modern Turkey is the result of a confrontation between Turks who were committed to 
the ideals associated with the modern West and those committed either to the old 
Ottoman regime or to Islam as organizing principle of the regime.1067  Reformers carried 
the day, especially after World War I.  Turkey’s success in moving toward modern and 
moderate government was so impressive that, for a time, the country was even considered 
a serious candidate for admission to the European Union, a considerable feat for a 
country that was not long ago the ruling heart of the Ottoman Empire and titular seat of 
the Islamic Caliphate.  In the space of a century, a loose amalgamation of disparate tribes 
and people, many of them in most respects pre-modern, has become an emerging 
economic and diplomatic power governed according to constitutional principles.  Free 
and fair elections are held according to schedule, the results are allowed to stand (most of 
the time), and the country ranks as the region’s freest (not counting Israel).1068 
Every student of government knows that Mustafa Kemal, known today as Atatürk, is the 
father of the modern Turkey.  It is widely recognized, moreover, that Atatürk’s reforms 
were deliberate, thorough, and far-reaching.  As one Turkey expert recently explained,   
No nation was ever founded with greater revolutionary zeal than the 
Turkish Republic, nor has any undergone more sweeping change in such a 
short time.  In a very few years after 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 	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transformed a shattered and bewildered nation into one obsessed with 
progress.  His was a one-man revolution, imposed and steered from above.  
Atatürk knew that Turks were not ready to break violently with their past, 
embrace modernity and turn decisively toward the West.  He also knew, 
however, that doing so would be the only way for them to shape a new 
destiny for themselves and their nation.  So he forced them, often over the 
howling protests of the old order.1069   
And yet, Turkey’s steps toward modern and moderate constitutional government began 
long before the Republic was declared and the Caliphate abolished in the years following 
WWI.  In fact, the intellectual roots of the effort to modernize the regime, driven by pro-
Western elites in the military and the bureaucracy, can be traced back to the eighteenth 
century.  For generations, reform-minded Turks worked to revolutionize the regime in 
important social and legal respects.  Although early efforts at constitutional reform were 
unsuccessful, and even provoked conservative retrenchment, reformers’ emphasis on 
educational reform yielded lasting results.1070  For while the early revolutionaries were 
certainly not Europhiles, they introduced European ideas that took hold and quickly 
spread. 
  
Building the Young Turks 
The proximate cause of this intellectual transformation was military and economic 
necessity.  Early modernizers in the Ottoman Empire were, in the first place, those willing 
to come to terms with a distressing reality:  their Empire was ill-suited to integrate into an 
international system increasingly dominated by the modern Western nation states, and 	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worse still, utterly unable to compete with them on the battlefield.  Napoleon’s crushing 
conquest of Egypt in 1798 was a humiliation felt throughout the Islamic world, one that 
foreshadowed many more to come.  Not an Indian province remained independent by 
the middle of the nineteenth century; Austria and Russia, meanwhile, had captured 
Muslim lands closer to Anatolia from which they posed a strategic threat to both the 
Empire and to Persia.  Most difficult to accept:  features of the civilization and regime 
deeply tied to its identity—many of them having to do with Islam—were at the core of 
their incompatibility with the West, and therefore, the cause of the Empire’s weakness.   
These exigencies opened Turkish minds to Western ideas at the end of the eighteenth 
century, if in an altogether accidental way.  The Sultan sent young Ottomans to Europe 
to learn about modern military and administrative techniques with the aim of 
strengthening the Empire.  But with the arts of war, students attending the Empire’s 
military academies, the very men who were destined to become its ruling elite, absorbed 
Europe’s languages and its revolutionary ideas.  Subsequent generations imported and 
further disseminated those ideas.  Over time, the schools they built would become 
“nurseries of revolutionaries.”1071  One of them, a poet-patriot and political theorist 
named Namik Kemal, whom to this day some refer to as ‘the poet of liberty,’ did more 
than simply bring the Enlightenment ideas of Europe to the East— he made them 
respectable.  A disciple of Rousseau and Montesquieu who was ultimately exiled for his 
efforts, he translated their works and advanced arguments not unlike those of Spinoza 
and Locke in the West, contending on the basis of Holy Writ that Islam was in fact 	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compatible with – even demanded! – representative and consultative government.  He 
proposed, as Bernard Lewis has explained, that “all that is best in European civilization 
derived from or could be paralleled in classical Islamic civilization, and the Muslim, in 
adopting these things, was returning to what was deepest and most authentic in his own 
tradition.”1072  True or not, only arguments that marshal the power of reigning sacred 
opinions can make the gradual adoption of new ones possible in fact.  London’s 
parliament was Kemal’s practical inspiration, and Kemal himself, the first Turk to 
“achieve a clear vision of freedom and self-government under law.”1073  
In the context of the Islamist arguments so potent today, Namik Kemal’s approach to 
Qur’anic interpretation seems perhaps even more radical than it was in his time.  For 
instance, having made the Lockean points that human beings are by nature free (“created 
free by God”) and endowed with a “natural right” to the exercise their faculties as they 
see fit, he goes on to explain that society is also obliged to use the preponderance of 
forced amassed by the state to protect individuals’ rights according to principle of 
consent.  As he explains in an interpretation of the Qur’an (Sura 3, Verse 159), written 
for wide public consumption,   
General freedom is protected within society because society can produce a 
preponderant force to safeguard the individual from the fear of the 
aggression on the part of another individual…  Therefore, just as all 
individuals have the natural right to exercise their own power, so too 
conjoined powers naturally belong to all individuals as a whole, and 
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consequently in every society the right to sovereignty belongs to the 
public.1074 
More important than his espousal of this alien Enlightenment idea, however, is the 
religious justification he appends.  Kemal argues that while the judicial authority does not 
in the first place reside with the people, executive authority is delegated by, and 
contingent upon the continued consent of, the governed—all of this, according to Islamic law. 
 
A shar’ [religious law] proof of this claim is the following legal rule: 
If the people of a town gathered and appointed someone as qadi [judge] 
over themselves to judge cases arising among them, the judicial activity of 
this person could not be valid; judicial authority would still belong to the 
qadi appointed by the state because jurisdiction is a right of the 
government.  But if the people of a town gathered and pledged allegiance 
to someone for the sultanate or caliphate, this person would [indeed] 
become sultan or caliph, while the previous sultan or caliph would retain 
no authority whatever, because the imamate is a right of the umma [the 
Islamic community].  
The public cannot perform the duties attached to this right for themselves, 
so the appointment of an imam [leader] and the establishment of a 
government are indispensable.  This is obviously nothing other than 
society’s delegating the performance of the aforementioned duties to some 
of its members.  Accordingly, monarchs have no right to govern other than 
the authorization granted to them by the umma in the form of allegiance 
[bay’a], and the authorization granted to ministers through appointment by 
monarchs.  The apt saying in the hadith [tradition of the Prophet] “the 
leader of the tribe is its servant” hints at this.1075 
In addition to penning patriotic poetry that fanned the bourgeoning nationalism of the 
Young Turks, Namik Kemal took overt political steps to help modernize Turkey.  He was 
a member of the commission that wrote the 18XX Constitution, to the restoration of 
which the Young Turks initially devoted their energies.  Later, from Paris, he published 
an opposition journal called Hürriyet (Liberty) dedicated to explaining constitutionalism 	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while “attempting to reconcile Sharia with European theories of law.”1076  According to 
Bernard Lewis, he was the first Ottoman to “achieve a clear vision of freedom and self-
government under law.”1077   
Namik Kemal, a philosopher, exerted his most profound political influence by way of a 
statesman enamored of his teachings, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.  His ideas had so 
thoroughgoing an effect on the father of modern Turkey that the pupil, born Mustafa to a 
devout woman of humble means, is said to have taken his second name as a tribute to the 
political theorist whose thought so deeply molded own his political ambition.1078  By the 
end of his life, Atatürk had dropped Mustafa altogether – it was “too Arab-sounding” for 
his modern sensibilities – preferring instead to be known, appropriately, as Kemal 
Atatürk—a name which invokes his legacy as the father of modern Turkey while 
reminding of Namik Kemal’s enduring importance.1079  
Other theorists made similar arguments.  Said Nursi, a contemporary of Atatürk who 
initially supported the Young Turks’ call for constitutional government, contended that 
the era of “jihad of the sword” had been eclipsed by a new era of reason, a return to 
“jihad of the word” in Islamic civilization.1080  As his English language intellectual 
biographer explains, Nursi contributed to the revolution in its early days by arguing 
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publicly in favor of “the conformity of constitutionalism with the Sharia.”1081  Persuading 
a population ill-acquainted with constitutional principles “of [the revolution’s] manifold 
benefits” in order to “arouse the consciences of Muslims to the potentials of unity and 
brotherhood, and to urge them down the way of progress” was the intention that 
animated his public pronouncements1082 (although in later years, Nursi became a leading 
critic of secularism and the materialist and positivistic philosophies that undergirded the 
Young Turks’ most radical reforms.)  Nonetheless, his contribution to the revolution he 
would later decry was important: 
In virtually all of the speeches, newspaper articles, and other writings that 
have been preserved, Nursi uses the ideas and terminology of the liberal 
though made familiar to the Ottoman intellectuals in the nineteenth 
century by Namik Kemal and the Young Ottomans, and their successors.  
That is to say, with his speeches and articles he was attempting to 
familiarize the people with such concepts as constitutionalism, 
consultation, freedom, despotism, progress, civilization, fatherland, and 
nation (millet).  However, he always in some way links these concepts with 
Islam.1083  
At the risk of belaboring this immensely important point, one further example merits 
consideration.  Ziya Gökalp, born to a man of modernist sensibilities with a deep 
admiration for Namik Kemal, was an important member of the Committee of Union and 
Progress in the lead-up to World War I.  His ability to read French allowed him to 
become well versed in contemporary social science literature and he quickly became a 
leading advocate of Turkish nationalism and modernization.  In an essay entitled “Islam 
and Modern Civilization,” he makes the radical argument that Islam is in fact more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1081 Sükran Vahide, “Toward an Intellectual Biography of Said Nursi,” Islam at the Crossroads, 
Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’, ed.  (New York:  SUNY Press, 2003), 6. 
1082 Sükran Vahide, “Toward an Intellectual Biography of Said Nursi,” 6. 
1083 Sükran Vahide, “Toward an Intellectual Biography of Said Nursi,” 6. 
	  541 
compatible with modernity than Christianity.1084  According to Gökalp’s counter-intuitive 
argument, Roman Christianity had, by accepting “the separation of state and religion as 
a principle… formulated… in the slogan ‘render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s and 
unto God that which is God’s,’” set up a permanent struggle for authority between 
claimants to ecclesiastical authority and temporal authorities.1085   
Far from conducing to modern constitutional government, the imperfectly demarcated 
separation of authority proposed by Christianity – especially when combined with the 
vanity of men (Gökalp describes the priesthood as an institution “contrary to the laws of 
nature and life”) – inevitably leads to endless conflict, absolute rule, and the arrestment of 
social and political progress.1086  The only alternative to religious war Gökalp could 
perceive for the West was the radical laicism of the French Revolution, which he aptly 
characterized as a “grave source of sickness for the French nation.”1087  In its rejection of 
any such separation, Islam did a better job preparing society for modern government.  In 
the first place, there was no need for “Inquisition courts.”  Furthermore, by abjuring any 
such separation, Islam was better equipped to cultivate a people capable of constitutional 
government:   
it was because Islam brought state, law, and court into the realm of the 
sacred that those traits such as loyalty to the secular ruler, a genuine 
fraternity, and solidarity among the believers, sacrifice of interests and life 
for the sake of jihad [holy struggle], tolerance and respect towards the 
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opinions of others, which are the very basis of a permanent order in 
society, were cultivated among all Muslims as common virtues.1088   
 
In fact, Gökalp goes so far as to assert that Protestantism is “a more or less Islamicized 
form of Christianity,” which, in his opinion, explains why “the modern state came into 
existence in Europe first in the Protestant countries.”1089  If Islam shares with Reformed 
Christianity a de-emphasis on the authority of priests, we have already noted the peculiar 
susceptibility of many other aspects of Islamic law to more recent interpretations that 
rather impede the establishment of modern government, in part, by elevating a quasi-
priestly body of vain scholars with an agenda of their own.  What is important about 
Gökalp’s work for present purposes is not whether his arguments are in every respect 
correct in the final analysis, but rather, his success convincing Turks in his own era that 
Islam not only does not prohibit, but in fact supports, modern constitutional government.  
As Robert Devereaux among others have explained, it was intellectuals like Gökalp – 
many of them, intimately familiar with Islamic law – who “formulated and popularized” 
the “intellectual currents” that made the emergence of modern Turkey possible.  Ensar 
Yilmaz recently elaborated the point, noting that “Gökalp’s political discourse entailed 
the enlightenment of the people by the elite.”  More precisely, Gökalp conceived of the 
state as a “soulless machine” and believed “it was necessary to add soul to the state,” what 
could only be achieved by creating a new “national culture.”  Here again, the elite would 
lead the “effort to make the people adopt ‘the common good’ that had been created by 
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mixing the values specific to Western civilization with the popular national cultural 
values.”1090  Devereaux goes so far as to suggest that “without the foundation that had 
been laid by Gökalp and his fellow Turkists, Atatürk’s achievements would have been 
impossible or, at least, vastly more difficult.”1091 
It was these principles – advanced and made respectable by Ottoman philosophers and 
theologians – that inspired the generation of politicians and statesmen known in the West 
as the Young Turks.  As political theorists from Aristotle to Machiavelli have recognized, 
public intellectuals (in the best case, philosophers) inspire and shape the ambition of those 
who are inclined to political action (in the best case, those Aristotle termed gentlemen).  
Though Atatürk was undoubtedly the man who ushered in Turkey’s modern reinvention 
in the years following WWI, it took a cadre of daring modernizers committed to dramatic 
reform to make Turkey’s transformation possible.  That they were reared on the ideas of 
Kemal, Nursi, and Gökalp – as opposed to the dangerous dreams of Islamists like al-
Banna, Qutb, and Mawdudi – is perhaps the primary reason a constitutional regime that 
inclines toward the West emerged in Turkey.  As early as 1876, prominent Europeans 
could perceive, at least among the elite, powerful sympathies for aspects of the Western 
political order.  On 25 May, 1876, Sir Henry Elliot, the British ambassador, reported that    
the word ‘Constitution’ was in every mouth; that the Softas [theological 
students], representing the intelligent public opinion of the capital, 
knowing themselves to be supported by the nation—Christians as well as 
Mahomentan—would not, I believe, relax their efforts till they obtained it, 
and that, should the Sultan refuse to grant it, an attempt to depose him 	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appeared almost inevitable; that texts from the Qur’an were circulated 
proving to the faithful that the form of government sanctioned by it was 
properly democratic, and that the absolute authority now wielded by the 
Sultan was an usurpation of the rights of the people and not sanctioned by 
Holy Law; and both texts and precedents were appealed to, to show that 
obedience was not due to a Sovereign who neglected the interests of the 
State…1092  
In sum, then, Enlightenment ideas, and the establishment of schools and academies 
modeled on Europe’s, had “by the twentieth century… produced a ruling elite with the 
knowledge, the capacity, and above all the sense of responsibility and decision to carry 
through the great social and political revolution that made modern Turkey.”1093  Indeed, 
as numerous scholars have pointed out, “Most of the leaders of the Turkish nationalist 
resistance movement after the First World War were thus contemporaries at the Istanbul 
War College at the turn of the century.”1094  Atatürk and his fellow cadets surreptitiously 
discussed the dangerous ideas of political theorists, going so far as to produce a 
“handwritten newspaper to explain the shortcomings which they had discovered in the 
administration and policy of the state” in the years they were being trained to serve it.  In 
Atatürk’s recollection of that initial foray into high political ideas, he recalls their 
awareness that what they were doing was prohibited by the existing regime: 
Political ideas came to be discussed during the years I spent in the War 
College.  We did not at first have a clear perception of how things stood.  It 
was the time of Sultan Abdülhamit.  We used to read the books of Namik 
Kemal.  We were closely followed.  Generally, we could read only in the 
dormitories, after going to bed.  The fact that readers of such patriotic 
works were persecuted, gave us the feeling that there was something rotten 
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in the affairs of state.  But we could not determine clearly what was 
wrong.1095 
In the years between his time at the War College and his rise to prominence at the end of 
World War I, Mustafa Kemal worked to advance his knowledge of European political 
thought.  As one historian sums up, “He learned French and devoured the works of 
Voltaire and Rousseau, together with translations of Thomas Hobbes and John Stuart 
Mill.”1096  These later revolutionaries understood that building a state that could exist 
comfortably on the borders of Europe mandated more than simply adopting Europe’s 
administrative techniques and ways of war.  As Andrew Mango has noted, while the 
military elite “had become enlightened, the mass of Muslims, who in spite of the reforms, 
still constituted the ruling community, maintained in their illiteracy the habits of the pre-
modern age.”1097  For Atatürk, modernization would require the deliberate abandonment 
of Islam as sole organizing principle of the regime.  Though they did not put it in 
precisely these terms, the Young Turks seem to have sensed what Noah Feldman has 
recently pointed out:  their predecessors, the earliest modernizing reformers, had 
inadvertently made the political situation in the Empire worse.  The codification of civil 
law in the latter half of the nineteenth century – a reform inspired by European legal 
codes – had all but backfired, destroying the one authority in the Empire that had until 
that point effectively restrained the executive: the ulema.1098   
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Prior to the reforms, religious scholars had been the keepers and interpreters of sharia, 
what conveyed an important power with which they were able to check, or at least 
restrain, the Sultan.  That authority was marginalized by reforms designed to improve the 
rule of law by standardizing its application.  Far from restraining the Sultan, then, early 
legal and constitutional reforms instead “displaced and destroyed the scholarly class, 
without leaving in their wake any institution or social entity capable of counterbalancing 
the executive as the scholarly class had once done.”  Put another way, the codification on 
earth of laws sanctioned by God had the practical effect of unifying sword and high priest 
by very quickly eroding the dependence of the Sultan upon a separate authority when it 
came to interpreting Islamic law.  Feldman goes on to argue that this move opened, 
throughout the Sunni world, both “the possibility of secular government” while 
simultaneously eroding “the one meaningful check on executive authority.”1099  Thus, 
early modernizing reforms in the Ottoman Empire – undertaken in the name of 
economic and military necessity – effectively cleared the way for the totalitarian Arab 
regimes carved from the Ottoman Empire after WWI. 
While Feldman suggests the revival of a scholarly class drawing its authority from its 
guardianship of Islam may be the best solution to the Arab world’s political difficulties 
today, Atatürk proposed a very different remedy for Turkey.  He agrees that establishing 
a balance between at least two powers is essential to durable constitutional government; 
but he denied that Islam could play a constructive role in establishing such a balance.  He 
recognized what early reformers who focused on laws alone did not.  Statecraft is, first 	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and foremost, soulcraft.  As Atatürk well understood, Turkey’s revolution could not have 
been made durable simply by purging those loyal to the ancien regime and by subsequently 
adopting the outward trappings of constitutional government; nor could the Turkey 
simply reestablish a salutary division by rehabilitating a scholarly class drawing authority 
from Islam.  Modern government required that at least one pole of the new regime be 
animated by modern ideas.  In the short term, there was a single candidate for the role:  
the military.  Far from attempting to graft a modern regime onto a people that was in 
decisive respects pre-modern in their opinions and habits, those responsible for the 
emergence of modern Turkey sought to empower a cadre of modernists in the short term, 
and to rip Turkey from the Islamic world (if necessarily incompletely) over the long term.  
Atatürk’s self-conscious goal was to found a new nation on the basis of modern 
constitutional ideals.   
 
Atatürk’s Grand Ambitions 
Mustafa Kemal articulated this ambition, and viewed it as the military’s responsibility to 
transform Turkey, as early as 1912 while he was still a relatively unimportant member of 
the reform movement.  Speaking to a German officer in the Ottoman service a few short 
years before WWI would catapult him to a world-historical role, he explained that the 
“Turkish army will have done its duty when it defends the country from foreign 
aggression and frees the nation from fanaticism and intellectual slavery,” to which he 
added the observation that the “Turkish nation has fallen far behind the West.  The main 
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aim should be to lead it to modern civilization.”1100  As Schacht points out in his classic 
study of Islamic law, “Modernist legislation does not, generally speaking, arise out of a 
genuine public demand.”1101  It appears, rather, when modernizers moved by a liberal or 
humanist spirit—oftentimes lawyers, military officers, and bureaucrats who had been 
schooled in the ways of the West—gain real influence over government.1102 1103  Atatürk 
appears to have understood that lawgivers of the highest order manage somehow to bring 
out what is best in their people while setting for the state a course that will permit its 
betterment over time. 	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traditionalists themselves “argue that the success of Islam in Indonesia from the fourteenth 
century onward had to do with the willingness to adapt to local customs, and they sometimes will 
admit that contemporary practices owe something to pre-Islamic traditions” (RAND, 370).  This 
willingness to tolerate habits, and even laws, not derived from a strict reading of Islam’s sacred 
texts differentiates Indonesian Islam from Arab fundamentalists in most important respects.  
Whereas the Arab radicals insist that literal adherence to Islamic law requires the overthrow of 
insufficiently strict rulers and the expulsion of infidels, Indonesian traditionalists cite the hadith in 
which Mohammed councils the toleration of an unjust ruler to justify a moderate and inclusive 
approach to religious practice in the country (RAND, 21).  The same verses once permitted the 
flexible interpretation of Islamic law that permitted the kind of division of authority between 
temporal rulers and religious scholar noted by Feldman, Lewis, and Schacht. 
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As leader of modern Turkey, Atatürk worked to bring about his modernizing vision.  In a 
remarkable speech delivered in August of 1925, he explains how he conceived of the 
undertaking he finally was bringing to port.  Constitutional reform would be ephemeral if 
habits of mind and guiding political ideals were not also transformed: 
… the aim of the revolutions which we have been and are now 
accomplishing is to bring the people of the Turkish Republic into a state of 
society entirely modern and completely civilized in spirit and form.  This is 
the central pillar of our Revolution, and it is necessary utterly to defeat 
those mentalities incapable of accepting this truth.  Hitherto there have 
been many of this mentality, rusting and deadening the mind of the nation.  
In any case, the superstitions dwelling in people’s minds will be completely 
driven out, for as long as they are not expelled, it will not be possible to 
bring the light of truth into men’s minds.1104 
But it was not sufficient to drive out “the superstitions dwelling in people’s minds.”  New 
opinions, opinions that would sustain constitutional government, would have to be made 
to replace Turks’ traditional beliefs.  One detects in Atatürk’s approach shades of 
Lincoln’s 1858 observation that “public sentiment is everything.”  He well understood 
that sacred opinions, habits of heart and mind, guiding ideals—whatever one calls them, 
ideas internalized by the population animate political regimes.  Thus, the job of a 
statesman is not simply to defend the political community or to direct its energies in 
prudent pursuit of some common good; above all, perhaps, the principles that ennoble 
the regime must be preserved and buttressed in the minds of the citizens who direct its 
affairs, not only by the deeds of great men but also by their words.  
Was Turkey ready for modern constitutional government?  Had an appropriate political 
character spread thoroughly enough?  Or can Rousseau’s criticism of Peter the Great – 	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that he tried to make Russians European when he ought to have begun by making them 
Russians – apply equally to Atatürk?  Turkey’s Constitutional regime remains fragile.  But 
in seizing the opportunity presented by WWI to promulgate new sacred opinions, and by 
providing for a mixed government in the interim, Atatürk demonstrated key features of 
statesmanship: a commitment to worthy ideals, a plan to promote them that 
appropriately calibrated means to ends, and an appreciation that they would not instantly 
take ubiquitous hold.  
In the first place, he recognized that World War I, a tragedy for the Ottoman Empire, 
was at the same time the great opportunity for Turkey’s modern reinvention.  By 
undermining the authority of the old guard, by shaking the Empire to the core and 
demolishing the order that had existed, an out of the ashes re-founding of the country 
seemed to be possible.   Rousseau’s discussion of the prerequisites of the promulgation of 
new modes and orders suggests Atatürk had good reason to be optimistic:  
There are indeed times in the history of States when, just as some kinds of 
illness turn men's heads and make them forget the past, periods of violence 
and revolutions do to peoples what these crises do to individuals: horror of 
the past takes the place of forgetfulness, and the State, set on fire by civil 
wars, is born again, so to speak, from its ashes, and takes on anew, fresh 
from the jaws of death, the vigor of youth.1105 
WWI not only helped Turks to forget their past.  The Empire had been dismembered, 
the Treaty of Sevres even allocating parts of the Anatolian heartland to Armenia and 
Greece.  Atatürk led the Turkish War of Independence, winning back important 
territories from bitter rivals.  In the end, the wars left standing, amidst so much rubble, a 
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single accomplished general positioned to become a national hero.  Military failures had 
swept the old regime away.  Atatürk took the opportunity to attend to Turkey’s 
constitution and its legal code; but he devoted more attention to the long task of 
reshaping the laws “graven in the hearts of the citizens… on which the success of all the 
others depends.”  We have said already that earlier influences—of Namik Kemal in 
particular—helped to redefine concepts like freedom and equality along Western lines.  
Thinkers had also offered an interpretation of Islam compatible with constitutional 
government.  But the impact of those ideas had been, almost exclusively, confined to the 
country’s elite.  Atatürk, leveraging unmatched popularity and a monopoly on political 
power in what was effectively a one-party state, took further steps to disseminate more 
widely these and other modern opinions in the years following the revolution.  As Kinzer 
and others have noted, while liberal constitutionalism was and remains the express goal, 
“[t]he new nation that Atatürk built on the rubble of the Ottoman Empire never could 
have been built democratically.  Probably not a single one of his sweeping reforms would 
have been approved in a plebiscite.”1106  
 
Illiberal Means for Constitutional Ends 
That new modes and orders cannot be founded while adhering to the standards and 
manners of public conduct which the new order seeks to establish and defend is a fact 
long recognized by political theorists.  Here again, Atatürk understood what the architects 
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of the Iraq war did not:  a liberal democracy cannot always be built exclusively by liberal 
and democratic means.   In order that Turkey would one day join the ranks of 
independent, modern, republics, Atatürk took the following undemocratic—some have 
said totalitarian—measures against tremendous domestic resistance.  Historians agree 
they were, for the most part necessary.  One has gone so far as to speculate about 
Turkey’s fate had Atatürk’s reforms not taken hold.  “It is frightening to imagine,” Kinzer 
remarks, “what Turkey would look like today without the influence of its army.  Quite 
possibly is would be somnolent and isolated, like Syria, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern 
countries where democracy and individual rights are concepts about which citizens dare 
not even dream.”1107   
• Resisting domestic pressure to rebuild the Empire, Atatürk accepted the European 
state system, even Turkey’s reduction to greater Anatolia, where he sought to 
build a new Turkish nationalism.  The terrible wars with the Greeks and 
Armenians helped to forge the invisible ties of affection that bind modern Turks to 
one another, this in the place of Islamic and Ottoman identities.  Scholars have 
noted that the concept of the modern nation-state fit uneasily in the Islamic world.  
Ali Allawi notes that “there was no word in any of the languages of Islam that 
would parallel the meanings of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism,’” later adding that 
Mustafa’s Kemal’s “Turkish experiment” would not be “duplicated in such 
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sweeping and determined terms in other Muslim countries” in part for lack of a 
single common identity.1108    
• To strengthen this new national consciousness, Atatürk took measures that strike 
modern sensibilities as extreme.  Most important, perhaps, a new history was 
written, designed to separate Turks from their Ottoman, and especially their 
Islamic, past.  M. Suktu Hanioglu, a recent biographer, draws attention to a high-
school textbook prepared under the supervision of Atatürk himself.  Therein, one 
finds this remarkable passage:   
The Turks, too, had been a great nation before accepting the religion of 
the Arabs…  [The] Arab religion… loosened the national ties of the 
Turkish nation [and] benumbed national feelings and enthusiasm for the 
nation, because the aim of the religion established by Muhammad 
prompted an Arab nationalist policy…  Those who accepted 
Muhammad’s religion had to suppress their identities and devote their lives 
to the exaltation of the name of Allah everywhere….  Under these 
circumstances, the Turkish nation resembled those who commit the 
Qur’an to memory without understanding the meaning of a single word of 
it and thus become senile.1109 
The new history books emphasized Turkish brotherhood, an affinity that had 
thitherto been subordinate in importance to religious and imperial affinities. 
Noble myths emphasizing Turkey’s pre-Islamic past were created, and a history 
divorced from Islam of which Turks could be was made an integral part of the 
secular grade school curriculum.  Atatürk—never a devout Muslim—might well 
have understood that while European Christianity had (for the most part) 
supported the emergence of the nation state by giving cohesion to the peoples in 
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the North Atlantic states, Islam is much less conducive to nationalism and 
patriotism in the modern world.   
The umma is a community of believers united across ethnicities irrespective of state 
boundaries; to the extent Muslims believe it important to establish laws that will 
govern the entire community according to revealed precepts, the unifying power 
of Islam is corrosive to national identities to the extent state boundaries fail to 
match up with the geographic bounds of the umma.   As Mango notes, whereas the 
Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Churches “had become by the 
end of the nineteenth century bearers of their respective national ideologies” (a list 
to which one could add the Catholic Church in Poland after the Cold War), 
Islamic affinities more often tear against the establishment of powerful national 
affinities.1110 
• To durably implant this new identity, Atatürk changed the alphabet—even the 
way the Turkish language sounds (in an effort to purge Turkish of Arabic and 
Persian words)—as part of a deliberate attempt to make it difficult for later 
generations to connect with their pre-Turkish past.  As a result, the majority of 
Turks today cannot read the words of the poets, theologians and philosophers 
who predate their Constitutional republic.  Atatürk even banned the translation of 
certain words into Turkish.  Among them:  the philosophy of Al-Ghazali.1111  He 
was censored because of the role his defense of revelation played in closing the 
Islamic world to Hellenic thought and banishing man’s use of his own reason.  	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The abandonment of the Arabic script in favor of the Latin alphabet (with slight 
modifications) was, moreover, a highly symbolic gesture; it symbolized a 
deliberate severance from the East in favor of the West.  On Atatürk’s 
explanation,  
We must free ourselves from these incomprehensible signs which for 
centuries have held our minds in an iron vice…  Our nation will show, 
with its script and with its mind, that its place is with the civilized world.1112 
• Islamic modes of dress were prohibited—first the turban, then the fez, ultimately 
the veil—in a deliberate attempt to transform the character of society.  Atatürk 
understood that the relinquishing of highly symbolic cultural artifacts could help 
to create a distance between Turks and their Ottoman-Islamic past.  He 
understood that the fez – designed to recall a prayer mat, its tassel symbolizing the 
prospect of escape to an otherworldly fatherland – was “an emblem of ignorance, 
negligence, fanaticism, and hatred of progress and civilization.”1113  The 
significance of such highly symbolic – and to many, highly offensive – actions 
resonated in Turkey and beyond.   
• The Sultanate, and shortly thereafter, the Caliphate, was abolished in favor of 
Republican institutions, and Islam, officially disestablished as the state religion.  
The careful supervision of Islam on a mosque-by-mosque basis was enshrined in 
law while dervish brotherhoods and Sufi orders—long the focal point of popular 
Islamic practice—were dissolved and their prayer meetings banned.1114  The state 	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supported religious reforms intended to personalize the practice of Islam in 
Turkey.  Noting that Charles Sherrill, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey at the time, 
was “not far off the mark” when he compared Atatürk to Luther, M. Suktu 
Hanioglu helpfully situates the thrust of Atatürk’s religious reforms in the context 
of the Resurgence of Islam: 
The main idea behind this initiative was that a religious reform program 
similar to that of the Protestant reformation of the sixteenth century would 
prompt a Turkish renaissance in the twentieth century.  Thus, unlike 
puritanical Muslim movements such as Wahhabism and Salafism, which 
proposed a return to the original sources of Islam in order to create a new 
orthodoxy, Mustafa Kemal wished to reinterpret the Muslim tradition so 
as to facilitate a Turkish renaissance.1115 
Last, it must be emphasized that Turkey is not a democracy in the narrow sense of the 
term.  Atatürk did not intend it to be.  In his cognizance that the extent of Turkey’s 
political reform would be limited by the people’s character – which would not be 
transformed overnight – one finds a final demonstration of his political genius.  He built a 
mixed regime in the hope Turks’ sacred opinions would, in time, evolve in such a way as 
to support increasingly representative regime that would nonetheless remain liberal and 
limited.  In the meantime, Turkey’s constitution divided authority between the people 
and a secular, pro-Western, and necessarily unelected elite tasked with refining and 
ennobling the public view.  If the tension between the people and Turkey’s unelected 
military officials keep the country freer than its Arab neighbors, it is the unelected 
establishment that exerts the liberalizing influence.   
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The most controversial institutional elements of the Turkish political regime from a 
purely democratic perspective—the military’s overwhelming political influence, the 
constitutional court’s jealous protection of the Kemalist constitution’s secular features, 
and the diyanet or Directorate of Religious Affairs (a body that appoints imams to Turkey’s 
mosques and sometimes writes their sermons)—are simultaneously those that have to this 
point sustained modern and moderate government in Turkey.  To wit, the unelected elite 
has not infrequently found it necessary to limit the freedom to worship, censor religious 
expression, prohibit open discussion of dangerous political ideas, disqualify Islamist 
political parties, overturn statutes inspired by Islamic law, and otherwise prohibit the 
intermingling of religion and politics by distinctly anti-democratic means; three times, an 
elected government has been deposed—all of it, for the sake of order and secular constitutional 
government.  Andrew Mango has gone to far as to assert that military constituted both “the 
vanguard of modernization” even as it perpetuated some of the “authoritarian traditions 
of the Ottoman state.”  Thanks to the Atatürk’s regime, in 2004 Mango was optimistic 
about Turkey’s future:  “It is because the order which he established has largely held, that 
the Turks can now embrace democracy, as the new secular, universal religion.”1116 
Stephen Kinzer invoked a Turkish diplomat to make a similar point in his recent work, 
Crescent and Star.  Discussing the requisites of liberal constitutionalism in Turkey in the 
context of the longer experience of the North Atlantic states, the unnamed diplomat 
explained Turkey’s path in these terms: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1116 Andrew Mango, The Turks Today, 24. 
	  558 
You in the West also had long periods of backwardness and intolerance…  
You had dictatorships, civil wars, religious fanaticism, the Inquisition, all 
kinds of horror.  Then, over a period of centuries, you climbed out of that 
hole.  You had the Enlightenment.  You had philosophers who wrote 
books about democracy.  Very slowly, people started to understand and 
accept these new ideas.  You began to have governments based on 
democratic principles.  Now, because you went through all of that, you can 
give your people complete freedom.  Your societies are stable enough to 
handle it.  But it’s not the same here.  Our Enlightenment began only 
seventy-five years ago.  It’s too soon to lift every restriction.  The risk is too 
great. We could loose everything.1117 
 
 
The Resurgence of Islam Tests Atatürk’s Regime 
The resurgence and radicalization of Islam apparent across the Islamic world today is 
testing Turkey’s mixed regime.  Until recently, scholars tended to agree that “the debate 
between secularists and Islamic groups” in Turkey was basically resolved in the late 1990s 
“when the political discourse of mainstream Islamic groups embraced secularism.”1118  Recent 
events have changed that.  Popular support for Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) and it populist Prime Minister, Recep Erdogan, is strong.  While the AKP is 
a moderate Islamist organization as judged by its domestic priorities, the party and its 
leadership sprung from the more assertive Refah Party, which was disbanded in 1997 for 
violating the Republic’s secular principles.  First elected in 2002, the AKP was reelected 
in 2007 and 2011 with strong parliamentary majorities.  Their control of the legislative 
branch permitted the AKP to elevate a new president in 2008; Erdogan’s choice, 
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Abdullah Gul, shares his assertive Islamist past.1119  While the AKP’s share of the popular 
vote has increased in each election, its parliamentary majority has consistently fallen short 
(though only narrowly so) of the super-majority required to amend the country’s 
constitution, which is widely believed to be one of Erdogan’s top priorities.  His ambition 
is to consolidate executive authority in a president, an office to which he would almost 
surely be elected.1120   
In the meantime, the AKP has nonetheless managed to enact a number of reforms with 
the same aim within the present constitutional arrangement.  Control of the presidency 
has allowed the AKP to alter the make-up of the Constitutional Court, an institution that 
has, since its inception, frustrated the aspirations of Islamists in Parliament (by voiding 
insufficiently secular laws or by banning their political parties altogether).  The AKP has 
also managed to transform the military’s position in the regime (ostensibly to assert 
civilian command over the armed forces), to gain control over Turkey’s police and 
intelligence apparatuses, and to place party allies in high-ranking positions of Turkey’s 
powerful bureaucracy—all (heretofore) important constituents of the mini-state 
established to guard Atatürk’s secular republic.  Erdogan has also used the government to 
target the press, harassing and cracking down on independent journalists with increasing 
frequency, especially those who have reported on the state’s prosecution of military 
leaders.  Most ominously, political trials of top-ranking officers (at least 300 in all 
including more than 40 generals) led Turkey’s top military commander and the heads of 	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the navy, army, and air force to resign in protest in July, 2011.1121  The event may turn 
out to symbolize a sea-change in Turkish politics:  the military, long the most important 
bastion of Atatürk’s brand of republicanism, found itself, for the first time since Turkey’s 
modern emergence, incapable of deflecting or overcoming attacks by a political branch 
controlled by a popular Islamist party.  It is not too much to say that the character of 
Turkey’s mixed regime has been transformed in the space of a decade—the unelected 
Kemalists who once checked the elected branch replaced with allies of the governing 
AKP, and the counter-majoritarian institutions they long controlled, captured or 
neutered.  
A failure to understand that political liberalism and democratic institutions are different 
things entirely abetted these developments.  Somewhat perversely, international pressure 
to domestic democratizing reforms led, in practice, to the empowerment of the country’s 
least liberal elements.1122  The AKP has publicly favored, and continues to support, 
joining the European Union (even though Turkey’s chances have been dashed by the 
recent turn against multiculturalism throughout Western Europe, to say nothing of the 
Euro’s present troubles); their enthusiasm is clearly driven by ulterior motives.  E.U. 
guidelines mandating democratic reform, in particular the reduction of the military’s 
power, were used by the AKP as powerful pretexts quietly to consolidate power; the 	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prospect of E.U. membership appeased and excited liberals who ought to have been 
alarmed.  If actions speak louder than words, it is surely significant that Erdogan has 
focused his diplomatic efforts on increasing Turkey’s considerable influence in the Middle 
East, while he adopted a rhetoric romanticizing the virtues of European integration.  The 
irony for Europeans:  it is precisely the undemocratic constitutional features of Turkey’s 
regime that helped, for six decades, to secure Turkey’s orientation toward the West.  The 
very counter-majoritarian features of the regime the good democrats of Europe scoffed at 
were exactly those that had moderated Islamist aspirations in parliament by erecting 
relatively clear limits beyond which elected governments had not been permitted to press.  
Michael Rubin is right to condemn Brussels on this point:  “By failing to encourage the 
creation of an alternate check-and-balance mechanism to replace the military’s 
traditional role as guardian of the constitution… the E.U. committed diplomatic 
malpractice.  Erdogan seized the opportunity and ran roughshod over Turkish secularism 
and democracy.”1123 
The foreign policy consequences of the AKP’s decade in power are no more encouraging 
than its domestic reforms.  Turkey has drifted further from the U.S., first and most 
dramatically evidenced by Ankara’s refusal to allow American ground troops to invade 
Iraq from the North through Turkey in 2003.  Meanwhile, Prime Minister Erdogan has 
embraced Iran, a country with which Turkey shares numerous security and economic 
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interests.1124  The Turks’ enthusiastic reception of President Ahmadinejad in 2008 further 
raised alarms (Prime Minister Erdogan called him a “friend” and dismissed concerns 
about the Iranian nuclear problem as “gossip”).1125 Meanwhile, Turkey’s relationship 
with Israel is badly frayed and worsening thanks, at least in part, to Erdogan’s proclivity 
for bellicose anti-Israeli rhetoric.  Add to this Turkey’s public insistence that Hamas be 
involved in the peace process, as well as its support for Hezbollah and other organizations 
with terrorist wings, and it is difficult to imagine Turkey’s relationship with Israel will 
improve in the short term.1126 There is also a strategic calculation.  As International Crisis 
Group notes, Turkey “perceives a diminished need for close ties to Israel” in part because 
it has concluded that Israeli intransigence on the Palestinian issue is “keeping the region 
on edge,” which frustrates Turkey’s overriding interest in regional stability.1127  (In part, 
Erdogan appears to be emotionally attached to the situation of the Palestinians.)1128  By 
distancing itself from Israel amidst so much uncertainty—Egypt’s revolution may bring 
deteriorated relations with that neighbor; there is not telling what Syria’s unrest might 
portend—Turkey may hope to pressure Israel into a settlement with the Palestinian 
Authority on terms fairly favorable to Palestinians.  Ankara has actively sought to 
improve relations with Sudan and Syria (until it became impossible to support Assad’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1124 Iran supplies Turkey with one-fifth of its natural gas.  The countries also have a developed 
trade relationship, Turkey serving as the road Westward for Iranians exports.  On the security 
side, both countries have an interest in containing Kurdish separatists.  With respect to Iran’s 
nuclear program, Turkey remains Iran’s best diplomatic conduit to the West.  ICG, “Turkey and 
the Middle East:  Ambitions and Constraints,” 7 April, 2010, 16-17; and “Turkey’s Crises Over 
Israel and Iran,” 8 September, 2010, 11-12. 
1125  International Crisis Group, “Turkey’s Crises Over Israel and Iran,” 21 
1126  Ehud Toledano, “AKP’s New Turkey” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 11, 52; 
International Crisis Group, “Turkey and the Middle East,” 18-19 
1127 International Crisis Group, “Turkey and the Middle East:  Ambitions and Constraints,” 24. 
1128 International Crisis Group. “Turkey’s Crises Over Israel and Iran.” 
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brutal crackdown on revolutionaries), while writing off Mubarak’s Egypt, a key American 
ally until the outbreak of the Arab Spring.  Whatever the implications for the Turks 
domestically, it is probable that a more democratic Turkey, freed from the guidance of 
the Europhile military and administrative elite, will continue (slowly) to drift away from 
the U.S. and Europe in the realm of international relations.	  	  	  
Taken together with its transformative domestic reforms, it is not hard to understand why 
the “AKP’s second term in office has given more momentum as well as credence to fears 
over the party’s real motivations,” and even “fueled suspicions of an AKP ‘deep plan’ to 
install an Islamic dictatorship.”1129  Versions of this concern are widespread, not to say 
ubiquitous, among policymakers and analysts in America, Europe, and even among 
Turks themselves.1130  A former Bush administration official cautions that at bottom, 
Turkish Islamists are “more in tune with the fanatically anti-Western principles of Saudi 
Wahhabi Islam” than the old Ottoman Islam.1131  Steven Cook, an American Turkey 
specialist, worries that “after six decades of strategic cooperation, Turkey and the United 
States are becoming strategic competitors—especially in the Middle East.”1132  At home, 
Prime Minister Erdogan has lost the support of Turkish liberals in the media and the 
academy, who fear the AKP is “transforming Turkey’s political culture from one based 
on Western democratic values into one base on an Islamic/conservative approach,” while 
risking alienation from the West by its increasingly pro-Arab and pro-Iranian foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1129 Ehud Toledano, “AKP’s New Turkey” 45-45.  
1130 International Crisis Group. “Turkey’s Crises Over Israel and Iran,” 18-19. 
1131 International Crisis Group. “Turkey’s Crises Over Israel and Iran,” 18 
1132 Steven A. Cook, “How do you Say ‘Frenemy’ in Turkish?” Foreign Policy.  June 1, 2010. 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/01/how_do_you_say_frenemy_in_Turkish 
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policy.1133  Some Arab Islamists believe (or hope) that they detect in the AKP the “initial 
stages of a long-term ‘stealth’ project whose purpose is to reclaim Turkish society and 
bring it back to Islam.”1134  As Ehud Toledano sums up, 
Many fear that AKP seeks to turn Turkey into an Islamic state and to 
sweep aside in the process the Kemalist legacy and its secular public 
sphere.  These fears include the Islamization of the education system and 
the creeping imposition of a host of restrictions on public behavior, such as 
women’s dress, the mixing of men and women in entertainment areas, 
consumption of alcohol, and the loss of other freedoms associated with a 
modern, liberal, and Western way of life.  Others worry about what 
appears to be the Erdogan government’s increasing assault on journalists 
who reported on the Ergenekon trials without necessarily toeing the AKP’s 
line.1135 
Those who reject this interpretation point to the AKP’s impressive accomplishments in 
the economic sphere.  Turkey has sustained impressive growth over the course of the last 
decade, inflation is under control, and direct foreign investment has exploded; as a 
consequence, living standards have improved considerably.1136  Moreover, the AKP has 
spearheaded efforts to improve the government’s relationship with Turkey’s ethnic and 
religious minorities, including the disaffected Kurdish population in the East.  Although 
the “opening” policy probably has as much to do with increasing the space for Islamic 
worship among Turkish Muslims, more generous religious freedoms and increased 
cultural autonomy have been extended to other minority groups as well.1137  The AKP 
has even devoted considerable resources to economic development in Kurdish-majority 
areas of the country.  Taken together, the initiatives have yielded electoral gains for the 	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Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 11, 12. 
1135 Ehud Toledano, “AKP’s New Turkey,” 45-45. 
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AKP among factions long ignored by Turkey’s ruling elite.1138  In the context of a decade 
of relative calm, and especially the AKP’s deliberate steps toward deeper integration with 
Europe, it is not hard to understand why commentators have frequently suggested that 
the AKP might serve as a kind of modern and moderate model for Islamist groups 
elsewhere in the Middle East.1139  On this account, improved relations with Syria and 
Iran are nothing more than the consequence of shared interests, and Turkey’s overriding 
desire to see its region achieve some measure of stability and economic integration.  If 
elections in Iraq, Gaza, Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere were to yield comparatively 
restrained ruling factions, anxieties about the potentially illiberal consequences of 
democratization in the Middle East would, indeed, be relieved to a very considerable 
extent. 
And yet, as Hillel Fradkin has intimated, the evidence in favor of the Islamist drift 
explanation is uncomfortably compelling.  Even before the resignation of Turkey’s 
military leadership in the summer of 2011, he contended that the AKP’s exercise of 
power had confirmed more fears than it had realized hopes.1140  Far from exemplifying a 
moderate species of political Islam more or less hospitable to Western concerns and 
interests, the AKP’s patient and gradualist approach—especially its embrace of 
democratic institutions and populist rhetoric to empower its allies and marginalize its 
opponents—might instead be taken as a successful model of Islamizing regime change. 
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To the extent that AKP continues toward autocracy and inspires other 
Islamic parties elsewhere, it may indeed become an example for Islamist 
politics—albeit a model of how to democratically acquire power and then 
corrupt democratic principles, institutions, and practices for anti-
democratic purposes.1141 
Indeed, Islamist parties seem increasingly to be employing the rhetoric of participatory 
democracy as a kind of cudgel by which to achieve their political objectives.  The AKP 
played the E.U. masterfully to unburden itself of so many of the old Kemalist restraints.  
Erdogan has since demanded that Hamas be given a seat at the negotiating table on the 
Israel-Palestine issue on expressly democratic grounds:  after all, Gaza elected Hamas to 
represent its interests in free and fair elections.  New electoral opportunities have grown out 
of the Arab Spring.  The Muslim Brotherhood embraced the opportunity to participate in 
Egypt’s elections, overcoming whatever lingering theological reservations they may have 
had about legitimizing the state system imposed by the North Atlantic powers.  
Enthusiastic participation by Islamist parties in the Egyptian and Tunisian elections, some 
more radical than the Muslim Brotherhood, catapulted factions intent to inject Islam into 
politics to positions of legislative dominance.  Thus, a familiar dynamic is likely to assert 
itself in new ways and places as countries in the Middle East adopt democratic institutions 
and practices:  the countries affected by the Arab Spring will, like Turkey, drift further 
from the U.S. while their domestic policies grow, if not increasingly illiberal, illiberal in 
different ways.  (Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and more radical adherents to 
Salafi strains of Islamism will surely fare better; Christians and women may not.)  Many 
Westerners, among them not a few foreign policy thinkers—all good democrats who 
confuse democracy with political liberalism—will be perplexed and troubled by this.  And 	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they will remain so—which is to say America’s Mideast foreign policy will remain 
confused—as long as they continue to misunderstand the character of their own liberal 
regimes and to ignore the aims and impact of the Islamic Resurgence. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
 
Optimists are fond of explaining that democratic responsibility will moderate 
Islamist parties catapulted to power by the Arab Spring.  They point to the AKP as a 
model for the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wings in Egypt and Jordan, and even for 
Hamas in Gaza, as though the AKP’s political success in Turkey will encourage the 
Brotherhood to adopt a similarly restrained species of politicized Islam elsewhere.  This 
hope reflects a misunderstanding of the origin of the AKP’s relative moderation.  The 
hard fought (and incomplete) ideational transformation in Turkey accomplished over the 
course of generations aimed at the very antithesis of the Brotherhood’s proselytizing 
efforts throughout the Middle East and beyond. Even today, while strong pluralities 
support Prime Minister Erdogan’s policies in Turkey, overwhelming majorities revere 
Atatürk and believe the secular nature of the republic should be maintained.1142  Not 
democracy, then, but institutions and reforms designed to check and transform popular 
opinion yielded modern Turkey and its moderate brand of Islamism.  Faced with a 
predicament similar to that the Turks faced at the end of WWI, however, much the Arab 
World has moved in the opposite direction.  Amidst the abysmal failures of socialism and 
Arab nationalism, it is not terribly surprising that large numbers embraced radical and 
politicized species of Islam rather than modernist alternatives.  As a result of those 
failures, moreover, few majority-Muslim countries have anything resembling the division 
of authority established by Turkey’s constitution to such successful moderating effect.  	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Where such divisions do exist, Morocco and Kuwait for example, it is the dynastic rulers 
friendly to the West—and not democratic institutions—that exert modernizing and 
liberal influence over the regime. 
What, then, are the lessons for those who would like to see modern and moderate regimes 
emerge form this era of revolution and upheaval?  The first is that ideas matter.  Where 
participatory institutions proliferate, the population’s guiding opinions and mores will be 
reflected in the laws that are passed.  For this reason, the ongoing intellectual battle 
between those who advocate politicized interpretations of Islam, and reformers like 
Abdolkarim Soroush, is exceedingly important.  Majorities will be increasingly liberal in 
the way they utilize their legislative authority, and more tolerant in their capacity as 
private citizens, as spiritually plausible accounts mandating tolerance and neighborliness 
take hold.  In the meantime, it is important to recognize that popular government can be 
successful even where religiously conservative interpretations of Islam predominate.  It is 
one thing to demand that a political community’s laws reflect the people’s sacred beliefs 
in an order that includes protections for minorities that disagree with the majority; it is 
quite another to use the coercive authority of the government to instantiate God’s laws as 
interpreted by a religious or scholarly elite, and to coerce that manner of observance with 
the state’s security apparatus.  Put another way, it would be foolish to expect Cairo to 
look like Amsterdam as a consequence of the Arab Spring.  Nor is it necessarily desirable 
that states in the Middle East aspire to emulate the permissiveness of the North Atlantic 
democracies. There is a difference, in other words—a very important one—between 
conservative Muslims and politicized Islam.  
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Second, democracy is not necessarily the answer.  What reformers long for—peace, domestic 
stability, limited government, minority protections, transparency and an end to 
corruption, etc.—are as much a consequence of political liberalism as they are traceable 
to free and fair elections.  American interests in the region, similarly, are best served 
where strategically important regimes in the Mideast are animated by liberal principles.  
Elections do not create political liberalism.  They are, rather, one important component 
of a functioning political regime.  Where the people do not, themselves, inject liberal 
sensibilities into the state, other sources must be sought.  
Third, it follows that constitutions are important—all the more where a people’s experience 
with free political institutions is less mature.  It is worth repeating that political bonds 
must be tightened where guiding commitments do not lead the majority to make 
moderate and restrained use of its authority and individuals freedoms.  Establishing 
independent checks on the popular branch or branches—as Atatürk did—is 
indispensable to government that is durably limited and tolerably liberal.  Where an 
established and independent center of political authority exists—be it military in nature 
or a family dynasty—it may be able to play an important role in a mixed constitutional 
order, especially when it commands the support of some important part of the political 
community, and where it is animated by liberal commitments.  New regimes should not, 
then, aspire simply to represent the people as they conceive of their interests, but rather, 
to represent the public interest broadly construed.  This often requires powerful counter-
majoritarian provisions and institutions that are not dependent upon, or even directly 
accountable to, the people.   
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Fourth, there is no substitute for statesmanship.  Western scholars and bureaucrats can no more 
craft a constitution that will last for an unwilling population than they can spread liberal 
commitments among a population hostile to the West.  A constitutional order will 
endure—and operate as it is designed to—only to the extent those living under it, as well 
as those operating within it, revere it and bind themselves to its principles and limitations.  
Where a constitutional tradition dating back generations does not exist, it is up to the 
heroes who capture the imagination and admiration of a people to chart for them a new 
political path.  Public affection for those glorified and celebrated by their political 
communities gives them the esteem required to affect a community’s guiding opinions, 
and to successfully establish a new regime; their stature in the public mind is, as it were, 
transferred to their political legacy.  Alien powers seeking to impose new institutions or 
ideas from outside or above will fail for lacking the necessary claim to the people’s 
affections and loyalties.   
Fifth, U.S. foreign policy contributes to the resonance of assertive strains of political Islam.  
The U.S. military presence in the Middle East, its long support for Arab dictators, drone 
strikes that can reach every corner and cave on earth, the perception that American 
support for Israel is unlimited and unconditional, the association of Iraq’s democracy with 
its utter political dysfunction—all of it helps politicized interpretations of Islamic law gain 
traction.  However legitimate or necessary from the perspective of U.S. interests, 
America’s interventions in the Middle East arouse the very furor and indignation that 
incline proud men to embrace Islamist ideologies for the guidance and validation that is 
otherwise hard to come by. 
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Thus, however desirable, there is very little the West can do to encourage the spread 
liberal democracy in the Islamic world in the short term.  Certainly, it should not be 
America’s grand strategy in the Middle East.  But there are a number of little things that 
can be done, and in some cases, things policymakers can refrain from doing.  Pressure to 
democratize should be united to equally forceful pressure to establish powerful 
independent and unelected checks on newly established participatory institutions.  
English language instruction as well as easy and unfettered access to the internet—
everything that helps break the Islamist monopoly on education where they are 
strongest—can help abet a war of ideas that can only be won by domestic reformers.  
Young reformers can be supported—whether by organizing conferences on the principles 
of liberalism in the Middle East, or by increasing the number encouraged to study in the 
West (as both Abdolkarim Soroush and Namik Kemal did)—such that they can propose 
suitable amalgamations that may resonate in Muslim-majority countries.  Support for 
social capacity-building NGOs—whether they aim to help establish a free press, educate 
administrators, develop local and municipal governing capacity, organize unions, or help 
establish independent local courts—can be increased.  And military intervention in the 
Middle East should be tailored in as narrow a way as possible to meet U.S. security 
objectives in the region.  When an Atatürk-like figure does emerge, policymakers in the 
West will have to recall that modern Turkey was not built overnight, and that Atatürk 
could not have succeeded by entirely democratic and liberal means.   
Last, it is important to remember that the West—in particular, its unique and evolving 
species of political liberalism—is itself the consequence of a series of intellectual 
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revolutions and political events that have, by their totality, created an unusual, fragile, 
and evolving personality.  That personality, blended with the national character and 
constitutional arrangement of the various North Atlantic states to different effect in 
certain particulars—has created the broadly similar regimes we know in the West, which 
have in turn secured for us the blessings of liberty, thanks to which so many worthwhile 
ways of living are possible.  It is from the noblest of motivations, motivations stemming 
from the very same liberal personalities, that we want a similar way of life for strangers 
who live under oppressive political regimes—even those who share neither our origins, 
nor our traditions, nor even our principles.  The willingness to sacrifice blood and 
treasure to help others enjoy the liberties we often taken for granted is doubly impressive.  
And yet, it would be folly to expect liberal democracy to spring up fully-grown in the 
Middle East.  Absent an appreciation of the impediments standing in the way—and the 
character of those impediments—well-intentioned intervention will continue to yield 
outcomes that are prejudicial to U.S. interests, and very often, pernicious to political life 
in the countries affected.  
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